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Abstract
America’s problem of access to Japanese markets has been one of the most salient issues 
in US-Japan relations in the last quarter century. This historically-grounded study seeks 
to explain the shift in US policy, beginning in the 1980s, away from traditional, “process- 
oriented” negotiations and towards a “results-oriented” policy of demanding quantitative 
indicators in market access agreements with Japan.
The policy sequence that culminated in America's results-oriented Japan policy was part 
of a broader response to a crisis in the institutions, laws and norms of the American trade 
policy regime in the first half of the 1980s. This crisis saw a resurgence of congressional 
trade activism that forced the second Reagan Administration in September 1985 to adopt 
a more aggressive bilateral market access policy, in contrast with the dominant 
multilateral approach of the postwar era. The interaction of long-term change in 
America’s international economic position and macroeconomic policy decisions of the 
first Reagan Administration were the fundamental determinants of this regime crisis. 
Japan was the primary target of American grievances about unfair trade barriers given the 
scale of its competitive challenge and the size of the bilateral trade imbalance.
To explain more fully the changes in US market access policy towards Japan, this study 
traces the progressive ascendancy of “hardliners” over “free traders” in the American 
trade policy community. The regime crisis had a far-reaching impact on the political 
fortunes of these key advocacy coalitions contesting America’s Japan policy. The 
postwar US trade strategy of process-oriented multilateralism refected the institutional 
power and preferences of free traders concentrated in the executive branch, the national 
security policy community and among the ranks of professional economists. Heightened 
exposure to Japanese behind-the-border practices in the late 1970s helped to crystallise a 
hardline coalition drawn from Congress, sections of the US traded goods sector and 
manufacturing-oriented policy analysts.
The policy regime crisis relaxed the institutional checks on the hardliners, exemplified by 
the increase in the number of formal market access agreements after 1985. More 
specifically, the second Reagan and Bush Administrations pursued a selective, results-
oriented Japan policy, with a bilateral agreement including a foreign market share target 
for semiconductor sales in Japan as the most dramatic example. A process of learning 
about the Japan problem across the American trade policy community strengthened the 
hardliners’ position in the second half of the 1980s. This saw the development of a more 
codified hardline paradigm (revisionism) and new credibility within the ranks of the free 
traders for the idea that Japan was different from other industrialised economies, at least 
in terms of its international openness.
The Bush Administration’s Structural Impediments Initiative incorporated elements of 
this policy learning in a process-oriented framework. The first Clinton Administration 
heralded the culmination of the hardliners’ ascendancy, placing demands for quantitative 
indicators in agreements with Japan at the centre of US trade policy. But by the mid 
1990s momentum behind a high-profile results-oriented approach had waned due largely 
to strong opposition from the Japanese government and the changing economic fortunes 
of the United States and Japan.
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1 America’s “Japan Problem” and the search for results
Introduction
On 15 April 1998. United States Trade Representative (USTR) Charlene Barshefsky 
used a forum marking the 50th anniversary of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) to praise the historical achievements of the rules-based multilateral 
trading system. At the same time, she singled out for criticism countries that had changed 
the letter of laws reducing trade barriers through successive rounds of the GATT, but 
‘did not meet the spirit of their goals. Markets remain largely closed, opaque and driven 
more by informal cliques than by laws, rules and contracts. Japan is a classic case in 
point’.1
Unmet American expectations about market access marked the “Japan problem” as the 
most salient bilateral issue consuming the time and energies of American and Japanese 
policy-makers in the closing decades of the 20th century. The prevailing air of crisis in 
US-Japan trade relations through this period generated a steady stream of claims and 
counter-claims about which country’s trade policies posed the bigger affront to the 
international trading system. Particular controversy surrounded America’s shift towards 
a “results-oriented” Japan policy — demanding quantitative indicators in bilateral market 
access agreements rather than relying on more traditional, “process-oriented” 
negotiations over ‘laws, rules and contracts’. This thesis examines the sources of change 
in US market access policy towards Japan, tracing the rise of a results-oriented Japan 
policy.
After World War II. the United States was instrumental in establishing the GATT-based 
trading system centred on process-oriented, multilateral trade negotiations and 
reciprocal, non-discriminatory reductions in trade barriers; albeit with qualifications and 
exceptions. The progressive reduction of industrial tariffs was the crowning achievement 
of this system which international relations scholar John Ruggie has identified with an 
ordering principle of ‘embedded liberalism' — a heterodox replacement of laissez-faire
1 Ambassador Charlene Barshefsky, Speech to the Institute for International Economics, 15 April 1998.
liberalism in which the goal of liberalisation was tempered by a common (Keynesian) 
social purpose among states for external and internal economic stability (Ruggie 1982, 
1986, 1996). Even by his relatively elastic standard, Ruggie has scored America’s 
results-oriented Japan policy as recent history’s most serious deviation from the 
embedded-liberalism compromise — a violation of 'both the spirit and letter of postwar 
norms’ (Ruggie 1996: 133).“ How did America’s policy approach of process-oriented 
multilateralism and non-discrimination evolve into demands for affirmative action in 
market access negotiations with Japan?
In contrast with the extensive theoretical and empirical work on the politics of trade 
protection, the politics of export market access have received much less attention, even 
though ‘the importance of the second seems to be growing relative to the first’ (Baldwin, 
Nelson and Richardson 1992: 679).2 3 A somewhat messy dependent variable, without 
clean lines of policy change, complicates the analytical task for this study. The lack of an 
obvious metric for market access policy -  unlike, say, tariff rates or non-tariff barrier 
(NTB) coverage ratios -  places a heavy reliance on inferences drawn from the historical 
record of US-Japan negotiations. The result is a patchwork ranging from purely process- 
oriented US demands through to explicit demands for specific market access outcomes. 
Even so, that record is suggestive of both a quantitative and qualitative change in US 
market access policy towards Japan through the 1980s and into the 1990s. This is evident 
in a sharp increase in the number of formal agreements between the two countries after 
1985 and a general trend towards more specific American market access demands vis-a- 
vis Japan.
A 1986 bilateral agreement identifying a market share target for sales of foreign 
semiconductors in Japan (renegotiated in 1991) stands out as the most radical departure 
from traditional, process-oriented market access agreements between the United States 
and Japan. It marks one end of a spectrum of sectoral negotiations under the second 
Reagan and Bush Administrations that amounted to a selective, results-oriented Japan 
policy. The election of the Clinton Administration in November 1992 saw the United
2 The elasticity of Ruggie’s embedded liberalism idea is illustrated by his characterisation of such import 
restricting trade interventions as “voluntary” export restraints (VERs) and the Multi-Fibre Arrangement 
(MFA) as examples of ‘norm-governed’ change (Ruggie 1982: 384).
For empirically-oriented contributions on US market access policy, see Mastanduno (1992a), Bayard and 
Elliott (1994), and Noland (1997).
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States elevate demands for quantitative indicators of results from Japan to a more high- 
profile status at the centre of US trade policy objectives. This study is designed as a 
multi-causal analysis of this evolutionary profile of policy change in an analytical 
framework where change in the policy environment and policy choice are both given 
their proper due.
An important premise for the thesis is that case studies of policy change over time need 
not involve mere “storytelling” but can, if done carefully, contribute theoretical insights 
(Lijphart 1971, Eckstein 1975, Skocpol and Somers 1980). This tradition of research 
combines comparison with an appreciation of historical context and a close analysis of 
the unfolding of events over time within the case (George and McKeown 1985, Collier 
1993). While scope for theoretical generalisation is constrained, in recent years a number 
of political-economy scholars have made the case for research agendas less enamoured 
with the search for a single, grand theory of foreign economic policy behaviour (Cohen 
1990, Dillon, Odell and Willett 1990, Odell 1990, Haggard 1991, Ikenberry 1996). The 
call is for more contingent analysis looking to identify the conditions under which 
particular variables are causally significant. This provides an opening for a synthesis of 
existing theories and approaches, integrating variables often treated as mutually 
exclusive sources of explanation. A detailed case study of policy change over time 
provides one route for taking up this challenge.
T his study’s point of departure is that variables at the interface of state-society relations 
warrant theoretical priority in explaining the content and timing of change in US market 
access policy towards Japan. This state-society approach is in the tradition of scholarship 
that emphasises variation in unit or domestic-level variables (across nation-states and 
over time) as causally significant for explaining policy variation. The dual demands for 
parsimony and explanatory leverage are met most efficiently with theoretical attention to 
the institutions, norms and groups which cross-cut the state-society distinction.
While the primary constraining and enabling factors explaining policy behaviour reside 
at this domestic “level-of-analysis”, a state-society approach accommodates 
international, systemic change as part of a multi-causal chain. The insight that systemic 
factors can shape domestic politics has been a distinctive strand in the political-economy 
literature seeking to integrate sources of explanation from different levels-of-analysis
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(Gourevitch 1978, 1986; Katzenstein 1978, 1985; Milner 1988; Rogowski 1989). A 
state-soeiety approach remains open to change at the international level helping to set the 
broad contours for policy change. But domestic politics are the primary focus of 
theoretical attention, due in part to policy indeterminacy arising from international 
forces. As Jacobsen (1996: 100) observes:
International forces require states to respond in indeterminate ways, but the specifics are 
the stuff of domestic politics. Few international messages enter the domestic arena 
unprocessed and unmediated, and fewer still can avoid further mediation in the domestic 
crucible. ... When we refer to an international realm we actually refer to politicized 
interpretations of aspects of it, a politicization constructed domestically. Most policies 
are not fashioned by systemic determinants because multiple routes to any single 
objective exist and because incentives operate more potently domestically than 
internationally.
A state-society framework
The state-society approach to explaining change in US market access policy towards 
Japan relies on three core assumptions: (1) the analytical priority of exploring the sources 
of state preferences; (2) that a domestic policy regime (the formal and informal “rules of 
the game” in a policy issue-area) is the most appropriate prism for exploring domestic 
preference formation; and (3) that domestic advocacy coalitions comprising both state 
and non-state actors are important agents for explaining the substantive content and 
timing of policy innovations.
The starting point for a state-society approach is the assumption that state preferences -  
that is, an ordering among fundamental social purposes underlying the strategic 
calculations of governments -  are causally significant. This boils down to an assumption 
that what states want is the primary determinant of what they do, with preferences 
determining the nature and intensity of the game states are playing.1 *4 The theoretical 
significance of this assumption is most obvious when the state-society approach is 
contrasted with international, systemic theories that some scholars maintain should be 
the first-cut for analysis in international and comparative political economy (Keohane 
1984: 16). Both realist and international institutionalist theories have states maximising a
1 Preferences comprise a set of fundamental interests (material or ideational) defined across “states of the
world” and are distinct from “strategies”, “tactics” and “policies”. By definition, they are causally independent
of the strategies of other states and, therefore, prior to specific interstate political interactions (Moravcsik
1997: 519).
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fixed, homogeneous utility function — unit or domestic-level factors are, at best, 
secondary sources of explanation. The realist paradigm, for example, maintains that the 
configuration of state capabilities in the international system is the primary determinant 
of what states do. By contrast, the state-society approach focuses on the differentiated 
interpretations of state preferences forged out of domestically-grounded institutions, 
norms and groups. It makes theorising about the process of domestic preference 
formation of first-order significance. This does not mean that states get what they want 
due to the reality of international constraints imposed by the preferences of other states. 
Indeed, the state-society approach is open to international-level factors shaping the broad 
contours of policy change, but the primary theoretical focus is on domestic politics.
The second assumption of this approach is that the enduring institutions, laws and shared 
norms mediating state-society relations in a given issue-area (the policy regime) should 
be at the centre of analysis of domestic preference formation. The state-society model of 
the policy process relies on a conception of domestic structure that includes the 
positional attributes of state and societal actors and the policy regime. For these actors, 
the regime’s institutions, laws and norms are, in essence, concrete features of structure, 
not interaction. Rationality in the identification of actor preferences means knowing the 
rules of the game. From this vantage-point, a state-society approach stands in contrast to 
models of the policy process that ignore or downplay the structuring and enabling role of 
institutions, laws and norms. This has particular relevance for the conceptual and 
theoretical treatment of the state. Where, for example, interest group pluralism assumes 
that the state is merely a filter for societal actor demands, a state-society approach takes 
account of the unique structural position of the state linking the international and 
domestic political economies. The measure of independent causal weight this affords 
state institutions and state actors points to the significance of domestic policy regimes in 
shaping not only which domestic groups gain access to the policy process, but even the 
way such groups define their goals.
The third assumption concerns the issue of agency and the realm of choice in the policy­
making process. Explaining the substantive content and timing of policy innovations 
draws attention to the political contests between domestic advocacy coalitions — sub­
regime groups that cross-cut the state-society distinction. The shared beliefs of key 
advocacy coalitions and their representation in central decision-making positions are
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important arbiters of state preferences and their translation into policy. In this context, 
the state-society approach permits a (limited) role for ideas in explaining policy change." 
Non-cognitive factors are assumed the primary drivers of policy, but a more complete 
explanatory picture brings into focus the way in which actors with scope for choice 
interpret policy problems, identify cause-effect relationships and propose policy 
responses. Exploring the fit between ideas and politics -  why some ideas win out over 
others, and why ideas catch on at the time they do -  allows for a fuller understanding of 
how the boundaries for policy innovation are delimited. This in turn permits a role for 
‘learning” whereby changing beliefs in a policy community about a policy problem 
leave an imprint on outcomes in a way that cannot be tied simply to changing external 
circumstances or the superior resources of one advocacy coalition over another.
Running through this state-society approach and the assumptions that preferences, rules 
and ideas matter is the overarching theme that history matters. Actions taken at one point 
in time result in opportunities for and constraints on future action. In one sense, this 
observation is trivial given a research task aimed at shedding light on historically- 
grounded policy outcomes. But it encapsulates the need to problematise state preference 
formation, the importance of institutions, the contingent nature of politics, and a role for 
political agency and choice. This makes room for an element of “path dependency” 
within this state-society framework. It embodies a view of politics where decisions ‘at 
one point in time can restrict future possibilities by sending policy off on particular 
tracks, along which ideas and interests develop and institutions and strategies adapt’ 
(Weir 1992: 192).5 6
The argument in brief
The central argument of this thesis is that the rise of a results-oriented Japan policy was 
conditioned by a “crisis” in the US trade policy regime in the first half of the 1980s. T his 
arose from the interaction of long-term, systemic change in the international position of 
the American economy and more concentrated macroeconomic shocks and domestic
5 The terms “beliefs” and “ideas” are used interchangeably in this study.
This highlights the commonalities between the state-society framework developed here and the “historical 
institutionalist” school with its distinctive emphasis on historical contingency and path dependency as part of 
the “new institutionalism” (Thelen and Steinmo 1992: 2).
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policy decisions in the early 1980s. Japan was the principal target of a more aggressive 
bilateral market opening strategy initiated in 1985 by the second Reagan Administration. 
The regime crisis enabled “hardliners” in the American trade policy community to exert 
more influence over US market access policy towards Japan through the second Reagan 
and Bush Administrations. This ascendancy of the hardliners over “free traders” was 
bound up with a process of learning across the American trade policy community that 
Japan was “different” economically from other advanced industrialised economies in 
terms of its international openness and responsiveness to process-oriented trade 
negotiations. The coupling of fertile political soil with these shared beliefs about the 
Japan problem culminated in the results-oriented Japan policy of the first Clinton 
Administration.
Attention to the critical mediating role of institutional variables helps in uncovering both 
the broad determinants of change in US market access policy towards Japan and, 
ultimately, whose preferences arc represented as state preferences. Following the passage 
of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (RTAA) of 1934, the American trade policy 
regime rested on a set of institutions, laws and norms which saw the US Congress cede 
primacy in trade policy to the executive branch. Under this “ 1934 regime”, the executive 
branch used this authority to play the game of multilateral “export politics” -  negotiating 
reciprocal liberalisation of trade barriers through the GATT with Congress largely 
shielded from the sort of log-rolling demands for protection which led to the sharp rise in 
US protection in the early 1930s (Destler 1995). Executive branch primacy in trade 
policy after World War II saw American policy preferences defined for the most part in 
terms of process-oriented, multilateral trade negotiations.
A combination of international and domestic shocks resulted in a crisis of legitimacy of 
the 1934 trade regime in the first half of the 1980s. An important systemic source of 
these pressures was the erosion of the (artificial) dominance of the American economy in 
the postwar period. Expansion of Japanese production, export and technological 
capabilities was at the leading edge of these international pressures. New patterns of 
poliey interdependence also followed from the emergence of new sources of surplus 
capital in the world economy with Japan again at the forefront. Change in America’s 
relative position in the international economy, especially vis-a-vis Japan, provides an
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important but permissive international setting when it comes to explaining the rise of a 
results-oriented Japan policy.
Critical to the nature, timing and intensity of the regime crisis were domestic factors, in 
particular the macroeconomic policy decisions of the first Reagan Administration. A 
sharp fall in American national savings and a sustained rise in the US dollar followed a 
marked loosening in fiscal policy in the early years of the Reagan Administration. The 
impact on the competitive position of America’s traded goods sector was apparent in 
sharply higher US trade deficits following the global recession of 1982. Acute pressure 
on the American traded goods sector underpinned both increased US protection and the 
shift by the second Reagan Administration in September 1985 towards a more aggressive 
bilateral market opening policy under the rubric of “fair trade”. The proximate cause of 
this shift in trade strategy was the credible threat by the Congress to enact restrictive 
trade legislation and to limit substantially the trade policy discretion of the executive 
branch. After 1985, Congress moved to reclaim a more central policy role and demands 
for fair trade and sectoral reciprocity became more dominant orienting norms for US 
policy behaviour (Destler 1995, Mucciaroni 1995). The scale of its competitive challenge 
to US industry and the size of the bilateral trade imbalance helped ensure that Japan 
would be the primary target of the new “aggressive bilateralism”.
Change in the political fortunes of two broad advocacy coalitions sheds light on the 
content and timing of US policy reactions to the Japan problem. The postwar US trade 
strategy of process-oriented multilateralism embodied the power and preferences of a 
“Free Trade-Good Relations” coalition (free traders). The trade regime crisis would 
leave this coalition fragmented and reactive to an emergent “Hardline-Japan is Different” 
coalition (hardliners). The rise of a results-oriented Japan policy and the timing of policy 
innovations reflected the progressive dominance of hardliners over free traders in the 
American trade policy community. The idea that Japan was significantly different from 
other advanced industrial economies in terms of its structural (behind-the-border) trade 
barriers constituted a binding force for the hardline challenge to the free traders. For the 
most part, free traders (concentrated at high levels of the executive branch, the national 
security policy community and among the ranks of professional economists) tended to 
view the stakes surrounding the Japan problem as relatively low. By contrast, hardliners 
(especially in Congress, the US traded goods sector and among manufacturing-oriented
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policy analysts) saw the stakes as high and requiring significant policy change by the 
United States.
The September 1985 shift by the second Reagan Administration towards the “self- 
initiation” of Section 301 actions signified the crisis of legitimacy in the 1934 trade 
regime and a new policy setting favourable to hardline grievances about Japan. The 
Market-Oriented, Sector Selective (MOSS) talks begun in 1985 illustrated the transition 
by the second Reagan Administration towards a more structured and aggressive approach 
to the Japan problem with a wider network of US government actors claiming a stake in 
securing market access results. With frustration over Japan market access growing across 
the American trade policy community, hardliners achieved their most dramatic policy 
breakthrough in 1986 with a bilateral agreement over semiconductor trade, including a 
20 per cent market share target for foreign sales in the Japanese market. The 
semiconductor agreement (renegotiated in 1991) was part of a selective, results-oriented 
policy under the second Reagan and Bush Administrations that highlighted the weakened 
position of the free traders in the wake of the regime crisis.
The second half of the 1980s saw the political base of the hardliners strengthened by a 
Congress intent on reclaiming an action-forcing role in US trade policy and more 
concerted demands by internationally-oriented American firms for a results-oriented 
Japan policy. It also was marked by a new phase in the American policy community’s 
learning about the Japan problem. The emergence of the so-called “revisionists” saw the 
development of a more codified paradigm surrounding Japan’s allegedly different form 
of capitalism. The idea that Japan was different (at least in terms of its international 
openness) also gained new credibility from within the ranks of professional economists 
— traditional bastions of free trade advocacy. By the end of the 1980s, learning across 
the US trade policy community about Japan was a notable element weakening opposition 
to a results-oriented Japan policy. The Bush Administration incorporated aspects of this 
learning experience in a process-oriented policy innovation — the Structural 
Impediments Initiative (SII). The election of Bill Clinton to the presidency in November 
1992 saw demands for quantitative indicators in bilateral agreements with Japan assume 
a higher policy priority in line with hardline trade preferences. The results-oriented 
approach of the Clinton Administration carried the mantle of a policy whose time had 
come.
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Organisation of the thesis
This study provides a layered analysis of the factors that explain the rise of a results- 
oriented Japan policy. Chapter 2 sets out the case for a state-society approach to 
explaining policy change, locating it in the political-economy literature on the 
determinants of national trade policies. The theoretical assumptions of the state-society 
approach distinguish it from system- or society-centred theories and approaches that 
maintain that a single level-of-analysis holds the key to explaining policy behaviour. The 
primary theoretical focus of this approach is on American state-society relations - 
specifically, the institutions, norms and groups that cross-cut the state-society distinction 
and that act as critical constraining and enabling policy variables.
Chapter 3 focuses on the central conditioning variable explaining change in US market 
access policy towards Japan — a crisis in the American trade policy regime in the first 
half of the 1980s. Putting the policy regime at the centre of the analysis emphasises how 
individuals and groups make choices in an environment that has established institutions 
and norms of action. The policy regime serves as a vantage-point for identifying the 
broad determinants of policy change. This chapter focuses on the interaction of 
international and domestic variables that restructured the American policy regime to the 
benefit of domestic actors advocating more aggressive market access demands on Japan.
Chapter 4 directs attention to the political contest between key advocacy coalitions 
whose belief systems guide understandings of policy problems and appropriate 
responses. It explores the emergence of a coalition of Japan hardliners, challenging the 
dominant free trade coalition’s process-oriented multilateral trade strategies. In the late 
1970s and early 1980s, heightened exposure by both state and non-state actors in the 
American trade policy community to behind-the-border market access problems in Japan 
helped to crystallise the core hardline idea that Japan was different from other industrial 
countries in terms of its structural barriers to imports. The trade regime crisis relaxed the 
institutional checks on the hardliners and paved the way for a more structured and 
aggressive approach to market access problems.
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Chapter 5 examines in detail the single most important precedent in the rise of a results- 
oriented Japan policy — the 1986 US-Japan semiconductor agreement and the retaliatory 
trade action by the United States in its immediate aftermath. The market share target set 
for foreign semiconductor sales in Japan was a dramatic departure from traditional, 
process-oriented negotiations. This breakthrough by the hardliners, while not heralding a 
wholesale change in policy, was a landmark in the somewhat haphazard shift towards a 
results-oriented Japan policy.
Chapter 6 examines a series of bilateral negotiations through the second Reagan 
Administration and the Bush Administration to support the argument that the trend 
towards a results-oriented policy went beyond the semiconductor case. Grey-area market 
access negotiations in such sectors as auto parts, telecommunications, supercomputer and 
computer procurement, glass and paper products suggested a more general trend towards 
a selective, results-oriented Japan policy.
Chapter 7 looks at the second phase of the ascendancy of the hardliners in the American 
trade policy community after 1985. Hardliners in Congress and the business community 
moved decisively into the role of advocates for a results-oriented Japan policy in this 
period. This chapter also focuses on the emergence of the revisionists as a knowledge- 
based network directly challenging the free traders’ view of the Japan problem, and the 
fertile political soil these ideas found in the second half of the 1980s.
Chapter 8 traces how a process of puzzling about the Japan problem by professional 
economists in the American trade policy community lent greater credibility to the notion 
that the way Japan worked challenged free trade orthodoxy. It also looks at how the Bush 
Administration’s Structural Impediments Initiative embodied elements of this policy 
learning about Japan in a process-oriented framework.
Chapter 9 examines the culmination of the hardline ascendancy with the election of the 
Clinton Administration and subsequent moves to put a results-oriented Japan policy at 
the centre of American trade strategy. While the agreements secured by the Clinton 
Administration established some new benchmarks, the Japanese government was 
successful in blunting demands for explicit quantitative indicators in market access 
agreements. A combination of factors, in particular strong Japanese resistance to US
1 1
demands and diverging performances of the US and Japanese economies, help to explain 
the reduced impetus for an aggressive results-oriented policy by the mid 1990s.
Chapter 10 looks briefly at the experience of the second Clinton Administration, draws 
out some theoretical perspectives from the study, and suggests how its insights might 
apply to future research on American trade policy.
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2 Explaining US trade policy: A state-society framework
Introduction
The key question confronting theories of foreign economic policy is whether state 
preferences matter and, if so, how to examine them in a theoretically useful way. A state- 
society approach focuses on the consequences for US trade policy of shifts in state 
preferences grounded in the institutions, norms and groups at the interface of state- 
society relations. The rise of a results-oriented Japan policy is traced through the twin 
state-societal lenses of the American trade policy regime and the key advocacy coalitions 
contesting America’s Japan policy. This chapter develops an analytical framework for 
explaining change in US market access policy towards Japan, contrasting it with 
alternative perspectives on the sources of foreign economic policy.
Although grounded in domestic politics, a state-society framework eschews any prior 
assumption that a single level-of-analysis can satisfactorily explain national trade 
policies. State-centred realist and game theoretic models focused on the international 
system are, at best, theoretically permissive with a high level of policy indeterminacy. 
These systemic approaches to US trade policy are not compelling without information 
about the preferences of such a major economic power. A state-society framework is 
open to international-level change reshaping policy constraints and incentives. But 
ignoring the domestic process linking state preferences and policy outcomes obscures 
when and how change in the international environment matters.
A state-society approach also stands in contrast to models of the policy process which 
ignore or down-play the role of institutions, laws and norms. Society-centred models 
focusing on domestic interest group activity view American trade policy as an essentially 
demand-driven process. This narrow focus, however, neglects the transformative 
capacity of state institutions and actors in the determination of state policy preferences. 
A state-society framework offers a more plausible treatment of the supply-side of the 
policy-making process (that is, the state) by focusing conceptually on the American trade 
policy regime — the institutional and normative rules of the game structuring state- 
society relations in the trade policy arena. Putting the regime at the centre of analysis of
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domestic preference formation highlights how institutional factors shape not only which 
domestic groups gain access to the policy process, but even the way such groups define 
their goals.
The policy regime provides the most appropriate vantage-point for identifying the broad 
determinants of policy change. An advocacy coalition approach complements this 
analysis by focusing on the shared beliefs of group actors with scope for policy choice. 
Comprised of state and non-state actors, advocacy coalitions are the basic units of 
analysis engaged in interpreting policy problems and proposing policy responses. 
Exploring the political contest between free traders and hardliners in the American trade 
policy community opens the way for ideas to help explain the content and timing of 
changes in US market access policy towards Japan. While non-cognitive factors are seen 
as the critical drivers of policy change, scope also exists for learning within a policy 
community to leave an imprint on political outcomes.
The limits of systemic theories of trade policy
A diverse theoretical literature on the determinants of national trade policies locates the 
primary sources of policy at different levels-of-analysis.7 Systemic or international-level 
approaches grant theoretical primacy to such factors as the distribution of global 
political-military power, the international economic structure, or shared systemic norms 
and information embodied in international institutions. Unit or domestic-level 
approaches emphasise such variables as the economic interests of societal actors, 
domestic political structures and coalitions, and/or the prevailing ideologies, beliefs and 
ideas of central decision-makers. Parsimonious, systemic models have a privileged status 
in the eyes of many international relations scholars. Keohane (1984: 16), for example, 
argues that systemic analysis should be the first-cut on research questions because 
'without a conception of the common external problems, pressures and challenges 
[facing states] we lack an analytical basis for identifying the role played by domestic 
interests’.
Waltz (1959) pioneered this way of understanding international relations by organising the literature on the 
causes of war around three levels-of-analysis (or “images”): systems, states and individuals. See also Singer 
(1961) and Jervis (1976).
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This “top-down'’, system-first proposition is unconvincing, however, in isolation from 
the particular object of research. Traditionally, systemic theories of international 
relations have taken as their main research program broad patterns of inter-state 
interaction and such large-scale questions as the scope for peaceful change in world 
politics. The dominant realist school has emphasised enduring threats to state survival, 
and the capacity of the international power structure to mould state behaviour and to 
limit the scope for international cooperation (Waltz 1979, Gilpin 1981). While accepting 
many of the core assumptions of realism, international institutionalist theories focus on 
the way in which multilateral institutions and norms can create opportunities for more 
cooperative political outcomes (Krasner (ed.) 1983, Keohane 1984). System-centred 
theories may be a logical starting point for high-level studies of inter-state relations, but 
their capacity to explain foreign economic policy content is more contentious. Indeed, 
the more careful systemic theorists have drawn a distinction between structural “theories 
of international relations” (the behaviour of aggregations of states) and “theories of 
foreign policy” (the behaviour of individual states) (Waltz 1979: 72, 77). By implication, 
variation in research questions recommends differentiated bodies of theory rather than a 
grand theoretical template fitting all international politics.
The qualified virtue of theoretical parsimony also cautions against making the 
international system the necessary starting point for explaining national trade policy. As 
Nye (1988: 243) has stated, ‘parsimony is not the only way by which one judges good 
theory. Good theory also requires a good explanatory fit’. This reinforces the case for 
theoretical pluralism with sensitivity to the scope and domain of research questions 
(Wolfers 1962, Baldwin 1989). As Haggard (1991: 417) has observed:
the claim for the superiority of a theory on the basis of its parsimony cannot stand alone. 
What use is a parsimonious theory that is wrong or that explains only a small portion of 
the variance? The issue, therefore, is not one of parsimony per se but of the trade-off 
between parsimony and explanatory power. The general point ... is that there is no need 
to grant priority to systemic theory on the basis of its parsimony alone, unless it can be 
proved also to have at least equal explanatory power.
The weak explanatory power of system-centred, state-as-actor models of US trade policy 
recommends a more “bottom-up” approach. This study focuses on state-society relations 
and on the domestic process linking trade policy preferences (what states want) with 
policy outcomes. Starting at the level of preferences reverses ‘the nearly universal
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presumption among contemporary international relations theorists that “systemic” 
theories like realism and [international] institutionalism should be employed as an 
analytical “first cut”, with theories of “domestic” preference formation brought in only to 
explain anomalies’ (Moravcsik 1997: 516). Systemic approaches lack a theory of 
preferences over outcomes (Powell 1994). The goals of unitary, rational states are 
assumed fixed or exogenous with variations in the geo-political environment seen as the 
key to explaining policy. By contrast, a state-society framework focuses on the 
consequences for US trade policy of shifts in state preferences grounded in the 
institutions, norms and group actors in American state-society relations.,s
Assuming that preferences matter is not to assume that states can do what they want 
regardless of other actors. Actual strategies and policies pursued reflect not simply a 
state’s own preferences, but rather the configuration of preferences of all states 
(Moravcsik 1997: 523). Nor does the state-society framework seek to locate the sources 
of policy action solely in domestic politics, for example, the preferences of domestic 
economic actors do not derive simply from “domestic” economic assets and 
endowments. The relative position of those assets and endowments in the global 
economy clearly matters. Hence, a state-society framework is open empirically to 
international-level change reshaping the trade policy environment. But it rejects a top- 
down, systemic perspective that assumes that state preferences are fixed or that they can 
be imputed exogenously from the international geo-political environment. The point is 
not to deny the significance of international factors as part of a multi-causal analysis of 
policy change. It is to argue that the most useful theoretical vantage-point for analysing 
when and how international-level change matters for policy lies at the intersection of 
state-society relations.
The realist literature on postwar US trade policy illustrates the limitations of systemic, 
state-as-actor approaches. Realists view the unitary, rational state as the dominant actor 
in international politics with states distinguished solely by their relative power in the 
international system. Threats to state survival are deemed pervasive given the ordering
s Conceptually, this state-society framework borrows heavily from Moravcsik’s (1997) ‘nonideological and 
nonutopian’ liberal theory of international politics. While sharing Moravcsik’s core assumption of the 
centrality of state-society relations in world politics, the approach advanced here places greater emphasis on 
the independent capacity of state institutions and state actors and less on the ‘capture’ of the state by societal 
groups.
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principle of “anarchy” in international politics. Realism highlights the constraints on 
international cooperation and the importance of the relative gains motive (how states fare 
relative to other states) over mutual interest in absolute gains (how states fare in and of 
itself). Realist scholars see states structuring international economic relations in pursuit 
of power, wealth and security. Such variables as the distribution of world output, trade 
and foreign direct investment (FDI), relative per capita income and relative productivity 
are assumed the primary determinants of state trade interests and hence policy outcomes. 
For realists, departures from free trade represent rational state behaviour because of the 
state’s non-economic objectives and/or because of economic gains from protection. As 
such, realism embodies distinct elements of the mercantilist tradition.
Two problems, both related to the inadequate treatment of state preferences, highlight the 
weakness of systemic realism as explanatory theory of US trade policy. First, even at its 
most plausible, realism is theoretically permissive and under-determining. Any given 
configuration of international structural variables can appear consistent with markedly 
different policy outcomes. In part, this policy indeterminacy problem refects 
disagreement among scholars on such fundamental issues as the nature of the 
international power structure, the goals of states, the way states pursue their goals and 
distributional consequences across states. Similar problems arise with state-as-actor 
game theoretic approaches. Second, notable empirical anomalies have confronted realist 
scholars who have sought to draw strong inferences about the systemic determinants of 
US trade policy. The works of Robert Gilpin, Stephen Krasner and David Take 
underscore the pitfalls of imputing state trade interests from the international 
environment and ignoring the domestic process of trade preference formation. The result 
is a body of literature where the trade-off between parsimony and explanatory power is 
poor. The case for making realism the theoretical starting point for a fine-grained 
analysis of change in US market access policy towards Japan is correspondingly weak.
Robert Gilpin (1971, 1975, 1977, 1981, 1987) and Stephen Krasner (1976, 1978, 1979) 
were among the founders of modern International Political Economy (IPE) with 
propositions about the international structural determinants of openness/closure of the 
international economy. Along with Kindleberger (1973), they are synonymous with 
hegemonic stability theory (HST), the argument that a powerful hegemon is necessary 
for the maintenance of an open and stable international economic order. Although the
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trade policy of the hegemon was not their main focus, Gilpin and Krasner drew explicit 
links between relative American economic decline and the expectation of significantly 
greater US trade closure. Both maintained that relative US decline would, and indeed 
should, see the rational, realist American state move away from openness, though they 
recognised obstacles to such a policy shift.
Gilpin’s (1975: 40) argument that "a liberal international economy requires a power to 
manage and stabilize the system’ provided the core of hegemonic stability theory. From 
the vantage-point of the mid 1970s, Gilpin saw American hegemony as short-lived, 
linking increasing instability in the world economy to US decline in the face of 
increasing Soviet military power and the rise of Western Europe and Japan as economic 
competitors. Sketching a range of scenarios for the international economy, he suggested 
that the ‘most likely' saw the American-led economic order ‘break down and fragment 
into conflicting imperial systems or regional blocks’ (Gilpin 1975: 72). By the 1980s, 
‘the Pax Americana was in a state of disarray’ (Gilpin 1981: 231). According to Gilpin 
(1987: 230), this new era of economic nationalism and protection demanded that the 
United States overcome its free trade ideology which had ‘become unrealistic under the 
present circumstances’.9
Like Gilpin, Krasner focused primarily on international openness and stability rather 
than national policy, but his realist, state-power model drew clear links between 
international structure and state trade interests.10 Krasner (1976: 323) maintained that 
‘openness is most likely to occur during periods when a hegemonic state is in its 
ascendancy’. He dated American ascendancy from 1945 to 1960 and the state power 
explanation of international openness was seen as persuasive through this period — 
tariffs fell, trade Bows recovered above interwar levels, and regionalisation of trade 
began to decline. Krasner conceded that his realist theory of trade policy had difficulty 
explaining the continuation of trends towards openness from 1960 to the mid 1970s. He 
attributed this to the influence of ‘particular societal groups whose power had been 
enhanced by earlier state policies’ to the point where they prevented the United States
9 To be sure, Gilpin’s brand of realist theory is eclectic, drawing on aspects of liberal and Marxist thought. 
111 Keohane (1997: 151) describes Krasner’s important 1976 paper, ‘State Power and the Structure of 
International Trade’, as having ‘crystallized issues and set the terms for more than a decade of work in the
held of international political economy’.
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‘from making policy amendments in line with state interests’ (Krasner 1976: 318) 
(emphasis added).
The major empirical anomaly for HST is that America’s trade policy has remained 
considerably more open and accommodating to imports than Gilpin and Krasner would 
have expected. By a range of indicators cited by both scholars, America’s relative 
position in the international economic system has eroded since World War II, although 
the experience has been an uneven one.11 In terms of output shares, trade shares, per 
capita GDP and productivity convergence, most of the relative decline in America’s 
international economic ascendancy occurred between 1950 and 1970 (Kunkel 1998). 
Change in the international financial position of the United States has been more 
pronounced since 1970.13
This relative change in the position of the United States in the international economy has 
not resulted in the sort of generalised, state-sanctioned movement away from openness 
conjured up by HST realists. The dependent variable, trade openness, is usually seen as 
encompassing both actual trade flows and the policy instruments designed to influence 
imports (Krasner 1976, Webb and Krasner 1989, McKeown 1991). As to the former, 
Figure 2.1 shows the continued trade integration of the United States into the 
international economy. Total merchandise trade (exports plus imports), total imports and 
manufactured imports have continued to rise as a share of US Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP). Import volumes rose at an annual growth rate of 6.2 per cent between 1965 and 
1995 and there is evidence of increasing import elasticity in the United States economy 
in the 1990s (Kunkel 1998: 15).
In terms of policy instruments, the general picture is one of low tariffs and pockets of 
high protection due to NTBs, but no generalised move towards trade closure by the
11 Indicators included: (1) the relative size of the US economy (Gilpin 1975, Krasner 1976); (2) relative 
economic growth rates (Gilpin 1975, Krasner 1976); (3) relative per capita income (Krasner 1976); (4) relative 
productivity performance (Gilpin 1977); (5) the relative US share of world trade (Krasner 1976); and (6) the 
relative US share of FD1 (Gilpin 1975, Krasner 1976).
12 On these measures, the US international economic position has been broadly stable from the early 1970s to 
the mid 1990s. Japan’s position continued to advance up to the early 1990s, while in some areas the major 
industrial nations of Western Europe have fallen from postwar peaks achieved before 1970.
The US share of the global stock of EDI fell significantly between 1970 and 1990, partly due to large capital 
inflows into the United States from other industrialised countries (Kunkel 1998, UNCTAD 1998).
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Figure 2.1 United States Merchandise Trade Shares (%GDP)
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Source: World Bank data, International Economic Databank, Australian National University.
United States. The process o f reciprocal tariff bargaining over the last 50 years has seen 
the trade-weighted tariff average of the United States fall to 3.5 per cent by the mid 
1990s following the Uruguay Round (Hoda 1994: 47).14 The major long-term departures 
from this general postwar trend towards increasing openness have been in textiles and 
apparel and parts o f agriculture.1'"' In addition, since the late 1960s, a number o f 
standardised-technology manufacturing industries with long-term structural adjustment 
problems have gained varying levels o f protection. Measurement problems mean that 
accurate data on long-term trends in NTB protection, and especially the intensity o f such 
measures, are not readily available. One estimate is that the share o f US imports affected 
by some form o f NTB increased from 36 per cent in 1966 to 45 per cent in 1986 (Laird 
and Yeats 1990).16 Simultaneous moves towards greater openness in some areas and 
increased closure in others (such as in the administration o f anti-dumping laws) make 
neat conclusions about trends in US protection difficult to draw. But Uruguay Round
14 A ll ta riff rates are bound and 40 per cent o f US imports are duty free (Hoda 1994: 47-49).
I> Maritime services have also been heavily protected dating back to the earliest years o f the Republic. 
u’ Data compiled by the OECD (1996) suggest that over the late 1980s and early 1990s approximately 20 per 
cent o f US ta riff lines were subject to NTBs.
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commitments and continued strong import growth in the 1990s point broadly to the 
maintenance of American trade openness.17
The weak empirical record of “first generation” realism embodied in HST spawned a 
range of alternative perspectives.18 One strand invoked the role of international 
institutions in maintaining an open international economic order (Krasner (ed.) 1983, 
Keohane 1984). For other scholars, the main problem with hegemonic stability theory 
was not that it neglected the role of international institutions, but that it mispecified the 
international economic power structure. David Lake (1984, 1988) sought to reassert the 
primacy of the international economic structure and of realist explanations of US trade 
policy. Lake (1988: 64) hypothesised that ‘nation-states will normally give priority to the 
constraints and opportunities of the international economic structure' in determining 
trade strategy given ‘the anarchic nature of the international system and the consequent 
need to ensure national survival in a competitive environment’.
Lake proposed a system-centred explanation of continued US openness in contrast with 
HST’s pessimism about the consequences of relative economic decline. Fie defined 
seven categories of nation states across two dimensions (relative size, and relative labour 
productivity) with economic structures distinguished by the number of middle-sized and 
large states in the international economy. The trade interests of two categories of state 
are relevant to understanding postwar US trade strategy: a ‘hegemonic leader’ (large and 
above average productivity), and an ‘opportunist’ (middle-sized and above average 
productivity). Lake identified three different structures since 1945: US hegemony (1945- 
65), US-West German bilateral opportunism (1965-75), and US-West German-French 
multilateral opportunism (1975- ).19 The United States was deemed a ‘hegemonic leader’ 
from 1945 with a trade preference for free trade at home and free trade abroad, and the 
capacity to move the latter goal towards realisation. In the mid 1960s, the position of the 
United States changed to one of ‘opportunism’ with a first preference for strategic trade 
protection at home and free trade abroad. Lake maintains that because other opportunist
1 T his finding remains robust in the second half of the 1990s (including post-Asia crisis), even though some 
sectoral pressures for protection in relation to steel and certain agricultural products have been accommodated 
(OECD 1999: 207-221).
Is See Kunkel (1998: 18-19) on some of the second thoughts of Gilpin and Krasner in light of the empirical 
weakness of simple HST.
1; Based on his calculation of labour productivity, Lake foresaw Japan emerging into the multilateral 
opportunist structure only in the late !980s/early 1990s.
21
States have stood ready to retaliate, and while there are still residual benefits to the 
United States from international openness, it has not been in the US national interest to 
move towards trade closure.
Lake’s systemic approach is logically consistent with continued US trade openness, but 
the emphasis on the strategic trade protection motive suggests it too is a weak predictor 
of policy content. While stopping short of ascribing all protection to strategic trade logic, 
he does assert that such motives ‘may explain the widespread patterns of protection 
observed historically’ (Lake 1993: 475). States are assumed to implement strategic trade 
protection to shift industrial structures towards capital-intensive industries that in turn 
create large technological spin-offs and a virtuous cycle of rising economic progress. 
Lake (1993: 475) concedes this is no more than an ‘intuition’ and that he is unable to 
‘measure or demonstrate these basic linkages'. More importantly, Lake leaves 
unexplored the dominant empirical evidence on the sectoral pattern of US protection. 
Tables 2.1 and 2.2 present data on the sectoral distribution of US protection in the early 
1990s to illustrate the types of industries that the US state has sought to protect.
Table 2.1 Sectoral Protection in the United States -  1993
1S1C d e s c r i p t i o n a v .  1MFIN t a r i f f  r a te s  
( p r o d ' n  w e i g h t e d )
c o r e  INTB  
F r e q .  R a t i o
1 Agriculture n.a. 3.6
2 Mining, quarrying n.a. 2.3
3 Manufacturing 4.9 24.7
31 -  food, bev. & tobacco 7.4 12.1
32 -  textiles & apparel 11.5 69.9
33 -  wood & wood prod. 4.1 0.6
34 -  paper & paper prod. 2.1 1.3
35 -  chemicals, petroleum prod. 5.2 5.8
36 -  non-metallic mineral products 4.9 5.3
37 -  basic metal industries 4.2 57.1
38 -  fabricated metal products 3.7 13.8
39 other manufacturing 5.9 1.1
Source: OECD (1996)
20 Lake’s argues that detailed analysis of the policy-making process and the terms of political discourse offers 
a way of assessing the theory’s validity.
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Table 2.2 Special Protection in the United States -  1990
P r o t e c t e d  b y  h ig h  t a r i f f s T a r i f f  o r  e q u i v a l e n t H o u r l y  w a g e s  r e l a t iv e
a s  %  w o r l d  p r i c e to  m a n u f .  a v e r a g e
ball bearings 11 1.2
benzenoid chemicals 9 1.55
canned tuna 12.5 0.44
ceramic articles 1 1 0.88
ceramic tiles 19 0.85
costume jewelry 9 0.61
frozen cone, orange juice3 30 0.74
glassware 1 1 1.07
luggage 16.5 0.63
polyethylene resins 12 1.36
rubber footwear 20 0.61
softwood lumber 6.5 1
women's footwear (exc. athletic) 10 0.57
women's handbags 13.5 0.56
P r o t e c t e d  b y  i m p o r t  q u o t a s
Agriculture
- dairy productsb 50 0.97
- peanutsc 50 0.62
- sugar 66 1.08
Maritime 85 1.28
P r o t e c t e d  b y  V E R s
apparel 48 0.6
textiles 23.4 0.74
machine toolsd 46.6 1.13
T o t a l 35.2 0.71
Notes: a (av. 1988-91); b (av. 1989-91); c (av. 1988-89); d (av. 1989-90)
Source: Hufbauer and Elliott (1994)
While short of a systematic examination of the issue, the data suggest that motives other 
than capturing the commanding heights of the international economy have dominated 
state-sanctioned protection in the United States. The OECD data suggest that the highest 
protection in 1993 was afforded textiles and apparel and basic steel products, industries 
facing long-term structural decline in the US economy. The 21 sectors receiving special 
protection which Hufbauer and Elliott (1994) investigate also suggest a pattern of 
protection flowing to industries which are either politically influential and/or which 
employ large numbers of low wage, low skill workers. Indeed, the weighted-average 
relative wage across these high protection sectors is some 30 per cent below the 
manufacturing average. Analysis of the sectoral spread of US protection can not be
23
considered decisive evidence against the strategic trade motivation. But it does underline 
that Lake’s “second generation” realism is based largely on assertion and intuition about 
trade policy in the absence of empirical investigation as to what actually determines 
policy.21
It can be argued that empirical anomalies in the works of Gilpin, Krasner and Lake do 
not constitute a complete indictment of realist approaches to US trade policy. Plausible 
arguments can be constructed about broad constraints imposed by the international 
environment on the choice-setting of US policy-makers. The correlation between relative 
American economic ascendancy and the high tide of American process-oriented 
multilateralism in trade policy from the late 1940s through the 1960s is suggestive of the 
sort of margin of dominance that accommodates such policy strategies. But a more 
general problem of policy indeterminacy highlights the theoretical permissiveness of 
realism and other system-centred approaches.
In the case of the United States, for example, how much power is enough for hegemony? 
When did the United States become a hegemon? Has it ceased to be one? (Russett 1985, 
Strange 1987, Nau 1990, Nye 1990) Lake’s approach illustrates how these (arbitrary) 
lines of demarcation can be forced to carry heavy causal burdens when it comes to 
variation in a state’s trade policy behaviour. By a range of measures, the United States 
had already reached hegemonic status by the time of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 
1930 and its structural parameters at that time were roughly equivalent to those in the 
1950s era of GATT-based liberalisation (Frieden 1986). For Lake’s approach to account 
equally well for US policy behaviour in 1930 and in the 1950s virtually demands a high 
level of policy indeterminacy and a weak link between international structure and policy 
outcome. As one sceptic has noted, ‘it is difficult to agree that the future of world trade 
hinges on whether the US share is 14 per cent or 17 per cent’ (Odell 1990: 159).
Why a dominant international position shapes the state’s trade interest in one direction 
and not another remains a puzzle for system-centred theory. Why, for example, should a
21 It is instructive that in Lake’s original version of his realist theory of US trade policy he noted that the 
recipients of US protection in the early 1980s were the ‘least competitive industries’ (Lake 1984: 165). A 
similar statement does not appear in his 1988 book. For detailed empirical work on the determinants of US 
protection, see Lavergne (1983) and Baldwin (1985).
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hegemonic power necessarily pursue open trade policies? Reliance by dominant powers 
on illiberal commercial policies appears at least as prevalent as liberal hegemony as the 
cases of the former Soviet Union in Eastern Europe and Germany before World War II 
seem to attest. Large structural power is likely to lead dominant states to seek access to 
weaker states, but power does not appear to determine the content of the resultant 
economic order (Hirschman 1945, Ruggie 1982, Nau 1990). Moreover, international 
trade theory identifies incentives for a hegemon to exploit its market power with optimal 
tariffs rather than maintain openness (Conybeare 1984). Some realists counter that a 
rational hegemon might forgo an optimal tariffand instead promote trade liberalisation if 
this could prevent the development of economic challengers (Gowa 1989a, Lake 1988). 
But in any case, the scope for hegemonic choice and policy indeterminacy appears 
substantial.
The fact that states usually have multiple goals introduces a further source of 
indeterminacy proportional to the complexity of states" utility functions. Given multiple 
state goals, a fully specified theory requires analysis of factors which affect the trade-offs 
between state goals when they conflict, including the weights which states attach to 
different decision criteria — in other words, the circumstances under which states are 
interested in relative gains versus absolute gains. At a minimum, realists would argue 
that states simultaneously seek security and wealth. Gowa (1989b) develops a model 
which identifies tension between these two potentially conflicting objectives as the main 
source of variation in national trade policy preferences. She suggests that in a bipolar 
security context, a rational hegemon may forgo optimal tariffs vis-a-vis allies because 
free trade has security externalities. Thus, the hegemon has conflicting security and 
economic incentives, but it is effectively constrained to facilitate free trade between 
friends for security reasons, even if allies enjoy relative economic gains. For some 
realists, however, relative economic gains by allies remain central obstacles to 
cooperative behaviour by the hegemon (Grieeo 1990). More fundamentally, there seems 
to be no systematic link between bipolarity and trade policy if one contrasts the trade 
relations within the liberal postwar Western alliance with those within the interwar 
German-led authoritarian alliance and the Cold War Soviet bloc. Rather, 'the relationship 
between bipolar systems and free trade appears to be subject to the domestic political and 
economic organization of the major alliance partners’ (Simmons 1994: 6).
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Despite realism’s reification of power politics and the relative gains motive, both the 
instruments of power and the distribution of gains remain surprisingly under-specified in 
explanations of American postwar economic hegemony (Snidal 1985). Was the United 
States a benevolent hegemon — accepting the burdens of leadership as implied by 
Kindleberger's (1973) collective action approach to international economic relations — 
or was it coercive — forcing weaker states to make contributions for the maintenance of 
the postwar liberal economic order? At various points, Gilpin, Krasner and Lake imply 
elements of both in the case of postwar US trade policy. The United States is cast 
variously as taking the lead on trade liberalisation, actively using leverage to change 
other states’ policy preferences, but also gaining relatively less than weaker states. The 
finding that the United States was a coercive hegemon but that other states secured 
relative economic gains poses a particular puzzle for approaches which focus on the 
international economic structure as the dens ex machina for policy behaviour. Lake 
concludes that the United States was necessarily coercive because in his theory not all 
states gain from free trade. The hegemon must change the policies of others to satisfy its 
own goals. But identification of the instruments of power and how the hegemon alters 
others’ behaviour — in other words, policy — is deemed merely a ‘second-order 
question'. It may take the form of ‘negative sanctions (threats), positive sanctions 
(rewards), the restructuring of market incentives, ideological leadership, or simply 
success worthy of emulation' (Lake 1993: 469). With such wide policy discretion, it is 
hardly surprising that the capacity to predict actual policy outcomes is low.
As Simmons (1994: 6) observes, systemic theories of foreign economic policy choice are 
‘based on the supposition that the strongest incentives facing states in the system are 
indeed external and can be deduced from systemic variables’. But the high level of 
indeterminacy in structural theory weakens the logic that the preferences of states, 
especially dominant economic powers, will be tightly constrained by the external 
environment. Simmons underlines this point with her analysis of the domestic sources of 
foreign economic policy during the interwar years — the period which spawned modern 
structural theories of IPE with the work of Charles Kindleberger (1973). She notes that:
Kindleberger himself was not puzzled by the United States’ unwillingness to open its 
markets, maintain a stable currency, and maintain countercyclical capital flows during 
the Depression. He understood the domestic political incentives facing American 
policymakers (and deplored these actions nonetheless). The point is quite general: 
without some information about the preferences of the dominant economic power and
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the other states in the system, the logic o f  systemic hegemonic theory is less than 
compelling (Simmons 1994: 6).
Game theory offers an alternative parsimonious, state-as-aetor approach, but it can not 
resolve the problems of indeterminacy in structural analysis. Game theory defines 
preference orderings exogenously and the logic of game theory is unassailable ‘as long 
as we make the correct assumptions about the nature of the game, which in turn rests on 
correctly identifying state preferences’ (Simmons 1994: 6). The most important of the 
various elements that describe a game is the payoff structure which illuminates not only 
w'hy players are interested in playing, but tells us what they are playing. Nelson (1991: 
133) states correctly that given the importance of the payoff structure:
it is somewhat surprising to note that in most applications o f game theory to specific 
strategic situations like trade policy, payoffs are (often implicitly) assumed as “given” . ... 
If our game theoretic account of the political economy of trade policy is to be at all 
compelling, we need to be considerably more concrete about the structure of the political 
space in which the game is played, the nature of outcomes in that space, and the 
mappings from political to economic outcomes and from economic outcomes to utilities.
Game theory cannot tell us where the payoffs come from, hence the importance of
22correctly identifying state preferences.
The trade policy regime as domestic structure
The most common bottom-up perspective on US trade policy formulation focuses on the 
political activity of societal interest groups. In keeping with the strong pluralist tradition 
in American political science, this approach sees politics as an essentially demand-side 
phenomenon with the interests of ascendant societal groups translated into political 
outcomes. Schattschneider’s (1935) account of pressure group activity and the Smoot- 
Hawley tariff remains an exemplar of this school. More contemporary scholars have 
traced American policy outcomes to the impact of international market conditions on 
shifting coalitions of sectors, industries and firms in the US economy (Gourevitch 1986,
2" The limits of the game-theoretic approach to trade policy choice have become more rather than less obvious 
over time. As one survey has noted, ‘At times, the relationship between particular issues (e.g., trade), game 
structures (e.g., prisoners’ dilemma), institutional forms (e.g., regimes), and outcomes (e.g., cooperation, 
allocative results) is very confused’ (Caporaso 1993: 456).
’ Notable works in the American pluralist tradition include Bentley (1949), Truman (1951), Latham (1952) 
and McConnell (1967).
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Friedan 1988, Milner 1988).“ Models of endogenous protection, developed by 
economists drawing on the public choice school of politics, represent a more formal 
strand of this society-centred literature. Trade intervention (usually an import tariff or 
quota) is conceptualised as a public or collective good, demanded by economic groups in 
society and supplied by politicians seeking to maximise political support. Which groups 
organise to demand political intervention depends on the concentration of benefits and 
the costs of collective action in the presence of the free-rider problem (Olson 1965).
At the core of this approach is a simple, powerful insight: trade intervention is because 
politically-influential groups in society can be made better off economically. Yet the 
narrow focus on interest group demands is problematic on both theoretical and empirical 
grounds. The risk of tautological reasoning hangs over the political science literature 
where a group’s influence is assessed solely from the outcome of group struggle. The 
lack of an independent measure of group power results in a strong post hoc character to 
many society-centred studies (Ikenberry, Take and Mastanduno 1988: 8). Endogenous 
trade policy models display greater theoretical coherence, but at the cost of a sizeable 
gap between theoretical abstraction and trade policies observed in practice. In his survey 
of this literature, Nelson (1988) attributes this gap to fundamental assumptions about the 
nature of politics being made on the grounds of theoretical convenience so as to 
minimise the need to alter standard microeconomic techniques. Notwithstanding the 
formal rigour of the endogenous trade policy literature, ‘the link between the theoretical 
concepts and their empirical referents is so weak as to undermine general interest in its 
results’ (Nelson 1988: 830).26
Undermining the theoretical and empirical claims of a society-centred approach to US 
trade policy is the neglect of the supply-side of the policy process. Rather than playing 
an active, transformative role in the policy process, the state is conceptualised as a more- 
or-less passive register of interest group demands, captured by a dominant societal group 
or coalition. State actors and institutions filter pressure group activity, but exert no
24 Linkages to the international level-of-analysis embody Gourevitch’s (1978) ‘second-image reversed’ 
approach, but with policy outcomes determined in a domestic pluralist framework.
2’ For surveys of endogenous protection theory, see Magee (1984), Nelson (1988), Hillman (1989) and Rodrik 
(1994). See Baldwin (1984a), Hughes (1986) and Marks and McArthur (1990) for surveys of the econometric 
literature related loosely to this theoretical work.
26 In a similar vein, Rodrik’s (1994:1) critique of this literature concludes that it ‘has lost sight of the very 
questions that have motivated it’.
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independent causal weight in the determination of state trade preferences. The unique 
structural position of the state at the intersection of the international and domestic 
political economies is subsumed by societal reductionism. To be sure, the empirical 
record of US trade policy affirms that societal pressures establish incentives and 
constraints on policy action. But rarely do such pressures appear sufficiently binding as 
to justify “black-boxing” the state. Major redirections of US trade policy, as well as more 
specific episodes in US-Japan trade relations, highlight the need to go beyond a focus on 
demands of societal interests.
A society-centred perspective has particular problems explaining the sustained tariff 
liberalisation by the United States in the second half of the 20lh century. Such an 
approach obscures the fundamental transformation in the institutional power and purpose 
of the US executive branch which conditioned this policy outcome. With the RTAA of 
1934, the Roosevelt Administration sought and obtained from the Congress a hitherto 
unprecedented role in US trade policy. This institutional bargain struck during the 
Great Depression allowed the executive branch to implement an internationalist trade 
policy centred on the reciprocal reduction of trade barriers. After World War II, the 
United States (in particular the US State Department) played the lead role in establishing 
the GATT — a new multilateral system of trade rules. The capacity of President 
Roosevelt’s successors to link a relatively liberal, multilateralist trade policy with such 
wider foreign policy interests as alliance building/maintenance and Cold War anti­
communism helped to cement a central role for the executive branch in US trade policy.
The critical role of state actors and institutional reform in this historical policy 
realignment begun only four years after the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act has been 
documented extensively (Destler 1995, Haggard 1988, Nelson 1989, Goldstein 1993). 
Haggard (1988: 96, 99) argues persuasively that while societal pressures reinforced the 
passage of the RTAA in 1934:
explaining the institutional innovations themselves demands attention to the initiatives,
interests, and motivations of state actors.
... Without allies in industry and agriculture who were capable of benefiting from a new
trade policy, the administration could not have acted. But executive initiatives and
2 Article 1, section 8 of the US Constitution grants Congress power over the regulation of international 
commerce.
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interests were crucial in defining the trade policy agenda, and even in shaping the 
“dominant coalition”.
The economic crisis of the Great Depression both created an environment conducive to 
institutional innovation and weakened the intellectual credentials of protectionism within 
the state policy-making apparatus (Destler 1995, Goldstein 1993). The RTAA is widely 
credited as a triumph of US Secretary of State Cordell Hull, the most vigorous free trade 
advocate in the Roosevelt Administration. The institutional emergence of what 
Schlesinger (1973) termed the “Imperial Presidency” provided the capacity for an 
emergent cross-party elite consensus to sustain liberal, multilateralist policy preferences. 
Although Congress would remain divided on trade policy and would continue to set 
limits of scope and duration on the president’s tariff cutting mandate, the executive 
branch used its newly-acquired policy authority to mobilise group interests in line with 
its policy preferences, offsetting to some extent opposing political and economic 
interests (Bauer, Pool and Dexter 1963). The capacity of state actors to exploit cross­
cutting societal pressures, to actively build coalitions of support for particular policy 
preferences, and to act as the ultimate source of policy authority weakens the claims of a 
society-centred approach.
The significance of institutional variables can be illustrated via effects on the 
configuration of group interests and the incentives for group action. Lowi’s (1964) more 
general inference that the institutional definition of a given policy strongly influences the 
form of politics surrounding that policy was drawn directly from the contrasting politics 
of Smoot-Hawley and the RTAA (and its legislative successors). Prior to the RTAA, 
trade was defined politically as a ‘distributive issue’. A universal norm of ‘reciprocal 
non-interference’ ensured that virtually all requests for protection by group interests were 
accommodated through generalised log-rolling. The periodic transfer of tariff cutting 
authority to the president after 1934 helped to alter the political definition of trade policy 
by weakening this general right to protection. The institutional definition of trade shifted 
more towards that of a ‘regulatory issue’ characterised by conflictive patterns of 
behaviour. Consistent with this new normative dynamic, the rise of anti-protection 
groups moderated the dominance of protectionist interests (Destler and Odell 1987). In 
this way, changes in the institutional structure can be seen as influencing not only which
s The following draws on Nelson’s (1989) analysis of Schattschneider (1935) and Lowi (1964).
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societal groups have access to the policy arena, but also the way such groups define their 
goals.
The location in the executive branch of more technocratic decision-making processes 
relating to administered protection also altered the incentives for group action. 
Institutionally, Congress has a more domestic and sectional orientation to trade policy 
compared with the presidency by virtue of their different electoral constituencies 
(Mayhew 1974, Baldwin 1985). Under the new rules for administered protection, 
expected beneficiaries found themselves having to lobby the executive for something 
approaching a public good, reducing incentives through the logic of collective action. In 
short, while Congress remained responsive to constituent pressure for protection, its 
responsiveness under the post-1934 institutional arrangements was systematically 
reduced compared with the period prior to the RTAA.“
Particular cases in the evolution of US market access policy towards Japan also highlight 
the capacity of state-centred variables to channel societal pressures away from certain 
policy outcomes. For example, the Reagan Administration’s initiation of a more 
aggressive market opening strategy in the mid 1980s was geared critically towards 
countering acute societal pressures at that time for a more protectionist policy towards 
Japan. By the first half of 1985, a significant cross-section of US manufacturing industry, 
including internationally-oriented firms traditionally supportive of freer trade, was 
lobbying actively for a Japan-specific import surcharge. Legislation mandating such a 
policy was initiated by elements in Congress that hitherto had resisted such directly 
restrictive action. Despite these pressures, Reagan Administration officials were able to 
channel demands for an import surcharge towards a more activist market access policy 
using Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974. Societal trade activity can provide an 
indication of pressure on the policy process to “do something”, but still fall decidedly 
short of explaining actual policy outcomes.,()
A second example of the imprint of state-centred variables was the Bush 
Administration’s decision in 1989 to resist societal pressure for an aggressive, results- 
oriented market access policy towards Japan. Soon after assuming office, the Bush
2> Destler (1995) characterises the post 1934 era as one based on ‘protection for Congress’.
1(1 This episode is dealt with in more detail in chapters 3 and 4.
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Administration was presented with a clear recommendation from its high-level private 
sector advisory body to move towards a policy of numerical market access indicators. 
Congress had also sent a strong signal in support of such an approach in the form of the 
1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act, including the Japan-focused Super 301 
provision. The Bush Administration resisted these pressures, embracing instead the less 
prescriptive, process-oriented Structural Impediments Initiative. A simple focus on 
societal pressures offers little help in explaining how SI I became the US government's 
key innovation in market access policy towards Japan between 1989 and 1992. A 
perspective that fails to accommodate the role of institutional variables and the 
preferences of state actors leaves critical aspects of policy decision-making unexplored.31
A state-society framework recognises the political capacity and causal significance that 
follows from the unique structural position of the state at the intersection of the 
international and domestic political economies. Variation in institutions linking state and 
society, and in state actor choice settings and motivations, are important sources of 
variation in state policy preferences. In this framework, the state is conceptualised as a 
relational variable rather than an autonomous actor. Importantly, this contrasts with 
state-centred approaches which conceptualise the state as a unitary, rational actor 
promoting ends and values separate from those in society (Krasner 1978, 1984; Evans, 
Reuschemeyer and Skocpol (eds.) 1985). As Lowi (1988: 891) has noted, the state-as- 
actor model is problematic as there are ‘too many characteristics of states, and too many 
of these characteristics are really continua, with every state placed at a different point on 
each continuum’. For the purposes of this study, the state is defined in terms of concrete 
institutions and actors rather than in terms of its autonomy. First, it is a set of 
representative institutions structuring state-society relations that is the focus of domestic 
and international political activity. Second, these institutions are staffed and directed by 
(boundedly) rational state actors whose roles and preferences have their own causal 
significance.
This relational concept of the state commends a focus on the policy regime -  the 
enduring institutions, laws and norms mediating state-society relations in a policy issue- 
area. Again, the contrast with a society-centred approach is worth highlighting. The
’’ Chapters 6-8 explore the Bush Administration’s Japan policy more fully.
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policy regime is conceptualised as a concrete feature of domestic policy structure, rather 
than simply the product of interest group struggle. Knowing the institutional and 
normative rules of the game is bound up analytically with actor rationality. All social 
action depends on the pre-existence of rules. Hence, domestic structure encompasses 
actors and rules (materials for action) rather than actors and the arrangement of actors as
• T Oin a purely “positional” ontology of structure (Dessler 1989).'
Putting the regime at the centre of the analysis emphasises how individuals and groups 
make choices in an environment that has established institutions and norms of action. 
Policy regimes shape and constrain political strategies in important ways. By shaping not 
just actors’ strategies (as in pure rational choice analysis), but their goals as well, 
regimes structure political interactions and leave their own imprint on the domestic 
process of preference formation (Thelen and Steinmo 1992: 9). Policy regimes temper 
the influence of changes in market conditions and in international and domestic politics. 
International forces are interpreted through institutional lenses that describe what 
changes are progressive, which do or do not affect national or particularistic interests, 
and what mechanisms government officials may use in response (Goldstein 1993: 18). 
Within domestic politics, institutions structure the incentives to political action and 
influence the relative standing and power of different groups.
Chapter 3 hinges the identification of key sources of change in US market access policy 
around the 1934 regime — the rules of the game established by the RTAA of 1934 
which restructured fundamentally American trade relations between the executive, 
Congress and societal groups. Centring attention on the structuring and enabling role of 
institutions, laws and norms reflects the grounding of a state-society approach in 
domestic trade preference formation. The policy regime provides the most appropriate 
vantage-point for analysing the interaction of international and domestic forces as part of 
a multi-causal analysis of change in US trade policy. The following chapter identifies the 
external sources of a crisis in the American trade policy regime in the 1980s which, it is 
argued, was the critical conditioning variable behind the rise of a results-oriented market 
access policy towards Japan.
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~ This conception of domestic structure draws on assumptions about rules/institutions embedded in the 
philosophy of scientific realism (Dessler 1989, Grafstein 1992).
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Advocacy coalitions, ideas and policy-oriented learning
A focus on advocacy coalitions complements the regime-centred analysis and takes the 
state-society framework into the realm of human agency and political choice. While the 
regime structures domestic trade politics, actors constantly seek to control or reformulate 
the rules of the game, to claim the authority and resources of institutions, and to persuade 
centres of policy-making of the merits of their ideas and policies. Tracing the political 
contest between key advocacy coalitions provides for a more detailed analysis of change 
in US market access policy towards Japan. Change in US trade policy is understood as a 
product of political-economic circumstance and the political choices of actors in a policy 
community (Heclo 1974). Advocacy coalitions include both state and non-state actors. 
The important role of state actors within advocacy coalitions, and the extent to which 
legal and institutional authority are critical resources in the policy process, reinforces the 
contrast with society-centred pluralism. At the same time, the diverse array of non-state 
actors in the American trade policy community (from societal interest groups to policy 
experts and journalists) makes for a more open and fluid perspective of the policy 
process than implied by state-centred approaches or tightly-structured “iron triangle’' 
models (Heclo 1978. Kingdon 1984, Hall 1993).
An advocacy coalition is defined as a group of actors from a variety of public and private 
institutions who ‘share a set of basic beliefs (policy goals plus causal and other 
perceptions) and who seek to manipulate the rules, budgets, and personnel of 
governmental institutions in order to achieve these goals over time’ (Jenkins-Smith and 
Sabatier 1993:5). The conceptual elevation of shared beliefs as the glue for group 
formation and concerted action is a central feature of this approach. It draws on a strand 
of the public policy literature which views policies themselves in the same manner as 
belief systems: that is, as sets of value priorities, perceptions of important causal 
relationships, perceptions of the seriousness of a problem, and perceptions of the efficacy 
of policy instruments as means of attaining those value priorities (Pressman and 
Wildavsky 1973, Majone 1980). In this state-society framework, two or more advocacy 
coalitions are the basic units of analysis engaged in framing debate on policy problems 
and, ultimately, determining the content of state policy preferences: identifying
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important relative to less important information, identifying cause-effect relationships,
3 3
and proposing policy responses.
An advocacy coalition approach opens the way for ideas to contribute to a more fine­
grained explanation of the content and timing of American trade policy innovations. The 
causal significance of ideas (vis-a-vis interests) remains a topic of intense controversy in 
the study of politics. The basic premise of this analysis is that the distinction should not 
be exaggerated as ideas and interests are usually intertwined; a view supported by 
distinguished scholars in both the rational choice and constructivist traditions (Fiorina 
1995: 114, Smith 1995: 137). Interests must be represented and aligned with those of 
other actors and may be ambiguous, unclear, or internally contradictory. Ideas are 
interesting at the stage of preference formation because of the difficulties in identifying 
structurally-determined interests and because they help to give content to “objective’' 
interests. Rationalist, interest-based models of actor behaviour must still identify a set of 
parameters (goals, means, perceived causal relationships, and performance indicators) 
which constitute a belief system (Sabatier 1987: 663). An advocacy coalition approach 
also makes a case for attention to groups formed around shared beliefs on operational 
grounds. Belief system models have the capacity to be more inclusive by incorporating 
self-interest and organisational interests, while also allowing actors to establish goals in 
quite different ways; for example, as a result of socialisation. This inclusiveness carries 
with it operational benefits when it comes to aggregating state and non-state actors into a 
limited number of advocacy coalitions (Sabatier 1993: 28).
To be sure, ideas will rarely be the major drivers of change in policy. Non-cognitive 
factors — the “real world" of international political-economic conditions, 
macroeconomic cycles, or broad governing coalitions in a political system -  will dictate 
the dominance of one coalition over others in a policy community, and hence core 
aspects of a policy. Belief systems may determine the direction in which an advocacy 
coalition will seek to move governmental policies, but its ability to do so will be 
dependent critically upon the distribution of such resources as money, number of 
supporters, expertise, and legal authority (Sabatier 1993: 29). Also, not everyone active 
in a policy community will belong to an advocacy coalition or share one of the major
" The advocacy coalition framework has been applied in an American political context to such policy areas as 
crime, unemployment and air pollution (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (eds.) 1993).
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belief systems. A potentially important role may be filled by ‘policy brokers’ concerned 
predominantly with finding some reasonable compromise to keep the level of conflict in 
a policy area within certain limits. 4
But ideas are more than epiphenomenal. Neglecting ideas underestimates the scope for 
human agency and choice resulting in an incomplete picture of the dynamics of policy 
change. Exploring the fit between ideas and politics -  why some ideas win out over 
others, and why ideas catch on at the time that they do -  allows for a fuller understanding 
of how the boundaries for policy innovation are delimited. Yee (1996: 97) argues 
cogently that as the basis for inter-subjective understandings, ideas ‘quasi-causally 
affect’ actions ‘not by directly or inevitably determining them but rather by rendering 
these actions plausible or implausible, acceptable or unacceptable, conceivable or 
inconceivable, respectable or disreputable, etc.’ How social phenomena become “policy 
problems”, and how particular understandings of problems emerge over time to guide 
policy-making, are important questions in a state-society framework.
This intertemporal dimension suggests a role for policy-oriented learning — relatively 
enduring alterations of thought or behavioural intentions that result from experience and 
are concerned with the attainment (or revision) of policy objectives (Heclo 1974: 306). ° 
A substantial literature on learning and its role in the policy process has developed from 
different social scientific perspectives.’6 While only individuals learn, the distribution of 
attitudes within, and positions of, groups clearly change over time. The advocacy 
coalition approach assumes that for the most part learning is instrumental. The core 
beliefs of an advocacy coalition are quite resistant to change over time and coalitions
vl The distinction between "advocate1 and ‘broker’ rests on a continuum. As Sabatier (1993: 27) points out, 
many brokers ‘will have some policy bent, while advocates may show some serious concern with system 
maintenance’.
°  The concept of policy-oriented learning is not meant to convey improved policy effectiveness. Nor does it 
carry normative implications regarding approval of the content and ends of policy. What Nye (1987: 379) 
terms ‘negative learning’ can occur where new information is misleading or wrongly applied.
'6 For surveys of the politics and foreign policy literature, see Bennett and Howlett (1992) and Levy (1994).
’7 Sabatier (1987: 672) cites in this regard: (1) individual learning and attitudina! change; (2) the diffusion of 
new beliefs/attitudes among individuals; (3) turnover in individuals within a collectivity; (4) group dynamics, 
such as polarisation of homogeneous groups; and (5) rules for aggregating preferences and for promoting (or 
impeding) communication among members. In general, a time frame of a decade or more appears necessary to 
allow for the cumulative impact of policy learning from past successes or failures.
36
will resist information suggesting that their basic beliefs may be invalid or unattainable. 1 
Hence, they will use policy analysis primarily to buttress and elaborate those beliefs (or 
attack their opponents’ views). While exogenous events or opponents’ activities may 
force a re-examination of core beliefs (cognitive learning), the pain of doing so (ego- 
defense, peer-group and organisational forces) tends to limit such activity.
Even so, learning can lead to changes in secondary aspects of a belief system; for 
example, the search for improved mechanisms to attain core values internal to a belief 
system. Often termed tactical learning, this implies a focus on learning within advocacy 
coalitions. A central argument of this study, however, is that policy-oriented learning 
will be more “credible” the more it embodies an element of learning across coalitions in 
a policy community and the less it relies on the superior resources or institutional 
position of one coalition over another. Drawing attention to policy-oriented learning 
points to a fluid dimension of the US trade policy process in which certain belief systems 
strengthen over time, binding one coalition of actors together, whereas alternative belief 
systems fragment, loosening ties within the rival coalition. Subsequent chapters argue 
that over time particular ideas about the Japan problem left an imprint on US trade policy 
in a way that cannot be tied simply to changing external circumstances or the superior 
resources of one coalition. The result was a deepening penetration across the American 
trade policy community of the view that Japan was different from other advanced 
industrial economies in terms of the openness of its economy to international commerce 
and its responsiveness to traditional, process-oriented trade negotiations.
To explain more fully the content and timing of change in US market access policy 
towards Japan, this study emphasises the contest between two broad advocacy coalitions 
in the American trade policy community -  the Free Trade-Good Relations coalition (free 
traders) and the Hardline-Japan is Different coalition (hardliners). The free traders are 
synonymous with US foreign policy internationalism and the ascendancy of the United 
States as a global superpower. Their expansive definition of American foreign policy
• 38
's Proponents of an advocacy coalition approach have divided the structure of elite belief systems into three 
categories: (1) a deep core of fundamental normative and ontological axioms that define a person’s personal 
philosophies; (2) a near (policy) core of basic strategies and policy positions for achieving deep core beliefs in 
a policy area; and (3) a set of secondary aspects comprising a multitude of instrumental decisions and 
information searches necessary to implement the policy core in the specific policy area. The three categories 
are arranged in order of decreasing resistance to change (Sabatier 1993: 30).
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interests has entailed far-reaching political-economic engagement and power projection 
and drawn strength from America’s global corporate and financial reach. The burst of 
American-led alliance and institution building in the years immediately following World 
War II established the structures that have supported this continuity (Gardner 1980, 
Pollard 1985, Ikenberry 1993). The emergence of the bipolar struggle of the Cold War 
saw containment of the Soviet Union provide an ordering doctrine of American foreign 
policy to which was welded the economic arms of American diplomacy (Gaddis 1982, 
Kunz 1997). If not free trade in an absolute sense, freer trade emerged as one element of 
a shared belief system increasingly identified with an American foreign policy elite. The 
capacity of this free trade coalition to command and staff key policy institutions in the 
US executive branch has been a hallmark of continuity in US foreign policy.
A core American trade policy strategy of process-oriented multilateralism through the 
GATT defined the policy ascendancy of the free traders from the second half of the 
1940s through the 1960s. Periodic rounds of trade negotiations under the GATT saw 
tariffs significantly reduced by the end of the 1960s. By the 1970s, the relative decline in 
the margin of American economic ascendancy, the emergence of a substantial balance of 
payments deficit and heightened domestic economic problems associated with stagflation 
weakened the political base of support for free trade. But the maintenance of strong Cold 
War alliances and support for an open international trading system remained core 
concerns of high-level American policy makers. By the 1980s, the strains on this policy 
framework emerged more acutely in the form of pressures on the US executive branch to 
adopt a less cooperative, less multilateralist trade policy. In time, the emergence of the 
Japan problem at the centre of American foreign policy debate would challenge 
fundamentally the dominant belief system associated with the free trade coalition.
The hardliners’ conception of the Japan problem drew on the longer American policy 
tradition characterised by suspicion of internationalism and free trade ideas and 
committed to defending sectoral interests under the rubric of fair trade.39 While the 
experience of the 1930s made trade protection a difficult argument to justify 
intellectually, it did not remove the political pressures on the American political system
’9 As Gardner (1980: 1) notes, prior to the 1940s the ‘dominant tradition of US international economic policy 
was a ‘compound of economic isolation and economic nationalism’. Similarly, Goldstein (1993: 176) remarks 
that ‘fair-trade ideas have a far longer and more entrenched history than free-trade ideas’.
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to constrain import competition. Neither did the institutional structures created after 
World War 11 to bind Japan into a US-centred international alliance network supplant a 
history of bilateral economic and military conflict which had marked the earlier century 
of US-Japan relations. The hardliners, institutionally represented most forcefully by parts 
of Congress, shared a general antipathy towards what they saw as a foreign policy elite 
all too willing to trade-off American commercial interests for the sake of good 
international relations. The same forces that eroded the political ascendancy of the free 
traders in the 1970s brought to the fore stronger demands for fair trade and for more 
specific reciprocity in the conduct of US trade policy (Cline 1983b).
Heightened exposure to Japanese behind-the-border institutions and practices, in 
conjunction with an increasing bilateral trade imbalance and intense Japanese import 
competition in the US market, led to increased American policy attention to bilateral 
market access problems in Japan in the 1970s. The idea that Japan played by different 
rules economically, while not new, gained wider intellectual support by the 1980s. Over 
time, the hardliners successfully focused attention on the Japan problem as an issue of 
high political and economic salience. In the wake of a crisis in the American trade policy 
regime, hardline ideas helped to alter the boundaries of American market access policy 
towards Japan.
Conclusion
A state-society approach focuses on the domestic institutions, norms and groups that 
cross-cut the state-society distinction. Although it is open to international-level factors 
shaping the broad contours of policy change, the primary theoretical focus is on the 
domestic process of preference formation. A state-society approach puts the domestic 
trade policy regime at the centre of the analysis, highlighting how institutional variables 
shape and constrain political strategies. An advocacy coalition approach complements 
this regime focus by examining the political contest between groups engaged in guiding 
understandings of policy problems, identifying cause-effect relationships, and proposing 
policy responses. The following chapter explores the critical variable underpinning the 
ascendancy of the hardliners over the free traders in the American trade policy 
community and the rise of a results-oriented Japan policy -  a crisis in the American 
trade policy regime in the first half of the 1980s.
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3 An American trade policy regime crisis
Introduction
The first half of the 1980s was marked by a crisis in the institutions, laws and norms that 
had oriented US trade policy since 1934 -  a crisis in the 1934 regime. The US trade 
deficit ballooned, a sharp rise in US protection threatened to undermine 50 years of trade 
liberalisation, Congress took on a more activist policy role, and America's postwar 
commitment to process-oriented multilateralism in its trade relations was significantly 
weakened. Japan would be the primary target of a more aggressive bilateralism after 
1985. This chapter argues that explaining the evolution of US market access policy 
towards Japan requires an understanding of this broader crisis in the American trade 
policy regime.40
Within a state-society framework, a regime focus highlights how institutional factors 
structure political situations as part of the architecture defining the policy environment. 
But just as a regime acts as a source of order, so can incongruities and frictions in 
different institutional politics act as sources of change. Such frictions tend to be most 
acute at times of economic stress, testing the legitimacy of established policy regimes. 
The economic crisis of the Great Depression paved the way for a major restructuring of 
the American trade policy regime via the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934. The 
1934 regime would in turn face a crisis of legitimacy in the 1980s and the resultant 
erosion of the key regime norm of executive branch primacy would have long-lasting 
consequences for US policy.
The regime crisis connects external shocks to the policy regime with the second Reagan 
Administration’s initiation of a more aggressive bilateral market access policy in 1985. 
The fundamental sources of this crisis lay in the interaction of international and domestic 
variables. The internationalisation of US manufacturing industry and the emergence of 
new sources of surplus capital in the global economy eroded the postwar dominance of 
the American economy. Japan emerged as the broadest and deepest economic challenger
1(1 Destlcr’s (1995) seminal book on American trade politics is a reference point for any institution- 
centred analysis of US trade policy.
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to American economic supremacy on both these fronts. Systemic change is nonetheless 
an insufficient source of explanatory leverage over the nature, intensity and timing of the 
policy regime crisis. Domestic decisions pushed the American trade policy process to 
crisis point in the mid 1980s -  most notably, the macroeconomic policies of the Reagan 
Administration.
The rising tide of regime stress in the first half of the 1980s was marked by a reassertion 
of congressional activism and rising US protection across a range of sectors. By 
September 1985, a credible threat by Congress to enact veto-proof restrictive trade 
legislation and to further limit executive branch policy discretion forced the Reagan 
Administration to adopt a more aggressive approach to bilateral export politics using 
Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974. The scale of its competitive challenge and the size 
of the bilateral trade imbalance went a long way to ensuring that Japan was the primary 
target of this shift in US policy.
Domestic regime crisis as a conditioning variable
This study’s state-society framework fits most comfortably within the historical 
institutionalist school of politics that, together with the rational choice school of 
institutionalists, has advanced the case for a “rediscovery” of institutions in political 
analysis. Historical institutionalists maintain that by shaping not just actors’ strategies 
(as in rational choice), but their goals as well, and by mediating their relations of 
cooperation and conflict, institutions structure political situations and leave their own 
imprint on political outcomes. The historical institutionalist school has a particular 
interest in constructing analytic bridges between state-centred and society-centred 
analyses by looking at the institutional arrangements that structure relations between the 
two (Thelen and Steinmo 1992: 10).
A regime focus highlights the importance of institutional context in mediating the 
formulation of actor goals and in determining whose preferences are represented as state 
preferences. Regimes tend to be “sticky” as institutions are slow to change and rules and 
norms endure. They often outlive the constellation of interests that created them. Policy
11 See, for example, March and Olsen (1989), North (1990), Weaver and Rockman (1993) and Hall and Taylor 
(1996).
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choices are long-lasting, not only because their institutionalisation influences future 
constellations of interests, but also because actors come to value the policy's rules and 
norms themselves (Goldstein 1993: 9). Regimes, while ultimately changeable, ‘confront 
choosing agents as historical givens, as part of the architecture defining the choice 
situation rather than as something to be chosen' (Caporaso and Levine 1992: 156).
The persistence or stickiness of policy regimes is governed critically by perceptions of 
their legitimacy. Focusing on political institutions, Skowronek (1995: 92) notes that:
the distinctive criteria of institutional action are official duty and legitimate authority. 
Called on to account for their actions or to explain their decisions, incumbents have no 
recourse but to repair to their job descriptions. Thus, institutions do not simply constrain 
or channel the actions of self-interested individuals, they prescribe actions, construct 
motives, and assert legitimacy.
Definitions of actor interest and actor behaviour are forged in an environment of 
legitimate and authoritative norms. Of course, in any political system there are likely to 
be contending sources of legitimate action. Indeed, many different rules and norms of 
legitimate action will be operative in a political system at any given time. This gives 
institutional politics not only its patterns of order, but also patterns of conflict. 
‘Institutional politics is most significant, in other words, as the arena in which different 
rules of legitimate order converge, collide, and fold back on one another' (Skowronek 
1995: 95). Perceptions of regime legitimacy take on particular significance in this 
context, as do issues of historical contingency.
The historical institutionalist approach seeks to integrate an understanding of general 
patterns of political history with an explanation of the contingent nature of political and 
economic development (Thelen and Steinmo 1992). It is interested in conjunctures of 
separately located processes or conflicts and how earlier outcomes change the parameters 
for subsequent developments. Emphasising the role of institutions, contingent variables 
and political agency, historical institutionalism avoids the sort of structural determinism 
that characterises more abstract, deductive theories. Space for historical and institutional 
arguments has come also from notions of multiple equilibria and path dependence drawn 
from economics. As Evans (1995: 7) notes:
These new theoretical approaches are saying that, even in principle, formal theoretical 
models cannot provide determinative answers without knowing something about
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individual sequences of events. There has to be an element of path dependence, which is 
to say history.
Using historical-inductive approaches, a number of scholars have explored the role of 
economic crises as a source of “extraordinary politics”, regime delegitimation and long- 
lasting policy reorientation (Olson 1982, Gourevitch 1986, Nelson (ed.) 1990, Haggard 
and Kaufman (eds.) 1992, Williamson and Haggard 1994).42 During crises, interests tend 
to be fluid, existing coalitions can fracture and opportunities are created for actors who 
were previously prevented from taking the initiative. Crises open the door to policy 
reform by breaking the normal, incremental mode of decision-making. This economic 
crisis hypothesis has found a place in the study of American trade policy with Goldstein 
(1993: 13) arguing that, ‘Just about all significant changes in American trade policy have 
been prefaced by hard economic times’. Most notably, the crisis of the Great Depression 
paved the way for a fundamental restructuring of the American trade policy regime with 
the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934. The RTAA transformed the American 
trade policy process by reordering the institutional relationship between the executive, 
Congress and societal groups. In particular, executive primacy replaced congressional 
primacy as the central norm of the American trade policy regime. The Depression was 
important not simply because of the export-oriented interests it served to mobilise, but 
also because state actors were empowered by crisis conditions to justify an 
‘extraordinary’ delegation of power from Congress to the executive (Haggard 1988: 
100). This regime change in the United States would provide the foundation for a more 
liberal international trading system under US leadership.43
The contrast with the pre-1934 regime highlights the significance of this institutional 
change. Under the US Constitution, America’s Founding Fathers created a system of 
‘separated institutions sharing powers’ (Neustadt 1960: 33). The separation of powers in 
the Constitution and its system of checks and balances built institutional conflict and 
contending sources of legitimate action into the making of public policy. Compared with 
parliamentary systems of government, the most striking feature of the American system 
is the weakness of the executive. The US president exercises very few powers alone 
outside of ensuring that laws are ‘faithfully executed’. The president can veto a bill
12 The term “extraordinary politics” has been borrowed from Balcerowicz (1994).
Winham (1992: 19) argues that the RTAA was ‘a signal event and it produced what could be reasonably 
called a revolution in international trade policy’.
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passed by Congress, but has little formal power to ensure that desired legislative 
measures will be enacted (Wilson and Dilulio 1995). Under the US Constitution, 
Congress has exclusive power to ‘regulate commerce with foreign nations’. While it has 
sole authority to negotiate agreements with foreign countries, the executive has no direct 
trade policy powers. As Destler (1995: 14) notes, ‘The Constitution grants the president 
no trade-specific authority whatsoever. Thus, in no sphere of government policy can the 
primacy of the legislative branch be clearer: Congress reigns supreme on trade, unless 
and until it decides otherwise’.44
Prior to 1934, the institutional dominance of Congress was largely unchallenged. The 
result was a domestically-oriented tariff setting process sensitive to particularistic 
economic interests. Following a brief period in which the revenue needs of the Republic 
prevailed (1789-1816), the politics of the tariff revolved primarily around firm and 
industry-level returns to protection -  especially following the Civil War which saw the 
development of many new industries in the North and the military defeat of the 
traditionally low-tariff South (Nelson 1989: 87). The Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, 
which increased ad valorem rates on dutiable imports to around 60 per cent, symbolised 
the ascendancy of narrowly-based commercial interests in a policy regime where the 
dominant norm of reciprocal non-interference meant that commercial interests expecting 
to be harmed found their only available recourse to be additional protection for 
themselves. Smoot-Hawley was followed by a wave of retaliation by America’s trading 
partners and the resultant steep fall in world trade deepened the economic crisis of the 
Great Depression (Kindleberger 1973).
This crisis of the pre-1934 policy regime provided the critical opening for supporters of 
institutional reform under the leadership of US Secretary of State, Cordell Hull. Hull's 
advocacy of free trade reflected a combination of economic and political motivations. He 
attacked the assumption that the United States could export without importing, but more 
important was the connection he drew between protectionism, nationalism and 
international conflict (Hull 1948). The move within the international trading system 
towards bilateralism and preferential trading schemes that accompanied the Depression
44 From a comparative perspective, as Cohen, Paul and Blecker (1996: 106) argue, ‘When it comes to trade 
policy, no other legislative body has as much influence and authority relative to the executive branch as does 
the US Congress’.
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put a premium on executive branch ability to negotiate credibly and tlexibly. Under Hull, 
the State Department criticised the incoherence of US policy, using historical precedent 
to justify a centralisation of policy through the RTAA of 1934 (Haggard 1988: 100). 
Indeed, as Goldstein (1993: 143) suggests, ‘Hull was successful at trade liberalization 
only because his ideas were consonant with the new institutional structures. In retrospect, 
his support of executive delegation was probably more critical to the history of the trade 
reform program than was his commitment to liberalism’.
The Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act was the last general tariff law enacted by the US 
Congress. Under the RTAA, the president was authorised to negotiate tariff reductions of 
up to 50 per cent within a specified period of three years. As Goldstein (1993: 146) 
points out, this congressional delegation of tariff setting to the executive branch was ‘an 
unusual moment in congressional history’ in that:
Congress could have mandated that it ratify all treaties negotiated by the president.
Instead, its members specifically denied themselves even this authority. After 1934,
treaties that were within the reductions specified, ex ante, by Congress were enacted and
implemented through executive order.
Presidential authority to negotiate and implement reciprocal tariff reductions with other 
nations was renewed in 1937, 1940, 1943 and 1945. After the war, the US executive took 
the lead in multilateralising its trade negotiating objectives through the GATT.45 The 
GAIT established the framework for an American trade strategy of process-oriented 
multilateralism designed to promote reciprocal reductions in trade barriers through trade 
negotiating rounds.46 Six rounds of GATT negotiations were completed by the end of the 
1960s. Especially important were the first, the Geneva Round of 1947, and the last, the 
Kennedy Round (1963-1967). During the former, the United States reduced its tariffs by 
an average of 20 per cent on all dutiable imports.47 During the latter, major participants 
reduced tariffs by about 35 per cent on their non-agricultural imports that accounted for 
about 80 per cent of industrial countries’ dutiable imports (Pastor 1980: 118-19).
45 Finalised in October 1947 after seven months of negotiation, the GATT contained ‘most of the provisions 
on commercial policy supported in the 1940s by US diplomats’ (Dam 1970: 12).
46 From the outset, there were important exceptions in efforts to establish a comprehensive, multilateral trading 
system, including US-instigated waivers to allow for the continuation of New Deal farm programs. In 
addition, moves to launch a more ambitious International Trade Organization could not gain US congressional 
endorsement (Diebold 1952).
1 The United States engaged in the most meaningful tariff reductions in the early years of the GATT largely 
due to the maintenance of quantitative restrictions in other countries (Curzon 1965: 70).
45
[Beyond the crisis phase of depression and war, a number of factors helped to reinforce 
and secure executive primacy at the heart of the 1934 policy regime. First, as will be 
explored further below, America’s global economic dominance was conducive to an 
executive-defined agenda of reductions in trade barriers. Second, trade policy was 
interwoven with a national security policy centred on the Cold War and the construction 
of an American-led alliance system in opposition to the spread of communism. In the 
immediate postwar years, key policy makers in the Truman Administration (e.g., 
Marshall, Acheson and Kennan) saw the instruments of international economic policy 
(including trade policy) as fundamental instruments of national security policy (Gaddis 
1982, Pollard 1985, Kunz 1997).48 And third, the 1934 regime was secured by the 
decline of trade as a major source of conflict between the Republican and Democratic 
parties. Critical in this regard was the gradual shift by the Republican Party towards 
support for a more liberal trade policy. This was vital to the norm of executive primacy 
as presidents, regardless of party, could champion liberal trade for both foreign and 
domestic policy reasons.44 Increased support for international economic liberalism 
among government and business elites was a significant factor in this cross-party support 
for executive primacy. This elite coalition in turn drew strength through the 1950s and 
1960s as the pursuit of freer trade coincided with a period of growing global economic 
prosperity. Success confirmed the liberal ideology, just as the Great Depression 
discredited protectionism.
The 1934 regime was characterised by a centralisation and insulation of the policy­
making process. At the same time, Congress took on a balancing and brokering role, 
continuing to place limits on the autonomy of the executive branch. Especially important 
were devices for managing protectionist pressures and diverting them from Congress to 
the executive branch. First, the GATT-based system of multilateral trade rounds 
provided the key mechanism for export politics, shifting the balance of trade interests by
1S A major aim of US policy was to integrate Japan into the “free world” economic system, underpinning its 
role as a key US strategic ally in Asia. The United States took the lead in sponsoring Japan’s entry into the 
GATT and, along with Canada, was one of two GATT members not to invoke Article XXXV authorising non­
application of the GATT to a new contracting party (Curzon 1965).
49 A key test of executive primacy came with the election of the Eisenhower Republican Administration in 
1952. In their analysis of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1954-55, Bauer, Pool and Dexter (1963: 
466) point out that the Republican Party (normally most susceptible to the pressure of business interests for 
protection from foreign competition) ‘felt free to adopt as the most cherished item of its legislative program a 
Roosevelt measure which transferred tariff making from the legislative to the executive branch’.
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engaging exporters in the opening up of new markets overseas and, in the process, 
deferring protectionist claims. Still, Congress continued to set guidelines, regulating how 
much tariff levels should be changed, by what procedures, and with what exceptions. 
Second, Congress established the terms of access to administered protection, designed to 
offer recourse to interests seriously injured by imports, and to combat alleged unfair 
foreign practices. With the retention in US trade law of procedural safeguards such as the 
peril point and escape clause provisions, Congress sought to ensure that industries 
disadvantaged by the trade liberalisation program of the executive could gain relief/1 
Third, Congress required an agent in the policy-making process to ensure that 
congressional and constituency concerns were not easily ignored even while trade 
expansion was pursued. As a price for providing President Kennedy with new 
negotiating authority in 1962, Congress proposed the establishment, within the Executive 
Office of the President, of the Special Trade Representative (STR).51 Later recast as 
USTR with the Trade Representative given cabinet rank, this agency would serve as the 
focal point for US trade policy management allowing Congress to more systematically 
shift responsibility on to the executive branch.
Clearly the shift towards executive primacy under the 1934 regime did not equate with 
free trade and demands for protection from politically-sensitive industries still had to be 
addressed. But equally, Congress gave executive officials leeway to find the specific 
form of protection that would minimise potential retaliation, and to ensure that less 
compelling pressures were diverted to a depoliticised administrative process that was for 
the most part unfriendly to granting relief (Mucciaroni 1995: 105). 2 By the 1970s, 
however, signs were emerging of a more fragmented and politicised policy regime as key 
economic interests abandoned support for liberal trade/'* 1 Structural economic problems 
of high inflation and unemployment preoccupied American policy-makers, as they did
50 See Destler (1995: 21) for a discussion of the peril point and escape clause provisions and their pre-1934 
precedents. Goldstein (1993) deals at length with how postwar moves towards liberalisation incorporated 
many vestiges from the earlier protectionist period.
1 In the immediate postwar years, the US State Department played the lead role in trade negotiations. But 
over time the State Department became subject to increasing domestic criticism for trading away American 
commercial advantages for diplomatic goals.
52 The percentage of industries for which the US International Trade Commission (ITC) found import-induced 
injury was 35 per cent in 1951 -62 and fell to 20 per cent in 1963-74 (Lawrence and Litan 1986: 44). 
y’ Most notably, rising import penetration in many manufacturing industries saw the peak body of US 
organised labour, the American Federation of Labour and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), 
move out of the open trade coalition. T his change in labour’s position was reflected in the trade policy stance 
among an increased number of Democratic Party members of Congress.
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those in most other industrialised economies. The emergence of persistent balance of 
payments problems saw trade issues become more salient politically in the United States. 
Also, the success of the process of tariff reductions shifted attention towards NTBs to 
trade, not only because they were more obvious as tariff rates declined but also because 
they were increasingly the outlet of protectionist pressures.
In the Trade Act of 1974, Congress authorised the Nixon Administration to begin a new 
round of negotiations -  the Tokyo Round -  with a particular focus on reducing NTBs. 
But in order to preserve greater oversight, Congress now stipulated that any agreements 
must be approved by a majority vote in both the House of Representatives and the Senate 
-  the so-called “fast-track” procedure. The 1974 Trade Act also eased the conditions 
regulating access to relief under anti-dumping and countervailing duty mechanisms. In 
addition, Congress established a process whereby domestic interests could petition the 
executive to act against unfair foreign import restrictions. Building on an earlier 
provision in the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, the new Section 301 provision granted the 
president authority to take retaliatory action against a country that maintained 
‘unjustifiable’, ‘unreasonable’, or ‘discriminatory’ restrictions on US exports. In time, 
Section 301 would form the legal instrument for a rebalancing of US trade policy focus 
away from multilateralism and towards aggressive bilateralism.
In 1979, the Carter Administration won overwhelming congressional approval for the 
Tokyo Round agreements. The Tokyo Round reduced tariff rates on manufactured 
products by an average of one-third and put in place new codes on NTBs in such areas as 
government procurement, subsidies and countervailing duties (Winham 1986). While 
Congress again moved to ease the standards by which administered protection could be 
granted in the Trade Act of 1979, the central norm of executive primacy was largely 
maintained. Congress’ main objective was limited to giving more power to the 
bureaucracy by easing aid requirements, not to subvert executive branch primacy. It was 
this presidential authority and leadership, used astutely to tip the balance in favour of 
freer trade, that underpinned the 1934 regime. It allowed Congress to avoid blame and 
continue to deflect pressures for it to assume a more dominant role in the trade policy 
process. As a result of successive rounds of multilateral negotiations initiated by the 
executive, the average US tariff level on dutiable imports was reduced from 60 per cent 
in 1931 to 5.7 per cent in 1980 (Lavergne 1983). With their larger constituency, capacity
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to control appointments, to set agendas and to define the nature of an issue, postwar 
presidents were able to use their position to support a generally liberal, multilateralist 
trade strategy. As Destler (1995: 32) notes:
There were variations in their degrees of personal commitment: on balance, Gerald R. 
Ford’s was greater than Richard M. Nixon’s, and Lyndon B. Johnson and Jimmy Carter 
were more devoted free traders than John F. Kennedy. But all proved willing to play the 
role of tilting in the liberal direction -  in the decisions they made themselves and in the 
appointments they made to key trade positions.
The 1980s crisis in the US trade policy regime would signify an unprecedented test of 
the legitimacy of the 1934 regime, its central norm of executive primacy and the process- 
oriented multilateralism that had been at the centre of American trade strategy for around 
40 years. It saw the most avowedly free trade-oriented US President of the modern era 
preside over what even supporters would term a ‘strategic retreat’ on trade policy 
(Niskanen 1988: 137). The Reagan Administration’s first formal “Statement on US 
Trade Policy” in July 1981 set as its goal the promotion of ‘free trade, based on mutually 
acceptable trading relations’ while pledging to ‘strongly oppose trade distorting 
interventions by government’.54 In time, senior Reagan Administration officials would 
acknowledge that the President had imposed more protectionist measures than any 
predecessor since Herbert Floover whose signature approved the Smoot Hawley tariff. 5 
By the second half of 1985, Congress had moved to reclaim a more central role in US 
trade policy, wielding the threat of veto-proof protectionist legislation and embarking on 
the first omnibus trade bill to be drafted by the Congress in over 50 years. President 
Reagan was forced to unveil a new strategy of ‘free and fair’ trade on 23 September 
1985. The centrepiece was the self-initiation by the US government of bilateral Section 
301 actions to combat unfair foreign trade practices.
The regime crisis acts as a conditioning variable and vantage-point for exploring change 
in US policy towards Japan. It illuminates the role of path dependency and how actions 
taken at one point in time result in opportunities for and constraints on future action by 
sending policy off on particular tracks. It would have long-lasting consequences as 
Congress moved to reclaim a more central role in US trade policy and the executive
54 US Congress, Senate Committee on Finance (1981).
55 In 1987, then US Treasury Secretary James Baker remarked that President Reagan had granted ‘more import 
relief than any predecessor ‘in more than half a century’ (Finger 1992: 89). Similarly, Niskanen (1988: 137) 
states that ‘the administration imposed more new restraints on trade than any administration since Hoover’.
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branch embraced a more structured and aggressive bilateral market access policy. As 
Haggard (1988: 119) notes, ‘If institutions matter in explaining policy outcomes, 
political scientists should spend more effort unraveling those historical conjunctures or 
“turning points” when the context of policymaking changes fundamentally’. But in so 
doing it becomes clear that while institutional factors are important, they are never the 
sole “cause” of outcomes. The underlying sources of the regime crisis lay in the 
interaction of international and domestic factors external to the policy regime.
America’s relative economic decline and the Japanese challenge
Stresses in the American trade policy regime by the 1980s can be traced in part to change 
in America’s relative position in the world economy, especially vis-a-vis Japan. Relative 
decline in American economic power and increasing interdependence with the world 
economy provide an important, but permissive, systemic factor explaining a general US 
shift towards a more aggressive bilateral market opening policy in the 1980s. Two 
factors restructured the international environment facing American institutions and 
actors: (1) the erosion of the artificial postwar dominance of American manufacturing 
industry; and (2) the emergence of new sources of surplus capital in the international 
economy. With the United States increasingly dependent on international trade and 
financial flows, Japan would emerge as the major economic challenger to American 
economic supremacy. In the real economy, Japan’s challenge was first apparent via 
pressure on basic US manufacturing industries, and later manifest in the area of high 
technology. By the 1980s, Japan's financial resources saw it eclipse the United States as 
the world’s largest creditor nation.
At the end of World War II, the United States emerged with its economic base greatly 
expanded, while the industrial capacity of both its enemies and its allies was either 
destroyed or obsolete. Output in the United States had roughly doubled in real terms 
during the war, and by 1945 the US produced around half of the world’s industrial output 
(Gardner 1980: 178). The United States was often the only source of products 
incorporating the technologies that emerged after the war. Trade patterns in the early 
postwar years confirmed its economic dominance. The United States accounted for over 
one-third of world trade in the war’s aftermath, but its economy remained largely self-
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sufficient/6 As late as 1952, the US share of manufactures exports of the ten largest 
industrial economies stood at 35 per cent, compared with only 21 per cent in both 1938 
and 1928. Export surpluses were recorded at that time in every major industrial group 
except metals -  for example, machinery, vehicles, chemicals, textiles, and miscellaneous 
manufactures (Baldwin 1984b: 8). One senior figure in postwar US economic diplomacy 
would write subsequently that the position of the United States after World War II was 
‘entirely abnormal and unsustainable’ (Volcker 1992: xv).
Two decades of rapid economic growth in Europe and Japan meant that the postwar 
dominance of the US economy had diminished significantly by the early 1970s. On a 
purchasing power parity basis, the US share of world output fell from around a third in 
the late 1940s to approximately 22 per cent in 1970 (Maddison 1995a). America’s share 
of the ten major industrial countries’ total manufacturing output fell from 62 per cent in 
1950 to 44 per cent in 1970 (Branson 1980: 191). Low- and medium-technology 
manufacturing industries in the United States experienced eroding comparative 
advantage, first relative to European and Japanese competitors, and later relative to the 
newly industrialising economies (NIEs) of Asia and Latin America. In the 1950s, 
productivity in Japan and Europe was very low compared with the United States. 
Subsequently output per worker in these countries converged to the US level, though at a 
steadily diminishing pace. Table 3.1 shows the differences in manufacturing productivity 
growth rates that delivered the postwar “catch-up" with the United States by other 
industrial countries, as well as the general productivity slow-down in the 1970s.
Table 3.1 Manufacturing Productivity Growth in Major Industrialised Countries
(average annual growth, %)
U n i t e d  S t a t e s J a p a n G e r m a n y F r a n c e U n i t e d  K i n g d o m
1 9 5 0 - 7 3 2.62 9.48 6.31 5.63 3.25
1 9 7 3 - 7 9 1.37 5.39 4.22 4.9 0.83
Source: Bailey and Blair (1988: 180)
' In 1946-47, exports were about 6 per cent of national income while imports were 2.5 per cent (Pollard 1985: 
281).
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The US share of world manufactures exports fell from 29 per cent in 1953 to 13 per cent 
in 1971 (Branson 1980: 196). Summarising the changing international position of 
America’s manufacturing sector, Branson (1980: 183) noted that:
in the immediate postwar years, the pattern of United States trade was distorted by a 
relative strength in manufacturing that was transitory. The recovery of the European and 
Japanese economies in the 1950s and 1960s, and the growth of manufacturing capacity 
in the developing countries in the 1960s and 1970s inevitably reduced the United States 
share of world output and of world exports. ... By the 1970s, trade patterns reflecting 
underlying comparative advantage had been restored, and the United States was once 
again an importer of consumer goods.
Total manufacturing output in the United States grew at about the same rate as the 
average of all industrialised countries between 1973 and 1980, and total employment in 
manufacturing increased in absolute terms (Lawrence 1984: 34). At the same time, a real 
depreciation of the US dollar after 1971 worked to sustain overall US manufacturing 
competitiveness through the decade. The US share of manufactured exports of 13 major 
OECD countries was roughly 20 per cent both at the beginning and end of the 1970s 
(OECD 1994: 87). The long-term structural adjustment problems of American 
manufacturing were concentrated overwhelmingly in a few large, medium and low- 
technology industries — in particular automobiles, steel, textiles and apparel. Special 
protection had been a feature of the textile and apparel industries since the mid 1950s, 
and of steel since the late 1960s.77 Sluggish domestic demand, declining comparative 
advantage and weak productivity growth continued to afflict these industries in the 1970s 
in the context of the more general slowdown in productivity growth in the industrialised 
world after 1973.
fables 3.2-3.5 show in most cases weak output growth, absolute declines in employment 
and rising import penetration across these basic manufacturing industries through the 
1970s and into the 1980s. In 1979, automobile output and employment were 12.8 per 
cent and 5.5 per cent respectively below peak levels in 1973. Steel production fell 8.3 per 
cent between 1973 and 1979, while employment was down 6.0 per cent from the 1974 
peak. Textile output reached a new peak in 1979, but with 13.1 per cent less labour than
7 Hufbauer, Berliner and Elliott (1986) provide a short history and analysis of the major cases of special 
protection in the United States.
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Table 3.2 US Automobile Industry (select statistics)
o u t p u t ( 1 9 7 3 = 1 0 0 ) e m p l o y m e n t  ( 0 0 0 s ) i m p o r t  p e n e t r a t i o n  ( % )
1 9 7 0 67.8 245.3 14.7
1971 88.8 283 13.1
1 9 7 2 91.3 284 14.6
1 9 7 3 100.0 309.1 15.2
1 9 7 4 75.8 262.2 15.8
1 9 7 5 69.5 235.1 18.2
1 9 7 6 87.9 273.8 14.9
1 9 7 7 95.3 289.9 18.3
1 9 7 8 94.9 303.5 17.8
1 9 7 9 87.2 292 22.7
1 9 8 0 66.0 220.6 28.2
1981 64.7 223.4 28.8
1 9 8 2 52.5 193.5 29.3
1 9 8 3 70.1 216.5 27.6
1 9 8 4 80.4 247.6 24.9
1 9 8 5 83.9 249.7 25.2
Sources: World Bank and United Nations data, International Economic Databank, Australian National 
University, Fuss and Waverman (1992), Crandall et al. (1986) and Nelson (1996).
Table 3.3 US Steel Industry (select statistics)
o u t p u t ( 1 9 7 3 = 1 0 0 ) e m p l o y m e n t  ( 0 0 0 s ) i m p o r t  p e n e t r a t i o n  ( % )
1 9 7 0 84.8 862 13.8
1971 77.9 798 17.9
1 9 7 2 86.2 800 16.6
1 9 7 3 100.0 860 12.4
1 9 7 4 96.6 881 13.4
1 9 7 5 77.2 783 13.5
1 9 7 6 84.1 778 14.1
1 9 7 7 83.4 785 17.8
1 9 7 8 91.7 808 18.1
1 9 7 9 91.7 828 15.2
1 9 8 0 75.2 749 16.3
1981 80.0 724 18.9
1 9 8 2 49.7 558 21.8
1 9 8 3 57.9 480 20.8
1 9 8 4 64.1 505 26.6
1 9 8 5 62.1 449 25.9
Sources: World Bank and United Nations data, International Economic Databank, Australian National 
University, OECD (1995), Gray, Pugel and Walter (1986).
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Table 3.4 US Textile Industry (select statistics)
o u t p u t ( 1 9 7 3 = 1 0 0 ) e m p l o y m e n t  ( 0 0 0 s ) i m p o r t  p e n e t r a t i o n  ( % )
1 9 7 0 7 7 .9 1 113 4 .8 9
1971 81.1 1 094 5 .4 7
1 9 7 2 9 2 .6 1 145 5 .4 6
1 9 7 3 1 0 0 .0 1178 5 .3 8
1 9 7 4 9 2 .6 1 107 5 .2 2
1 9 7 5 85 .3 9 9 6 4 .5 6
1 9 7 6 9 3 . 7 104 2 4 . 9 9
1 9 7 7 9 3 . 7 106 7 4 .81
1 9 7 8 9 5 .8 106 2 5 .8 3
1 9 7 9 101.1 1 024 5 .5 8
1 9 8 0 9 6 .8 9 8 6 5 .9 9
1981 9 4 .7 951 6.51
1 9 8 2 8 7 .4 8 9 7 6 .3 9
1 9 8 3 9 8 .9 9 0 5 6 .4 7
1 9 8 4 9 6 .8 89 5 8 .5 0
1 9 8 5 9 5 .8 8 3 9 9 .8 4
Source'. World Bank and United Nations data, International Economic Databank, Australian National 
University.
Table 3.5 US Apparel Industry (select statistics)
o u t p u t ( 1 9 7 3 = 1 0 0 ) e m p l o y m e n t  ( 0 0 0 s ) i m p o r t  p e n e t r a t i o n  ( % )
1 9 7 0 8 6 .6 1164 5 .5 6
1 971 8 8 .7 1 1 4 2 5 .9 4
1 9 7 2 9 3 .8 1187 6.51
1 9 7 3 1 0 0 .0 1213 7 .1 2
1 9 7 4 9 9 .0 1155 7 .7 7
1 9 7 5 9 1 .8 1065 8 .5 5
1 9 7 6 1 0 7 .2 1117 10 .87
1 9 7 7 1 15.5 1155 1 0 .76
1 9 7 8 1 15.5 1 146 1 4 .27
1 9 7 9 1 15.5 1 137 1 4 .79
1 9 8 0 1 0 8 .2 1150 1 5 .04
1981 103.1 1097 16 .04
1 9 8 2 9 1 .8 1 019 16.33
1 9 8 3 9 9 .0 1 036 18 .2 0
1 9 8 4 1 0 7 .2 9 7 8 2 3 . 2 5
1 9 8 5 104.1 8 8 7 2 5 . 5 7
Source: World Bank and United Nations data, International Economic Databank, Australian National 
University.
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in 1973. Apparel output performed strongly, increasing by 15.5 per cent between 1973 
and 1979, but with 6.3 per cent less employment.
Despite already receiving in some cases very high protection, these industries figured 
prominently in the trade-related adjustment problems of the United States in the early 
1980s. Their predicament was widely portrayed as synonymous with the “de- 
industrialisation” of America due to foreign trade. In the cases of steel and automobiles, 
industries where wage levels were significantly higher than the US manufacturing 
average, declining employment raised the spectre of well-paid manufacturing jobs
migrating overseas leaving US workers with low-paid employment in the services
*>8sector.
Japan’s remarkable economic recovery from wartime devastation was both a vindication 
of American postwar foreign economic policy and the source of significant adjustment 
pressure on American manufacturing industry. The rapid growth of export-oriented 
Japanese manufacturing industry was a hallmark of postwar growth. Japanese 
manufacturing output grew at an extraordinary annual rate of 14 per cent between 1953 
and 1971, even faster than the 8.8 per cent annual growth in national output (Denison 
and Chung 1976: 73)/9 Growth in export volumes provided a critical spur to 
productivity growth and investment in Japan. Table 3.6 shows average growth of 
Japanese export volumes in the 1950s and 1960s of 16.5 per cent, almost double that of 
Western Europe and three times that of the United States. The elasticity of exports with 
respect to output over this period was a remarkable 6.6 per cent in Japan, significantly 
higher than in the United States and Europe. Barely a decade after Japan commenced its 
rapid postwar growth, a leading scholar would argue that ‘no other country has ever put 
so great a strain on American tolerance of competitive manufactures’ (Hunsberger 1964: 
vii).
Through the 1960s and 1970s, Japan successfully realigned the sectoral composition of 
output, employment, investment and exports away from low-technology sectors such as
58 See, for example, Bluestone and Harrison (1982). For a more careful analysis of the impact of trade on 
American manufacturing employment, see Lawrence (1984).
”  Within manufacturing, the growth rate was highest in machinery (19.6 per cent), comprising electrical and 
nonelectrical machinery, transportation equipment (including automobiles), and precision instruments 
(Denison and Chung 1976: 74).
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Table 3.6 Export Growth Rates and Relationship to Output Growth
(1950-52 to 1967-69, %)
G r o w t h  r a te s  o f  
m e r c h a n d i s e  e x p o r t s
G r o w t h  e la s t i c i t i e s  
o f  e x p o r t s  to  G N P 1
U n i t e d  S t a t e s 5.3 1.5
J a p a n 16.5 6.6
W e s t e r n  E u r o p e 8.4 1.8
Export growth rate divided by the corresponding GNP growth rate at constant prices. 
Source: Eichengreen and Kenen (1994: 24).
textiles, wood and food and into medium- and high-technology sectors such as 
automobiles, computers and telecommunications equipment. Table 3.7 identifies export 
shares of select commodities over time to illustrate the changing composition of 
Japanese exports. The growth of Japanese manufacturing capability and its changing 
composition was a source of dislocation in the US economy and a target of Japan- 
specific protection since the 1950s. The Eisenhower Administration first engineered 
VERs on Japanese cotton textiles in 1957. This was followed by the Short-Term and 
later Long-Term Cotton Textile Arrangements during the Kennedy Administration, and 
by the first MFA during the Nixon Administration (Saxonhouse 1972, Destler, Fukui and 
Sato 1979, Friman 1990). From 1969, the United States negotiated VERs on steel 
imports from Japan and in the 1970s Japanese consumer products were singled out for 
special protection. VERs on steel imports from Japan would remain in place from 1969 
to 1974. The Ford Administration negotiated an orderly marketing arrangement (OMA) 
on specialty steel imports from Japan in 1976, while carbon steel imports were restricted 
again under the “trigger price mechanism” put in place by the Carter Administration in 
1978 (Crandall 1981, Sato and Hodin 1982). Carter Administration trade officials also 
negotiated an OMA on colour television receivers from Japan in 1977.
By the 1970s, Japan had become a global economic power, the world’s second largest 
market economy, and the major challenger to American industrial and technological 
supremacy. Though well down on the rates recorded in the 1950s and 1960s, Japanese
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Tabic 3.7 Shares of Select Products in Total Japanese Exports (%)
1 9 5 7 1 9 7 0 1 9 8 0
T e x t i l e s 34.8. 9.7 3.9
I r o n  a n d  S t e e l 7.6 15.7 12.5
E l e c t r i c a l  m a c h i n e r y 2.1 14.5 16.4
M o t o r  v e h i c l e s 1.1 8.5 21.4
Sources: World Bank data, International Economic Databank, Australian National University, Japan Times 
(1960)
growth continued to exceed that of other industrialised countries in the 1970s. Japanese 
shares of global output and trade continued to rise in the face of two oil shocks, weaker 
domestic demand and a less favourable external environment. Rapid capital 
accumulation remained the key driving force behind Japanese economic expansion with 
the stock of invested capital as a ratio to GDP surpassing the US level in the 1970s 
(Maddison 1995b). By the end of the 1970s, the broad technological ascendancy of the 
United States was being challenged in a range of export-oriented sectors of Japanese 
industry. Jorgenson, Kuroda and Nishimizu (1987) concluded that by 1979 Japan had 
closed the productivity gap in nine of 28 industries, including automobiles, transportation 
and communication, electrical machinery and precision instruments.
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 suggest why Japan’s technological advance came to represent a 
particular problem for the US trade policy process in the first half of the 1980s. Figure 
3.1 shows that through the 1970s the overall US trade position in manufactures remained 
roughly in balance with an increasing surplus in high-technology products cancelling out 
a growing deficit in low-technology products. Figure 3.2 shows bilateral manufacturing 
trade balances between the United States and Japan with US deficits across all three 
categories, but increasing significantly in medium-technology products from the mid 
1970s and in high-technology products from the start of the 1980s.60
1,0 See Zysman and Tyson (1983: 33) for a discussion of the perceived adverse implications of the US trade 
deficit with Japan in technology-intensive products.
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Figure 3.1 US Trade Balance in Manufactures
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Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics, International Economic Databank, Australian National 
University.
Figure 3.2 US-Japan Trade Balance in Manufactures
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With the internationalisation of American manufacturing, trade became more important 
to America’s domestic and international politics. The continued erosion of US 
comparative advantage in low- and medium-technology industries, an adjustment 
problem made more acute by the post 1973 slowdown in demand and productivity 
growth, increased demands for new and more restrictive trade measures. The rapid 
advance of Japanese manufacturing export capacity challenged the ascendancy of 
American firms across a range of higher technology products. With a broader range of 
American commercial interests pursuing direct trade remedies against Japanese imports, 
Japanese market access negotiations not surprisingly became a more important part of 
the export politics of the executive branch.
Along with adjustment pressures in the real economy, a loss of financial hegemony by 
the 1980s reinforced the new pressures of interdependence and America’s relatively 
diminished position in the international economy. The growth of alternative sources of 
surplus capital in the world economy arose with the enormous expansion in private 
capital flows. The emergence of a large pool of excess savings in Japan compared with a 
low and declining savings rate in the United States was a key factor underlying record 
capital flows and a transformation of US-Japan financial relations. In the space of a few 
years in the 1980s, Japan became the world's largest creditor nation while the United 
States became the world’s largest net debtor. In the process, Japan became a major 
investor in the United States creating new sources of friction surrounding asymmetries in 
the bilateral investment relationship.
As the world’s strongest economic power, the United States assumed primary 
responsibility for the reconstruction and management of international monetary relations 
after the war. The US dollar was at the centre of the Bretton Woods monetary system 
based on the strength of the US economy, America’s role as provider of global liquidity, 
and the commitment of the US government to convert dollars into gold at $35 per ounce. 
The system of fixed exchange rates put in place under Bretton Woods greatly constrained 
international capital flows in the world economy. Since large international capital flows 
could create pressures on exchange rates, governments tended to adjust internal, 
macroeconomic policies to keep current account imbalances small in order to preserve 
currency values. Under the Bretton Woods system, currency pegs could be adjusted in 
cases of “fundamental disequilibrium”, but only as a last resort. Exchange controls
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restricting capital Hows were still quite severe in most industrial countries in the 1950s 
and 1960s. But the postwar reconstruction of the international economy and the 
development of new markets and trading technologies eroded the effectiveness of 
controls over time. The growth of highly liquid international financial markets in which 
the scale of transactions greatly exceeded official international reserves made it 
increasingly difficult to carry out orderly adjustments of currency pegs.
The underlying tensions in the Bretton Woods system became more apparent during the 
late 1960s. This reflected a number of factors, including expansionary US 
macroeconomic policy, a dramatic increase in private capital markets relative to official 
reserve holdings, and divergences in policy objectives among some of the major 
participants in the system (Solomon 1977). Despite attempts to maintain the system in 
the early 1970s, speculative capital flows and concerns about the US dollar's 
overvaluation led the Nixon Administration to break the link between the US dollar and 
gold in August 1971 and to finally abandon the fixed exchange rate system in 1973 
(Gowa 1983). Well into the 1970s, however, net capital transfers remained small, 
resulting in a close correlation between national domestic investment and national 
savings.61
This correlation began to break down in the early 1980s (Frankel 1991, Feldstein and 
Bacchetta 1991). A combination of domestic policy decisions and secular shifts in 
national savings and investment patterns gave impetus to financial integration and large 
capital flows. The pace of financial reform intensified in industrial countries in the late 
1970s, making substantial funds from high-saving countries such as Japan and (West) 
Germany available in the international capital markets. And even though all major 
industrial countries experienced a decline in their national savings rates after the mid 
1970s, there were marked differences among industrial countries in terms of the 
proportion of national income that was saved. This was nowhere more apparent than in 
the world's two largest economies with the US savings rate ranking consistently among 
the lowest in the industrialised world and Japan’s consistently among the highest.
61 In a widely-cited study, Feldstein and Morioka (1980) found that the development of more open 
international financial markets in the 1970s did not lead to a reduction in the very high correlation between 
domestic saving and investment rates in industrial countries. One explanation for this pattern, not inconsistent 
with a high degree of capital mobility, is that governments in the 1970s may have to some extent aimed fiscal 
policy at limiting the magnitude of current account imbalances (Summers 1988).
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Record capital Hows and Japan’s eclipse of the United States as the world’s largest 
creditor nation in the 1980s were a direct result of the high Japanese savings rate. In the 
period of rapid growth from 1960 through to the early 1970s, the high Japanese savings 
rate was absorbed by an equally high rate of investment, and the balance between 
savings and investment was maintained. But in the 1970s, notably in the wake of the first 
oil crisis, Japan’s annual economic growth rate fell from around 10 per cent to roughly 
half that figure. With the savings rate showing little if any decline, Japan began to 
accumulate large savings surpluses.62
The deregulation of Japanese financial markets helped to make these substantial excess 
savings available in international capital markets. Japanese restrictions on foreign 
exchange and private capital flows remained tight until the late 1970s. Towards the end 
of the decade, these policies came under pressure from the domestic financial sector, as 
well as from American government negotiators.63 Financial reform in Japan was 
undertaken progressively with the revision in 1980 of the Foreign Exchange and Trade 
Control Law. This reform changed the earlier policy that all international transactions 
would be prohibited unless specifically authorised by the government to one in which 
transactions would be free of control unless specifically targeted by the government 
(Komiya and Suda 1991).
As Figure 3.3 shows, savings and investment moved in opposite directions in the world’s 
two largest economies in the early 1980s. These shifts were reflected in current account 
balances. The 1980s saw a historic swing by the US toward massive borrowing from 
abroad as a widening of the US budget deficit created excess demand for saving and 
attracted foreign saving through higher interest rates. This net capital inflow reversed the 
pattern of the preceding 90 years. During World War I, the United States had passed 
from being a net debtor vis-ä-vis the rest of the world to being a net creditor. By 1982 the 
United States had attained a recorded net investment position in excess of $350 billion, 
with net foreign assets more than 10 times as large as Japan’s. It took only a few years of
62 Japan’s especially high rate of household savings has been attributed to, among other things, a prosaving tax 
and financial system, a shortage of housing, leisure, and consumption goods on which to spend income, and a 
rapidly aging population (Horioka 1990).
6'’ According to Alexander (1995: 5), ‘Outside pressure likely had less impact than the declining domestic 
demand for loans plus growing opportunities evident overseas as other countries liberalized their broadly 
defined financial policies; that proved a strong impetus for Japanese investors to seek changes in domestic 
regulations’.
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Figure 3.3 Gross Savings and Investment Ratios -  United States and Japan
%GDP
Japan saving
Japan investment
US investment
US saving
Japan CAS
US CAS
Note: CAS = Current Account Surplus 
Source'. Bergsten and Noland (1993: 37)
large external imbalances to undo a century o f net accumulation o f foreign assets by the 
United States and to dramatically change the relative financial positions o f the US and 
Japan (Figure 3.4).
Japan’s high savings rate combined with financial market liberalisation provided the 
impetus to its purchases o f foreign assets. The most striking feature was the surge in 
cross-border portfolio investment flows. An average annual in flow  o f $1 billion o f 
portfolio investment in 1970-82 into Japan changed to an average annual outflow o f $52 
billion in 1983-88. Meanwhile, the average portfolio capital in flow  into the United States 
increased from $0.1 b illion in 1970-82 to an average o f $40 billion in 1983-88 (IMF 
1991: 16). Japan's net asset position in the United States increased from -$2 billion in 
1980 to $129 billion in 1988. By the end o f the 1980s, the US accounted for nearly ha lf 
o f Japan’s net foreign assets and Japan had become the largest foreign holder o f US 
Federal debt securities and the second largest investor in US businesses and real estate 
(Jackson 1990). Financial interdependence added a new dimension to bilateral economic
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Figure 3.4 International Investment Position of the United States and Japan
(Sbillion, historical-cost basis)
$ billion
United States
Source: Bank of Japan, Balance oj Payments Monthly, various issues. US Department of Commerce,
64Survey oj Current Business, various issues.
friction. The degree to which Japanese firms began acquiring American companies 
through foreign direct investment became a focal point of political concern about the 
increasing presence of foreign firms in the United States/0 Concerns also surrounded the 
rise in Japanese holdings of US Federal securities and fears that Japanese investors could 
spark a financial crisis in the United States by withdrawing their funds (Bergsten 1987).
The rise in Japanese FDI in the United States in the second half of the 1980s was a 
particular focal point for attention (Yamamura (ed.) 1989). Figure 3.5 shows this 
increase relative to US FDI in Japan. While the sharp appreciation of the yen after 1985 
was a key factor behind increased Japanese FDI, the political spotlight focused on the 
extent to which Japan was an outlier both in terms of the penetration of its economy by 
foreign firms and the behaviour of Japanese-based firms in the United States (Graham
64 Revisions in the US Department of Commerce data incorporate the concept of current replacement cost 
rather than the traditional historical cost measure. This method narrows the extent to which the United States 
appears as a net debtor but does not change the overall trend.
65 The most notable political response was the passage by Congress of the Exon-Florio amendment as part of 
the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988. This established for the first time a mechanism to 
screen certain direct investments in the United States. Although Japanese FDI was of growing importance as 
the 1980s wore on, European (and especially British) firms continued to account for the majority of FDI in the 
United States (Graham and Krugman 1995).
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Figure 3.5 Foreign Direct Investment -  United States and Japan
$ billion
Japan FD! in US-A— US FDI in Japan
Source: US Department of Commerce, Survey o f Current Business, various issues.
and Krugman 1995: 174).6<1 Japanese firms were criticised for destroying jobs and 
worsening the trade deficit, eroding America’s technology base, and potentially 
compromising national security (Burstein 1988, Prestowitz 1988). Especially prominent 
were claims that Japanese firms had a higher propensity to import rather than source in 
the US domestic market.67 Japanese companies in the United States were also singled out 
as exerting undue influence in American political processes (Choate 1990). The rise of 
Japan as a financial superpower in the 1980s contributed to American perceptions of a 
unique Japan investment problem that amplified tensions in the trade relationship.
Reaganomics and the domestic sources of regime crisis
So far, the American trade regime crisis has been analysed in terms of pressures arising 
from relative change in the economic positions of the United States and Japan in the 
international economy. But systemic changes do not affect the policy environment in an 
unambiguous way. The nature, intensity and timing of the American trade regime crisis
<)b For analyses stressing the importance of past restrictive investment policies in Japan, see Mason (1992) and 
Encarnation (1992).
"7 Graham and Krugman (1995: 78) found that in 1990 Japanese affiliates imported 2.2 times as much per 
worker as did the average foreign-controlled affiliate. They suggested that the main reason for the disparity 
related to mismeasurement and selection bias as Japanese FDI were newer and less mature.
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cannot be explained adequately without taking account of domestic policy actions. This 
is especially the case where policy developments outside the trade policy process can 
have profound implications for US trade policy. A central lesson of the 1980s concerned 
the degree to which macroeconomic factors can have large, unintended consequences for 
US trade policy. The trade regime crisis cannot be understood independently of the sharp 
deterioration of the US external deficits associated with the budgetary policies 
implemented in the first term of the Reagan Administration. The impact of Reaganomics 
suggests that a balanced macroeconomic policy mix underpinned, at least implicitly, the 
stability and legitimacy of the 1934 regime.
Despite rising import competition, external developments still played a relatively small 
role in the performance of the US economy at the start of the 1980s. Imports and exports 
each accounted for less than 10 per cent of GDP, trade was roughly in balance and 
international capital Rows financed a very small part of the net investment of the United 
States. But by 1985, the United States was running a current account deficit of over $120 
billion (around 3 per cent of GDP) and was well advanced towards becoming the world’s 
largest net debtor. A 40 per cent real appreciation of the US dollar against the currencies 
of its trading partners between 1979 and the first quarter of 1985 undermined even the 
most competitive traded goods industries.
The steep deterioration in the US trade balance in the early 1980s reflected the 
macroeconomic policy mix of fiscal expansion and monetary contraction in the United 
States in combination with the opposite mix in other industrialised countries. Beginning 
in October 1979, the US Federal Reserve tightened monetary policy determined to 
squeeze double-digit inflation out of the US economy. The federal funds rate rose from 
12 per cent in October 1979 to 18 per cent in March 1980, while the prime rate peaked at 
21.5 per cent in the last quarter of 1980. This monetary tightening resulted in a sharp rise 
in the real interest rate differential and appreciation of the US dollar at the same time that 
the US economy slumped into a deep recession in 1981-82. Unemployment reached 10.5 
per cent in 1982 while US manufacturing production and employment fell 8.3 per cent 
and 10.7 per cent respectively from their 1979 peaks (CEÜA 1986).
In the face of a deteriorating economy, the newly-elected Reagan Administration’s 
budget program of March 1981 featured major reductions in income tax rates over three
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years and a large real increase in defense outlays.68 In the absence of reduced spending 
on domestic programs, the budget deficit climbed from 2.1 per cent of GNP in 1981 to 
4.6 per cent in 1982 and 5.2 per cent in 1983. The reduction in tax revenue from 20.8 per 
cent of GNP in 1981 to 18.6 per cent in 1983 accounted for most of the budgetary 
shortfall, but the Reagan Administration also increased real federal spending by 3.7 per 
cent per annum in its first term. As the fiscal stimulus took hold in 1982 and 1983, the 
US economy recovered strongly from recession contributing to a further rise in the 
interest differential and the exchange rate. The current account fell substantially into 
deficit in 1983, when the recovery in growth was under way and the lagged effects of the 
earlier appreciation of the dollar were beginning to have strong effects (Figure 3.6).
Figure 3.6 The US Current Account and Real Effective Exchange Rate
$ billion (1979=100)
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Source: IMF-’, International Financial Statistics, International Economic Databank, Australian National 
University.
Compounding the impact of the Reagan Administration’s macroeconomic policies on 
external balances was the move by other countries towards fiscal consolidation. As the 
United States was increasing its structural budget deficit, Japan took substantial steps to
t,s In August 1981, President Reagan signed into law an across-the-board 25 per cent cut in personal income 
tax rates to be phased in over three years. The 1981 bill also substantially reduced taxation of business income 
(Niskanen 1988).
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reduce its deficit, accentuating the differential in real interest rates and providing a 
further incentive for capital flows out o f Japan and into the United States.69
Figure 3.7 shows the slump in US export volumes and the surge in import volumes that 
accompanied the Reagan Administration’s high dollar recovery. A fall in real net exports 
more than accounts for the fall in the nominal current account given the improvement in 
the US terms o f trade over the period. Export prices rose moderately on average while 
import prices fell due to lower oil prices and to the dampening effect o f the rise in the US 
dollar on nonoil imports (Hooper and Mann 1987: 21). The sharp deterioration in the US 
manufactures trade deficit ignited fears that the United States was falling victim to the 
industrial targeting policies o f foreign governments, especially Japan.
Figure 3.7 US Export and Import Volumes (1979=100)
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Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics, International Economic Databank, Australian National 
University.
But as Lawrence (1984: 50) noted at the time, the manufactures deficit and the strength 
o f the exchange rate reflected:
(’9 Estimated structural changes in the central government budget deficit between 1980 and 1986 were +2.7 per 
cent ofG NP for the United States and -1.8 per cent o f GNP for Japan (IM F 1986).
67
the need to channel foreign goods into the United States to meet the rise in domestic 
consumption. In this sense, the growth in the manufactured goods trade deficit is a 
response to a change in economic structure. But it is not a change that has resulted from 
shifts in US or foreign industrial policies or prowess; it is rather a change that reflects the 
budgetary decisions o f the US government.
How did President Reagan’s economic advisers envisage the international implications 
of the president’s macroeconomic policies? William Niskanen (1988: 231) notes that, 
‘the rapid increase in imports and the trade deficit were the major unanticipated 
economic effects of the initial Reagan program’.70 Indeed, he argues:
the initial program barely acknowledged the international dimensions of economic 
policy. One paragraph described how the proposed policies were expected to improve the 
international economic environment, but there was no mention of the principles that 
would guide our economic relations with other nations. The implicit assumption was that 
international conditions were not an important consideration affecting the proposed 
policies (Niskanen 1988:6).
This neglect of the foreign economic policy implications of Reaganomics found 
expression in the official view that the steep rise in the US dollar in the first half of the 
1980s simply reflected foreign investors’ endorsement of the administration’s policies 
rather than being a symptom of macroeconomic policy imbalance.71 A number of 
analysts have explored the relationship in the US context between macroeconomic 
developments and trade policy response, and in particular the impact of an overvalued 
exchange rate on import protection. Bergsten and Williamson (1983: 102) concluded that 
‘overvaluation of the dollar has proved to be an accurate “leading indicator’’ of trade 
policy in the United States — perhaps the most accurate of all in the postwar period'. As 
of the early 1980s, they identified the three postwar periods of most severe protectionist 
pressures in the United States — the early 1970s, 1976-77, and 1981-82 — as following 
promptly on periods of overvaluation of the dollar (Bergsten and Williamson 1983: 111). 
Bergsten (1982a) considered the impact of a misaligned exchange rate on trade policy to 
be even more pronounced in the bilateral economic relationship between the United 
States and Japan. Dornbusch and Frankel (1987) were more cautious about dismissing 
alternative, microeconomic hypotheses on the determinants of US protection in the first
70 Niskanen was a member of the President Reagan’s Council of Economic Advisers from April 1981 to 
March 1985.
1 See Williamson (1985), Marris (1987) and Destler and Henning (1989) for critiques of the Reagan 
Administration’s exchange rate policies.
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half of the 1980s, but concluded that an overvalued exchange rate was the most 
important macroeconomic factor.
The link between macroeconomic factors and the sharp increase in US protectionism in 
the first half of the 1980s points to the significance of Reaganomics as a domestic shock 
to the American trade policy regime. Table 3.8 shows how the move by the United States 
towards a substantial federal budget deficit in the early 1980s was correlated with large 
net capital inflows and hence a marked increase in the current account deficit. It also 
highlights how the growth of the “twin deficits” through this period was in marked 
contrast with the relative internal and external balance from 1950 to 1980. This suggests 
the historical importance of orthodox budgetary policy as an implicit norm of the 
American trade policy regime.
Table 3.8 The “twin deficits” of Reaganomics
Per iod  
or y ear
Net  private  
d o m e s t i c  
s a v i n g s  
(1)
S ta t e  and  
local  
surplus  
(2)
Federa l
deficit
(3)
Net
d o m e s t i c  
s a v i n g s  
(1 )+(2 ) - (3 )  (4)
Ne t  private  
d o m e s t i c  
i n v e s t m e n t  
(5)
Ne t  d o m e s t i c  
s a v i n g s  shortfal l s  
(5) - (4)= net  
capital  inf lows (6)
1 9 5 0 - 5 9 7 . 5 - 0 . 2 -0 .1 7 . 8 7 . 5 - 0 . 3
1 9 6 0 - 6 9 8  1 0 0 . 3 7 . 8 7 . 1 - 0 . 7
1 9 7 0 - 7 9 8 . 1 0 . 8 1 . 7 7 . 2 6 . 9 - 0 . 3
1 9 8 0 6 . 4 1 2 . 2 5 . 2 4 . 9 - 0 . 3
1 9 8 1 6 . 6 1.1 2 . 1 5 . 6 5 . 5 - 0 .1
1 9 8 2 5 . 5 1.1 4 . 6 2 2 0
1 9 8 3 5 . 7 1 . 4 5 . 2 1 . 9 3 .1 1 . 2
1 9 8 4 6 . 8 1 . 7 4 . 5 4 6 . 6 2 . 6
1 9 8 5 5 . 7 1 . 6 4 . 9 2 . 4 5 . 1 2 . 7
1 9 8 6 5 . 3 1 . 3 4 . 8 1 . 8 5 . 1 3 . 3
1 9 8 7 4 . 1 1 . 2 3 . 5 1 . 8 5 .1 3 . 3
Source: Lawrence (1988: 51)
Richardson (1991: 8) has noted how ‘US trade policy in the 1980s ended up a weak and 
unwilling handmaiden to macroeconomics. It was forced into trying to do what 
macroeconomic policy could or would not do’. The impact of Reaganomics underscores 
how notionally separate policy developments can have major spillover effects in other 
policy domains with long-lasting consequences. The trade regime crisis saw the collision 
of domestic macroeconomic decisions with longer term structural forces changing the
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institutional dynamic of American trade policy and favouring certain groups and ideas 
over others. Consistent with the historical institutionalist approach, Weir (1992: 192) 
points to the need for ‘casting a broad eye over politics to understand how developments 
in different domains of politics and policy collide to create outcomes that cannot be 
readily anticipated or easily controlled by individual actors. Such collisions can become 
turning points in a sequence by creating opportunities for political actors seeking to 
promote new ideas and different visions of politics’. The regime crisis which led in 1985 
to highly conflictual relations between the executive and Congress would be one such 
turning point, rendering some interpretations of US trade problems more persuasive than 
others.
The rise of aggressive bilateralism
Ballooning US trade and current account deficits, sharply higher protection, a Congress 
intent on reclaiming an action-forcing role in US trade policy and a move away from 
multilateralism towards more narrowly-based market opening policies would be among 
the key legacies of the American trade policy regime crisis. With institutional conflict 
between Congress and the executive branch at a level not seen for 50 years, the Reagan 
Administration was forced to embrace a more aggressive bilateral approach to export 
politics. Specifically, it moved from a stance of relative neglect of Section 301 towards 
its high-profile and aggressive use. Prior to 1985, Section 301 was not a major part of US 
trade law armoury and provided little more than a mechanism for US business to register 
a market access complaint. The most comprehensive study of the provision found that of 
the 21 investigations under Section 301 during the first Reagan term, ‘only two were 
even partially resolved to US satisfaction’ (Bayard and Elliott 1994: 15). After 1985, 
Section 301 would become a major tool of American trade policy, one that other 
countries would condemn as contrary to the norms of the multilateral trading system.
In the early part of the Reagan Administration, recession and the rising dollar ensured 
that American industries’ demands for import relief remained the most politically- 
sensitive trade issues. Executive officials justified new import protection on the basis 
that, were it not to act, Congress would impose even more restrictive measures. The most 
striking departure from the Reagan Administration’s free trade credentials came in its 
first months in office when it secured a VER to restrict annual Japanese automobile
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exports to the United States to 1.68 million units (Winham and Kabashima 1982). The 
auto VER was followed in December 1981 by the renewal of a more restrictive MFA. 
And in October 1982, after US steel producers filed multiple anti-dumping and 
countervailing duty petitions, Commerce Secretary Malcolm Baldrige announced VERs 
restricting carbon steel exports from the EC. " Successful campaigns by the automobile, 
steel, textile and apparel industries pointed to the influence of these politically powerful 
industries, but also to the pragmatic calculus of an administration keen to preserve 
political capital in Congress for President Reagan's domestic agenda.7'
Early in its first term, the Reagan Administration held back from pressing for specific 
market access concessions from Japan, merely warning that it needed to take actions to 
support the international trading system (Japan Economic Institute of America 1983: 45). 
The 97th Congress (1981-1982) initiated the main instrument of export politics directed 
at Japan in the form of “reciprocity” legislation. In December 1981, the Senate Finance 
Committee (the committee with trade jurisdiction in that chamber) passed a ‘sense of the 
committee’ resolution embodying the idea of equivalent or reciprocal market access 
between Japan and the United States.74 This new ‘strict reciprocity’ was described at the 
time as ‘aggressive rather than passive as in the past: it would impose new trade barriers 
as a threat, rather than merely refraining from extending new liberalization to 
nonreciprocating countries’ (Cline 1983a: 16).72
More than 30 reciprocity bills were introduced in the 97th Congress (Cline 1983b: 121). 
The focal point for legislative activity was the reciprocity bill (S. 2094) introduced by 
Senator John Danforth (R, MO), chairman of the trade subcommittee of the Senate 
Finance Committee. The bill sought to establish the principle that US access to foreign 
markets be ‘substantially equivalent’ to the access accorded by the United States. In so
72 Japan had limited its carbon steel shipments to between 5 per cent and 6.5 per cent of the total US market in 
understandings with successive US administrations (Hufbauer, Berliner and Elliott 1986: 171).
' In the case of the automobile VER, former USTR William E. Brock maintains that the Reagan 
Administration could have blocked any congressional trade restrictions, ‘but we thought the price we would 
pay in some other areas of real consequence like the tax reductions that we were wedded to might be higher 
than we wanted to pay’. William E. Brock, interview with author, 24 June 1996, Washington DC.
74 The resolution called on the US Trade Representative to ‘take such actions as are necessary and appropriate 
to bring the denial of equivalent market access specifically and directly to the attention of the Government of 
Japan ... [and] achieve expeditiously reciprocal trading opportunities for all American producers in the 
Japanese market’ (Japan Economic Institute of America 1982: 35).
73 Keohane (1986) popularised the terms ‘strict’ and ‘diffuse’ reciprocity to differentiate the more narrowly 
defined 1980s version from the less calibrated reciprocity practised in the earlier rounds of the GATT.
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doing, it sought to amend Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 to make lack of 
substantially equivalent market access grounds for a complaint by an injured party or by 
the president or Congress. 6 But in the midst of a deep recession, congressional interest 
in export politics waned and the Danforth reciprocity bill failed to reach the Senate floor 
in 1982. Congressional trade energies shifted towards a more pointedly trade-restrictive 
piece of legislation in the House of Representatives targeted at Japanese automobile 
manufacturers.77 November 1982 saw the trough of recession in the United States and 
while the Reagan Administration avoided greater restrictions in the automobile industry, 
rising import penetration continued to drive other basic manufacturing industries to seek 
import relief. Despite a strong economic recovery through 1983 and 1984, the Reagan 
Administration acquiesced to further protection for the steel, textile and apparel 
industries (Pearson 1989).
The focus of US market access pressure on Japan in the early years of the Reagan 
Administration remained very much on cases where clear Japanese government 
restrictions could be targeted. In 1983, talks focused on beef and citrus products and the 
procurement practices of Japan's state-owned telephone monopoly, the Nippon 
Telephone and Telegraph Company (NTT) — all cases of existing agreements coming 
due for renewal. A new area for discussions was trade in high-technology products with 
both governments looking to reduce bilateral trade conflict, especially in the 
semiconductor industry. Despite a strong rhetorical pitch, then USTR William Brock 
recalls that, T don’t think we were that tough on Japan. The public posturing was more 
than the private one’.
There were the non-governmental barriers, but they were still more buried under the 
surface. We would take those examples that were more egregious in the first place and 
document the case and we made usually a pretty good amount of progress.
... Everyone could figure out what it would take to satisfy the politicians on both sides. 
And it was contentious, but in the final analysis it was not that difficult a negotiating 
procedure. What it was not doing was dealing with the problem; and we began to realise 
that.78
76 Believing the legislation would violate the GATT and invite foreign retaliation, the Reagan Administration 
proposed a compromise bill which included a limited strengthening of Section 301, but which replaced any 
reference to ‘substantially equivalent’ market access with ‘fair and equitable’ market opportunities. 
Congressional Quarterly, 19 June 1982, p. I486.
A highly restrictive domestic content bill on automotive manufacturers passed the House of Representatives 
in 1982 and 1983, but failed to reach the floor of the Senate.
78 Brock, interview, 1996.
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In 1984, US-Japan talks continued on the renewal o f the beef and citrus and NTT 
procurement agreements as well as on US complaints concerning Japanese barriers in 
wood products, legal services and Japan’s inadequate copyright protection laws. By this 
time, the sharp rise in the US trade deficit with Japan was creating its own momentum 
behind bilateral trade friction (Figure 3.8). As it mirrored the broader deterioration in the 
US external position, the bilateral imbalance provided an important transmission belt 
from Reaganomics to a more aggressive Japan policy. Between 1981 and 1984, the US 
trade deficit with Japan doubled from $18 billion to almost $37 billion. The trade gap 
had ‘an important indirect impact by creating, in US trade politics, something o f a 
presumption o f Japanese guilt’ which in turn made it ‘more difficult for US officials to 
accommodate Japanese arguments and interests without undermining their credibility at 
home’ (Destler and Sato 1982: 272-273).
Figure 3.8 US-Japan Merchandise Trade Imbalance
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Source: World Bank data, International Economic Databank, Australian National University.
Economic advisers in the Reagan Administration sought routinely to explain the US 
external imbalance in terms o f an excess of national investment over national savings
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and to caution against drawing trade policy inferences from bilateral imbalances.79 But 
for a significant section of the American trade policy community, unfair trade barriers
offered a more intuitive explanation for the bilateral imbalance — one reinforced by
80complaints from American commercial interests.
Niskanen (1988: 150) criticised both branches of the US government based on his 
experience on the Reagan Administration's CEA:
Congress does not yet recognize that the trade deficit is made in the United States. The 
trade deficit or, more accurately, the broader current account deficit is the difference 
between saving by Americans and investment in the United States. The only effective 
ways to reduce the trade deficit are to increase US saving, reduce the government deficit, 
or reduce private investment in the United States. The administration was not immune to 
this misrepresentation. In the early fall of 1984, 1 made a presentation to the cabinet on 
this relation of US foreign and domestic balances. Although my presentation involved 
little more than stating the implications of some accounting identities, this relation was 
not broadly understood. Only the usual courtesies of a cabinet meeting prevented the 
pragmatists and trade hardliners from commenting that I might understand economics, 
but I did not understand the real world. 1 was no more successful in making this point in 
personal discussions with members of Congress. An alternative explanation of their 
response may be that they understood this relation perfectly well, but that concern about 
the trade deficit provided a convenient rationalization for trade measures they believed 
were important for political reasons.
Compounding the pressures on the American policy regime and narrowing the outlets for 
market opening initiatives was the failure of the GAIT Ministerial Meeting of 
November 1982 to endorse proposals for a new multilateral trade initiative (Schott 
1983). With the Reagan Administration deprived of the traditional mechanism of export 
politics, American frustration with the efficacy of multilateral market opening 
approaches correspondingly increased. The most immediate result was the emergence in 
Washington of a more favourable attitude towards free trade agreements (FTAs). The 
United States commenced negotiations on FTAs with Israel in 1983 and with Canada in 
1986. Failure to advance multilaterally left bilateral mechanisms as the main channel 
for a rising tide of frustration with foreign trade barriers. Without the overarching
See, for example, CEA (1983).
Ml In the case of Japan, Bruce Smart, who became Under Secretary of Commerce for International Trade in 
1985, observes that in both Congress and the executive ‘a lot of people thought that Japanese closure of 
markets caused the trade deficit’. The role of macroeconomic factors ’was not clearly understood ... The guy 
that understood it best in the administration was George Shultz, but on the other hand it was easy to blame the 
Japanese’. S. Bruce Smart, telephone interview with author, 19 July 1996.
sl Former USTR Brock notes that the GA I T impasse resulted in ‘a very different attitude about what we 
needed to do to construct the new trading system and we began to talk about free trade areas as models’. 
Brock, interview, 1996.
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momentum provided by a multilateral negotiation, results on bilateral market aceess 
negotiations would become a litmus test for success or failure of the administration’s 
trade strategy. Moreover, opposition to American plans to expand GATT’s coverage 
meant that many Japan market issues could only be taken up in a bilateral context. The 
fact that the GATT was not moving forward in the first half of the 1980s, both in terms 
of liberalisation measures and coverage, fuelled the search by US officials for other ways 
of playing the game of export politics.
The Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, the first major piece of trade legislation since 1979, 
was notable for the absence of any fast-track authorisation for a new round of 
multilateral trade negotiations. The main features of the 1984 Trade Act were 
authorisation for the executive to negotiate an FTA with Israel, the renewal of the 
Generalized System of Preferences program, the amendment of Section 301 of the 1974 
Trade Act to provide for executive branch self-initiation of cases against foreign trade 
barriers, and the instruction that the executive make an annual report of foreign trade 
barriers and their impact on US exports (Schwab 1994: 62). The institutionalisation of 
annual reports on foreign trade barriers underscored congressional frustration with the 
executive branch. According to Judith Bello, former General Counsel at USTR:
The fundamental idea which the administration found impossible to object to, and even 
more impossible to get anybody in the Congress to see the cause of concern, was to force 
the administration on an annual basis to catalogue trade barriers against US goods and 
services and intellectual property. And once you institute that catalogue on a systematic 
basis you have significantly increased the pressure on the administration to report on an 
annual basis what the hell they’ve done about each of those barriers. Because you have 
given the Congress a telephone book of problems from which they can then grill each 
trade representative. ... That single change was the beginning of the process of really 
holding USTR's feet to the fire to be more aggressive on trade policy.s'
Early 1985 saw congressional impatience with the Reagan Administration's trade policy 
reach new heights. Susan Schwab, then trade adviser to Senator John Danforth, outlines 
the mood at the start of the 99th Congress (1985-86):
The US trade deficit was rising to historic levels with few nonlegislative outlets for 
release of the frustration that had been building in Congress. Although “unfairness” in
82 James Murphy, a US negotiator in the early 1980s on legal services access and copyright protection in 
Japan, maintains that ‘we’d always look for a GATT angle if there was one. But for the most part the kinds of 
problems we had were not susceptible to GATT actions. It just didn’t cover them so we didn’t find GATT that 
helpful’. James Murphy, interview with author, 8 July 1996, Washington DC.
K‘’ Judith Bello, interview with author, 26 July 1996, Washington DC.
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the international trading system was no more prevalent at this time than at any other 
during the era, the tolerance of American politicians for it seemed to plummet. They 
were inundated by complaints about the high dollar and its impact on US exports and 
import-sensitive industries, with the message coming loudly from sectors normally in the 
forefront of the free-trade movement as from industries from which the politicians had 
come to expect it. While the size of the US trade deficit was a factor, its composition was 
even more so.
Industries that had never before experienced foreign competition in their home markets 
or faced an erosion of their international market share, brought their trade problems to 
the attention of politicians who had rarely given trade issues much thought (Schwab 
1994: 64).
The administration began 1985 heralding a new framework for negotiations with Japan 
the Market-Oriented, Sector Selective talks agreed to by President Reagan and Prime 
Minister Nakasone in early January. The MOSS proposal carried the stamp of the US 
Treasury Department that had recently concluded negotiations with Japan on financial 
market liberalisation and the internationalisation of the yen -  the so-called yen/dollar 
talks (Frankel 1984). The proponents of MOSS saw it as moving beyond product-by­
product negotiations that tended to deal only with specific government barriers that had 
been the subject of formal complaints. MOSS was geared to a handful of areas where a 
broader range of impediments could be addressed, including private sector as well as 
government-imposed barriers. But the Reagan Administration’s new' initiative generated 
a luke-warm response on Capitol Hill as it was becoming clear to the 99th Congress that 
the 1984 Trade Act offered negligible relief for American industry still burdened by the 
high dollar.
Before the MOSS talks made any tangible progress, the congressional mood towards 
Japan soured abruptly once more. The catalyst was President Reagan’s decision in early 
March not to ask Tokyo for a fifth year extension of the automobile VER and Japan’s 
subsequent announcement that the export restraint would be retained, but with the 
numerical limit raised by nearly 25 per cent. Congressional resolutions calling on the 
administration to retaliate against Japan’s unfair trading practices followed in March and 
April. Both houses passed resolutions threatening retaliation against Japan whose 
bilateral surplus with the United States would reach $50 billion in 1985. The Senate 
resolution, passed by a vote of 92-0, dismissed all previous US market access 
negotiations with Japan as ‘largely unsuccessful’ and asserted that ‘the bilateral trade 
imbalance’ was ‘costing the United States hundreds of thousands of jobs every year’
76
84 • -(Destier 1986: 179)/ Congressional confidence in the Reagan Administration’s trade 
policy suffered a further setback in March 1985 when the President announced that he 
was appointing USTR William Brock to become the new Secretary of Labor. Brock’s 
replacement, Clayton Yeutter, faced a barrage of demands for a tougher trade policy 
during his confirmation hearing before the Senate Finance Committee in June.8:1
For the first time in the modern era of US trade policy, trade was shaping as a viable 
partisan issue in Congress as the Democratic Party looked for strategies to help it 
recapture control of the Senate at the 1986 congressional elections. In July 1985, 
Representatives Dan Rostenkowski (D, IL) and Richard Gephardt (D, MO) and Senator 
Lloyd Bentsen (D, TX) introduced legislation (H.R. 3035) to impose a 25 per cent import 
surcharge on countries like Japan that ran big trade surpluses with the United States.86 
Especially significant was the fact that Congressman Rostenkowski was Chairman of the 
House Ways and Means Committee and Senator Bentsen was the ranking Democrat on 
the Senate Finance Committee — two individuals and two institutional positions 
normally synonymous with trade liberalising measures. ‘I know I’ve been a free trader 
all my life,’ Bentsen stated in a New York Times op-ed article, but the United States must 
now accept its trading partners 'for what they are’ and 'establish a trade policy built on 
results’ (Dryden 1995: 309-310). Not surprisingly, Republicans controlling the Senate 
looked to demonstrate their own credentials as being tough on trade. In July, Senator 
Bob Packwood (R, OR) introduced a bill (S. 1404) requiring retaliation against Japan for 
its unfair trade practices. The Unfair Trade Practices of Japan Act of 1985 was a binding 
version of the resolution passed by the Senate in March.'
s l The House of Representatives adopted a similar resolution by a vote of 394-19. As Schwab (1994: 66) 
points out in the case of the Senate action, the resolution itself ‘was not so unusual, since the Congress 
regularly passes nonbinding resolutions commending or condemning all manner of individuals, nations, and 
activities. Rather it was the speed and manner in which the resolution emerged that set it apart, offering a 
glimpse of tensions in the trade arena that were to characterize the period’.
s" Yeutter recalled later: ‘I just got an ear-full and it was very bitter; bitterness at the whole executive branch, 
including the White House. ... They didn’t blame President Reagan personally because everybody loved 
President Reagan, but boy did they blame everybody else. They hated the State Department, hated the 
National Security Council (NSC), hated the White 1 louse staff. They felt that all these folks had a conspiracy 
to protect the interests of foreign countries and forget about US interests. So that was the psychology of the 
moment’. Clayton Yeutter, interview with author, 2 August 1996, Washington DC.
86 Later versions of the bill sponsored solely by Representative Gephardt became known as the “Gephardt 
amendment” (Schwab 1994: 69).
87 S. 1404 failed to reach the floor of the Senate in the 99lh Congress, but it emerged later as the conceptual 
basis for “Super 301” in the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 (Schwab 1994: 67).
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Soon after, President Reagan’s rejection in August of an ITC recommendation for import 
relief to shoe manufacturers set off a storm of protest in Congress about the 
administration's trade approach. By September 1985, protectionist sentiment in Congress 
had mushroomed with over 100 protectionist bills on the congressional calendar, many
o o
directed specifically at Japan (Ahearn 1986, Destler 1986: 75). Finally, the
administration acted to stem the tide of congressional trade activism. September 1985 
marked a watershed in American market opening policy with the Reagan 
Administration’s embrace of Section 301 as a market-opening tool. In a speech at the 
White House on 23 September 1985, President Reagan outlined his administration’s 
intent to self-initiate a series of 301 investigations — into Japan’s barriers to cigarette 
imports, Brazil's information industry policies, and South Korea’s restrictions on 
insurance providers. He also authorised accelerated action to resolve two existing 301 
cases against Japan (leather quotas) and the EC (canned fruit) and announced a trade 
policy “strikeforce” to come up with further recommended targets. President Reagan 
pointedly made the case for fair trade declaring that he would not ‘stand by and watch 
American workers lose their jobs because other nations do not play by the rules’ (Dryden 
1995: 31 1).89
President Reagan's fair trade speech came one day after US Treasury Secretary James 
Baker unveiled the Plaza Accord in which the world’s five major industrial countries — 
the United States, Japan, West Germany, France and Great Britain — agreed on 
concerted efforts to drive down the US dollar.90 Baker had played an important role in 
the reorientation of US foreign economic policy from his position as chairman of the 
newly-created Economic Policy Council (EPC). It was Baker’s EPC which finally 
decided that the US government should for the first time initiate Section 301 cases 
against foreign trade barriers rather than wait for private sector petitions. Secretary of 
State George Shultz was wary of the reaction of America's allies to such confrontational
88 The congressional mood was exemplified by the rapid movement through the legislative process of a highly 
restrictive textile bill (H.R. 1562) introduced in March 1985. The so-called Jenkins bill easily passed both the 
House and the Senate in the (northern) fall, but the margins proved insufficient to override an eventual 
presidential veto (Destler 1995: 90).
89 According to former US trade official William Piez, ‘up until that point, a number of agencies in 
Washington had resisted the use of “fair” because they said it was cover for protectionism. But after Reagan 
made the statement these reservations were overcome. And whereas we used to say that market opportunities 
should be “equal, competitive and transparent”, we started putting the word “fair” in’. William Piez, interview 
with author, 17 July 1996, Washington DC.
n> James Baker had become US Treasury Secretary in February 1985 in a job switch with Donald Regan who 
became President Reagan’s chief-of-staff.
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actions, but Baker, Yeutter and Commerce Secretary Baldrige prevailed, arguing that an 
unambiguous signal had to be sent to Congress (Dryden 1995: 310).91 The Reagan 
Administration’s September 1985 initiatives averted what might otherwise have become 
a wholesale congressional revolt against executive branch primacy on trade policy. As it 
stood, Congress had already embarked on a path towards new omnibus trade legislation 
designed to tie the hands of the executive with a more mandatory approach to targeting 
trade barriers of other countries — and especially Japan. In this sense, the September 
1985 measures were, as Yeutter readily concedes, Too little, too late’.92
The Reagan Administration’s embrace of Section 301 was an important turning point, 
ushering in a new policy environment more favourable to critics of Japan’s trade 
policies. As Destler (1995: 127) observes:
Section 301 was “export politics” pursued by exceptionally aggressive means, a product 
o f  the egregious trade imbalance and frustration at foreign unfairness, real and perceived. 
And its most important single target was Japan. The administration worked, for policy 
and political reasons, to spread the pain among countries, but there was no doubt which 
country Congress had most in mind.
Japan was not singled out in actual legislation passed by Congress or by the executive 
branch’s actions. As former USTR official Geza Feketekuty has noted. ‘The decision 
was made that the administration had to get ahead of the pack; not just with Japan, but ah 
across the board on enforcement of [Section] 301 issues in a much more structured way 
to keep the focus on the export side and off the import side’.* 9’ Yet, Japan remained the 
focus of the most intense US demands for new market access. Feketekuty associates the 
early part of the second Reagan Administration with the end of a pattern of ‘political 
orchestration’ associated with process-oriented negotiations with Japan up to that time.
Up to then it was really all a process of seeing what problems we could fix in order to 
keep the protectionists at bay when they complained about all these Japanese goods 
coming in. It was a political process —  trying to manage a set o f  pressures, but do some 
good as well. After we had a sufficient number o f rounds [with the Japanese 
government] w e’d come up with a resolution on an issue that would help defuse it. ...
>] Baker’s close aide at Treasury, Robert Zoellick, suggests that ‘a wide range of people in the Reagan
Administration had different views about what these [Section 3011 trade actions amounted to. Some saw them
as defensive, some saw them as bad in any form, and some really got into it’. Robert Zoellick, interview with
author, 19 June 1996, Washington DC.
92 Yeutter, interview, 1996.
9'’ Geza Feketekuty, interview with author, 22 June 1996, Washington DC.
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The procedural change in itself appeared to be satisfactory in a way because it had solved 
the political problem. After 1985, that no longer became acceptable. M
The four sectors identified for the MOSS negotiations in 1985 would be followed by a 
new set of targets at the start of 1986. Japan was clearly the focus of America's trade and 
competitiveness problems as US high-technology industries intensified efforts to secure 
new trade remedies against Japan. The political pressures surrounding a trade deficit in 
excess of $50 billion in 1985 guaranteed that Japan would be the main target of the new 
aggressive bilateralism in US trade policy. Then USTR Clayton Yeutter observed later 
that the American trade policy community ‘looked at the Japan situation as being the 
most difficult challenge. Everybody recognised that we had a major problem globally 
because of the trade deficit being so great overall, but the biggest chunk of that problem 
was the Japanese’.95
Conclusion
In the first half of the 1980s, America’s postwar trade strategy of process-oriented 
multilateralism was shaken by a crisis of legitimacy of the American trade policy regime. 
This crisis stemmed from the interaction of long-run change in the international position 
of the American economy and domestic macroeconomic policy decisions of the Reagan 
Administration. It would have long-lasting consequences in the form of higher protection 
for US industries, a resurgence of congressional activism in trade policy, and the 
embrace of aggressive bilateralism in market access policy. Given the scale of its 
competitive challenge and the size the bilateral trade imbalance, Japan would be the 
primary target of American grievances about unfair trade barriers. The trade regime 
crisis was critical in connecting external shocks to the policy regime with the second 
Reagan Administration’s more aggressive bilateral market access policy and, ultimately, 
the rise of a results-oriented Japan policy. The following chapter probes more deeply into 
how the political struggle between key actors explains specific Japan policy innovations.
94 Feketekuty, interview, 1996.
95 Yeutter, interview, 1996.
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4 Hardliners versus Free Traders
'The US government establishment went through a collective tutorial on Japan that was a unique 
experience
Maureen Smith, former Director, Office of Japan,
96US Department of Commerce.
Introduction
The previous chapter argued that a crisis in the American trade policy regime was critical 
in conditioning a general shift towards aggressive bilateralism in US trade policy in the 
mid 1980s. That Japan would receive particular attention can be explained in part by the 
dimensions of its competitive challenge to the United States and by the growth in the 
bilateral trade imbalance. But why Japan alone would in time become the focus of a 
unique type of results-oriented market opening policy still is not explored adequately. 
While external shocks to the policy regime can be seen as the broad determinants of 
policy change, they have more trouble explaining the substantive content and timing of 
policy innovations. A more complete analysis of the evolution of US market access 
policy towards Japan highlights the role of human agency and choice in the policy­
making process. This requires moving beyond a focus on the trade policy regime.
An advocacy coalition approach directs attention to the actors who constantly seek to 
control or reformulate the rules of the game, to claim the authority and resources of 
institutions, and to persuade centres of policy-making authority of the merits of their 
ideas and policies. As noted previously, advocacy coalitions are sub-regime groups 
comprised of state and non-state actors who interpret policy problems, identify cause- 
effect relationships and, ultimately, shape the content of state preferences. The postwar 
US trade strategy of process-oriented multilateralism embodied the regime power and 
preferences of a Free Trade-Good Relations coalition (free traders). The trade regime 
crisis of the 1980s would leave this coalition fragmented and reactive to an emergent 
Hardline-Japan is Different coalition (hardliners). The rise of a results-oriented Japan 
policy reflected the ascendancy of the hardliners over the free traders in the US policy­
making process. A process of learning across the American trade policy community that
96 Maureen Smith, interview with author, 18 July 1996, Washington DC.
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Japan was different from other industrialised countries in terms of its international 
openness and responsiveness to process-oriented trade negotiations was one element of 
this ascendancy.
This chapter traces the development of a hardline coalition from the ranks of US trade 
officials, congressional actors, industry groups and manufacturing-oriented policy 
analysts in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Against the backdrop of a rising bilateral trade 
imbalance and intensified Japanese competition in high-technology products, heightened 
exposure of front-line US trade agencies to market access problems in Japan helped to 
crystallise the core hardline idea that Japan was different from other advanced economies 
in terms of its structural barriers to imports. But prior to the regime crisis reaching a head 
in 1985, the hardliners faced effective resistance from an alliance of free trade-oriented 
officials and economists, as well as policy-makers in the national security apparatus of 
the American state. To the free traders, the idea that Japan was sufficiently different to 
warrant a departure from process-oriented negotiations was either challenged on 
intellectual grounds, or considered irrelevant in light of bigger international and domestic 
challenges facing the United States.
The regime crisis was significant in elevating the hardliners to a new level of political 
and policy relevance and in weakening the position of the free traders. The MOSS talks, 
begun at the start of 1985, signified the transition by the second Reagan Administration 
towards a more structured and aggressive approach to Japan market access problems. 
This involved demands for more formal market access agreements and a widening 
network of US government actors with a bigger stake in securing results in the Japanese 
market.
NTT and high-tech targeting: Focal points behind-the-border
The late 1970s offer the most compelling, if inevitably arbitrary, point of departure for 
tracing the emergence of a hardline coalition in the American trade policy community. 
Through the Carter Administration (January 1977-January 1981), Japanese import 
penetration of the US market remained the most economically and politically salient 
dimension of US-Japan trade relations with large industrial sectors such as steel and 
automobiles under intense competitive pressure. American market opening energies were
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concentrated largely on the multilateral Tokyo Round negotiation where NTBs of the 
major trading states, including Japan, came under much closer scrutiny. Japan’s 
remaining formal trade barriers, in particular its quantitative restrictions on imports of 
leather, wood products and a range of agricultural products, were the main market access 
irritants at the time.97
In 1977, policy-makers in the newly installed Carter Administration focused on Japan in 
the context of a sharp rise in its global and bilateral external imbalances (see Table 4.1). 
They argued that Japan’s lagging domestic demand, rising external surpluses and import 
restrictions were incompatible with its increased responsibilities in the international 
economic system. The rise in the US merchandise trade deficit with Japan served as the 
most visible peg for claims that Japan enjoyed the benefits of relatively open access to 
US markets for its manufactured products, while restricting access for agricultural 
products in which the United States was relatively competitive. In what the US 
government hailed at the time as a landmark in bilateral economic relations, Japan 
agreed to a package of macroeconomic stimulus measures and improved access for beef 
and citrus products in the Strauss-Ushiba Agreement signed in January 1978.98
Table 4.1 External Balances of the US and Japan (1970-80) Sbillion
Global Current Account 
United States Japan
US-Japan 
Merchandise 
Trade Balance
1970 2.6 2.0 -1.6
1971 -1.0 5.8 -3.7
1972 -5.3 6.6 -4.7
1973 7.6 -0.1 -1.9
1974 1.7 -4.7 -2.7
1975 17.9 -0.7 -2.8
1976 3.8 3.7 -6.8
1977 -15.1 10.9 -9.7
1978 -15.8 16.5 -13.6
1979 -0.1 -8.7 -10.6
1980 2.2 -10.8 -12.2
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics, International Economic Databank, Australian National 
University.
; At the time, Japan retained 27 residual import quotas. See Komiya and Itoh (1988) for a detailed 
assessment of formal Japanese trade liberalisation in the postwar period.
’s Destler and Mitsuyu (1982) describe this episode of macroeconomic diplomacy, while Sato and Curran 
(1982) analyse the beef and citrus negotiations.
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Through 1977-78, new mechanisms providing for a more continuous, institutionalised 
dialogue between American and Japanese economic and trade officials were taking 
shape. One of these was the Trade Facilitation Committee (TFC) which included 
officials from the US Department of Commerce and Japan’s Ministry of International 
Trade and Industry (MITI). The TFC was established in September 1977 to handle 
complaints from American industry about barriers to the Japanese market. It provided a 
new outlet not just for US firms with product-specific market access problems, but for 
career officials in the Commerce Department with considerable Japan-related experience 
who Thought that, too often, the United States had wasted its political leverage in 
removing trade barriers of little consequence to overall trade flows’ (Curran 1982: 
198)."
Against this backdrop, the negotiation surrounding the procurement practices of NTT 
begun in 1978 was an important early landmark in bringing Japanese behind-the-border 
policies and practices into sharper focus within the US government. These talks focused 
unprecedented attention of the STR’s office, the Commerce Department and 
congressional actors on Japanese industrial organisation and high-technology policies. 
While the TFC had fielded a small number of complaints about NTT’s corporate 
practices, formal negotiations arose not from an American industry complaint but from 
the Tokyo Round’s attempt to establish a code for open-bidding procedures on 
government procurement. By the middle of 1978, each of the major GATT contracting 
parties had offered to place a certain amount of government procurement under the code. 
Japan’s initial offer ($3.5 billion) was considerably less than offers made by the United 
States ($16 billion) or the European Economic Community (EEC) ($10.5 billion). 
American officials requested that Japan increase its offer; specifically, that it go beyond 
procurement by central government ministries and place purchases of its state-owned 
corporations under the code. NTT immediately came under scrutiny as the largest such 
corporation with annual procurement amounting to $3 billion. Hence, it was the size of 
NTT’s procurement rather than any particular high-technology targeting or industrial
99 The US-Japan Trade Study Group was formed around the same time. Comprised mostly of business 
representatives from both countries, it was designed as a more informal, analytical body to review 
bilateral trade issues and make recommendations to the respective governments.
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policy measure which drew official American attention to NTT in 1978 (Curran 1982:
192).1110
At the time, NTT was a quasi-government body with a statutory monopoly over Japanese 
domestic communications services and equipment procurement. Although nominally 
under the supervision of the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications (MPT), NTT 
was operationally autonomous, especially when it came to procurement decisions. 
Historically, it sourced the bulk of its purchases from a small “family” of four Japanese 
suppliers — Fujitsu, Hitachi, Nippon Electric Company (NEC) and Oki — and some 200 
subsidiaries and affiliates.101 So-called “sole-source” procurement practices linked 
product development with product procurement from the NTT family to the exclusion of 
both foreign and other Japanese firms. Most European government-owned telephone 
systems followed similar closed procurement practices while American Telephone and 
Telegraph (AT&T), then a near-monopolist in the United States and the largest telephone 
company in the world, relied on its subsidiary, Western Electric, for around two-thirds of
its equipment supplies. Hence, NTT’s close buyer-supplier relationships were not
102unusual when compared with practices in other national telecommunications markets.
NTT protests that other national telecommunications carriers followed similar 
procurement practices were met with US government complaints about the lack of 
sectoral reciprocity in the Japanese and American telecommunications markets. NTT’s 
political vulnerability stemmed from both the bilateral trade statistics and structural 
differences in the respective markets. In 1977, the US merchandise trade deficit with 
Japan had reached a new high and US imports of network telephone and telegraph 
equipment from Japan of $35 million far exceeded US exports to Japan of $4.5 
million. ‘ Moreover, Japanese telecommunications firms were seen to have benefited
1(1(1 Former US Commerce Department official Maureen Smith confirms that initially ‘the truth of the 
matter is that nobody in the US government fully understood what NTT was all about. It was just a notion 
that they buy a lot of telecommunications equipment so they ought to be in [the procurement agreement]’. 
Maureen Smith, interview, 1996.
"" In 1977, the four major suppliers filled nearly 70 per cent of NTT requirements for communications 
equipment (Gresser 1980: 3).
1(12 Curran (1982: 187) states that while NTT’s practice of maintaining close relationships with a small 
number of suppliers was common, its practice of excluding foreign firms from the supplier network, 
including foreign firms with local subsidiaries, was unusual.
I0’ US Congress, House Committee on Ways and Means (1979: 33).
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greatly from regulatory developments in the United States.104 By the mid 1970s, a series 
of court decisions in the United States had broken AT&T’s monopoly of the US 
telecommunications market, both in terms of mainline services and interconnect 
equipment. This allowed a number of firms, including Japanese companies within the 
NTT family, to supply equipment to end-users who could plug into AT&T’s central 
network. In addition, Japanese and other foreign firms had enjoyed the benefits of the 
patent licensing requirements placed on Bell Laboratories and of the constraints on 
Western Electric’s capacity to compete internationally.
Even if access to US government telecommunications procurement was denied to 
Japanese suppliers, it was argued, they would still have an immense opportunity in the 
private sector American market, while American suppliers did not have similar access to 
the Japanese market (US GAO 1979). Okimoto (1986: 57) observes that the divergent 
industry structures at the time in the United States and Japan were ‘entirely fortuitous but 
far-reaching’.
AT&T’s structure and the international diffusion of Bell technology kept the barriers to 
new entry low not only for US companies but also for Japanese and foreign latecomers. 
NTT’s structure, particularly the lack of a Western Electric counterpart and the intimate 
give-and-take relationship between NTT labs and private Japanese companies, provided 
Japan’s private sector the opportunity to speed up the process of industrial catch-up. 
Japan as a latecomer happened to be the beneficiary of America’s open structure and 
strict antitrust enforcement (Okimoto 1986: 57).
Rather than appearing fortuitous, US officials working on Japan trade issues saw NTT’s 
organisational structure and procurement practices as a revealing insight into Japanese 
“industry targeting” — an arm of the Japanese government in cooperation with domestic 
firms restricting foreign access to a high-growth, high-technology sector and providing 
Japanese firms with a secure home market from which to export aggressively. As the 
American government’s focus shifted from the overall quantum of NTT procurement to 
its high-technology component, NTT’s standards and approval procedures and its
104 In 1956, a US Department of Justice suit against the vertically-integrated Bell System and its parent 
company, AT&T, was settled by a Consent Decree which: (1) confined AT&T and its Western Electric 
subsidiary to domestic regulated telephone services; (2) constrained Western Electric to manufacture 
equipment solely for domestic use by the Bell System; and (3) forced the Bell companies to license their 
patents under reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms to all applicants.
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extensive research and development (R&D) programs came under particular scrutiny.Ith 
Equivalent access to new technologies became another major area of contention as the 
scale of NTT’s R&D programs and their wider importance for telecommunications and 
computer-related technologies came to be appreciated.106
Former US trade official Maureen Smith recounts the wider lessons drawn from the NTT 
experience by US officials involved in the negotiations:
We started to get to know what NTT was all about. It was an excellent roadmap and
learning experience to get into the broad, naked, blood-bleeding heart of Japanese
industrial policy. When you started saying, for example: “How come you are not buying
[American] semiconductors for manufacture of your telecommunications equipment?”
Well the answer was really simple because of the fact that there are companies in the
NTT family that manufacture all the semiconductors. ... Fujitsu, Hitachi etc. had all
participated in joint research so they all knew the specifications that NTT needed in
telecommunications equipment. ... It was just an incredible experience to walk through
this dialogue with NTT and that started telling us an awful lot about what was really 
■ ,  107going on in Japan.
The interaction of experiences at the operational level of US-Japan negotiations with 
changing political imperatives at higher levels in the American trade policy process 
would prove a recurring theme in the emergence of the hardliners. Staff analysis by the 
STR’s office, the TFC and the National Telecommunications Agency on the importance 
of access to the Japanese telecommunications market to the US industry began to filter 
up to more senior policy-makers in the Carter Administration (Curran 1982: 207). This 
new information intersected with demands on STR Robert Strauss to deliver a substantial 
high-technology component in the GATT procurement agreement in order to assure 
congressional ratification of the Tokyo Round in 1979. The domestic constituency 
Strauss needed to satisfy in the NTT negotiations was more conspicuous following the
105 Criticism centred on NTT’s reliance on detailed “design” specifications for equipment known only to 
members of the NTT family, rather than on more general “performance” specifications. Their impact was 
seen as especially severe on US firms attempting to sell high value-added telecommunications equipment 
such as PABX’s (Private Automatic Branch Exchanges) into the Japanese inter-connect market, a part of 
the market in the United States where Japanese manufacturers had made significant inroads.
NTT’s main arguments against US demands for its inclusion under the GATT procurement code were 
that: (1) other national telecommunications monopolies were not being compelled to adopt open-bidding 
procedures, (2) standards were proprietary information which it should not be compelled to divulge, (3) 
non-family equipment would compromise the integrity of the Japanese telephone system because of 
poorer quality, and (4) technology developed in NTT-sponsored research may leak to foreign competitors 
if NTT lost control over product development (Curran 1982).
107 Maureen Smith, interview, 1996. Prestowitz (1988: 260) would describe Smith, Director of the Japan 
Office at the Commerce Department through most of the 1980s, as one of only two ‘sources of 
institutional memory’ on Japan trade issues in the US government.
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formation in April 1978 of a House of Representatives taskforce on US-Japan trade 
drawn from the powerful Ways and Means Committee. The taskforce spotlighted the 
NTT issue following a visit to Tokyo in November 1978 during which the congressmen 
encountered determined opposition to any move towards open-bidding procurement at 
their NTT meetings. In a strongly-worded report in January 1979, the congressional 
taskforce concluded:
It appears that the Japanese are using their protected home market to improve their 
telecommunications technology while exporting as much as they can into the open 
American market. Since telecommunications is one of the industries “of the future”, this 
type o f one-sided and unfair trade competition is particularly serious.100
The NTT negotiations remained deadlocked at the start of 1979 with the United States 
requesting the Japanese telecommunications carrier be placed under the procurement 
code in its entirety and Japan adamantly opposed to any such outcome. Due to NTT’s 
significant autonomy, the Japanese government had considerable difficulty in 
establishing the grounds for negotiating flexibility.110 Only when the NTT dispute 
threatened to sour a May 1979 summit meeting between President Carter and Prime 
Minister Ohira did American and Japanese negotiators strike an interim deal in which 
both governments agreed on the goal o f ‘mutual reciprocity’ in telecommunications with 
a deadline for a final agreement by 31 December 1980.* 111 Japan proposed a new 
bargaining position in mid 1980 which divided purchases into three categories: one 
which applied competitive bidding procedures under the GATT procurement code, a 
second which provided for negotiated bids on general telecommunications equipment, 
and a third which included equipment still in the experimental or development stage to 
be handled under joint R&D programs. Although not satisfied with the assignment of 
products to each category, the United States accepted the basic framework.112
108 During the delegation’s stay in Japan, NT!' President, Tokuji Akigusa, was reported to have remarked 
that the only things NTT would buy from the United States were “mops and buckets”. Curran (1982: 201) 
notes that ‘the mops-and-buckets story was widely circulated, especially in Japan, and, for the US 
officials, it came to symbolize NTT’s uncompromising attitude, even though Japanese officials maintained 
that Akisuga had been misquoted’.
109 US Congress, House Committee on Ways and Means (1979: 33).
110 Signs of flexibility appeared on both sides in the first months of 1979, but the United States rejected as 
inadequate an initial NTT procurement offer because it excluded purchases of items such as sophisticated 
digital-switching equipment and computers from open-bidding procedures.
111 The United States indicated that it would deny Japanese firms access to US contracts under the GATT 
government procurement code unless a satisfactory deal on NTT was achieved.
112 The final agreement saw NTT increase its offer in the open-bidding category from the earlier figure of 
$600 million to $1.5 billion with the residual $1.8 billion in NTT procurement divided between the 
negotiated bids and joint research and development categories (Curran 1982: 235).
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Announced in December 1980, the NTT agreement was designed initially to be in place 
for three years. But it became only the first in a series of difficult negotiations on access 
to the Japanese telecommunications market. In a scenario that would be repeated in 
many other contexts, the US government criticised Japan in subsequent years for 
following the ‘letter’ but not the ‘spirit’ of the NTT agreement (USTR 1982). With 
modest results gauged by sales of sophisticated American telecommunications 
equipment, the first NTT agreement left an imprint on US trade officials of the limits of 
purely process-oriented negotiations with Japan.113
In tandem with the NTT negotiations, the final two years of the Carter Administration 
witnessed a new level of American interest in the long-term sources of Japan’s economic 
ascendancy, juxtaposed with increasing concern about falling US competitiveness. The 
politically-dominant trade issues continued to arise from Japanese import penetration in 
American markets for products such as steel and automobiles. But by the late 1970s, 
increasing evidence pointed to the loss of traditional US market share to Japanese 
competition in American, Japanese, and third country markets for high-technology 
products. Industries traditionally part of the free trade coalition in the United States 
began to make representations to Washington about the “structural” advantages enjoyed 
by their Japanese competitors. Building on the NTT experience, complaints about 
Japanese industry targeting in computers, robotics, machine tools and semiconductors 
received broad exposure in the American trade policy community for the first time.114 In 
this context, the American semiconductor industry was especially active in seeking to 
dramatise the role of industrial targeting in Japan’s high-tech challenge to American 
industry.
Whereas US government officials and congressional actors were in the forefront of 
framing and publicising the case against NTT, the semiconductor industry’s campaign 
against Japanese industrial targeting illustrates the importance of non-state actors in the 
hardline advocacy coalition. In both cases, the result was the same: to direct US
11' The American Chamber of Commerce in Japan (1997: 23-24) has described the ilrst NTT negotiations 
as a ‘pioneering effort’ in the area of government procurement and noted that ‘from the point of view of 
overall negotiations, the NTT case provided some valuable experience and precedents’. At the same time 
it quoted a former US trade official as saying that the agreement ‘exemplifies that gradualism is often not 
a good course to liberalization’.
114 See, for example, US GAO (1979), US Congress, Joint Economic Committee (1980), Gresser (1980).
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government attention beyond formal trade barriers to Japanese behind-the-border 
institutions and practices seen as unfairly favouring domestic high-technology firms. Of 
course, governments in both the United States and Japan had played active roles in the 
development of the semiconductor industry, albeit for different purposes.11? Following 
the invention of the transistor at Bell Telephone Laboratories in 1947, the US military 
seeded the growth and diffusion of American high-performance transistor technology in 
the 1950s through R&D funding and procurement. After the development of the 
integrated circuit (IC) in 1959, the market for ICs in the United States was dominated by 
military computer applications and the premium prices paid on military contracts 
facilitated the rapid application of IC technology to the commercial sphere.11(’ It was only 
after the mid 1960s that commercial computers became the primary market for American 
semiconductors. Defense-related support for the semiconductor industry declined sharply 
in the 1970s and by the end of the decade the standard of technology embodied in 
commercial applications far exceeded that used in defense systems.
Government laboratories in Japan were active in the early phase of semiconductor R&D 
in the 1950s, while MITI used its authority over foreign exchange to act as a gatekeeper 
to improve the terms by which Japanese firms gained access to foreign technology. 
Without a large military market, Japanese producers concentrated on applying existing 
technology to move rapidly into commercial applications, in particular consumer 
electronics. In the 1960s, Japanese firms pursued a successful export strategy centred on 
such products as transistor radios, tape recorders and televisions. In response, American 
producers at the technological frontier shifted into more advanced silicon transistors used 
in industrial and computer applications. In the mid 1960s, MITI launched an industrial 
policy to build a world-class computer industry in Japan in an effort to catch-up to the 
United States. Henceforth Japanese government support for the semiconductor industry 
was aligned with this broader goal. MI ITs industrial policy included an outright ban on 
imports of advanced ICs, subsidised loans and tax credits for capacity expansion and an 
increase in semiconductor-related R&D subsidies. The technological gap between the 
United States and Japan remained, however, as the technological frontier shifted towards
115 The following overview of government involvement in the American and Japanese semiconductor 
industries draws heavily on Flamm (1996).
116 Over 70 per cent of integrated circuits manufactured in the United States went into defense and space 
applications in 1965 (Flamm 1996: 426).
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replacing large numbers of chips with a smaller number of large-scale integration (LSI) 
chips, an area where American production technology was dominant.
Until the mid 1970s, American producers were able to rely on new technology to provide 
the basis for improved competitive performance by American producers vis-ä-vis 
Japanese and European rivals manufacturing older products. Under pressure from the 
United States, the Japanese government liberalised formal trade and investment barriers 
in the mid 1970s at the same time as it increased subsidies to semiconductor R&D. NTT 
and MITI launched major Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI) research projects in 1975 
and 1976 respectively, aiming to improve mass production technologies of high-volume 
chips used in the computer industry, in particular dynamic random access memory chips 
(DRAMs). These programs appeared successful in that by the end of the 1970s Japanese 
firms had closed the gap in many areas of semiconductor technology, extending the 
frontier in some.
The different development paths of the semiconductor industry in the United States and 
Japan gave rise to divergent industry structures which would become an important factor 
in future US-Japan disputes over semiconductor trade. In the United States, the large 
diversified electronics companies that invested heavily in the development of 
semiconductor devices in the 1950s were slow to make a major commitment to ICs. 
Aided by military contracts and relatively low capital requirements at the time, many 
small venture companies established a strong foothold in the American market and 
became instrumental in the development of semiconductor technology in the 1960s and 
1970s. These so-called “merchant” producers specialising in semiconductor production 
became the prime movers in the political-economy of the American semiconductor 
industry. Alongside this group were the “captive” producers, firms such as IBM and, 
until the 1980s, AT&T which consumed virtually all of their semiconductor output 
without attempting to sell on the open market.117
In Japan, the bulk of semiconductors were produced by the semiconductor divisions of
11 By far the most important captive producer was IBM whose share of world semiconductor production, 
while declining, remained almost 10 per cent through the years of rising US-Japan trade tensions in the 
first half of the 1980s. As Flamm (1996: 20) points out, when it came to the definition of the US 
semiconductor industry, much of the empirical data fuelling policy debates omitted IBM.
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large, vertically-integrated electronic systems companies (mainly manufacturers of 
communications equipment, computers and consumer electronics) which began 
producing semiconductor devices soon after the invention of the transistor (Okimoto, 
Sugano and Weinstein 1984). In the 1960s. the five largest Japanese computer producers 
— Fujitsu, Hitachi, NEC, Toshiba, and Oki, which were among the largest 
semiconductor makers in Japan — were also the main targets of MITI’s industrial policy 
on computers. The capacity of the American merchant firms to define US-Japan 
semiconductor trade as a David and Goliath-type struggle of independent, market- 
oriented US firms versus large, structurally-advantaged Japanese conglomerates, with 
almost unlimited financial resources and active government industrial policy support, 
undoubtedly contributed to the level of economic friction in this high technology 
industry in the 1980s.
A group of American merchant semiconductor manufacturers formed the Semiconductor 
Industry Association (SIA) in August 1977, prompted in large part by Japan’s emergence 
as a global force in industry capacity and processing technology. At the time, American 
semiconductor manufacturers still held an estimated two-thirds of the (non-communist) 
world semiconductor market, net earnings were in line with the US manufacturing 
industry average and Japanese imports accounted for less than 5 per cent of the US 
market (US Department of Commerce 1979). Given the comparative health of the 
American industry, STR Robert Strauss, as the Carter Administration’s most senior trade 
official, accorded the California-based SIA a decidedly lukewarm initial reaction. The 
industry body subsequently took its case to Capitol Hill and in August 1978 convinced a 
Senate committee to request an ITC investigation into the competitive position of the US 
semiconductor industry. As if to vindicate the industry’s concerns, by the end of 1979 
Japanese manufacturers had successfully captured almost 40 per cent of the US market 
for 16K DRAMs after a shortage developed in that year for the most advanced 
semiconductor memory component then in quantity production (Flamm 1996: 139). In 
representations to executive branch officials and Congress, the SIA developed its case 
that the US industry was at a structural disadvantage relative to a coordinated Japanese
llx On the basis of interviews with industry executives and former US government executives, Flamm 
(1996: 138) records that: ‘After a transcontinental pilgrimage to Washington intended to inform US Trade 
Representative Robert Strauss that “the Japanese are coming,” semiconductor executives were reportedly 
dismayed to get a “so what?” reaction from Strauss’.
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government-business industrial strategy.m By 1980, American semiconductor 
manufacturers had succeeded in gaining a more sympathetic hearing for their grievances 
within the executive branch’s trade policy agencies.120
Inadequate market access in Japan was only one item on a long list of SIA complaints at 
the end of the 1970s. The more immediate concern of the industry was rapid Japanese 
import penetration and its main grievance at the time was the alleged imbalance in 
financial resources between US and Japanese firms. The SIA (1980: 38) claimed that 
The US semiconductor manufacturers are at a structural disadvantage in access to capital 
as compared to the Japanese and that this disadvantage coupled with the target product 
practice in Japan of focused export aggressiveness in the US and elsewhere abroad 
would put the semiconductor industry in dire competitive straits during the 1980’s, 
unless public policy was invoked to prevent it’. As part of its evolving public policy 
strategy, the SIA enlisted Ambassador Alan Wolff, formerly Deputy Special Trade 
Representative under Robert Strauss, as its key adviser on trade policy. z Among its 
activities, the SIA sponsored a major policy conference in June 1980 on An American 
Response to the Foreign Industrial Challenge in High Technology Industries which 
brought together semiconductor chief executives and several senior US government 
officials.
It is important not to overstate the impact of this first phase of the US merchant 
semiconductor industry’s campaign to bring the US government's attention to its 
deteriorating competitive position vis-ä-vis Japanese manufacturers. At the end of the 
1970s, it remained one of America’s healthiest industries and its case against Japan had 
yet to be tied concretely to policy instruments under US trade law. But in terms of the 
crystallisation of hardline thinking about Japan, the SIA was effective in dramatising for
119 For example, testifying on behalf of the SIA at hearings in October 1979, L.J. Sevin argued that: ‘In a 
free market, the US semiconductor companies are competitive with any private companies in the world. 
We question, however, whether the Japanese semiconductor firms fairly fit the description of private 
enterprise. Rather, when we look closely at the Japanese companies, we feel that we are competing with 
the central Treasury of the Japanese government’. US Congress, Joint Economic Committee (1980: 21). 
See also SIA testimony before the US Congress, House Committee on Ways and Means (1980a).
1211 Late 1979 saw the first attempt by Commerce Department officials to establish a more systematic 
industry-government dialogue based around an inter-agency group at the assistant secretary level (SIA 
1980: 24).
121 At SI R, Wolff had chaired the inter-agency Assistant Secretary’s Group on Japan. His subsequent 
influence as one of Washington DC’s most high-profile trade lawyers reinforces the need to integrate both 
state and societal actors within the advocacy coalition approach.
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sections of the US trade policy community the scale and speed of Japan’s technological 
advance. It also laid the base for Japanese industry targeting to become a rallying point
for hardline critics of Japan in later years. More narrowly, the SIA was able to test which
122arguments could or could not withstand scrutiny in the American trade policy process.
An increasing bilateral trade imbalance, the NTT negotiations and the alarm bells rung 
by the SIA ensured wider and deeper scrutiny of Japan by those parts of the US trade 
policy community most sensitive to industry complaints about unfair foreign government 
practices and lack of sectoral reciprocity. Still, within the state policy-making apparatus 
most hardliners were concentrated at a relatively low level of the Carter Administration. 
Moreover, the generalised complaints about Japanese industrial targeting and close 
buyer-supplier relationships had yet to be linked effectively to specific trade policy 
remedies or actions. For example, after extensive hearings into the semiconductor 
industry in 1980, the House Ways and Means Committee taskforce on Japan trade issues 
concluded that Japanese behaviour did not offer ‘any clear evidence of the traditional 
types of unfair trade practices’ and that the hearings ‘have probably raised as many
123questions as they have answered’.
Remarks by Undersecretary of Commerce Robert Hertzstein, the ranking US government 
official at the June 1980 high-technology policy conference sponsored by the SIA, 
underscored how generalised claims about Japanese “structural advantages” still 
represented new policy territory in an official process reliant on a formal adjudication of 
unfairness. Hertzstein argued that:
1 think the government needs to ask questions and then take concrete action. I think we 
ought to start exploring what are the factors that affect the competition in global markets. 
Is it capital? Is it access to technology? Is it market access? Is it access to engineers? Is it 
innovation and flexibility? Is it language? We must then ask to what extent those factors 
are equally available to the different players in the game, to what extent access to 
specific resources is affected by the location of the company’s ownership or by the 
location of its headquarters, or its manufacturing facilities. When we can get that 
understanding, we will have an idea of what’s fair and what’s unfair. To some extent, we 
may decide that on some of these it’s just a matter of each company making the best use
l2‘ In particular, claims about the industry’s special economic status — that semiconductors were the 
“crude oil of the 1980s” and also that it was a uniquely volume-driven industry with market share as the 
overriding determinant of future industry competitiveness — received sustained exposure and ultimately 
became influential in US government circles (US Congress, Joint Economic Committee 1980: 15).
123 US Congress, Mouse Committee on Ways and Means (1980b: 40).
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of the opportunities that it finds. For others, we may find that there’s an element of 
unfairness there (SIA 1980: 58).1“4
Traditional tariffs and NTBs remained the major market access irritants in the bilateral 
relationship and on this score there was recognition that Japan had taken steps to 
liberalise its economy. In October 1979, the General Accounting Office released what to 
that point was one of the most wide-ranging official reports on US-Japan trade relations. 
It concluded that the sharpest policy contrast between the two countries was that Japan 
encourages its strong industries while the United States protects its weak ones. Based on 
seven industry case studies, the report restated traditional NTB complaints about Japan’s 
complex distribution system and rigid design and safety standards, while being equally 
critical of structural trends in the American economy and the domestic market 
orientation of US industry (US GAO 1979). ' The second report of the House Ways and 
Means Committee taskforce on Japan trade released in September 1980 adopted a 
conspicuously moderate tone describing Japan as ’a reasonably open market for many 
products, other than certain agricultural and high-technology items’. Stronger 
congressional criticism accompanied a House of Representatives resolution (H. Con. 
Res. 376) in November 1980 calling on Japan 4to assume a greater sense of responsibility 
for the trade deficit.’. But, with the exception of NTT, the policy focus was on formal 
quantitative restrictions on products such as beef, citrus, lumber, tobacco and leather 
goods.
The broader American political context underlines the relatively low priority attached to 
Japanese trade barriers and the low stakes in aggressively pursuing market access issues. 
In terms of the size of trade flows and current employment in the United States, disputes 
over beef and citrus access and NTT during the Carter Administration were far less
124 'I'his early phase of the SIA campaign illustrates the degree to which its message had yet to make a 
major impression. SIA trade adviser Alan Wolff recalls: ‘I was on a Joint Economic Committee panel 
after I left government [in 1979] and there was this semiconductor guy talking about industrial targeting 
and no-one in the room had a clue what in the world he was talking about. ... They had this notion that 
you go to Washington and tell the guys, whoever is in the room, and Uncle Sam will take care of your 
problem. Well Uncle Sam went on to think about getting hostages out of Iran, or whatever Uncle Sam 
was worried about’. Alan Wolff, interview with author, 22 May 1996, Washington DC.
I2? NTT was deemed ‘an exception to liberalization’ in Japan rather than representing a norm of 
intractable structural barriers in the Japanese economy.
126 The taskforce commented that ‘it has become increasingly clear to us, and to many businessmen 
dealing with Japan, that our trade problems result less and less from Japanese import barriers, and more 
and more from domestic, American structural problems of competitiveness and quality’ (US Congress, 
House Committee on Ways and Means 1980b: iv).
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visible than disputes over Japanese exports of steel and automobiles (Destler and Sato 
1981: 351). At higher levels of the US executive branch, the conventional wisdom 
remained that trade disputes with Japan could not be allowed to damage the overall US- 
Japan relationship. The Free Trade-Good Relations coalition that had dominated the 
institutional positions and policy thinking of US administrations since Franklin 
Roosevelt remained dominant in the Carter Administration. Finally, Japan market access 
problems and trade issues in general were all but invisible during the presidential 
election campaign of 1980. Moreover, given that Republican candidate Ronald Reagan's 
winning platform undertook to follow a more market-oriented approach to economic 
affairs, those seeking a more activist American government response to the competitive 
challenge of Japan could seemingly take little comfort from the result (Drew 1981).
The report released in January 1981 by the Japan-United States Economic Relations 
Group (the so-called “Wise Men’s Group") serves as a useful marker of this early phase 
in the American trade policy community’s puzzling about the Japan problem. 
Commissioned by President Carter and Prime Minister Ohira in May 1979, the group 
comprised senior private sector figures from business and academia, as well as former 
high-level officials from each country. The group was asked to recommend ways of 
ensuring a healthy bilateral economic relationship in the future and its report drew 
widespread praise for its balanced, but candid, assessment of US-Japan trade issues. Key 
members of the Ways and Means Committee’s international trade subcommittee urged 
the incoming Reagan Administration to make the report ‘a keystone in its approach to 
Japan, so that disputes may be reduced and bonds strengthened between our two nations 
during the next four years’ (Japan Economic Institute of America 1981: 45). Among the 
relevant conclusions of the Japan-United States Economic Relations Group (1981) were 
that:
— ‘there needs to be a better understanding of the reasons for trade and current account 
imbalances. There have been serious adverse consequences of a continued, narrow United States 
focus on the bilateral trade imbalance’ (v).
‘In terms of tariffs and quotas, the Japanese market is as open as the American market 
for comparable manufactured goods’ (x).
‘In terms of government procurement practices, foreign investment rules, entry of 
services, and procedures for standards, inspections and testing, Japan’s market is not as open as 
the American market and more needs to be done to liberalize market access in Japan’s own 
national interest' (x).
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— ‘There are special difficulties for foreign business in Japan from more intangible 
factors such as administrative procedures, traditional business customs and mores, and cultural 
and social barriers to foreign influence' (x).
— i t  is impossible to measure how “open” any nation’s market is. [But] ... the Group 
believes that Japan is not yet as “open” as the United States to foreign imports, capital, and 
influences. On the other hand, Japan appears to be generally meeting its international obligations 
to provide equal national treatment in those areas where there are treaties or international trade 
codes, and in this sense, Japan is playing according to the rules' (55).
- The “Japan, Inc.” image ‘presents a very false and misleading impression of the 
Japanese economy. It is also harmful to United States-Japan economic relations because it 
creates the false impression that Japan can manipulate exports and imports at will. Business does 
not meekly respond to government fiat nor is government the creature of business’ (61).
— ‘How administrative guidance affects foreign trade is not clear. In recent years, there 
has been little evidence of government pressure to restrain imports. Much more prevalent have 
been government efforts to restrain exports, as in the case of Japanese automobile exports to the 
United States. In this case, the industry has apparently paid little attention to the government’ 
(62).
It would be a mistake to overestimate this report’s influence, especially as it can be read 
as vindicating a range of perspectives on Japan market access. Its findings nevertheless 
mirror the limited impact on US trade politics at this time of arguments that Japan was 
inherently different in the way its economy operated. The report largely reinforced an 
orthodox free trader’s policy perspective that intervention in trade flows was 
inappropriate and to be discouraged, and that market access problems in Japan should be 
handled gradually, with minimal politicisation, and consistent with rules and norms of 
the multilateral trading system.
“Peeling the onion” and debating industrial policy
As noted in chapter 3, the most pressing trade issue confronting the incoming Reagan 
Administration was the American automobile industry’s demand for relief from Japanese 
imports. Japan drew no explicit reference in the July 1981 White Paper on trade policy 
released by USTR. The only hint of a more robust bilateral market access policy was the 
undertaking to seek new ways of dealing with government intervention not covered by 
the NTB codes negotiated in the Tokyo round. " A more deliberate approach would 
soon emerge with the Commerce Department seeking MITI’s agreement to upgrade the 
Trade Facilitation Committee to undersecretary level. The TFC was seen as reasonably
127 US Congress, Senate Committee on Finance (1981).
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effective in handling product-specific complaints, but officials at the Commerce 
Department were now keen to extend its mandate to cover more general topics such as 
industrial policy.128 Consultations on a number of market access issues took place 
through 1981, and in November of that year USTR lodged a list of desired tariff and 
NTB reductions with the Japanese government in advance of formal sub-cabinet 
discussions the following month.
Prominent items on the list were tariff cuts on computers and computer parts, as well as 
long-standing demands for greater agricultural liberalisation, including a request to speed 
up the timetable for Japanese liberalisation of beef and citrus import restrictions. Some 
months earlier, Japan had moved to head-off bilateral tensions over semiconductors by 
accelerating planned tariff reductions to bring Japanese tariffs into line with American 
tariffs. Meanwhile, NTT’s initial efforts at implementing the December 1980 agreement 
drew positive, or at least neutral, responses from US officials prepared at that stage to 
give the agreement time to work. Congress served as the focal point for a more 
confrontational approach with Senator John Danforth leading a push for stricter 
reciprocity with Japan.
In 1982, officials in Commerce and USTR sought to engage their Japanese counterparts 
more formally on a wider array of Japanese public and private sector practices claimed to 
be impeding US exports. At the April 1982 meeting of the TFC, Undersecretary of 
Commerce for International Trade Lionel Olmer proposed a long-range program to 
assess differences in American and Japanese industrial organisation and business 
practices and the obstacles to US exports created by administrative guidance, depressed- 
industry cartels and industry-targeting practices (Japan Economic Institute of America 
1983: 49).i:g The widening of the American government’s net beyond traditional tariffs 
and NTBs was further illustrated in November 1982 with the release by USTR of its 
most comprehensive inventory yet of Japanese trade barriers. 1'his 85-page report
l2s As of December 1980, US commercial interests had filed 93 complaints against Japan with the 
American side of the TFC. Of these, 3 1 were dropped after review by the Washington TFC staff, and 61 
were forwarded to the US Embassy in Tokyo. The Embassy, in turn, transmitted 22 for action by the 
Japanese side of the TFC. Of these, 16 cases were favourably resolved, one was withdrawn and five were 
in progress (Nanto 1982: 106).
121 Olmer embodies both the emergence within the executive branch of a harder-line view of Japan and the 
fluid nature of the American trade policy community. Prior to entering the Reagan Administration, he had 
led Motorola’s project to sell pocket pagers to NTT (Prestowitz 1988: 15).
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included criticism of market access barriers resulting from Japanese industry targeting, 
regulated and unofficial cartels, government-sponsored cooperative research and 
development programs, administrative guidance and anti-trust exemptions. It also sought 
to frame the debate on Japanese structural barriers more broadly by pointing to the way 
in which keiretsu corporate groupings restricted market access in Japan. Releasing the 
report. Deputy USTR David McDonald warned that, ‘The political consensus for free 
trade in the United States is badly eroded. If we are to rebuild it, quick action by the 
Japanese on its own announced measures, as well as agricultural liberalization, is vital’ 
(USTR 1982: 2).
The view that Japan was different in terms of government intervention and the scale of 
structural, behind-the-border barriers to trade was becoming lodged firmly within the US 
government agencies with day-to-day responsibility for trade policy. Congressional 
testimony by USTR William Brock in June 1982 points to the evolution in official 
thinking about Japan, and its greater emphasis on behind-the-border barriers. Brock 
remarked that:
protectionism [in Japan] takes on so many different colorations. We started out with 
tariffs; we have pretty well dealt with tariffs. Then we came with [sic] nontariff barriers, 
and we have come a long way in dealing with some of those.
Now we have a new form of protectionism called industrial policy. And in industrial 
policy a government can skew patents to selected firms, it can skew capital systems so 
credit is available to some and not others. It can engage in all kinds o f bureaucratic 
processes which allocate resources, talents, and government opportunities for contracts,
priced high, which constitute an effective backdoor subsidy. All of those things can have
. . .  . 130an enormous protective impact.
Commenting on Prime Minister Suzuki’s May 1982 liberalisation package before the
same forum, Commerce Undersecretary Olmer claimed that it ‘identified and thereby
acknowledged a broad range of structural and other problems which inhibit imports.
Attention will focus no longer on minor technical issues when seeking solutions to the
overall problem. Nor will private business practices be described as having no effect on
imports’.1 jl Deputy USTR David Macdonald told the same hearings that:
Although all countries have nontariff barriers, those in the Japanese market are unique in 
the extent to which they keep out imports from all over the world, not just the United 
States (49). ... we, nor the Japanese political leadership, have yet plumbed the essential
130 US Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs (1982: 848). 
1,1 US Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs (1982: 746).
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market access problem which at the bureaucratic level can be described as 
institutionalized (51). ... Those who deal with the trade problem on a day-to-day basis 
find it to be primarily a structural imbalance, only partly resulting from other factors
such as the yen-dollar ratio (52)........Japanese NTBs represent a “difference in kind”
compared with Europe. It is a mental attitude running through the entire Government and 
the business community, and less so, the retail public. To buy foreign where domestic is 
available, or to allow foreign importation where domestic competitive products are 
available is, I wouldn’t say unpatriotic, but something approaching that feeling (82). It is
like peeling an onion. Behind those dozens [of barriers] we are not sure there are not
132more (85).
The peeling onion metaphor would become a constant theme of the hardline critique of 
traditional, process-oriented market access negotiations with Japan. The case that best 
exemplified this experience surrounded attempts by American firms to sell aluminium 
softball bats in Japan. Through the 1970s, all metal bats were designated “specified 
products” under Japan's Consumer Product Safety Law with the requirement of an “s- 
mark” label to certify product safety. The Japan Softball League (JSBB) also established 
standards for a “JSBB-mark” for metal bats used in league games. American bat 
manufacturers looking to sell into Japan were refused JSBB certification when this was 
requested in 1980 and the American government took up the issue in the second half of 
1981. In the liberalisation package announced by Prime Minister Suzuki in May 1982, 
the Japanese government endorsed the principle of foreign participation in setting 
product standards and testing procedures, and specifically that US metal bat suppliers be 
allowed access to the JSBB standard system. However, bat sales were still obstructed 
when the JSBB refused to change their standard that demanded a rubber or plastic plug 
be inserted in the base of all bats and that bats use a particular aluminium alloy not used 
in US bats. The United States argued that use of such “design criteria” and not 
“performance criteria” was contrary to the GATT Standards Code. But only after a 
further US government complaint and intervention by the Japanese government did the 
JSBB agree to approve US bats that met MITI’s requirements for obtaining the “s-mark” 
signifying a safe product.
1,2 US Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs (1982). The assertion that Japan was a more closed 
market than Europe was still seen by some as controversial at the time. Chairing the 1982 Foreign Affairs 
Committee hearings on US-Japan relations, Congressman Stephen Solarz (D, NY) registered his surprise 
at Commerce Undersecretary Olmer’s view that Japanese NTBs were greater than those in Europe. Fie 
stated that, ‘y°u are the first person I have ever heard argue that Japan has more nontariff barriers to trade 
than the European countries. Virtually everyone to whom I have spoken about this has said Japan has 
more than the United States, but not nearly as much as Europe’ (US Congress, House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs 1982: 750).
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A more general problem was then exposed in that under the existing M1T1 procedures 
each imported bat had to be individually tested to certify compliance with standards and 
acquire the product approval labels. Only Japanese manufacturers could use the 
streamlined lot-inspection system that allowed for self-certification after a factory and its 
quality-control system had been inspected and registered. Mi l l interpreted Japanese law 
as prohibiting the inspection of foreign factories. In August 1982, American officials 
complained that the lot-inspection system was discriminatory and a violation of the
I o o
GATT Standards Code that Japan had signed in the Tokyo Round. " It appeared that 
while Japan had signed the code and revised the general Japan Industrial Standards law, 
detailed customs procedures were left unchanged at a lower level within the Japanese 
bureaucracy. In its November 1982 inventory of Japanese trade barriers, USTR (1982) 
noted that ‘unless US producers opt for the burdensome dock inspection procedure, they 
cannot obtain the “s-mark”. Without the “s-mark” they cannot obtain the JSBB mark. 
Without the JSBB mark US bats cannot be used in official games and are not afforded 
the commercial advantage that goes along with carrying the JSBB mark’. After further 
bilateral consultations and a signal by the American government that the case may be 
taken to GATT dispute settlement, the Japanese government agreed to bring its detailed 
procedures into line with the Standards Code across a range of areas. But it was 1984 
before MITI published the standards and application procedures applicable to imported 
metal bats and began to register US factories. In a final gambit, the JSBB tried 
unsuccessfully to block approval of the “s-mark” by attempting to require three years of 
testing in league games before the mark could be granted.1 *’4
Among US trade officials, the peeling onion experience encapsulated a widely-shared 
perspective on the distinctiveness of the Japan market access problem. A steady stream 
of complaints and frustrating negotiations had uncovered numerous problems at low 
levels of the Japanese bureaucracy where decision-making on access for foreign products 
was often slow, arbitrary and opaque. This meshed with cultural and attitudinal 
explanations of Japanese resistance to imports. But for the emergent group of Japan
1" Article 7 of the code required that foreign and domestic suppliers of similar products receive equal 
treatment under certification systems, while Article 5 required the same conditions of inspection apply to
foreign and domestic products.
1,4 In interviews for this study, a number of former US government officials made reference to the
symbolic importance of this case and its contribution to mounting frustration with the deep-seated nature 
of Japanese market access problems. For a more detailed discussion of this episode, see Rapp (1986).
1 0 1
hardliners, the problem went well beyond a legacy o f regulatory controls, recalcitrant 
low-level parts of the Japanese bureaucracy and cultural import resistance. The Japanese 
government was seen as having mastered the art of industry targeting with a highly 
coordinated strategy to displace American industry from the commanding heights of the 
international economy. This in turn was alleged to threaten American high-wage jobs, 
technological ascendancy and potentially long-term national power and security. 
Government-directed industrial policy, research cartels, administrative guidance, anti­
trust exemptions and the like were viewed as a continuation o f past Japanese 
mercantilism by means other than traditional tariffs and quotas.
Most active within the executive branch in the US Commerce Department, the hardliners 
despaired at the naivety of the Reagan Administration’s free trade philosophy at a time 
o f continually rising US trade deficits with Japan and deterioration in the 
competitiveness of US high-technology industries. Prestowitz’s (1988) account of his 
period as Counselor for Japan Affairs to the Secretary of Commerce in the Reagan 
Administration is the exemplar of the views and policy frustrations o f the hardliners in 
the first half o f 1980s. He also identifies clearly the degree to which Congress formed a 
critical part of the hardline coalition in US-Japan trade negotiations.
Congress is the central institution in negotiations between the United States and Japan. 
Were it not for Congress, it is unlikely that there would be any negotiations at all. All 
postwar US administrations have been reluctant to press hard for US commercial 
advantage and have hesitated to enforce US trade law.
... national security issues are seen as far more important than a few dollars’ worth of 
trade. Thus, denied significant assistance from the executive branch, those injured by 
imports or unfair trade turn to Congress, which — because it cannot help by negotiating 
directly itself — usually responds to the complaints of its constituents in the only way it 
can: by introducing bills that threaten to impede the entry of foreign goods into the US 
market.
The reigning administration normally responds by labeling such measures “protectionist” 
and hastening to negotiate, not primarily to solve the problems but to give an appearance 
of progress so that Congress, not really wanting to act beastly to US trading partners, 
will find an excuse to keep from doing so.
... In this way, successive administrations have hoped to demonstrate to Congress that 
they are doing “something”, and to Japan that they are not violating free-trade doctrine 
any more than political reality necessitates. The game is complex and is played at several 
levels: sometimes congressional threats are real; sometimes they are merely to frighten 
reluctant administrations into action; and sometimes an administration asks to be 
frightened so that it can then point to the danger of congressional action as a negotiating 
tool (Prestowitz 1988: 250-251).
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The rising bilateral trade deficit, the early 1980s recession and the structural problems of 
American manufacturing industry provided fertile political ground for the hardliners in 
the administration, Congress and the most trade-sensitive parts of the US economy. Also 
important in the codification of hardline ideas was the stream of analysis challenging 
orthodox economic interpretations of US-Japan trade based on the principle of 
comparative advantage. An increasing number of manufacturing industry-oriented policy 
analysts sought to provide an alternative interpretive framework of US-Japan economic 
relations based around the postulated role of industrial policy in Japan's economic 
success. This work sought to highlight Japan's capacity to use industrial policy to shape 
comparative advantage, in contrast with American commercial policies seen as reactive 
and backward-looking. In an American policy context, debate tended to range loosely 
around whether Japanese industrial policy should be punished because it was unfair or 
emulated because it was successful. Favouring punishment were a range of business 
organisations and companies seeking relief from Japanese imports (including the SIA, 
the Labor-Industry Coalition for International Trade, and the US Trade Policy Council). 
A number of academic analysts leaned towards some form of emulation (including John 
Zysman, Stephen Cohen and Chalmers Johnson of the University of California at 
Berkely, Ezra Vogel at Harvard University, Bruce Scott and Robert Reich at Harvard
13 SBusiness School and Lester Thurow at Massachusetts Institute of Technology).
The free traders: Keeping the hardliners in check
During the first Reagan Administration, the hardliners faced strong and effective 
opposition to their efforts to draw the US government away from traditional, process- 
oriented market access negotiations with Japan. According to the former Undersecretary 
of Commerce Lionel Olmer:
The people that entered the Reagan Administration at a senior level in the national 
security apparatus and economic policymaking apparatus were ideologically committed 
to a pure free trade policy — I’m thinking of David Stockman, George Shultz and Don
1 ° See Lincoln (1984: 55) for a comprehensive study of Japan’s industrial policy and its relation to US 
policy debates in the first half of the 1980s. For a sample of the literature from analysts who sought to 
spotlight the importance of industrial policy to Japan’s economic success, see Magaziner and Hout(1981f 
Johnson (1982), Magazinerand Reich (1983), Reich (1983), Zysman and Cohen (1983) and Zysman and 
Tyson (1983). Noble (1989) provides an excellent survey of the academic debate on Japanese industrial 
policy.
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Regan. And so the mind-set was clearly one of believing that companies who 
complained about the lack of market access are essentially whiners seeking a 
government hand-out or government assistance to achieve for them what they should 
have been able to achieve for themselves.136
Prior to the trade regime crisis, the Free Trade-Good Relations coalition successfully 
contained any movement towards a results-oriented market access policy. This coalition 
held that, notwithstanding frustrations surrounding market access barriers in Japan, 
neither the economic nor the political stakes for the United States warranted any radical 
departure from traditional process-oriented negotiations. As one pillar of this alliance, 
supporters of free trade on intellectual grounds tended to see American trade problems 
with Japan as largely self-inflicted and/or much less important than the large domestic 
economic challenges facing the United States. The second group, concentrated in the 
national security apparatus of the American state and the postwar internationalist foreign 
policy elite, was concerned principally to avoid trade tensions with Japan that might 
jeopardise American global military-security objectives, primarily containment of the 
Soviet Union. For this coalition, special pressure on Japan to assure sales of US products 
was contrary both to market-based rules of the international trading system and to 
America’s broadly-defined foreign policy interests. The idea that Japanese economic 
institutions and policies were sufficiently different to warrant an unorthodox market 
access policy was either challenged on intellectual grounds, or considered largely 
irrelevant when set against the more important domestic and international policy 
challenges facing the United States.
Informed by orthodox economics, the dominant view among the free traders was that the 
Japan problem was either a political problem, or a macroeconomic problem of America’s 
making rather than one caused by Japanese barriers. The presumption that free trade 
invariably was the best trade policy independent of the policies of other countries was a 
powerful orienting idea for this group. A number of propositions tended to follow from 
this free trade policy paradigm. First, just as any Japanese barriers to trade were 
primarily to the detriment of the Japanese economy, so the United States would be the 
loser from any restrictive actions against Japan. Second, a bilateral US trade deficit with
1" Lionel Olmer, interview with author, 3 1 May 1996, Washington DC. Stockman, Shultz and Regan 
were, respectively. Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), Secretary of State and 
Secretary of the Treasury in the first Reagan Administration.
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Japan had few if any implications for American economic prosperity which depended 
fundamentally on domestic sources of economic growth and productivity. And third, any 
Japanese actions to reduce trade barriers would have negligible impact on the trade 
imbalance in the absence of changes in underlying macroeconomic variables such as 
national savings, investment and exchange rates. Hence, the (small) economic stakes for 
the United States did not warrant: (1) protection for American industry faced with 
intense competition from Japan; (2) narrowly-defined reciprocity policies which would 
block Japanese access to the American market as retaliation against Japanese barriers; or 
(3) other US government action to interfere with outcomes in the Japanese market in 
favour of American industry. In the early 1980s, free traders gave little credence to 
arguments that there was something inherently different about trade with Japan that 
would justify new forms of policy intervention to distort trade flows.
Vigorous opposition to the Japan hardliners on economic grounds in the first Reagan 
Administration came from such agencies as the US Treasury Department, the CEA and 
the OMB. ' The CEA was especially assertive in various policy debates seeking to 
explain the underlying determinants of Japan’s trade surplus in manufactures, arguing 
against the continued emphasis of US policy on the bilateral trade imbalance, and 
challenging claims about the threat to US interests of Japanese behind-the-border 
practices. In its 1983 annual report, the CEA (1983: 57) devoted considerable attention to 
US-Japan trade issues arguing that:
Japan runs a huge surplus in its manufactured trade, while the United States runs only a 
small one, and Japan also has a large surplus in its bilateral trade with the United States. 
These facts are often attributed to Japanese trade restrictions which seriously hurt US 
businesses. Trade restrictions, however, do not in the long run improve the Japanese 
trade balance. ... they lead to offsetting increases in other imports or declines in exports. 
The main explanation of Japan's surplus in manufactures trade and in trade with the 
United States is that Japan, with few natural resources, incurs huge deficits in its trade in 
primary products, especially oil, and with primary producers, especially the Organization 
of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). The surpluses in the rest of Japan's trade 
offset these deficits.
Council member William Niskanen (1983: 74) reflected the traditional free trader’s view 
on Japan’s differentness and the effects of Japanese industrial policy:
1,7 The State Department also maintained a strong policy commitment to free trade on economic grounds 
with George Shultz (an economist) as Secretary of State.
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It is dangerous to suggest that it is not in our interest to trade with countries that do not 
have similar economic policies, or economic history, or institutions, or even language. 
Differences among countries are in some sense trade barriers; they are also a basis for 
comparative advantage. We should be very careful not to let our lack of understanding 
about the consequences of Japanese industrial policy lead us into a stricter form of 
reciprocity standard under which we restrict trade with countries that do not have 
regulations or antitrust policies or other economic policies like our own. I see little 
reason to export US antitrust laws or regulations, and I am not sure that I would want to 
import those of any other country. ...
I also think that we should be prepared to live with subsidies that are in some sense a part 
of the permanent policy of another government, except in those conditions in which 
strong national security considerations dominate. By and large, if other governments 
over a sustained period of time choose to subsidize some particular good or service in 
international trade, a share of the benefits of such a subsidy will accrue to us.
In addition to the free traders within the executive branch agencies, academic economists 
and free trade policy analysts in the think tank community sought to counter arguments 
for more interventionist US trade strategies. The free trade think tanks ranged across the 
political spectrum from the traditionally liberal Brookings Institution to the conservative 
Heritage Foundation, as well as more narrowly-focused institutions such as the Institute 
for International Economics (HE). Via publications and regular appearances at 
congressional hearings, individuals from these privately-funded organisations attempted 
to steer public policy attention in Washington more towards US domestic policies, with 
less focus on sectoral reciprocity and industrial targeting grievances directed at Japan. 
Founding Director of the HE and former Carter Administration Treasury official, C. Fred 
Bergsten, was especially active in making the case that a seriously overvalued dollar-yen 
exchange rate was the central factor underlying growth in the US-Japan trade imbalance 
and the political tensions associated with it. BergsteiVs critique was directed at the 
Reagan Administration’s macroeconomic policies and the resulting high US interest 
rates and exchange rate (Bergsten 1981, 1982a, 1982b). Policy analysts at the Brookings 
Institution including Charles Shultze, chairman of the CEA under President Carter, and 
former State Department official Philip Tresize, were prominent in challenging 
arguments about the scale and importance of industrial policy in Japan’s postwar growth 
and its possible application in an American setting (Shultze 1983a, 1983b; Trezise 1983).
Academic specialists on the Japanese economy such as Professors Hugh Patrick (Yale 
University) and Gary Saxonhouse (University of Michigan) also sought to counter 
simplistic claims about the scale of Japanese trade barriers and government intervention
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in the Japanese economy.138 Saxonhouse in particular challenged the widespread view 
that Japan’s relatively low level of manufactured imports was in itself evidence of 
uniquely restrictive Japanese barriers. Based on a multicountry, empirical model of 
international trade, Saxonhouse (1982, 1983a) concluded that the pattern of Japanese 
trade was well explained by a Hecksher-Ohlin framework based on orthodox 
international trade theory. He argued that Japan’s distinctive trade structure compared 
with other industrial economies simply reflected how the Japanese economy’s other 
attributes were also distinctive.Ijy In a widely-cited paper delivered at a conference 
sponsored by the HE in June 1982, Saxonhouse (1983a: 285) concluded that:
Most of the current emphasis placed on opening the domestic Japanese market to foreign 
product competition is misplaced. By the traditional indices of the international 
economic system foreign access to the Japanese market would have to be considered 
excellent. Indeed, when the distinctive endowments of the Japanese economy have been 
appropriately considered not only is foreign access good but so is foreign performance. 
By these standards foreign penetration of the Japanese market is equivalent to the 
experience of other major industrial economies.
In the debate on industrial policy, Saxonhouse (1983b) also cited evidence to show that 
by the beginning of the 1980s, Japan’s direct industrial subsidies were negligible and 
special tax preferences were small by international standards. Saxonhouse argued that 
distinctive Japanese institutions and other forms of government intervention in Japan 
(e.g., direct influence on the size and composition of bank loan portfolios, government- 
business R&D programs and special aid through government procurement) were better 
thought of as substitutes rather than complements for functionally equivalent institutions 
in the United States. While it is difficult to argue that in isolation the Saxonhouse 
analysis was especially influential on the US policy process, it did provide a focal point 
for free trade-oriented actors in the American trade policy community looking to steer
140the US government away from greater intervention in US-Japan trade flows.
In coalition with those arguing for free trade on purely economic grounds, the second 
major source of opposition to the Japan hardliners during the first Reagan Administration
138 See, for example, testimonies before US Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs (1982).
1,9 "No other advanced industrial economy combines such high quality labor with such poor natural 
resources at such a great distance from its major trading partners’ (Saxonhouse 1983a: 273).
140 See, for example, the statement by C. Fred Bergsten to US Congress, House Committee on Foreign 
Affairs (1982). Chapter 8 identifies how the conclusions drawn by Saxonhouse were challenged by other 
mainstream economists in the second half of the 1980s.
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resided in the political-security policy apparatus. President Reagan had won office with a 
pledge to project a more assertive American defense and foreign policy posture backed 
by significantly increased military spending.141 The election o f Yasuhiro Nakasone as 
head o f the governing Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and Japanese Prime Minister in 
November 1982 ushered in a new era o f US-Japan high-level exchange on global issues. 
Prime Minister Nakasone’s early and clearly-stated support for American defense and 
foreign policy objectives became the foundation for a much-touted personal rapport 
between President Reagan and the Japanese Prime Minister. The Williamsburg summit 
o f 1983 would see ‘an implicit extension of the Western security alliance to include 
Japan’ (Frost 1987: 123). And in the interests o f a more equal US-Japan security 
relationship, both governments also agreed in 1983 to permit the export o f Japanese 
military technology to the United States and to promote the transfer o f dual-use 
technology, capable o f both commercial/civilian and military applications (Frost 1987: 
131). At the Shimoda conference o f September 1983, Secretary o f State George Shultz 
used his keynote speech to argue that the time had come to think o f US-Japan relations 
less in bilateral terms and more as an ‘ international partnership’ , a theme amplified by
14?President Reagan in his November 1983 speech to the Japanese Diet.
Prior to the trade regime crisis, the relationship between US-Japan trade issues and 
security matters was essentially a continuation o f the established Cold War pattern. The 
two sets o f issues rarely i f  ever became entangled at the operational level o f policy. Both 
political-military and trade officials tended to recognise that any specific problems would 
be handled in separate domains. But to an important extent this separation only served to 
underline the prevailing Cold War hierarchy between “ high” and “ low” foreign policy 
priorities and the institutional dominance of the Free Trade-Good Relations coalition. 
This was manifest in the limits on the types o f trade action could gain the necessary 
inter-agency consensus in the US policy process. Richard Holbrooke (1991-92: 47), the
141 A strong Cold War prism confirmed Japan’s strategic importance in containing the expansion o f Soviet 
influence in the Asia-Pacific. In early 1981, the Reagan Administration began a campaign to persuade 
Japan to upgrade its self-defense capabilities in such activities as patrolling sealanes and defense 
surveillance. Executive branch officials tended to emphasise sharing o f roles, missions and increasingly 
defense technology rather than specific Japanese defense outlays. See, for example, Dam (1984: 12).
142 See US Department o f State (1984) for texts o f addresses by President Reagan and Secretary o f State 
Shultz. Prime Minister Nakasone’s most famous statement o f support came during his first visit to 
Washington DC as Prime Minister in January 1983 when he proclaimed Japan as an ‘ unsinkable aircraft 
carrier’ for American policy in the Pacific (Nacht 1983).
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Carter Administration’s Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific, has 
described the Cold War pattern whereby:
if a trade negotiation appeared to be headed for collapse, the leaders o f  both nations 
would often step in to make a deal that would be justified on grounds that the only 
beneficiary from any crisis in Japanese-American relations would be the Soviet Union. 
This potent Cold War argument won the political or bureaucratic debate every time, 
although it annoyed many who thought it was invoked excessively or without proof.
Trade officials in the Commerce Department and USTR arguing for a more aggressive 
policy towards Japan certainly perceived that their capacity to pursue such a policy was 
constrained during the first Reagan Administration to the detriment of American 
commercial interests. Former Deputy USTR Michael Smith, chairman of the sub-cabinet 
Trade Policy Review Group (TPRG) through much of this period and the senior career 
trade official engaged in US-Japan negotiations, identifies the clear-cut divisions on 
Japan within the US government and the institutional checks on a more aggressive trade 
policy:
This town [Washington DC] was divided between the Chrysanthemum Club and the 
Black Ships Society. 1 didn’t side with either of them, 1 just said I wanted to get into that 
market.
There were so many apologists. The State Department was owned by the Japanese. We 
used to call them the Japanese Embassy on 23rd Street. They would totally cave on us. 
I’m not faulting the NSC [National Security Council] as much as I fault the State 
Department. The State Department just had an acute case of clientitis —  acute. ...
We had a lot of problems with the Department o f  Defense because they viewed Japan as 
their unsinkable aircraft carrier. One day in a Cabinet meeting we had [Defense 
Secretary] Cap Weinberger say that it was more important to have night landing rights 
for our pilots than it was to save the American semiconductor industry. There was a 
blindness on the issue.14’
Commerce Undersecretary Olmer provides a similar perspective pointing to the 
influence of policy-makers with:
genuine beliefs that leaving aside the question o f creating jobs through building products 
in this country and exporting them, Japan was far more important to the United States for 
security reasons and that it was far more important to engage Japan in an ongoing 
relationship o f the deepest sort in preparing for the 21st century. ...
1 ’’ Michael Smith, interview with author, 10 May 1996, Washington DC.
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The view was that: “I know there may be problems for some American companies, but I 
really think we need to work these things out cautiously. Don't break eggs; figure out 
another way to make an omelette” .144
Based on his time in the Reagan Administration, Prestowitz (1988: 269-270) provides a 
more caustic reading of the motivations of the key foreign policy players with input into 
US trade policy. He argues, for example, that: the State Department thinks trade 
problems ‘are mostly the fault of the United States and particularly of lazy US 
businessmen. It often works with the Japanese to “control the crazies” in the US 
government (that is, Commerce, the US Trade Representative and the Congress) and is 
sometimes a conduit of confidential information to Japan’; the US Embassy in Tokyo ‘is 
even more supportive of Japanese positions than is the [State] department’; the National 
Security Council is ‘an outpost of the State Department in the White House on these 
issues’; and the Defense Department is ‘generally not pro-business’ and mainly 
concerned ‘to maintain a harmonious military relationship’.
The clearest illustrations of the relative positions of the Japan hardliners and the free 
traders during the first Reagan Administration arose in the area of high-technology 
competition and associated allegations of Japanese industrial targeting. Inter-agency 
discussions on the goals of the High Technology Working Group, established in 1982 to 
try to reduce trade tensions, pitted hardliners and trade pragmatists in Commerce and 
USTR against the free traders. Discussions in 1983 remained largely exploratory despite 
American concerns about Japanese dumping in the US market and low US sales in the 
Japanese market. Threats of Congressional action and private sector unfair trade petitions 
led the US to demand a second round of negotiations focusing entirely on market access 
for semiconductors. But to the dismay of the Commerce Department’s negotiator, ‘the 
invocation of free-trade doctrine by most of the US government agencies made it 
impossible to negotiate for concrete results’ (Prestowitz 1988: 52).14:1
The American machine tool industry would serve as the unlikely lightening rod for the 
debate over Japanese industrial targeting. In May 1982, Houdaille Industries (a Florida- 
based machine tool maker) filed a petition calling on the US government to deny 
investment tax credits on purchases of Japanese-made machine tools because of Japan’s
144 Olmer, interview, 1996.
145 The HTWG’s focus on semiconductors is examined in more detail in the next chapter.
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alleged subsidisation of its industry. Under Section 103 of the Revenue Act of 1971 (an 
otherwise obscure tax provision) the President could exclude a foreign product from 
investment tax credits in the United States if it was determined that a foreign government 
burdened US commerce through the ‘tolerance of international cartels’. Prestowitz 
(1988: 223) would later describe the 1000-page petition submitted by Houdaille 
Industries as ‘the most comprehensive vivisection of Japanese industrial policy and trade 
practices undertaken to date’. It pointed to a history of trade and investment restrictions 
in the 1950s and 1960s and the emergence of a cartel of Japanese machine tool makers to 
counter liberalisation measures undertaken in the 1970s. The most controversial aspects 
of the case surrounded the extent to which the Japanese government, and in particular 
MITI, actively shaped and subsidised the industry so that it became a cartelised sector 
targeting exports to the US market (Dryden 1995: 292). USTR and the Commerce 
Department backed the Houdaille case against Japan with congressional support, while 
Treasury, the CEA, and the State Department were the main opponents of any punitive 
trade remedy.
For the better part of a year, the Houdaille case ensured Japanese industrial policy 
received unprecedented scrutiny in Washington DC via numerous congressional hearings 
and official and non-official reports.14*’ Houdaille’s lawyer, Richard Copaken, used 
unconventional methods including videotaping supposed collusion by executives in the 
Japanese machine tool industry and ‘exposing’ a speeial Bicycle Racing Fund from 
which, it was alleged, MITI subsidised the machine tool industry with proceeds from 
bicycle and motorcycle races in Japan. As Dryden (1995: 292) notes, ‘American TV and 
newspaper reporters latched onto Copaken’s thesis, and Houdaille’s case was soon 
enjoying a wave of favourable publicity’. Japan hardliners in the US government saw the 
Houdaille petition as a critical test case for mounting a more far-reaching official 
response to Japanese industrial policy. In a January 1983 memo to Commerce 
Undersecretary Olmer, Prestowitz stated that, ‘Some positive action on this [Houdaille] 
petition would be a wonderful way to keep the pot stirring ... It would create uncertainty 
on the part of the Japanese not only with regard to machine tools, but also with regard to 
robotics and other targeted industries’ (Dryden 1995: 292-293). Critics of the case within 
the Reagan Administration charged that US machine tool makers were in trouble largely
146 See, for example, US GAO (1982a), US GAO ( 1982b), Wheeler, Janow and Pepper (1982), US ITC 
(1983).
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due to their own mismanagement and the 1981-82 recession, and that a favourable 
decision for Houdaille would open the door to a flood of requests for import relief from 
US industries. They also argued that the case threatened to undermine long-standing US 
policy in multilateral forums which opposed the use of tax measures to affect trade 
flows.
As debate continued into 1983, Houdaille’s claims came under greater scrutiny and the 
drive to pursue the remedy of rejecting tax credits weakened. At a cabinet-level meeting 
in January 1983, USTR Brock made the case for a finding of unfairness against Japan, 
but reportedly proposed a negotiated settlement more along the lines of a VER 
(Prestowitz 1988: 225). Even hardliners such as Prestowitz conceded by this point that 
the Houdaille petition ‘may not be a perfect case, ... [but] there is probably no such thing 
...; the nature of industrial policy is such that it is very difficult to find smoking guns’ 
(Dryden 1995: 293). With the inter-agency process deadlocked over a finding or a 
recommended action against Japan, President Reagan on 22 April 1983 rejected the 
Houdaille petition citing his belief in free trade and his regard for Prime Minister 
Nakasone’s efforts to expand Japan’s defense role. Instead of official action on the 
petition, the President directed that a special series of industrial policy talks be held to 
determine whether Japan’s industrial policies had an adverse effect on US trade. 
Reflecting the hardline perspective within the Commerce Department, Maureen Smith 
notes that ‘with the Houdaille case we had learned a good deal about Japanese industrial 
policy and targeting. ... If that had not been short-circuited, the whole subsequent history 
might have been very, very different and it might have been the most effective policy
147tool to grapple with Japanese industrial policy'.
The subsequent industrial policy dialogue between USTR and MIT1 moved the issue of 
Japanese industrial policy into a setting which offered Japan hardliners no clear result or 
path towards an active US government policy response. Former US trade official 
William Piez who participated in the talks recalls the informal style and inconclusive 
outcome of the process:
We would sit with the Japanese for hours and talk about their industrial policy and ours.
They were interesting and useful talks in part because they didn’t have a specific
147 Maureen Smith, interview, 1996.
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negotiated result. The idea was just to understand things better and people didn’t fret too 
much over documents. ...
The objective was really to determine whether Japanese industrial policy was trade 
distorting. Did it make them more competitive than they would otherwise be without 
government intervention in the process? ... 1 guess the conclusion of those talks was: 
“Maybe, but it’s hard to prove”. And they were reciprocal in that the Japanese would go 
after us on such questions as whether the Defense Department was subsidising the 
manufacture of semiconductors.
So although in form there were distinct differences, and the Japanese were quite frank
that their industrial policy was intended to make them more competitive as exporters, we
were presumably making the world safe for democracy and becoming more competitive 
148as a by-product.
A strengthening US economy through 1983 eased the industrial policy debate into the 
background of US-Japan relations. The high-profile market access issues ofthat year -  
new demands for beef and citrus liberalisation and renewed criticism of low 
telecommunications imports under the NTT procurement agreement — tended to 
confirm the prevailing constraints on policy, despite the hardening opinion towards 
Japan in some US government agencies. Even these demands were checked temporarily 
in the second half of the year by the guardians of good relations with Japan — a signal of 
American support for Prime Minister Nakasone in upcoming Diet elections, and a 
gesture to smooth relations pending President Reagan’s visit to Japan in November 1983. 
The only substantive announcement on economic issues during the visit related to 
Japanese capital market liberalisation. And in the wake of the visit, Vice President 
George Bush was enlisted to oversee inter-agency coordination on Japan policy as the 
White Mouse looked to place bilateral trade frictions within a broad foreign policy 
context (Japan Economic Institute of America 1984: 12).149
Soon after President Reagan’s visit to Japan, American and Japanese officials renewed 
negotiations on NTT procurement and beef and citrus liberalisation given looming expiry 
dates for the existing agreements. The first NTT agreement failed to meet US 
government expectations as judged by the lack of major sales of high-technology
" s Piez, interview, 1996.
149 While head-of-state visits are invariably occasions for friendly speeches and pledges of mutual support, 
President Reagan’s speech before the Japanese Diet in November 1983 was an exemplary papering over 
of bilateral trade differences. For instance, reflecting on Japan’s historical drive to catch-up with the 
United States, President Reagan noted: ‘I don’t think I’ll be making headlines when I say, you’ve not only 
caught up in some cases, you’ve pulled ahead. [Laughter] Here again, our partnership is crucial. But this 
time, you can be teachers’ (US Department of State 1984: 65).
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equipment during the three-year life of the agreement (US GAO 1983). NTT purchases 
of foreign telecommunications equipment had remained below 2 per cent of total 
procurement in the period following the December 1980 agreement (US ITC 1983: 6). In 
its November 1982 statement on Japanese barriers, USTR (1982) noted that no sales of 
high technology products had taken place due to what it described as the ‘closed loop’ 
between NTT and its suppliers. Those inside the loop were seen to benefit from 
economies of scale, cost and risk reduction and advances in production technology 
associated with industry targeting. In response to sustained criticism by USTR Brock, 
NTT took a series of initiatives in March 1983 in which it committed itself to accept bids 
in English and not just Japanese, to accept bids at its New York office instead of only in 
Tokyo, and to extend the application period for bids on more sophisticated 
telecommunications equipment. A new three-year accord was concluded in late January 
1984, but only after the United States dropped demands linking renewal of the NTT 
agreement to changes in Japan's satellite development and purchasing policies. The new 
agreement provided for greater opportunities for involvement by foreign firms in NTT 
R&D programs for sophisticated telecommunications products and more regular 
agreement reviews.IM)
The second NTT agreement was soon overshadowed in early 1984 by MPT’s draft 
legislation to partially deregulate telecommunications services in Japan that included 
plans to privatise NTT. This opened the way to prolonged negotiations over reciprocal 
access in telecommunications, especially given further moves towards deregulation in 
the United States with the divestiture of AT&T in 1984. The main focus of these broader 
negotiations was Japanese regulations on the market for computer communications 
systems, otherwise known as value-added networks (VANs). By the second half of 1984, 
American concern over NTT procurement centred on whether a privatised NTT would 
continue to be bound by the government-to-government agreement. Other ongoing 
market access complaints pursued by the United States in bilateral negotiations in 1984 
included tariffs on forest products, Japanese regulations on cigarette pricing and import 
distribution, the status of a group of 13 agricultural quotas, access to the legal profession 
in Japan and tariffs on a range of products — paper and forestry products, agricultural
150 The satellites dispute centred on the domestic content procurement policy of Japan’s National 
Aeronautics and Space Development Agency under the 1978 plan for self-reliance in space technology 
(US-Japan Trade Study Group 1984: 54).
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machinery, alcoholic beverages and wine (Dam 1984). In negotiations on a new beef and 
citrus agreement, Japan resisted American demands for full liberalisation, but agreed in 
April 1984 to increased quotas on imports of beef, oranges and orange and grapefruit 
juice over four years (Japan Economic Institute of America 1984, 1986).
Regime crisis, MOSS and new policy thresholds
While the first Reagan Administration gave increased attention to select areas of high- 
technology and services trade, its approach remained one slanted heavily towards 
Japan’s formal, product-specific trade restrictions on, for example, beef, citrus, leather, 
wood and tobacco products. Few new government-to-government agreements were 
negotiated.151 The first half of the 1980s saw a series of Japanese liberalisation 
“packages” which many free traders in the American trade policy community hoped 
would solve at least some complaints of corporate America. As one analyst has noted, 
when originally conceived:
the package approach seemed brilliantly designed to suit the taste of a people captivated 
by kits and how-to-do-it devices. By the seventh such package, however, American 
patience had worn thin. Each new collection of import-liberalizing measures announced 
by the Japanese Government seemed to confirm the alleged barrenness of concessions 
offered in the last one (Frost 1987: 13-14).
The trade regime crisis and policy turning point reflected in President Reagan’s Section 
301 initiatives in September 1985 relaxed the institutional checks on the hardliners. It 
paved the way for a more structured and aggressive approach to market access problems 
with a much greater emphasis on formal agreements linked to US trade law. The long- 
lasting importance of the trade regime crisis can be seen quantitatively in terms of the 
increase in US-Japan market access agreements beginning with the MOSS process. 
Figure 4.1 shows the jump in the number of bilateral agreements after 1985 as the US 
government adopted a more deliberate policy of negotiating formal agreements. Six 
market access agreements were secured in the first half of the 1980s. The next decade 
would see about 50 agreements signed.
151 The 1983 High Technology Working Group measures on semiconductors and the financial market 
agreement following the yen-dollar talks were the only new agreements negotiated by the first Reagan 
Administration. The administration renegotiated agreements with Japan on NTT procurement, beef and 
citrus liberalisation and bilateral air services.
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Figure 4.1 US-Japan Bilateral Market Access Agreements
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Source: Office of the US Trade Representative, various documents.
Premised on the need to address more systematically than hitherto the peeling onion 
phenomenon, MOSS was a deliberate attempt by free traders to deflect overt results- 
oriented strategies proposed by the hardliners. A January 1985 meeting between 
President Reagan and Prime Minister Nakasone offered scope for a broad reassessment 
of Japan market access issues within the Reagan Administration — what Prestowitz 
(1988: 296) would describe later as "the next round in the debate over process versus 
results’. A proposal favoured by USTR and Commerce Department officials that 
President Reagan ask Prime Minister Nakasone to set a target for imports attracted 
significant pre-summit speculation. An inter-agency coalition of free traders, including 
the political-military agencies, opposed such an approach as a violation of market 
principles and eventually won endorsement for the more process-oriented MOSS 
framework.1̂2 The idea was to broaden negotiations away from specific products to a 
select group of industries and to address the full range of impediments seen as denying 
comparable market access to American producers. Following the Reagan-Nakasone 
summit, four areas were selected for the first round of MOSS negotiations —
152 International Trade Reporter, 1(24), 19 December 1984, p. 757. International Trade Reporter 2( 1), 2 
January 1985, p. 8. See also Prestowitz (1988: 296) and Mikanagi (1996: 44). Then Treasury official 
Robert Fauver maintains that ‘it was the structure and style of the yen/dollar talks that we used as the 
model for the MOSS talks and convinced the USTR and Commerce to follow that kicking and screaming’. 
Robert Fauver, interview with author, 2 June 1996, Washington DC.
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telecommunications, medical equipment and pharmaceuticals, sophisticated electronics, 
and forest products. These targets had two characteristics in common. First, American 
suppliers appeared competitive in other international markets, yet had trouble making 
sales in Japan. Second, domestic regulatory practices were identified from past 
negotiations as barriers to comparable market access.
The broad foreign policy orientation symbolised by the Reagan-Nakasone relationship 
saw Secretary of State George Shultz and his Japanese counterpart, Foreign Minister 
Shintaro Abe, charged with oversight responsibility for the MOSS talks at the start of 
1985. The State Department’s Undersecretary of Economic Affairs, W. Allen Wallis, led 
the sub-cabinet talks with negotiating responsibilities parcelled out to other agencies: 
USTR acted as the lead negotiator in electronics, the Commerce Department in 
telecommunications, Treasury in medical equipment and pharmaceuticals, and the 
Agriculture Department in forest products. At the first MOSS sub-cabinet talks in late 
January 1985, Undersecretary Wallis explained that the American goal was to address 
the full range of "laws, regulations, institutions and customs that could impede free 
access for foreign suppliers’ (Japan Economic Institute of America 1986: 69).
The telecommunications sector quickly emerged as the main focus of bilateral 
negotiations as US officials demanded greater harmonisation between Japanese standards 
and certification procedures for telecommunications equipment and the more liberal 
regulatory approach in the United States.153 Reforms to Japan’s telecommunications laws 
timed to take effect on 1 April 1985 provided a defacto deadline for progress in 
MOSS.im By late April, Japan agreed to a range of measures to increase transparency in 
the development of telecommunications regulations, to liberalise equipment standards on 
issues such as voice quality and signal strength, and to accept foreign testing results in 
the certification of telecommunications network equipment.ly  ̂ Progress in other areas, 
including a second round of telecommunications talks centred on radio communications, 
proceeded more gradually through the (northern) spring and summer of 1985. The 
electronics sector negotiations included US proposals for intellectual property protection
l5'’ Congress also focused heavily on the telecommunications negotiations. Since the early 1980s, Senator 
John Danforth had led efforts to pass sectoral reciprocity legislation in telecommunications.
154 For accounts of Japanese telecommunications reform in the 1980s, see Tomita (1992), Choy (1995) 
and Steven K. Vogel (1996: 137-166).
155 International Trade Reporter, 2(17), 24 April 1985, p. 564.
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of computer software and semiconductor designs, which carried over from talks in 1984, 
and demands for foreign participation in Japanese R&D programs and standards-setting 
groups. The medical equipment and pharmaceutical negotiations targeted Japanese 
acceptance of foreign test data in registering foreign products and the streamlining of 
procedures for the clearance and sale of such products. A July 1985 action program 
announced by the Japanese government dealt with a number MOSS-related measures, 
but slower progress was recorded in the politically-sensitive forest products sector with 
Japan holding out against demands for significant tariff cuts.1
The September 1985 response by the Reagan Administration to the congressional trade 
backlash tied the White House more directly to MOSS and to securing identifiable 
market access improvement in Japan. In addition to the new Section 301 measures, 
President Reagan instructed Secretary of State Shultz to ‘seek time limits on the current 
discussions with Japan designed to open access to specific Japanese markets, at the end 
of which specific commitments will be evaluated and follow-up procedures begun’ 
(White House 1985). President Reagan’s announcement also dashed any hope Japanese 
officials may have had that the December 1985 MOSS deadline would provide some 
respite from American market access demands. With protectionist trade bills (including 
many with a specific Japan orientation) still pending on Capitol Hill, the White House 
noted that the United States would ‘take the initiatives necessary to achieve more 
equitable access in a number of foreign markets, particularly in Japan and major 
developing countries’. The Reagan Administration foreshadowed that after Japanese 
commitments in the four original MOSS areas had been secured ‘new sectors will be 
added that offer the promise of expanded US exports’.
Citing ‘important progress’ from the MOSS process, American and Japanese officials 
announced agreements across all four negotiating areas on 10 January 1986.1 7 MOSS 
can be seen as part of an evolutionary response by the American policy process to the 
Japan problem, formalising a shift in emphasis away from border barriers and towards 
domestic regulations and practices. As noted previously, the January 1986 MOSS 
agreements also set a new benchmark for detailed, formal market access agreements tied
|M’ Mikanagi (1996: I 15-124) provides useful chronologies of progress on each sector.
157 International Trade Reporter, 3(3), 15 January 1986, p. 82. US officials identified the 
telecommunications and medical/pharmaceutical agreements as the most successful.
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to US trade law with a stronger emphasis on institutionalised monitoring. Finally, the 
wider distribution of bureaucratic responsibility in MOSS ensured that traditional free 
trade agencies (the State Department and the Treasury as well as the White House itself) 
assumed a more direct stake in securing identifiably successful bilateral agreements. A 
resurgent Congress was the larger institutional force behind the Reagan Administration’s 
September 1985 policy reaction that strengthened the authority of the hardliners and 
trade pragmatists in the US policy process. But at the same time, MOSS helped to erode 
of the sort of executive branch divisions on Japan policy characteristic of the first 
Reagan Administration. Former Deputy USTR Michael Smith recalled later that MOSS 
served a useful purpose by ensuring other agencies ‘would get engaged in looking at the 
difficulties’.
And then they would get disgusted by what they saw; that was fine. So MOSS actually
turned out to be fairly effective. It had the effect of deflecting some of the hard-asses —
like [Commerce Department officials] Clyde Prestowitz and Lionel Olmer — and it kept
the trade ball in play. State chaired one, Agriculture another — collegiality and all that
crap. But in the end, even the State Department had to admit that the more they peeled
off the layers of the onion, the more the problem was exposed. Eventually everybody
1S8knew Japan was a problem. Even the apologists knew it was a problem.
Conclusion
The high political salience of the Japan problem by 1985 reflected the rise of a hardline 
coalition challenging the dominant position of free traders in the US policy-making 
process. With increased exposure to Japan market access problems, the idea that Japan 
was different from other industrialised economies in terms of the scale of structural, 
behind-the-border barriers to imports was lodged firmly within US agencies with day-to- 
day responsibility for trade policy. The regime crisis weakened the institutional checks 
on the hardliners and paved the way for a more structured and aggressive approach to 
market access problems in Japan. The MOSS process demonstrated a new emphasis on 
formal agreements tied to US trade law and formed part of the transition to a selective 
results-oriented approach through the second Reagan and Bush Administrations. The 
following chapter explores the most dramatic example of this policy in the form of the 
1986 US-Japan semiconductor agreement.
Michael Smith, interview, 1996.
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5 The Semiconductor Agreement: A Hardline Landmark
Introduction
The September 1986 semiconductor trade agreement was the most significant precedent 
in the rise of a results-oriented market access policy towards Japan and perhaps the most 
controversial US trade policy action of the 1980s. The agreement illuminates key 
dimensions of America’s trade policy regime crisis, in particular Japan’s rise as a 
powerful high-technology competitor to the United States and America’s new aggressive 
bilateralism after 1985. More narrowly, it would become a critical landmark in the 
evolution towards a results-oriented market access policy towards Japan. The agreement 
represented a comprehensive managed trade response by US policy-makers determined to 
protect an industry seen as critical to America’s future competitiveness and, at some 
level, its national security.
The market access dimension of the agreement, in particular a secret numerical target set 
at 20 per cent of Japan’s semiconductor market, was a dramatic departure from traditional 
process-oriented market access demands by the United States. President Reagan’s March 
1987 decision to impose punitive trade sanctions against Japan for allegedly violating the 
agreement (the first such sanctions since World War II) demonstrated the US 
government's new policy purpose to secure concrete results in sectoral trade agreements 
with Japan. While trade conflict was never far from the surface of US-Japan relations in 
the 1980s, this series of measures was, as one analyst has noted, ‘unprecedented for its 
swiftness, severity, and agreement with industry recommendations’ (Yoffie 1988: 83). 
This chapter looks at how this agreement came about and its immediate aftermath.
As outlined in chapter 4, the US semiconductor industry’s arguments against Japanese 
industrial targeting were in many ways a template for the policy network of hardliners 
inside and outside of the US government in their attempt to influence US trade policy 
towards Japan. This chapter traces the industry’s campaign to enlist the US government's 
support for its trade policy objectives vis-a-vis Japan from the early period of the Reagan 
Administration through to the March 1987 sanctions decision. This provides a window 
into the shift in trade policy authority towards the hardliners and pragmatists in the US
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policy process and away from the free traders and national security guardians 
traditionally supportive of non-confrontational, process-oriented negotiations with Japan.
The numerical target demand was not the product of any systematic reassessment of 
Japan policy by the US government. In part, it reflected the political and bureaucratic 
cover that the trade regime crisis provided for a small group of officials to pursue a 
radical policy outcome. Still, over time the hardline premise of the agreement and the 
subsequent retaliatory action — that process-oriented negotiations with Japan in previous 
years had yielded little genuine market access — would encountered less and less 
opposition within the US policy community. Indeed, the semiconductor agreement would 
become a focal point for hardline attempts to legitimise a results-oriented policy towards 
Japan.
Japan’s DRAM dominance and the High Technology Working Group
The major Japanese electronics firms surged to a position of global parity or leadership in 
semiconductor processing technology, cost competitiveness, product quality and 
innovation in the early 1980s. The most dramatic eclipse of American semiconductor 
dominance occurred in the memory chip market, specifically the market for DRAMs. 
Japanese firms captured around 40 per cent of the US market for 16K DRAMs in the late 
1970s (Borrus, Millstein and Zysman 1983: 219). They in turn surpassed many US 
merchant firms in the commercial development of the 64K DRAM chip, while NTT and 
NEC displayed prototypes of the first 256K DRAMs at the 1980 world semiconductor 
conference in San Francisco (Prestowitz 1988: 39). Japanese producers won about 70 per 
cent of the 64K DRAM market in the United States in 1981 (OECD 1985: 35). A key part 
of their competitive advantage appeared to be new benchmarks in quality control with 
lower semiconductor defect rates compared with their American competitors (Okimoto, 
Sugano and Weinstein 1984: 53). By 1982, Japanese firms’ ascendancy in DRAM 
production was confirmed when merchant sales in Japan surpassed those in the United 
States (Figure 5.1). DRAMs accounted for less than 20 per cent of the total US 
semiconductor market at the time, but they were at the centre of the fast growing 
telecommunications equipment and computer markets. They also acted as critical
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Figure 5.1: Shares in World Merehant DRAM Market
%
United States
OtherEurope
Source: Dataquest in Dohlman (1993: D5)
“ technology drivers” for the semiconductor industry with learning benefits applicable 
to the production o f other types of semiconductors and to future generation memory 
chips.1 *' '9 Thus it was hardly surprising that semiconductors moved to the centre o f US- 
Japan trade conflict in the early 1980s.
Building on its initial foray into Washington trade politics during the Carter 
Administration, the SIA developed a three-pronged public policy wish-list in 1981 to 
meet the Japanese challenge. Two aspects were domestically-oriented: incentives for 
capital formation, and increased investment in R&D and engineering education. The third 
was increased foreign market access, and in particular the SIA requested for the first time 
that the Japanese government create an “ affirmative action program” to offset the impact 
on foreign firms o f past protection (Flamm 1996: 147). The SIA took its case to the 
newly-elected Reagan Administration whose initial response to the market access 
complaints was to negotiate accelerated mutual reduction in semiconductor tariffs with 
Japan.160 Further initiatives were forthcoming on the S lA ’s domestic priorities, but few in
1 " Historically, DRAMs with new design rules appeared six months before SRAMs (Static Random
Access Memory Devices) and EPROMs (Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory devices), and
two years before microprocessors, at the same design rules (Dohlman 1993: Appendix B).
K>(l In May 1981, both countries agreed to accelerate Tokyo Round commitments and reduce
semiconductor tariffs to 4.2 per cent by 1982 (Japan Economic Institute o f America 1982: 55).
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the Reagan Administration saw a case for more concerted trade policy action on the 
semiconductor industry’s behalf. With the US economy headed into recession, other 
trade-sensitive sectors exhibited clearer signs of economic distress as the American 
semiconductor industry still accounted for over 50 per cent of world sales. Japanese 
import penetration amounted to only around 10 per cent of total US semiconductor sales 
despite the pressure of Japanese entry into the US DRAM market.161
A weakening in demand and a new round of aggressive Japanese semiconductor pricing 
prompted fresh complaints from some US producers in early 19 8 2.162 Hardliners in the 
US Commerce Department warned their Mil l counterparts that the US government may 
be forced to “monitor” chip prices and soon thereafter prices rose in response to Japanese 
cutbacks on exports to the United States (Prestowitz 1988: 49).u” This episode led to the 
first formal semiconductor talks between the US and Japanese governments. In April 
1982, the High Technology Working Group was formed to address bilateral trade issues 
in such sectors as semiconductors, telecommunications equipment and computers. As 
noted in the previous chapter, the main focus was on access to Japan’s semiconductor 
market. This was largely because the US government had sold the HTWG to the 
domestic merchant semiconductor industry as an alternative to a dumping investigation 
(Flamm 1996: 153). As co-chairman of the American 11TWG delegation, Prestowitz 
(1988: 51) later outlined the constraints that the US government inter-agency policy 
process placed on a hardline negotiating position.
Most of the key administration figures were not engaged. Although some of us thought 
otherwise, in the eyes of most of the cabinet this was a long way from arms control and 
Star Wars. Thus, there was no mandate to achieve anything specific. As a result, we had 
to operate within the bounds of a consensus obtained from the various agencies of the US 
negotiating team that included members of the Office of the US Trade Representative, the 
Council of Economic Advisers, the National Security Council, the Office of Management 
and Budget, and the departments of State, Labor, Treasury, Commerce, and Defense.
1,11 Then Commerce Department trade official Clyde Prestowitz (1988: 48) records that industry 
representatives ‘got a reception as cool as the autumn weather in Washington. The lawyers, academic 
economists, and career bureaucrats who filled many key government positions shared a suspicion of 
business as protectionist and opposed to consumer interests. To them, the semiconductor industry 
seemed healthy: while it might have problems in one or two areas, over all it was 50 per cent bigger 
than the Japanese industry and remained profitable, while growing much faster than most US 
industries’.
K>2 The price of 64K DRAMs plunged from $25 in the fourth quarter of 198 1 to $3 in February 1982. 
Motorola led complaints about unfair Japanese pricing in early 1982, but the SI A remained divided 
over any possible anti-dumping action (O’Shea 1995: 33).
K” Flamm (1996: 149) writes that within the Japanese semiconductor industry ‘these reductions in 
exports are openly acknowledged to have been spurred by MIT1 guidance’.
123
The Consensus was that, while it was appropriate to request better market access, asking 
for a specific market share or sales volume would violate free-trade doctrine and hence be 
unacceptable. ... Thus before talking to the Japanese, we limited ourselves to asking 
simply for a more open market, whose meaning we did not define, and a system of 
gathering statistics on semiconductor shipments. Moreover, the consensus, strongly 
influenced by the State Department and the National Security Council, would not allow 
— even as a tactic — the suggestion of any retaliation if Japan did not respond favorably 
for fear that the overall relationship between the two countries might be harmed.
The first “Agreement on Principles” announced by the HTWG in November 1982 offered 
general support for free trade and investment in high-technology industries, called for 
equal national treatment in market access, and established a taskforce for semiconductor 
industry data collection.164 Both the State Department and the Japanese Foreign 
Ministry’s Bureau of Treaties worked to water down the already-vague language in the 
original FITWG document while officials from the CEA, OMB and the Justice 
Department were on guard against anything that looked like government cartelisation of 
the semiconductor market (O'Shea 1995: 21). The United States pressed for a second 
round of talks in 1983 that again focused on semiconductor market access in Japan. The 
task reportedly set for US negotiators ‘was to get measurable sales without asking for 
them’ (Prestowitz 1988: 53). A second HTWG agreement announced in November 1983 
set a timetable for semiconductor tariff elimination between the two countries, sought to 
enhance opportunities for investment, established procedures for improved intellectual 
property protection and institutionalised biannual governmental meetings to review 
semiconductor issues. And, for the first time, MITI undertook on behalf of the Japanese 
government to ‘encourage Japanese semiconductor users to enlarge opportunities for US- 
based suppliers so that long term relationships could evolve with Japanese companies’. A 
confidential “chairman’s note” set out a number of specific steps in this direction. Flamm 
(1996: 155) concludes that ‘US negotiators took these portions of the agreement to be a 
euphemistic articulation of an oral commitment by MITI to provide “administrative 
guidance” to Japanese firms to increase their purchases of US suppliers’ chips, and 
indeed the language of the confidential note would seem to support this proposition'.
The continued erosion of the American industry’s global position through 1982-83 saw
164 Prestowitz (1988: 52) describes the November 1982 agreement as ‘more a monument to clever 
drafting than anything else’. The agreement was deemed to have the status of recommendations to the 
two governments and therefore not to have the force of law.
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the SIA step up its campaign against Japanese industry targeting. The SIA’s legal 
advisers drafted a Section 301 petition alleging unfair trade barriers in 1982, but the trade 
association stopped short of filing an official complaint. By 1982, the SIA had begun to 
frame its case against Japanese structural barriers, production and pricing practices more 
explicitly around claims of industry collusion and coordinated predatory behaviour, with 
the Japanese government in the role of providing administrative support and guidance 
(Flamm 1996: 152). In early 1983, the SIA released a major report entitled The Effect o f  
Government Targeting on World Semiconductor Competition: A Case History o f  
Japanese Industrial Strategy and its Costs fo r America which set out to ‘describe the 
decade or more of coordinated effort by the Japanese government to put the Japanese 
producers in a dominant world-wide position in key product lines’ (SIA 1983: v). With 
Japan accounting for around 30 per cent of global semiconductor sales, the SIA (1983: 
90) emphasised the high stakes for the US industry in breaking into the Japanese market:
While the Japanese export drive in high density RAMs has had a dramatic and visible 
impact on a number of US semiconductor firms, a less visible but equally serious threat 
to US firms is posed by the continuing inaccessibility of Japan’s domestic semiconductor 
market. The problem here is not only denied opportunities, but an increasing threat to US 
firms in all world markets because of their continuing inability to penetrate the Japanese 
market.
The report alleged that the Japanese government had systematically targeted the industry 
in three ways: (1) it had subsidised Japanese chip producers with various forms of direct 
and indirect aid leading to large capital investments and aggressive export pricing; (2) 
MITI had actively cartelised the industry structure by presiding over the formation of 
research cartels, encouraging product specialisation by firms, and supervising the 
industry structure to ensure that firms moved in a direction consistent with national goals; 
and (3) after formal liberalisation, the government had promoted and condoned “Buy 
Japan” practices to block import penetration by foreign firms. All of this, it was claimed, 
had resulted in an industry structure where ‘supply and demand is controlled by an 
oligopoly of Japan’s leading semiconductor producers, who have both the incentive and 
the ability to adhere to “Buy Japan” practices’ (SIA 1983: 74). According to the SIA, this 
structure ensured that the American share of the merchant semiconductor market in Japan 
never exceeded 12 per cent for a sustained period of time despite formal liberalisation, a 
more favourable exchange rate relative to the era of high border protection, and repeated 
US company efforts to expand their sales to Japan. This performance was contrasted with
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the success of US firms in Europe where they held 56 per cent share of the merchant 
market. The SIA highlighted what it claimed were cases where new American 
semiconductor products enjoyed initial strong export growth to Japan, only to see sales 
fall away once a similar Japanese product was introduced. The report recommended that 
the US government: (1) establish a monitoring system to give “early warning” of export 
drives and possible predatory actions by Japanese firms; and (2) insist on fully equivalent 
commercial opportunities in Japan, including a requiring the Japanese government to 
establish an affirmative action program to compensate for past discrimination (SIA 1983: 
6 ) .
The Electronic Industries Association of Japan (EIAJ) rejected the SIA analysis arguing 
that Japanese government policies were GATT-legal and no different from government 
industry policies in the United States. It claimed that no obvious disparity in market 
access existed given Japanese import penetration measured roughly 13 per cent of the US 
merchant market in 1983, broadly comparable with US market share in Japan of around 
10 per cent. The Japanese industry also cited differences in product quality and services 
as critical factors underpinning preferences for Japanese products.1(0 In the event, 
bilateral semiconductor tensions receded in 1984 amidst a mini-boom in semiconductor 
demand. Indeed, there were signs that the HTWG negotiations had assisted American 
industry in increasing sales from around 10 per cent of the Japanese market to almost 12 
per cent. But this fragile truce would be shattered in 1985 — a year of acute bilateral 
trade tension which happened to coincide with one of the largest slumps in the history of 
the semiconductor industry.
Saving a “strategic” industry in crisis
Precipitous falls in semiconductor demand and prices in 1985, plus the capacity of the 
large, vertically-integrated Japanese chip producers to sustain aggressive investment 
programs in the face of global over-capacity, drove events that culminated in the 
September 1986 semiconductor agreement. After rising by 27 per cent in 1983 and 46 per 
cent in 1984, the value of world semiconductor sales fell 17 per cent in 1985. The 
demand crunch was especially severe in the North American market where sales dropped
165 Inside US Trude, 2(6), 10 February 1984, p. 5.
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30 per cent compared with a 10 per cent decline in the Japanese market.166 While the 
most proximate cause of the industry shakeout was a sharp drop in computer sales, 
pervasive unfair practices of Japanese manufacturers became the focus of the political 
reaction to the American industry’s woes.16' In the process, the American merchant 
semiconductor industry received the sort of high-level US government attention for 
which it had been clamouring since 1977.
The leading edge of the semiconductor crisis was once again the market for DRAMs 
where global merchant sales fell from a record $3.6 billion in 1984 to $1.4 billion in 1985 
(Dohlman 1993: D5). Average prices for 64K DRAMs, the product in largest commercial 
production, dropped from between $3 and $4 in 1984 to a low point of 30 cents in June 
1985, igniting charges of dumping and below-cost, predatory pricing by Japanese firms. 
Larger than normal “learning curve“ declines in prices were also reported in merchant 
markets for later generation DRAMs and more sophisticated products (Figure 5.2).
Figure 5.2 Average Selling Prices (US dollars per chip)
us$
256K  DRAMs
1M DRAMs
256K  EPROMs
Source: Dataquest; in Tyson (1992: l 15, 122).
I<’1’ Semiconductor Industry Association, www.semichips.org/stats.
1,1 Irwin (1996: 35) identifies as the critical demand shock a decline in sales of microcomputers in 
1985, a market that had grown five-fold from 1981 to 1984.
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Japanese firms surpassed American merchant firms in the commercial development and 
production of 256K DRAMs as the latter struggled to earn the returns on other products 
needed to approach commercially viable output levels. Firms such as Intel, Motorola, 
Hewlett-Packard and AT&T still dominated markets for certain types of ICs such as 
microprocessors and read-only memories, but steep losses across a range of market 
segments undercut their capacity to cover R&D costs and sustain investment. By the 
(northern) spring of 1985, US semiconductor firms had laid off thousands of workers, 
shortened working hours for remaining employees, mothballed capacity and wound back 
new investment programs.
For the US semiconductor industry and its hardline allies in the US government, a fall in 
market penetration in Japan only confirmed their scepticism about the gradualist, low-key 
approach undertaken in the HTWG negotiations. Falling sales to the Japanese electronics 
groups saw the US merchant firms’ share of the Japanese market drop from around 12 
per cent to once again below 10 per cent. Japanese firms attributed at least part of the 
import decline to the incapacity of American firms to fully sustain fast delivery and 
customer service in line with the surge in industry demand in 1984.168 But for the 
hardliners, it confirmed the need for the United States to press for specific results in 
agreements backed by a credible threat of retaliation. As one analyst has noted, the 
experience of the HTWG ‘made US semiconductor makers and their representatives 
adamant that they would never again settle for vaguely worded agreements that were 
based on trust rather than sanctions’ (O'Shea 1995: 23). The Commerce Department 
official most directly involved in the HTWG talks concluded subsequently that ‘the new 
“long-term relationships” [with Japanese firms] had lasted less than a year’ citing a drop 
in US sales to Japan of 30 per cent at a time when overall Japanese demand fell 11 per 
cent (Prestowitz 1988: 54).u,l)
By February 1985, the SIA’s legal advisers had again sounded out trade officials on the 
US government’s reaction to a Section 301 unfair trade case. This time they received 
encouragement in this direction from USTR William Brock prior to his leaving that post
Inside US Trade, 3(35) 30 August 1985, p. 1 1.
169 Similarly, S1A trade adviser Alan Wolff would later describe the HTWG process as 'a complete 
waste of time other than as a learning process ... It was hortatory — “We really ought to open markets” 
that sought of thing; zero impact’. Wolff, interview, 1996.
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in March. Much of the SIA’s case alleging denial of access in Japan at that point was 
centred on US firms holding over 50 per cent of the European market for semiconductors, 
but never exceeding around 10 per cent of the Japanese market for any sustained period 
of time. An insight into the reasoning invoked to support the SIA’s demand for 
affirmative action from Japan comes from a reported exchange between SIA legal adviser 
Alan Wolff and the former chief trade official in the Reagan Administration. Wolff 
maintains that:
We went and said to Bill Brock: “We can’t sell in the Japanese market; we only have 
circumstantial evidence though”. ... And Brock said: “Look in the southern universities in 
the 1950s there were no minority students. You don’t have to show denial of access to an 
individual minority applicant to say that there was a problem of access to the southern 
university system on the part of minorities. Similarly, we have enough to go on here”.170
The SIA also set about mobilising an influential group of legislators from both political 
parties to support any trade action. The newly-formed Semiconductor Congressional 
Support Group (SCSG) was made up of 20 members of Congress in both houses with 
heavyweight representation beyond the key semiconductor producing states such as 
Texas and California. The SCSG included senior legislators with positions of trade 
leadership, some with strong free trade credentials and others known as hardliners and 
sponsors of tough trade legislation. With a mounting trade deficit and Japan the target of 
increasingly vitriolic criticism on Capitol Hill, ‘the SCSG became a popular caucus and 
many lawmakers sought to join. A decision was made, however, to keep the SCSG “lean 
and mean” —  a small group of well-led committed activists" (O’Shea 1995: 24).
Before the SIA could proceed to tap this political support base, it had to blunt potential 
opposition from major chip users in the United States, as well as resolve divisions within 
the trade association itself over any trade policy action. The SIA avoided a confrontation 
with the American Electronics Association (AEA), the largest group of semiconductor 
users, by muting calls for trade restrictions and emphasising the market access demands. 
If a company or industry group had opposed SIA initiatives in the past, new attempts 
were made to persuade them at least not to undermine the SIA’s case.171 Within the SIA, 
opposition to import restrictions came from large captive producers such as IBM. and
170 Wolff, interview, 1996. Dryden (1995: 313) also draws attention to this exchange.
1 1 In fact, the AEA later issued a letter supporting the objectives of the Section 301 case (Yoffie 1988: 
86).
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companies such as Texas Instruments that manufactured semiconductors in Japan. 
Concerned about possible implications of a Section 301 case, especially the prospect of 
future retaliation against Japan, these firms hoped to avoid an escalation in trade friction.
Two factors appear to have tipped the balance towards the SI A securing the necessary 
support for a trade remedies case in the (northern) summer of 1985. First, complaints 
about Japanese chip pricing reached a new pitch in June 1985 after Undersecretary of 
Commerce Lionel Olmer publicised a memo from Hitachi America to its distributors in 
the market for leading-edge 256K EPROMs. The memo urged them to continue to 
undercut rivals (Intel, Advanced Micro Devices and Fujitsu) by 10 per cent price cuts in 
order to build market share, at the same time guaranteeing a 25 per cent profit margin. A 
wave of adverse publicity about Japanese business practices was generated in an already 
a frayed political environment.172 Second, US merchant firms found a more receptive 
audience to their argument that the weakening of the semiconductor industry would 
ultimately rebound on US chip users should they find themselves dependent on Japanese 
suppliers that were also their main competitors in downstream markets such as computer 
systems. The capacity of the large Japanese electronics firms to sustain high investment 
in a depressed semiconductor market added to concerns prompted by the movement of 
US firms out of DRAM production. Superior investment rates were demonstrated through 
the previous industry slowdown in 1981-82 and, although the 1985 slump would see 
producers in both countries scale back investment plans, fears about the impact of new 
Japanese capacity in a depressed global market exercised the minds of American chip 
producers, users and trade officials by the middle of 1985 ( fable 5.1). In May 1985, 
Commerce Department officials reportedly warned their Mi l l counterparts that a major 
bilateral dispute would erupt unless Japanese firms cut capacity and increased chip 
prices, but without the desired reaction in Tokyo (Flamm 1996: 163).
172 International Trade Reporter, 2(24), 12 June 1985, pp. 780-781. Hitachi officials acknowledged that 
the memo had been sent to its distributors, but said that it was the product of an overzealous employee 
and was not company policy. See O’Shea (1995: 24) for a discussion of the impact of the memo, 
including its text.
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Table 5.1 Semiconductor Capital Spending in North America and Japan
North America Japan
S billion % sales $ billion % sales
1980 1.37 6.0 0.63 17.0
1981 1.35 16.6 0.83 16.4
1982 1.21 15.4 0.92 17.1
1983 1.45 15.0 1.70 22.3
1984 3.05 21.6 3.58 31.0
1985 2.07 18.4 3.23 31.5
Source: Dataquest in Dohlman (1993: D2).
The SIA filed its Section 301 petition with USTR on 14 June 1985. The trade association 
alleged that the Japanese government had actively created an anti-competitive, 
discriminatory market structure in Japan that blocked American suppliers gaining market 
access commensurate with their competitive position internationally. Amendments to 
Section 301 as part of the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 had facilitated the unfair trade 
action by broadening the statute’s definition of an ‘unreasonable’ foreign barrier to any 
policy or practice which ‘denies fair and equitable market opportunities’ — a reflection 
of hardline demands for sectoral reciprocity. Again, much was made of the circumstantial 
evidence that US sales rarely exceeded 10 per cent in Japan despite US firms holding 
around 55 per cent of the European market.17 ' Structural barriers and Buy Japan attitudes 
were deemed the result of an oligopolistic structure where the leading producers of 
Japanese semiconductors were also the largest consumers. The petition specifically 
alleged that in taking liberalisation countermeasures the Japanese government had 
violated GATT Article XI on the transparency of trade barriers as well as the 1983 
HTWG agreement. The petition also focused on Japanese government policies that it was 
claimed reduced investment risk in Japan and created the capacity for unfair export
l7' Notably, the SIA’s own calculation at the time based on 1984 data put Japanese import penetration 
of the American semiconductor market at 14 per cent (SIA 1985).
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pricing. The SIA proposed that unless US sales in Japan improved rapidly, the Reagan 
Administration should pursue an unfair trade action under the GATT. It also requested 
that a monitoring framework be established which could trigger anti-dumping 
investigations and that the Justice Department investigate possible antimonopoly 
violations by Japanese firms which resulted in predatory pricing behaviour. In framing 
the case for maximum support, an SIA spokesman stated at the time that the trade 
association did not 'seek protection, but rather access to other markets. That is in keeping 
with what we have always believed’. '74
The SIA’s petition was accepted by the US Trade Representative’s office and newly 
confirmed USTR Clayton Yeutter announced a Section 301 investigation on 11 July 
1985. This was a victory for the hardliners and pragmatists within the trade policy 
process against the free trade leanings of the Reagan Administration. Not surprisingly, 
key congressional supporters of the SIA weighed in with concerted efforts to convince 
the executive of the merits of the petition.10 More broadly, the SIA persuaded 180 
representatives and senators to send letters (drafted by the SIA's legal team) to the 
administration (Yoffie 1988: 87). The usual divisions within the inter-agency process 
were apparent once again. Economists at CEA, OMB and the Justice Department found 
the SIA’s evidence of Japanese barriers less than compelling. The President’s National 
Security Adviser and other custodians of good relations with Japan were also inclined to 
oppose the petition. But importantly, divisions emerged over the potential danger of 
American dependence on foreign semiconductors to the point where the Defense 
Department’s Defense Science Board and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
supported the industry's case (Prestowitz 1988: 56). Some uncertainty surrounded how 
the key player in the decision, new USTR Clayton Yeutter, would approach the issue. His 
predecessor William Brock had encouraged the SIA to pursue its case shortly before he 
was moved to become Secretary of Labor in March 1985. At least initially, Yeutter (a 
trained economist) was reportedly less swayed by the industry’s pitch for aggressive
174 International Trade Reporter, 2(25), 19 June 1985, p. 807.
1 ’ Senator Alan Cranston (D, CA) played a lead role within the SCSG facilitating meetings between 
industry leaders and key administration figures, including possible sceptics such as Secretary of State 
George Shultz. Inside US Trade, 3(27), 5 July 1985, p. 7. That the industry reportedly gained a 
sympathetic hearing from Secretary Shultz has been highlighted by some observers as an important 
break from past State Department attitudes (Dryden 1995: 430, Irwin 1996: 43-44).
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policy action.176 He recalls that ‘this was a new issue for me. ... We had some discussions 
on this shortly after I became USTR and this was the first time I’d paid any attention to 
this industry because my background was agriculture. Nobody had anything to say about 
semiconductors in the 1970s; they were hardly a factor at that tim e'.177
In the event, the new USTR and his staff became active proponents of the semiconductor 
industry’s critical economic and national security importance. Another unfair trade 
petition lodged soon after the Section 301 petition was filed, the first of a series of 
dumping cases launched against Japanese semiconductor producers, dramatised the state 
of the industry for US officials. On 24 June, US chip maker Micron Technology filed an 
antidumping suit with the Commerce Department against seven Japanese producers of 
64K DRAMs. At the time, Micron was not a member of the SIA; hence the dumping 
action was a departure from the strategy of focusing on the market access complaint. 
Within the trade agencies forced to respond to the two unfair trade petitions, the 
semiconductor industry's problems now became the subject of a new degree of scrutiny. 
Then Deputy USTR Michael Smith recalls that:
When the [Micron] dumping case was filed we [Yeutter and Smith] were in a Quad 
meeting in Canada. As soon as we could discreetly leave we came back to the US and 
looked at this dumping case. We quickly realised that we had a bigger case than a 
dumping case. We had a case of access into the Japanese market, we had a case of 
dumping in third-markets, and we had a case of dumping in the US market. ...
It was clear that our technology and our quality were no better than the Japanese; could 
have been worse. But we had briefings from the CIA, DIA [Defense Intelligence Agency] 
and the Defense Department that this was a pretty big issue. They couldn’t afford to lose 
capacity in semiconductors. So, to make a long story short, we decided to go and have 
major negotiations. ...
We felt rightly or wrongly — we may have overreacted — but we felt in a way the crown 
jewels of the United States were at stake. ... We were being told by very reputable people 
that semiconductors were the keys to the future. If you lose that capacity then you’re
176 According to SIA adviser, Alan Wolff, ‘We llled [the Section 301 petition] and Clayton Yeutter 
became USTR. He said: “You guys, I don’t know what you think you’re doing here. You’re no better 
than the textile guys — carving up markets’” . Wolff, interview, 1996. Based on Wolffs account, 
Dryden (1995: 3 13-314) concluded that ‘it wasn’t clear at all Yeutter would go along with the SIA 
plan’.
1 Yeutter, interview, 1996. Yeutter served as Deputy Special Trade Representative from 1975 to 1977 
and prior to that as Assistant Secretary of Agriculture for International Affairs and Commodity 
Programs.
I7S International Trade Reporter, 2(27), 3 July 1985, p. 865.
dependent. Now could the United States as the leader of the free world do that? We
179judged no.
With the president’s National Security Adviser adopting a stance in line with foreign 
policy concerns not to offend a major ally, USTR Yeutter became a strong proponent of 
the semiconductor industry’s case on national security grounds (Irwin 1996: 38). Indeed, 
he argued later that the 1986 semiconductor deal:
may have been the most important single negotiation we did in my tenure looking back 
now in retrospect. What was not known publicly at the time, or if known not fully 
appreciated, was how close we were to losing the entire American semiconductor 
industry. It was down and almost out with only a couple of independent companies still in 
business, along with IBM and others making semiconductors for their own use. The 
industry was in deep trouble because of the Japanese competition and what I felt was 
clearly predatory dumping in the US market on the part of the Japanese firms. I was 
persuaded, and I suppose the Japanese would argue to the contrary, that the Japanese 
firms were determined to put the American semiconductor firms out of business. ...
I will never forget that one of the people supposed to be an expert in this business said: 
“Don’t even waste your time with semiconductors; it's gone. You've got to devote your 
attention to saving the computer industry because that’s going to be next’’. Well finally I 
decided that I wasn’t ready to draw that conclusion that there really was no opportunity to 
save the semiconductor industry. And I felt there were major national security issues at 
stake and that these overwhelmed the economics of the situation. And that’s something 
that I could never talk about publicly because a lot of that was classified in terms of just 
how vulnerable we might be in the defense industry and elsewhere if the US as a nation 
became dependent on Japan as its source of semiconductors.180
While broad strategic industry arguments were used to justify the protection of the 
semiconductor industry, the SIA’s claims of illiberal Japanese government and industry 
practices also clearly carried weight with US officials. Flamm (1996: 164) draws 
attention to one particular behind-the-scenes factor which may have emboldened US 
trade officials to pursue the semiconductor industry’s complaints aggressively.
Reports gleaned from a variety of sources in Japan spoke of the existence of a shadowy 
Council of Nine consisting of sales representatives of Japanese producers of discrete 
semiconductors who met periodically in a social setting to set prices, agree on market 
shares, and allocate sales to individual customers. At least some elements of the Japanese
179 Michael Smith, interview, 1996. The dumping allegations were described as a ‘crystallising 
moment’ by then Japan Office Director at the Commerce Department, Maureen Smith. ‘It got the inter­
agency process mobilised because of the fact that MIT1 consistently denied that there was any dumping 
going on. Every agency was looking at the intelligence and USTR and Commerce did everything 
possible to get MITI to come to grips. We said: “We’ve got the data, you know it, you know we know 
it, cut the crap and let’s solve this short of a dumping action”. And despite that, MITI consistently 
denied it and I think that brought all of the agencies to a common perception of what was really going 
on’. Maureen Smith, interview, 1996.
1X0 Yeutter, interview, 1996.
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government apparently knew of these activities, and Mi l l representatives were reported 
to have observed or attended some of the meetings. Knowledge of the Council of Nine 
was closely held within both US government and industry, but senior American officials 
were well aware of it by 1985, and satisfied that it existed.
Because the group was never openly investigated, the extent to which it actually
succeeded in affecting competition in the Japanese market for discrete semiconductors
will probably never be known. Never issued publicly, the reports circulating behind the
scenes nonetheless had an important impact. The SIA was reinforced in its determination
to file an official Section 301 trade action. When the government received this complaint,
awareness of the existence of the council played some role in hardening its resolve to
support and pursue the 301 case. And one can only speculate that the Japanese
government may have felt some vulnerability on these issues and been more willing to
181negotiate the agreement eventually signed.
Dumping actions strengthen US leverage
Official bilateral consultations on semiconductors commenced in August 1985, but the 
atmosphere of crisis surrounding the US semiconductor industry only deepened in 
coming months. In the Micron dumping case, the ITC on 8 August announced a 
preliminary determination that Japanese imports of 64K DRAMs were injuring domestic 
producers. Around the same time, it was disclosed that the Justice Department, under 
considerable pressure from Congress, had begun an anti-trust inquiry into possible 
predatory pricing of EPROMs in the aftermath of the now infamous “Hitachi memo”. In 
early September, Micron Technology filed a private anti-trust suit against Japanese 
DRAM producers and later that month three US merchant producers — Intel, Advanced 
Micro Devices and National Semiconductor — filed a dumping petition against eight 
Japanese EPROM producers. By October, Intel, Mostek and National Semiconductor had 
announced plans to close down facilities and phase out production of DRAMs (Flamm 
1996: 167).
Cut backs in Japanese production of 64K DRAMs saw prices recover from their lowpoint 
of June 1985. But in the process, production and consumption accelerated in the next- 
generation 256K DRAMs in which Japanese producers were dominant. Concerned that 
neither the US industry nor the bilateral government negotiations were positioned to meet 
this challenge. Commerce Department officials moved to increase the stakes in the
181 Flamm (1996: 165 fn 6) notes that his account ‘draws on confidential letters and drafts from US 
sources that I was permitted to review and interviews with former US government officials. Sources of 
information about the activities of the Council of Nine, and its very existence, were considered 
extremely sensitive by both American government and industry’.
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dispute and arm the US government with new leverage in the form of an official, self- 
initiated dumping case. In October, officials in the Commerce Department had compiled 
what they referred to as ‘irrefutable, detailed evidence' of Japanese dumping of 256K 
DRAMs in the United States (O’Shea 1995: 27). J. Michael Farren, then Deputy 
Undersecretary of Commerce for International Trade, maintains that the government took 
the lead:
really because the industry could not move fast enough. Because of the generational cycle 
for semiconductors, the industry was always a year behind where it should have been in 
terms of a dumping case in order to have an impact on Japanese dumping practices. 
That’s where [Commerce Secretary] Mac Baldrige decided to use the authority which had 
only been used once before. ... One of the things that persuaded Baldrige to go ahead on 
the semiconductor dumping case was that Clyde Prestowitz had brought in the latest 
estimates of Japanese investment in semiconductor manufacturing which showed that by 
1986 Japan would have added the productive capacity to swamp the global market with 
product.182
The US government dumping action formulated in the Commerce Department was 
extraordinary not only because the self-initiation authority was rarely invoked, but also 
because it was designed to cover not only current-generation 256K DRAMs, but also any 
higher density products not yet on the market. For President Reagan to approve such a 
controversial action required an abnormal measure of high-level consensus about 
officially labelling Japan as unfair. The conditioning role of the trade regime crisis was 
significant in tipping the balance in the executive branch towards the hardliners. As well 
as self-initiating a series of Section 301 actions in September 1985 to defuse 
congressional trade action, President Reagan also established a special “strike force’' to 
identify and combat unfair trade practices.
Commerce Secretary Malcolm Baldrige, a noted hardliner, was put in charge of the strike 
force creating an opening for the dumping action. The dumping proposal was presented at 
the first meeting of the strike force in late October 1985. As framed by Baldrige, the issue 
became whether any agency opposed enforcement of US dumping laws. While officials 
from the CEA, OMB, the Justice Department, Treasury and the State Department raised 
concerns, the legitimacy which President Reagan had bestowed on the strike force tended
182.!. Michael Farren, interview with author, 18 July 1996, Washington DC. The only previous case of a 
self-initiated antidumping case was during the Carter Administration within the framework of the steel 
trigger price mechanism (Japan Economic Institute of America 1986: 88).
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to mute formal dissent from the Baldrige proposal (Prestowitz 1988: 60). l~ The body 
tentatively approved the recommended action in the absence of major concessions from 
Japan in the bilateral talks. Although the decision was set aside through November as 
Japanese officials sought to avoid an official US government finding of unfairness, the 
strike force recommendation was eventually forwarded to President Reagan who signed 
the order to proceed with the dumping case on 6 December 1985. ‘‘ By year’s end, 
official talks were taking place under the shadow of no less than three semiconductor 
dumping actions as well as the Section 301 case.
In an attempt to hold back the tide of American trade actions, MITI negotiators in late 
1985 and early 1986 proposed a package settlement which included a system of price 
Boors for Japanese imports to the United States and a general commitment to help 
increase US semiconductor sales to Japan’s large electronics firms by 25 per cent — but 
without a specific guarantee (O’Shea 1995: 28). Their US counterparts rejected this offer. 
American trade officials wanted to ensure that, as well as countering low chip prices in 
the US market, any agreement covered Japanese exports to third markets. This would 
avoid the United States becoming a “high-price island” for chips forcing American 
semiconductor users, especially the computer industry, to locate offshore. The Commerce 
Department announced preliminary dumping margins against four Japanese producers in 
the Micron 64K DRAM case in December.I x̂  And although signs emerged of recovery in 
the semiconductor market by early 1986, the investigative lags in the dumping cases 
ensured no relief from future adverse determinations. In March 1986, the Commerce 
Department announced preliminary dumping findings in the EPROM action and the 
government-initiated 256K+ DRAM case. Margins against Japanese producers of 
EPROMs ranged from 21.7 per cent to 188 per cent and from 19.8 per cent to 108 per 
cent on US imports of 256K DRAMs.ISf) The following month, final dumping margins 
ranging from 11.9 per cent to 35.3 per cent were posted against four Japanese producers
ls' USTR also reportedly had reservations about the official dumping action lest it hamper progress on 
the bilateral negotiations then under way (Dryden 1995: 3 14). Note that the strike force was an 
anomaly in that standard practice usually saw a USTR official chair any inter-agency decision-making 
body on trade policy.
1X4 In the context of the semiconductor trade dispute, Prestowitz (1988: 56) describes the establishment 
of the strike force as ‘a fluke’. It nonetheless forms part of the policy sequence linking the domestic 
regime crisis to new policy thresholds via the enhanced policy authority of the hardliners.
IX:i The preliminary margins ranged from 8.9 per cent to 94 per cent. International Trade Reporter,
2(49), I 1 December 1985, p. 1543.
186 International Trade Reporter, 3(11), 12 March 1986, p. 329. International Trade Reporter, 3(12) 19 
March 1986, p. 372.
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of 64K DRAMs.1X7 Facing end June deadlines for final determination in the other two 
dumping cases and a 1 July deadline on the Section 301 case, Japanese negotiators were 
under pressure to stave off the full impact of US trade remedies.
In the early months of 1986, negotiations deadlocked over a system to control chip prices 
in third-country markets and the SIA’s demand for a specific market access commitment. 
On the latter, the SIA’s starting point was a figure of 30 per cent market share, roughly 
equivalent to its share of international markets outside the United States, including Japan 
(SIA 1985: 14). Initially, US negotiators were guarded, pressing their Japanese 
counterparts for a substantial market access commitment while stopping short of 
specifying a specific number. But by March, reports claimed that US officials had floated 
the idea of a 30 per cent US market share in Japan.189 Shortly thereafter, a proposal from 
five major Japanese semiconductor companies to souree 20 per cent of their 
semiconductors from US firms by 1990 was being widely reported.19'* 1Importantly, as the 
time frame for resolving the dispute prior to statutory deadlines shortened, negotiations 
took place away from the scrutiny of the US inter-agency process. The dual objectives for 
US officials were to placate the semiconductor industry while avoiding an open 
confrontation with the free trade agencies in the Reagan Administration. An official from 
the State Department was part of the small negotiating team headed by Deputy USTR 
Smith, but he was reportedly kept at arms-length from the market access negotiations to 
avoid his superiors at the State Department intervening in the negotiations (Dryden 1995: 
319).
The (ambiguous) deal, the 20 per cent target, and the drive to retaliation
After meetings between USTR Yeutter and MITI Minister Watanabe in May, the outline 
of an agreement was reported in the media (Flamm 1996: 172).191 Further details were 
ironed out over following months with agreement on the scope of the proposed system
IK7 International Trade Reporter, 3(18) 30 April 1986, p. 577.
Iss Prestowitz cites a SIA-commissioned report as setting the ambit for US market access demands. 
Finan, William F. and Chris B. Amundsen, ‘Report on Estimating US Market Share in Japan’, a report 
to the SIA, Washington, DC: Quick Finan & Associates, 8 November 1985.
IS) International Trade Reporter, 3(1 1) 12 March 1986, p. 330.
190 Inside US Trade, 4(13), 28 March 1986, p. 2. See also Flamm (1996: 170).
1 M Earlier in May, the House of Representatives voted 408-5 on a resolution that President Reagan 
retaliate if Japan did not sign an agreement in the near future (Irwin 1996: 48).
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for monitoring chip prices in third-country markets proving especially difficult. A deal 
was reached after a rescheduled deadline of end July. Officially signed on 2 September 
1986, the semiconductor agreement stipulated that in return for the United States 
suspending both the anti-dumping and Section 301 cases, the Japanese government 
agreed to establish a system to monitor Japanese export prices (both to the United States 
and to third-country markets) and to promote a ‘gradual and steady’ increase in foreign 
access to Japan's semiconductor market. In terms of trade policy intervention, the most 
dramatic element of the agreement was the export pricing regime. But the most 
controversial feature was a secret ‘"side letter" exchanged concurrently with the text of 
the main agreement that cited a specific figure of 20 per cent as an objective for foreign 
access in the Japanese semiconductor market in five years. Later revealed, the side 
letter’s rather vague undertaking was as follows:
the Government of Japan recognizes the US semiconductor industry’s expectation that 
semiconductor sales in Japan of foreign capital-affiliated companies will grow to at least 
slightly above 20 per cent of the Japanese market in five years. The Government of Japan 
considers that this can be realized and welcomes its realization. The attainment of such an 
expectation depends on competitive factors, the sales efforts of the foreign-capital
affiliated companies, the purchasing efforts of the semiconductor users in Japan and the
192efforts of both Governments.
The exact origins of the 20 per cent figure and its interpretation remain contested issues. 
When the US industry sought enforcement based on a linear increase in market access 
towards the 20 per cent goal, MITI officials denied the existence of the side letter. When 
it was publicly confirmed by former US trade official Clyde Prestowitz in his 1988 book 
Trading Places, the Japanese government maintained that no official commitment 
attached to what was simply a statement of industry expectation.193 It would appear that 
officials on both sides had an interest in using the side letter to guard against international 
and domestic scrutiny by opponents of the agreement. At the same time, US government
lv2 Inside US Trade, 6(45), 18 November 1988, p. 1. Although the details of the side letter were not 
disclosed at the time the agreement was announced, Flamm (1996: 174) points out that the exact 
wording of the relevant sections on market access were reported in the Financial Times around the time 
of the agreement.
1 Writing in Bungei Shunju in May 1988, an anonymous Japanese semiconductor executive put an 
interpretation from the perspective of Japanese producers: ‘I imagine that MITI was in a considerable 
dilemma. It knew well that the Japanese industry was in great reaction against the “20 per cent market 
share in five years rule”, while it must save the honor of the US side. Then MITI got the US side to 
agree by putting the specitlc figures in the side letter, while it throttled the resistance of the Japanese 
manufacturers by using a delicate expression in the side letter. 1 think that was the background ofthat 
side letter’ (Howell, Bartlett and Davis 1992: 81-82).
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officials acted on what they took to be a Japanese government commitment. As to the 20 
per cent figure itself, clearly by 1985-86, and in light of the HTWG negotiations, the US 
industry’s objective was to secure a very specific undertaking as part of its standing 
request for a Japanese affirmative action program. A number of analysts point to the US 
government simply following the demands of the S1A (Prestowitz 1988, Irwin 1996). 
USTR Clayton Yeutter confirms that the US government reached a point of demanding a 
specific number, but looks to downplay the industry’s role. He argues that:
The industry demands really weren’t all that relevant at that time. We were clearly 
getting input from the industry, but the 20 per cent number was essentially a USTR- 
developed number.
The US market share in Japan was 8 per cent or thereabouts when we negotiated that 
agreement whereas our market share elsewhere in the world was something above 40 per 
cent as 1 recall. And the point I kept making to the Japanese in the negotiations was that 
something is wrong here: “If we had a free and open market in semiconductors in Japan, 1 
don’t know' what our market share would be, but it wouldn’t be 8 per cent. Maybe it 
wouldn’t be 40 per cent either, but it is going to be somewhere between 8 and 40”. And 
that’s kind of where the 20 per cent number came up. ...
So I said: “Well let’s at least get to 20, and if you want to argue that 20 would not be a
legitimate share of the Japanese market by foreign firms under free and open market
conditions then make that argument”. But they weren’t willing to make that argument. So
I said that in my view we would not in any way distort the market. We would improve
194the refection of market conditions.
Deputy USTR Michael Smith similarly rejects the notion that the 20 per cent figure 
simply reflected SIA demands. And while he concedes that a specific market share was a 
necessary part of any final agreement from an American standpoint, Smith maintains that 
the Japanese government proposed the 20 per cent figure in order to reach a settlement. 
He maintains that:
We knew their market was closed and what drove us in this case was that the industry 
had come to the US government and said: “We’re going to have to go offshore. If we 
don’t have greater market share, we can’t export more”. So it was a market share issue 
from the start and people have lost sight of this. It was a market share issue because the 
only way US producers could stay in the United States was if they could export more and 
you had to increase their market share overseas. ... Now people say that’s not fair. You 
should adjust the price and let the market decide. But with semiconductors we didn’t 
know whether we could do that; whether we could dare risk that. ...
On the access thing, that was an accident; the original figure was 30 per cent. And for a 
variety of reasons it got knocked down and they said they’d in essence guarantee better
191 Yeutter, interview, 1996. Irwin (1996: 50) asserts that ‘USTR Yeutter explicitly asked for 20 per 
cent in a Tokyo meeting with Minister Watanabe on May 28, 1986’. Dryden (1995: 3 19) also maintains 
that by May 1986, Yeutter ‘had become an enthusiastic advocate of an enforceable market-share goal’.
140
than 20 per cent. ... It had nothing to do with size of market etc. We both realised it was 
unrealistic to come up with a number that was too big. And [Japanese negotiator] Kuroda 
and I talked about it for hours and there was never any question about a number; it was 
just a question of what the number was going to be. And yet, I'm not kidding you, it 
came up at the last moment —  90 yards down the road. Admittedly it pulled us out of a 
very difficult situation because we didn’t have any other mechanism. And it was a 
Japanese idea. Now SI A say it was their idea —  nonsense.1 >5
Some support for Smith’s assertion that Japanese officials were key actors in the process, 
at the very least in conditioning their domestic constituency for a market share outcome, 
is found in Flamm’s analysis of the September 1986 semiconductor agreement. In 
particular, he pinpoints a speech in March 1986 by MITI Deputy Director General 
Tanahashi of the Machinery and Information Industries Bureau at an industry summit 
between US and Japanese semiconductor manufacturers. According to Flamm (1996: 
170), this speech ‘was believed to have been the origin of the 20 per cent market share 
target for foreign semiconductors later included in a side letter’ to the 1986 agreement.
In that speech Tanahashi reportedly stated that “ it was expected that the totai share of 
US-made semiconductors used by live large Japanese manufacturers will account for 
19.5 to 20 per cent in 1990.” This was interpreted in the Japanese press as a proposal 
from the Japanese side. See “How Should We Settle Japan-US Semiconductor Friction?” 
Nihon Keizai Shimbun, April 2, 1986, p. 2. It was precisely at this point that reports o f  a 
20 percent market share target by 1990 began to circulate within the Japanese 
semiconductor industry (Flamm 1996: 170, fn 30).
Makoto Kuroda, the former MITI Vice Minister and Michael Smith’s counterpart in the 
1986 semiconductor negotiations, rejects any notion that the market share figure was a 
Japanese idea or that any official commitment or guarantee was part of the agreement. He 
recalls that:
In the chip agreement we never negotiated: “30 [per cent] too high, why not 20?” That 
was not coming from Japan. We would say 30 is impossible and that even 20 may be 
reached in five years time, but nobody can commit. ...
The [US] industry considered 30 per cent o f  the share should be theirs if Japan was not 
taking any special measures protecting Japanese industry. So 30 per cent market share 
type of concept was lingering all through the discussions. And to that we said: “Access is 
opportunity, we can’t commit to results. We are not buying; the private sector is buying”.
But at the same time we said that we would encourage Japanese [firms] to purchase if the 
quality is good and specifications meet their desires. Because at that time facing an 
increasing trade imbalance, the Japanese government, especially MITI, was urging 
Japanese consumers to import. And there was the famous TV appearance o f [Prime 
Minister] Nakasone asking the Japanese people to buy at least $100 o f imports to reduce
195 Michael Smith, interview, 1996.
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our growing imbalance. This was the type of argument that was prevailing at that time. 
So it was not really unnatural to say that: “OK, we will commit ourselves to encourage 
and facilitate imports, but we are not in a position to make any commitment to results’'.
But to this argument Clayton Yeutter said that, without some number, the S1A will not be 
satisfied. So he made a very strong appeal that without a number no agreement can be 
reached. So then it was a compromise: “You say this is the expectation of the American 
industry — 30 is too high; 20 per cent, OK”. And we accepted; if this is the expectation 
on the part of the American industry, we are ready to recognise and we even said that if it 
is achievable we welcome it. That type of statement should be understood by the 
atmosphere I described — that we are trying to promote our imports. ... And I suspect 
that those Japanese producers selling part of their chips [to the US market] considered at 
the time that if they wanted to sell to the US market, they had to accept something.1 )6
The signing of the 1986 semiconductor trade agreement did not herald an end to the 
semiconductor dispute. Indeed, the agreement’s ambiguity regarding the specific actions 
required of the Japanese government guaranteed further conflict as trade in 
semiconductors became ’no longer simply manipulated’ but ’actively managed’ (Tyson 
1992: 107). The US government’s interpretation of the 20 per cent market share 
expectation provided one aspect of continued conflict. But, at least through the second 
Reagan Administration, the market access issue was regularly overshadowed by the 
fallout from the effective cartelisation of the world market for DRAMs due to the 
agreement’s anti-dumping provisions. This generated renewed opposition to the
197agreement from US semiconductor users, as well as a GATT complaint by the EC.
The Commerce Department’s new “foreign market value” floor price system for Japanese 
exports came under criticism from US chip users following an immediate rise in the price 
of US imports of DRAMs in September 1986.148 And as early as October, US merchant 
producers began lobbying the US government to retaliate against Japan’s alleged
196 Makoto Kuroda, interview with author, 20 February 1997, Tokyo. Yoshihiro Sakamoto, another 
former MITI Vice Minister and an official in the Machinery and Information Industries Bureau during 
the 1986 negotiations, makes the additional point that at the time ‘there was not so much sensitivity [in 
Japan] about government intervention into the market so judging from the overall political importance 
of the US-Japan relationship the Japanese government accepted the market share target in exchange for 
the suspension agreement on dumping’. Yoshihiro Sakamoto, interview with author, 19 February 1997, 
Tokyo.
197 The EC initiated a GATT case in September 1986 and formally requested a GATT panel under 
Article XXIII in February 1987. In March 1988, the GATT panel concluded that the Japanese export 
monitoring mechanism was inconsistent with the Article XI prohibition against quantitative 
restrictions. The panel did not find evidence of discrimination on market access in favour of the United 
States as the relevant provisions, excluding the then secret side letter, were deemed too ambiguous 
(Ryan 1995: 7).
198 See Flamm (1996: 266-72) for details on the US Commerce Department’s firm-specific floor price 
system on US imports of Japanese DRAMs and EPROMs from late 1986 through mid 1991.
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violation of the agreement’s third-country dumping and market access provisions.199 In 
late January 1987, US trade officials set short deadlines for a halt in dumping and 
increased market access as MITI attempted to bring Japanese firms’ production and 
exports under tighter control.200 Unsatisfied with Japan’s response, on 26 March 1987 the 
cabinet-level EPC recommended that President Reagan impose 100 per cent tariffs on 
$300 million of Japanese exports of computers, machine tools and colour televisions — 
the first major sanctions against Japan since World War II.
With US government credibility seen to be at stake, and with Congress contemplating
legislation to further restrict executive branch trade policy discretion, even agencies
201opposed to the agreement felt compelled to support swift enforcement measures. 
Coming less than six months after the agreement was signed, the sanctions decision 
displayed an unprecedented determination to use access to the American market as 
leverage in bilateral negotiations with Japan. The chorus of support for retaliation echoed 
the hardline view that Japan in the past had played the United States as a sucker in trade 
negotiations and that process-oriented agreements offered no discernible results. 
Rationalising the sanctions decision in this case, administration officials argued that ‘for
the first time Japan had been caught out of compliance with an easily verifiable
202agreement'.
On Capitol Hill, hardliners painted the sanctions decision as an overdue response to a 
history of “bad faith” agreements. Releasing a GAO report on the semiconductor 
agreement on 15 April 1987, Senate Finance Committee Chairman Lloyd Bentsen 
maintained that retaliation would not have been necessary if stronger action had been 
taken in the past. ‘If we had such a policy, the Japanese and others would have learned
203long ago not to sign trade agreements with us unless they intended to live up to them’. 
Refecting later on the merits of the sanctions decision, then USTR Clayton Yeutter 
maintained that, ‘This was the first time Japan got caught with a definitive commitment.
199 Inside US Trade, 4(41), 17 October 1986, p. 13.
200 Inside US Trade, 5(6), 6 February 1987, p. 1.
201 International Trade Reporter, 4(5), 4 February 1987, p. 141. International Trade Reporter, 4(13), 1 
April 1987, p. 423. The tariffs came into effect on 17 April 1987. Based on US government figuring, 
$135 million in sanctions were directed against alleged third-country dumping violations while $165 
million in sanctions related to alleged market access violations.
202 ‘Strong evidence led US to set Japan sanctions’ by Stuart Auerbach, Washington Post, 5 April 1987, 
p. H01.
2lb International Trade Reporter, 4(16), 22 April 1987, p. 538.
143
Prior to that time they were always able to keep their commitment fuzzy enough that 
nothing much ever happened and this was the first time that they discovered they had to 
deliver in a negotiation’.204 A new policy threshold had been established with the 1986 
semiconductor agreement in terms of US demands for specific results and swift 
retaliation to secure those results.
The first semiconductor agreement in perspective
The results-oriented semiconductor agreement of 1986 and the retaliatory sanctions 
geared to its enforcement were landmarks in US-Japan trade conflict. At one level, they 
symbolised the scale of Japan’s emergence as a high-technology economic power and the 
pressures this generated on a once-dominant American industry. One measure of this 
ascendancy is that the Japanese semiconductor market accounted for around 47 per cent 
of global merchant sales in 1986, up from less than 25 per cent in 1977. Meanwhile, sales 
in the North American market in 1986 had fallen to around 40 per cent of the world 
market compared with a figure of over 60 per cent in 1977 (Dohlman 1993: D l). Beneath 
this transformation in global market positions, an important theme of this study relates to 
the proximity of the semiconductor agreement, with its radical dumping and market 
access provisions, to the trade policy regime crisis in the United States. The American 
merchant semiconductor firms were positioned to take advantage in 1985-86 of a 
resurgent Congress looking to reclaim trade policy authority and an executive branch 
intent on more aggressive pursuit of sectoral reciprocity and fair trade. In this context, the 
semiconductor agreement was a major breakthrough for the policy network of Japan 
hardliners in the American trade policy community in their political contest to assert 
authority over the alliance of free traders and national security officials which in the past 
had restrained results-oriented trade demands and threats of retaliation.
With its protection to provide breathing-space for an American industry, the agreement 
shared characteristics with a long line of past arrangements driven by Japan’s export 
competitiveness. But its primary significance relates to the market access precedent — a 
specific share of the Japanese market for foreign semiconductors identified (at least 
obliquely) in a formal agreement. The agreement was a new reference point in US market
Yeutter, interview, 1996.
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access policy towards Japan. Still, its importance remains as part of an incremental 
process. It did not signify a general change towards demanding specific numbers in 
market access negotiations. It was, as the next chapter will highlight, at one end of a 
spectrum of results-oriented market access negotiations with Japan undertaken by the 
second Reagan Administration and the Bush Administration. In short, the 1986 
semiconductor agreement was not a model for other agreements at the time it was 
negotiated. To put the semiconductor agreement in perspective as part of an incremental 
process of policy change demands attention to its precedent-setting character, but also its 
contingent features.
The first contingent factor was the importance US policy-makers attached to the 
semiconductor industry relative to other sectors subject to negotiations. While debate 
surrounds the degree to which the US industry was in fact under threat in 1985, the belief 
that semiconductors were indeed the “keys to the future” or “the crude oil of the 1980s”, 
and that an American-owned merchant industry was a vital national interest, appears 
genuinely held. The second aberrant feature was the sheer bargaining power possessed by 
the United States in the negotiations by virtue of the collective weight of the dumping 
actions that were the central concern of Japanese semiconductor producers and their 
representatives in 1985-86. On rare occasions could US officials maintain such a credible 
threat of punitive trade remedies that could be leveraged to support a radical policy 
outcome. Third, the degree to which free traders were excluded from the policy process 
was a telling aspect of the semiconductor negotiation. Then Deputy USTR Michael Smith 
has noted that ‘this was so difficult for us that we never told the other agencies’ (Dryden 
1995: 319).
We never took it to cabinet —  put it that way. We never took it to a lot of people until it 
was done. ... The nay-sayers —  the Attorney General, the Secretary o f State, the 
Secretary of Defense and all that —  didn’t like this agreement. George Shultz was a 
trained economist, he knew what the hell we’d done; w e’d rigged the market.
The eventual presentation of the market access deal as a fa it accompli confirmed the 
reach of this agreement beyond the boundaries of inter-agency consensus. Free traders in 
the White House, the CEA and elsewhere attacked the market access provision revealed 
by USTR Yeutter at an EPC meeting in late 1986 (Dryden 1995: 320). Moves towards
205 Michael Smith, interview, 1996.
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retaliation were also arranged to lock-in high-level State Department officials not 
appraised of the agreement’s secret provisions. Then Undersecretary of State for 
Economic Affairs, W. Allen Wallis, provides an insight into the carefully staged lead-up 
to the retaliation decision, even disputing the official interpretation of the agreement by 
his administration colleagues. Wallis recalls that:
There was duplicity in that [the semiconductor agreement]. There was suddenly a 
meeting called at the Capitol [in March 1987] which I was asked on very short notice to 
attend. 1 had no idea what was coming up. There were a large number o f people there 
including several senators and cabinet ministers, and it turned out the entire meeting was 
basically focused on me. And the way they put it was: “The Japanese have agreed to this 
—  foreigners should get x per cent of their market. Would the State Department go along 
with insisting that they carry through with what they agreed to?” And I remember the 
way I put it was: “If they agreed to it well of course the State Department will go along 
with trying to enforce it” . So they took that as a commitment from the State Department. 
Subsequently 1 found out that the Japanese adamantly refused to make any commitment 
or even to say it was a target. From my point of view, there was clearly duplicity and
trickery within the US government to get the State Department to appear to go along with
206that. Shultz didn’t hear about it until later and he was absolutely flabbergasted.“
Finally, there is an important sense in which the 1986 semiconductor agreement was 
viewed as an anomaly by those officials most directly involved in its negotiation. This 
underscores the success of the US semiconductor industry in selling its special case to 
USTR. While USTR often found itself in alliance with Commerce Department hardliners, 
it was also in the role of an institutional broker. Hence, it often sought to chart a course 
between the Commerce Department hardliners and the free traders in the US policy 
process; to fashion a trade policy that was sensitive to industry demands and politically 
sustainable, but also tilted towards maintaining an open American market and broad 
policy coherence (Destler 1995). Again, former Deputy USTR Michael Smith offers an 
insight into why the semiconductor agreement may be viewed as sui generis, rather than 
part of a general results-oriented strategy by the second Reagan Administration.
In my view, the semiconductor agreement was a special, one-time, never-to-be-repeated 
negotiation. ... I never viewed this as the proudest moment in USTR history. Not because 
it was an evil deal, but because it violated the principles USTR was in favour of. We had 
been batting against the Europeans and the less developed countries for years on 
domestic content and export performance requirements and that sort of stuff and here we 
were, in a way, part of that managed trade ethos.
20(1 W. Allen Wallis, interview with author, 15 August 1996, Washington DC. 
A)1 Michael Smith, interview, 1996.
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Conclusion
The September 1986 semiconductor trade agreement was an extreme policy reaction to 
support an industry seen as critical to America’s high-technology base. It was also an 
important landmark in the shift by the United States towards a results-oriented market 
access policy towards Japan. The setting of a numerical target of 20 per cent foreign sales 
in the Japanese market and the subsequent move towards sanctions established a new 
threshold in terms of demands for specific market access results and swift retaliation to 
secure those results. But rather than heralding a general shift towards a results-oriented 
policy, it should be seen as part of a policy sequence and at one end of a spectrum of 
agreements. The following chapter examines other examples of the selective results- 
oriented policy of the second Reagan Administration and the Bush Administration.
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6 Reagan, Bush and Selective Demands for Results
Introduction
The 20 per cent market share target in the 1986 US-Japan semiconductor agreement 
would remain a unique case in US market access policy towards Japan (with the Bush 
Administration opting to recognise the figure explicitly in a renegotiated agreement in 
1991). More generally, however, the line between process and results-oriented policy 
became blurred across a range of bilateral sectoral negotiations in the aftermath of US 
trade regime crisis. A more structured American focus on Japanese domestic practices 
was institutionalised with the MOSS process begun in 1985. Subsequently, a number of 
grey area market access negotiations in such sectors as auto parts, telecommunications, 
supercomputer and computer procurement, glass and paper products suggested an 
identifiable move towards a selective, results-oriented policy towards Japan.
By 1992, a number of sectoral negotiations appeared closer to the results-oriented rather 
than process-oriented end of a policy spectrum. The semiconductor agreement was part 
of a policy record that included Japanese '‘voluntary” import expansion measures (VIEs), 
actions designed to accommodate particular US companies in the Japanese market and 
progressively more detailed market access agreements, in some cases with quantitative 
criteria to assess the agreement’s performance. This chapter examines a series of bilateral 
negotiations through the second Reagan and Bush Administrations to support the 
argument that the trend towards a results-oriented market access policy went beyond the 
semiconductor case.
Auto parts: Domestic content with a VIE component
As noted in chapter 4, the MOSS talks bridged the trade regime crisis. They began in 
January 1985 as an attempt to tackle the peeling onion phenomenon, while steering away 
from an explicitly results-oriented policy. But by the end of 1985, MOSS was central to 
the Reagan Administration’s attempts to demonstrate a tougher market access approach 
towards Japan. The key addition to the MOSS process in 1986 was the automotive parts 
sector. Whereas MOSS was premised on dismantling barriers to internationally
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competitive US products in the Japanese market, the Reagan Administration’s decision 
to pursue auto parts negotiations was essentially a case of pragmatic trade politics; a 
response to a large industry with a significant sectoral trade deficit with Japan. The trade 
problems of the US auto parts industry related overwhelmingly to Japanese competition 
in the American automotive market. American auto parts production and employment in 
the mid 1980s remained well below peak 1978 levels despite a recovery in profitability 
of the Big Three American car manufacturers — General Motors (GM), Ford and 
Chrysler — boosted by the VER on Japanese vehicles secured in 1981 (OECD 1992: 35- 
6). Having unsuccessfully pursued domestic content legislation during the first Reagan 
Administration, the US auto parts industry, the UAW and their allies in Congress
identified MOSS as the best available policy option for externalising adjustment
208pressure.
The automotive sector’s large (and growing) share of the US-Japan trade deficit was at 
the heart of the Reagan Administration’s calculation to target auto parts (Figure 6.1). The 
March 1985 decision not to request an extension of the VER on Japanese vehicle imports 
only strengthened pressure on the executive branch for a new sectoral policy initiative.209 
By 1985, the bilateral deficit in auto parts had reached $3 billion, up from $1 billion in 
1980, while new factors associated with the industry’s internationalisation dictated a 
trend of increasing deficits and a higher share of parts in the bilateral automotive 
imbalance (US ITC 1987). First, as part of their drive to catch up with the Japanese 
competition, American auto manufacturers sourced production parts increasingly from 
offshore affiliates, including in Japan. Second, Japanese firms had established a strong 
presence as suppliers of the large and growing replacement parts market for the nearly 20 
million Japanese vehicles sold in the United States between 1978 and 1985 (Japan 
Economic Institute of America 1986: 109). And third, rising “transplant” production 
following direct investment by Japanese vehicle producers in the US had emerged both
20!' Before targeting MOSS, the US industry attempted unsuccessfully to revive a 1980 TFC initiative to 
boost sales of US parts to Japanese vehicle manufacturers. This plan was shelved after the auto VER was 
established in May 1981. International Trade Reporter, 2(36), 1 1 September 1985, p. 1 1 10.
2<',, A day after President Reagan announced the removal of the VER, Japan announced that it would extend 
the restraint on vehicle exports, but with the level increased from 1.85 million to 2.3 million units. The 
limit was no longer binding after 1987 although the Japanese government again lowered the export quota 
in March 1992. The VER was finally removed in March 1994. See Bass (1992) and Smitka (1997).
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Figure 6.1: Automotive Sector’s Share in US-Japan Merchandise Trade Imbalance
(% )
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Source: US Bureau of Census. Figures cited in Nanto, Cooper and Bass (1995).
as a significant source of rising parts imports from Japan and a highly-visible focal point 
for US auto parts interests subject to structural change (Figure 6.2).210
Figure 6.2: Share in North American Vehicle Production
of Japanese-owned Vehicle Manufacturers
Source: Automotive News. Figures cited in Fuss and Waverman (1992: 226), MacKnight (1993: 4) and JE! 
Report 28E3, 24 July 1998.
: |" Honda was the first Japanese manufacturer to begin production in the United States in 1982. By the end 
of the 1980s, seven Japanese vehicle manufacturers had production facilities in the United States with total 
car and truck capacity of around 1.7 million units (Wong 1989, MacKnight 1993).
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The United States nominated auto parts as the fifth candidate for MOSS talks in early 
1986, despite concerns in sections of the Reagan Administration that a de facto domestic 
content policy would be the likely outcome.211 At the time, the prospect of Congress 
forcing a more protectionist trade policy on the executive was seen as a real possibility 
with the Democrat-controlled House of Representatives moving towards passage of a 
trade bill (H.R. 4800) the White House would label as 'pure protectionism’ (Destler 
1995: 91). Passed by the House in May 1986 by a vote of 295-115, H.R. 4800 included 
the infamous Gephardt amendment, demanding that Japan and other high trade surpluses 
countries reduce bilateral imbalances with the United States by 10 per cent per year.212 
That same month, after direct representations from President Reagan to Prime Minister 
Nakasone, the Japanese government reluctantly agreed to auto parts negotiations.211
The stated goal of US officials in MOSS was To eliminate impediments to US 
companies from becoming full suppliers to Japanese vehicle manufacturers in Japan, the 
United States and third markets’ (USTR 1986: 160). In practice, the auto parts 
negotiations had a dual focus. In keeping with the original MOSS premise, US trade 
officials targeted process-oriented changes in Japanese government regulations and 
certification standards in the so-called “after-market” for repairs and accessories in 
Japan. The larger focus, however, was on pressuring Japanese manufacturers, in 
particular their US affiliates, to source original equipment (OE) parts from US suppliers. 
The vertical buyer-supplier keiretsu relationships of Japanese vehicle manufacturers 
were identified as unfairly excluding US firms from component supply relationships.214 
This focus on private-sector business practices exploited similar themes to the US 
semiconductor industry’s allegations of informal Buy Japan practices and exclusive 
corporate structures. Subsequently auto parts access became a key sectoral lightning rod 
for bilateral conflict over keiretsu relationships and their alleged role as Japanese 
structural impediments.21" That Japanese manufacturers were in important respects less
211 One US official lamented at the time that, ‘The purpose of MOSS is to open Japanese markets, not to 
restrict Japanese exports to the US. ... In theory it [Japanese exports] should not be part of the MOSS 
negotiations but as a practical matter, it may be impossible to exclude it’. Inside US Trade, 4(14), 18 April 
1986, p. 1 1.
212 International Trade Reporter, 3(22), 28 May 1986, p. 706.
-L’ ‘Japan to take up auto parts’, Japan Times, 5 May 1986, p. 1 1. International Trade Reporter, 3(20), 14 
May 1986, p. 648.
214 ‘American auto parts makers fight against cultural barriers’ by Susan Frankel, Japan Economic Journal, 
12 July 1986, p. 19.
5 Chapter 8 elaborates on the intensive academic debate that accompanied the emergence of 'keiretsu ties 
as an issue in US-Japan trade conflict.
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vertically-integrated than the Big Three American firms was highlighted by the fact that 
the American manufacturers were in the process of reducing their heavy reliance on in- 
house parts facilities (OECD 1992: 43). Lower production costs, greater automation, 
better employment relations and higher quality control appeared the more fundamental 
sources of Japanese competitive advantage in the automotive industry, only partially 
offset by a weaker exchange rate after 1985.217
Through 1986-87, Commerce Department and MITI officials adopted a gradualist 
approach to expanding US parts sales looking to facilitate contacts between Japanese 
manufacturers and the larger, more internationalised US suppliers of OE parts. While 
warning their Japanese counterparts of protectionist pressures in Congress, Reagan 
Administration officials rejected calls for formal targets for Japanese purchases and 
opposed sectoral reciprocity bills threatening closure of the US market. In August 
1987, the two governments agreed on a series of initiatives designed to ameliorate auto 
parts conflict. The main outcome was the establishment of a data collection system for 
monitoring purchases of American-made parts by Japanese manufacturers and their US 
subsidiaries. The Japanese government also indicated its preparedness to promote contact 
points for American suppliers in Japanese firms and to ensure that the Ministry of 
Transport’s regular vehicle inspection system did not discriminate against installation of 
foreign-made parts. On the issue of buyer-supplier relationships, the 1987 MOSS report 
concluded that There is no evidence given the severe competition among parts suppliers 
that “affiliated suppliers” are being accorded a special position over other suppliers by 
their parent automakers’ (Duncan 1995). The report’s positive tone drew a strong attack 
from smaller American parts suppliers (and their allies in Congress) hardest hit by 
structural change in the auto parts industry. The hardliners’ criticism centred on the lack 
of a specific Japanese commitment to future sales and the failure of the new statistical
216 During the 1980s, GM, the largest American manufacturer, was also the world’s most integrated 
automaker with about 70 per cent of parts supplied by in-house parts divisions. By contrast, major 
Japanese manufacturers tended to source less than 30 per cent of parts in-house (US ITC 1994). For a 
detailed study of the role of supplier networks in the Japanese automotive industry, see Smitka (1991).
21' As one example of the so-called “lean production” techniques developed by Japanese manufacturers, a 
typical Japanese automaker in the 1980s maintained links with around 200-300 production suppliers 
whereas GM dealt with approximately 3500 (US ITC 1987: 4-13). On the broader dimensions of the 
challenge Japanese competition posed to the US automotive industry, see Womack, Jones and Roos 
(1990), Fuss and Waverman (1992) and Nelson (1996).
2IS Inside US Trade, 5(1), 2 January 1987, p. 1. Inside US Trade, 5(6), 6 February 1987, p. 5.
219 International Trade Reporter, 4(33), 19 August 1987, p. 130. "Final report for MOSS talks on 
transportation machinery’, Japan Economic Journal, 29 August 1987, p. 4.
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monitoring system to distinguish between sales to Japanese manufacturers by so-called 
“traditional" (American-owned) parts makers and by the increasing number of Japanese- 
owned parts suppliers located in the United States.220
The Bush Administration extended the Reagan Administration’s low-key approach with 
an emphasis on building industry-to-industry links. Regular conferences brought together 
Japanese purchasing teams and executives from US parts companies and “design-in” 
programs were geared towards building relationships between US parts makers and 
Japanese vehicle producers at an early stage of the manufacturing process. Increasing 
purchases of US parts and materials by the transplants and an increase in US auto parts 
exports to Japan from $200 million in 1985 to $450 million in 1988 reinforced the Bush 
Administration’s inclination to avoid a confrontational auto parts strategy. But such 
trends failed to quell the clamour by the hardliners for stronger trade action, especially 
given the rise in the bilateral auto parts deficit from $3.1 billion in 1985 to $8.8 billion in 
1988. By the late 1980s, auto parts accounted for around one third of the bilateral 
automotive sectoral deficit and 20 per cent of the total US-Japan trade imbalance 
(MacKnight 1993: 6-8).
The Super 301 actions mandated by the 1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act 
(hereafter the 1988 Trade Act) provided a ready target for auto parts grievances in 1989 
and 1990.“““ Bush Administration officials were able to deflect demands for a more 
confrontational policy by taking advantage of divisions within the US industry between 
the larger manufacturers of high-value components (engines, transmissions, etc) and the 
smaller firms specialising in accessories and replacement parts and more reliant on the 
Big Three American manufacturers. The larger firms represented by the US Motor and 
Equipment Manufacturers Association were the main beneficiaries of the MOSS 
initiatives. By the end of the 1980s, they were accruing increased sales from some 
combination of government activity and enhanced commercial advantages due to 
increased quality, a lower exchange rate and proximity to the Japanese transplants. The 
more hardline APAA campaigned for relief on behalf of smaller parts suppliers faced
220 Inside US Trade, 5(34), 21 August 1987, p. 7. Inside US Trade, 6(7), 19 February 1988, p. 5.
221 See Duncan (1995) on the intensified bilateral business linkages promoted by the MOSS talks.
"22 The Congressional Taskforce on Auto Parts, the (JAW and the Automotive Parts and Accessories 
Association (APAA) all recommended Super 301 action against Japan targeting auto parts sales 
(MacKnight 1993: 8).
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with ongoing rationalisation in the largely saturated North American automotive 
market." S. Linn Williams, Deputy USTR in the Bush Administration, identifies 
industry division as an important element providing officials with room to avoid a 
hardline Super 301 strategy on auto parts in 1989 and 1990. He recalls that:
The auto parts industry was badly split — there were the big guys and the little guys. The 
little guys — doing spark plugs, wipers and those things — took a very hard line on 
Japan. What they were fighting for was the domestic market. They wanted us to go and 
scare the Japanese so they’d sell their spark plugs; that was that. Then there were the big 
guys — TRW, Allied-Signals, Borg Warner etc. They were interested in the Japanese 
market and they had a much softer line. They had their tie-in arrangements with the 
Japanese and they didn’t want to upset that applecart. They were much more go-slow. So 
the parts industry was zeroed out.
As a follow-up to the MOSS process, the Commerce Department and MITI announced 
an eight-point Market-Oriented Cooperation Plan (MOCP) in June 1990.222 The MOCP 
built on industry-to-industry initiatives and provided an umbrella for the development of 
voluntary company purchasing plans of US-made parts by the five major Japanese 
automakers — Honda, Mazda, Mitsubishi, Nissan and Toyota. Other initiatives included 
support for greater purchasing autonomy and design responsibility for the American 
production facilities of Japanese manufacturers and the commissioning of a joint price 
survey of OE and replacement parts in the Japanese market (Tamada 1993). But by 1991, 
the Bush Administration’s gradualist approach on auto parts was in the process of 
unravelling. With the American automotive industry entering its third consecutive year 
of declining vehicle production, Congress began a new cycle of legislative activity aimed 
at mandating reductions in the US-Japan trade deficit starting with the auto and auto 
parts industries.226
Japanese transplant operations and the roughly 300 Japanese-affiliated auto parts plants 
in the United States received unprecedented official attention in 1991 with keiretsu ties at
22' An APAA spokesman underlined the organisation’s domestic focus in his 1990 statement that the 
‘gravest threat to our industry’ is posed by ‘hundreds of Japanese suppliers moving on shore to replicate 
exclusionary ties to Japanese car makers, and more importantly, to crack the Big Three markets and 
lucrative after-market for US nameplates’. Inside US Trade, 8(9), 2 March 1990, p. 9.
224 S. Linn Williams, interview with author, 24 September 1996, Irvine CA.
225 ‘Accord reached in auto parts talks’, Japan Times, 16 June 1990.
12<' Congressional representatives of the auto parts industry introduced companion bills in the House of 
Representatives (H.R. 787) and the Senate (S. 301) in early 1991 aimed at reviving Super 301 and 
targeting countries whose bilateral deficits accounted for 15 per cent or more of the total US trade deficit 
and sectoral deficits of five per cent or more of bilateral imbalances. International Trade Reporter, 8(6), 6 
February 1991, p. 199. Inside US Trade, 9(6), 8 February 1991, p. 4.
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the centre of the bilateral Structural Impediments Initiative and the auto parts industry’s 
problems the subject of hearings by numerous congressional committees.227 June 1991 
witnessed an important turning point in sectoral politics when for the first time the Auto 
Parts Advisory Committee (APAC), an industry body set up to advise the Commerce 
Department on Japan auto parts trade, presented the Bush Administration with a 
consensus, hardline recommendation for a dumping investigation and a Section 301 case 
against the Japanese auto parts industry.228 The Bush Administration rejected the APAC 
proposal, but Commerce Department officials launched renewed demands for increased 
US sales on the back of the MOCP price study which identified cases of “comparable” 
parts costing up to three times more in Japan than in the United States.220
The inclusion on the bilateral auto agenda in 1991 of American grievances concerning 
low vehicle sales in Japan further strained the pattern of low-key follow up to the MOSS 
process. The Japanese government reluctantly agreed to examine the statutory motor 
vehicle inspection and distribution systems and to participate in a joint study of the 
problems foreign automakers faced in the Japanese market.230 At the time, imports made 
up around four per cent of the Japanese automobile market with American cars 
accounting for less than one per cent of sales in Japan (Bass 1992). Explanations for low 
sales by the Big Three invariably pointed to their low export orientation, failure to 
develop right-hand-drive vehicle models, reluctance to invest in marketing and 
distribution relationships and perceptions of poor quality relative to Japanese vehicle 
producers. According to Mike Farren, the Bush Administration's Undersecretary of 
Commerce and chief automotive sector negotiator, Tip until 1990 the US auto
227 The potential anticompetitive effects of keiretsu relationships being replicated in the United States was 
the subject of no less than three official inquiries by the Department of Justice, the Federal Trade 
Commission and the GAO in 1991. See ‘Honda: Is it an American car?’ by Paul Magnusson et al.. 
Business Week, 18 November 1991, p. 39.
International Trade Reporter, 8(26), 26 June 1991, p. 978. APAC also released a controversial 
University of Michigan study which projected a bilateral auto parts trade deficit of $22 billion in 1994 and 
a significant further decline in US automotive parts suppliers unless action was taken against Japanese 
procurement practices.
22> International Trade Reporter, 8(27), 3 July 1991, p. 1013. ‘Factors explain US-Japan auto parts price 
discrepancy: M i l l ’, Nikkei News Bulletin, 27 June 1991. The Department of Commerce/MITI study found 
that of 68 uninstalled after-market parts surveyed, 87 per cent were priced higher in Japan than in the 
United States, and that of 65 installed parts surveyed, 80 per cent were priced higher in Japan than the 
same or comparable US parts. MITI argued that price discrepancies reflected a complex mix of factors 
including ancillary services provided by Japanese auto parts firms and the larger role of discount stores in 
the United States.
2,0 Inside US Trade, 9(31), 2 August 1991, p. 18. ‘Trade talks to include US car sales’ by Nobuyuki Oishi 
and Thomas P. O’Toole, Nikkei Weekly, 3 August 1991, p. 8.
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manufacturers had steadfastly refused to allow the US government to become engaged in 
negotiations on the question of market access to Japan. They only wanted the US 
government engaged on Japanese import penetration’. Again, contrary to the basic 
MOSS premise, the proximate causes of this latest episode of bilateral auto trade politics 
were the large sectoral deficit in vehicles ($21.3 billion in 1990), strong competitive 
pressures from the Japanese transplants and record Big Three losses totalling $7.5 billion 
in 1991 (Nanto and Bass 1992).
By November 1991, economic recession, a hostile Congress disenchanted with the Bush 
Administration’s trade policy and a looming presidential election year combined to place 
automotive issues at the forefront of a new round of bilateral trade tensions. American 
officials launched renewed criticism of the announced voluntary purchasing plans of the 
major Japanese vehicle producers. Having previously cancelled a planned trip to Japan 
and other Asia Pacific countries, President Bush rescheduled the visit as a trade mission 
complete with a delegation of American business executives, including auto industry 
executives. In the subsequent flurry of activity geared towards making the Bush visit a 
success, US officials demanded concrete sales results in the auto parts and vehicles 
sectors. Under duress, the Japanese government corralled the live major Japanese 
automakers into twice expanding their voluntary auto parts purchasing plans and
234extracted additional measures to assist Big Three vehicle sales in Japan. '
January 1992 saw the culmination of this scramble for results with a series of 
announcements orchestrated by MIT1 as part of an “Automotive Action Plan'’ (White 
House 1992).20 Japan’s auto manufacturers announced plans to increase purchases of
2.1 Farren, interview, 1996. Reflecting on the Big Three’s commitment to the Japanese market, another 
Bush Administration official noted wryly that ‘my personal experience with the Big Three was that they 
could barely find Japan on a map’. Not-for-attribution interview. See also Armacost (1996: 36).
2.2 International Trade Reporter, 8(45), 13 November 1991, p. 1643. Inside US Trade, 8(47), 22 
November 1991, p. 1.
2”  ‘Car issues said vital to Bush visit’ by Akinori Uchida, Daily Yomuri, 24 December 1991, p. 1. ‘US 
calls for “visible” results on trade issues’, Mainichi Daily News, 26 December 1991. Not-for-attribution 
interviews with former Japanese officials.
2,4 ‘PM urges automakers to help US car industry’, Mainici Daily News, 1 January 1992. ‘Japan 
automakers willing to expand US auto imports’, Nikkei Top Articles, I January 1992.
225 See also JE! Report 2B, 17 January 1992, JEI Report 3B, 24 January 1992.
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US parts from $9 billion in Japanese fiscal year (JFY) 1991 to $19 billion by the end of 
JFY 1994. Of this total, $15 billion was marked as procurement of US parts by Japanese 
affiliates in the United States. As in the semiconductor negotiations, capital-affiliation 
rather than production location became a critical element of US demands with the 
Automotive Action Plan stating that 'special consideration’ would be given to American- 
owned suppliers in meeting the purchasing plans. Japanese producers also announced 
new investments in R&D operations in the United States as a signal of their commitment 
to future auto parts sales. The market access-VIE component of the action plan remained 
relatively less significant with US exports to Japan slated to rise from $2 billion to $4 
billion in JFY 1994. In relation to vehicles, Japan’s major manufacturers undertook to 
increase opportunities for Big Three models to be handled by their dealer networks in 
Japan and to set informal sales targets for foreign nameplates. The Japanese government 
rejected American demands for a specific sales commitment, but pledged to speed up 
resolution of outstanding standards and certification issues.
In the event, American and Japanese officials received little credit for the automotive 
measures despite the affirmative action plans announced during President Bush's Japan 
visit.* 2 ’0 With the House of Representatives again moving towards passing a protectionist 
omnibus trade bill (H.R. 5100), Bush Administration officials walked a fine line between 
asserting that the Japanese undertakings were voluntary plans rather than official 
commitments while at the same time holding out the prospect of more formal 
‘benchmarks’ in future auto negotiations.2’7 Even so, the inevitable scrutiny attending the 
Japanese automakers' procurement plans and VIE implied that the new goals were 
voluntary in name only. As one Bush Administration trade official noted later, the 
company plans ‘occurred in the important political context of a presidential visit, and the 
pledges were announced at the same time as the official communique’ (Janow 1994: 66). 
And according to the official most directly involved in securing the January 1992 auto 
commitments, 'we knew the political reality would be that the Japanese would try to
238move heaven and earth to meet the goals’.
2.6 ‘$10 billion trade goal: But executives sceptical of import pledges’ by Paul Blustein and Stuart 
Auerbach, Washington Post, 10 January 1992, p. A01. ‘US Democrats decry summit, seek retaliation’ by 
Hisashi Kitahara, Daily Yonntri, 1 1 January 1992, p. 1.
1.7 International Trade Reporter, 9(16), 15 April 1992, p. 685. Passed by the House on 8 July 1992, H.R.
5 100 included a mandatory Section 301 investigation of unfair Japanese trade practices in autos and auto 
parts. A companion bill was introduced in the Senate (S. 3019), but received no action (Bass 1992).
2's Zoellick, interview, 1996.
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Results for Motorola and Cray
The Reagan and Bush Administrations’ efforts in Japan on behalf of telecommunications 
firm Motorola Inc. and supercomputer manufacturer Cray Research Inc. yielded very 
specific actions making room for particular American companies in sectors characterised 
by heavy Japanese government discretion. The cellular telephone and third-party radio 
negotiations highlighted the grey area between process and results-oriented policy where 
new technologies expose the limits of existing regulatory structures and where technical 
constraints (such as a radio wave spectrum) dictate close government oversight of 
limited market opportunities.“'9 The supercomputer case pointed to the greater political 
scope for results-oriented market access demands where the Japanese government had 
direct or indirect leverage over purchasing decisions. No overt numerical goals were 
established in these negotiations, but the multiple iterations implied progressive 
movement beyond process-oriented negotiations through the Reagan and Bush 
Administrations. A familiar pattern emerged whereby an initial American complaint was 
followed by a process-oriented agreement centred on general norms of transparency and 
non-discrimination. Unmet American expectations and continued allegations of Japanese 
government management of internal market outcomes usually resulted in a new cycle of 
negotiations, more explicit threats of retaliation, a more detailed market access 
agreement and ultimately more concerted pressure for concrete results.
The original MOSS telecommunications negotiations covered an extensive set of issues 
related to standards, testing and certification of telecommunications equipment and the 
terms of foreign entry for the provision of telecommunications services in Japan. Reagan 
Administration officials demanded significant policy harmonisation so that US 
companies could offer the same type of telecommunications products and services in 
Japan that Japanese companies offered in the United States (Prestowitz 1988: 297). 
Begun in June 1985, negotiations on radio system licensing and equipment approval 
constituted the second and most difficult phase of the MOSS negotiations (Mikanagi 
1996: 67-9). The January 1986 telecommunications agreement secured broad agreement 
on liberalisation of foreign access to cellular telephone and third-party radio services in 
Japan with measures designed to make standard setting and allocation of frequency more
2’v Third-party radio systems are mobile communications networks of the type used by taxis, towing and 
delivery services.
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transparent and to reduce licensing and foreign ownership restrictions. American trade 
officials gave the agreement high marks, but made final judgement on market access 
conditional on MPT’s implementation.240
Japan was an early mover into cellular telephony in 1979, but NTT (the former 
monopoly provider) was slow to encourage market growth and penetration rates lagged 
far behind other industrial countries well into the 1980s.241 With reform of the world’s 
second largest telecommunications market in prospect, Motorola, the largest American 
telecommunications equipment manufacturer, looked to establish a presence in a cellular 
phone market valued at $400 million in 1986 and expected to grow by 40 to 50 per cent a 
year during the next five years (Tyson 1992: 68). Under the MOSS agreement, MPT 
appointed representatives from foreign firms (including Motorola) to the 
Telecommunications Deliberation Council, the new body charged with setting technical 
standards. In March 1986, the council recommended that any of three cellular phone 
standards, including Motorola’s Total Access Communications System (TACS), could 
be adopted for cellular service in Japan.242 MP4' decided in turn that the Japanese market 
should be divided into geographic regions with a now privatised NTT allowed to operate 
a nation-wide cellular system based on its proprietary system with one additional service 
to be licensed in each region. Some observers have suggested that MP 1 actively sought 
to delay applications by foreign companies keen to enter the Japanese cellular market 
while it assembled alternative domestic consortia of companies (Prestowitz 1988: 299, 
Steven K. Vogel 1996: 163).
Japan’s Daini Denden Corporation (DDI) proposed to establish a cellular system based 
on Motorola's TACS standard and cellular equipment. Nippon Idou Tsushin Corporation 
(IDO), a consortium with strong industry and government connections as a subsidiary of 
4'eleway Japan Corporation, came forward with a rival offer based on the N IT  
standard.“ In January 1987, MPT announced the new license allocations after the two
240 International Trade Reporter, 3(3), 15 January 1986, p. 82.
241 The following discussion draws on Tyson (1992: 66-75) and Johnson (1993: 37-41).
242 TACS had been adopted as an international standard in a number of countries in contrast with NTT’s 
proprietary system that was not used outside Japan (Johnson 1993: 37).
24’ The Telway Japan consortium included such partners as Toyota Motor Corporation, Japan Highway 
Public Corporation and Tokyo Electric Power Company (Johnson 1993: 42-3).
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potential entrants rejected an initial ministry proposal that they form a joint venture to 
avoid excess competition with NTT. NTT and IDO were licensed to compete in eastern 
Japan accounting for between 60 and 70 per cent of the Japanese market while the 
Motorola-DDI partnership was licensed to compete with NTT in the remainder of the 
country centred on the Kansai and Hokuriku regions (Johnson 1993: 44). Reagan 
Administration officials immediately complained about the exclusion of the Motorola- 
based service from the largest and most lucrative segment of the Japanese market, 
disputing MPT’s claims about insufficient radio capacity and the dangers of excess 
competition.244 This renewed campaign resulted in the Motorola-DDI service being 
granted an expanded license for all of Japan except the Tokyo-Nagoya corridor. 
Motorola appeared grudgingly to accept the MPT decision, but in mid 1988 the cellular 
phone dispute was rekindled after MPT allocated new frequency bandwidth for a new 
mobile communications service (Convenience Radio Phone) in the Tokyo-Nagoya 
region. The American telecommunications firm again complained to the US government 
arguing that this action belied MPT’s assertions about insufficient radio frequencies 
(Tyson 1992: 69).
Motorola’s second grievance arising from the 1986 MOSS agreement was that MPT 
continued to discriminate against new entrants in third-party radio spectrum allocation 
and license approval. Mobile Radio Center (MRC), the former government-run 
monopoly affiliated with MPT, was the sole provider of such services in Japan until 
Motorola, in partnership with Shikoku Tsuhan, launched its Japan Shared Mobile Radio 
(JSMR) system in 1987.“4 Again the commercial focus of the dispute was the lucrative 
Tokyo area where the Motorola-Shikoku Tsuhan joint venture sought to expand its 
market reach after an initially successful entry in regional Japanese markets.246 Motorola 
alleged that MPT restricted frequency allocation and managed competition in the Tokyo 
market to the advantage of MRC. Also subject to complaint was the practice whereby 
MRC could obtain radio licenses from MPT based on forecasts of future customers while 
the new foreign affiliated entrant was required to pre-sign customers prior to license 
approval (Tyson 1992: 72).
241 ‘US getting bad connection to Japanese mobile phone market’, .Japan Times, 27 February 1987.
245 ‘Motorola 1st foreign company to enter Japan wireless phone market’, .Japan Economic .Journal, 12 
September 1987, p. 13.
24<’ ‘Nippon Motorola applies for Tokyo mobile radio service approval’, .Japan Times, 3 March 1988.
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In both cases, Motorola alleged that the Japanese government applied bogus technical 
arguments to limit competition faced by powerful Japanese corporate interests. In early 
1989, the company filed a formal complaint with the US government charging that MPT 
had violated the 1986 MOSS agreement by failing to grant US companies comparable 
access to Japan’s markets for cellular phone services and third-party radio systems.247 
The unfair trade petition was primed to take advantage of the 1988 Trade Act and a 
special reciprocity provision (Section 1377) that mandated that USTR conduct an annual 
review of telecommunications agreements. The crux of the complaint was the cellular 
phone issue, specifically the denial of radio frequency that would allow users of 
Motorola phones to “roam” in the Tokyo area. Motorola had recently released a new 
extra compact phone (MicroTac), but the incompatibility of DDTs Motorola system with 
the NTT standard required the incorporation of bulky roaming requirements that posed a 
particular handicap in the cellular phone market.248 In April 1989, US Trade 
Representative Carla Hills announced that the United States would retaliate against Japan 
for violating commitments under the 1986 MOSS telecommunications agreements unless 
Japan acted immediately to remedy the alleged discriminatory practices.249 A deadline of 
10 July 1989 was set before the customary Section 301 remedy of 100 per cent tariff 
retaliation would come into effect on a range of Japanese product lines. Japanese 
officials denied any agreement violation arguing that the dispute reflected new demands 
by Motorola unrelated to the original MOSS agreement. They maintained that no 
additional frequencies were available for cellular phones in the Tokyo-Nagoya region 
and also that the complaint would be immaterial within two years when digital cellular 
technology superseded Motorola’s analog system.2'"'0
A new telecommunications agreement was signed on 28 June 1989 after several rounds 
of negotiations between US trade officials and their Japanese counterparts led by Ichiro 
Ozawa, an influential member of the ruling LDP.2"1 The agreement included very
24 Inside US Trade, 8(23), 3 I March 1989, p. 4. The company estimated that alleged Japanese barriers in 
these markets would cost it more than $2 billion in lost sales over ten years.
2,8 Tim e’s a wasting for Motorola telecom entry’ by Hisao Takagi, Japan Economic Journal, I July 1989, 
p. 28.
249 ‘Administration orders trade sanctions against Japan’ by Stuart Auerbach, Washington Post, 29 April 
1989, p. Dl I. Under Section 1377, a determination of non-compliance was equivalent to a final, 
affirmative finding of a trade agreement violation under Section 301.
250 International Trade Reporter, 6(20), 17 May 1989, p. 615. American officials were sceptical of claims 
about technical spectrum limits because of similar MPT arguments in the lead-up to the 1986 agreement.
251 ‘Hills announces telecommunications agreement’, Office of the US Trade Representative, 28 June 
1989.
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specific Japanese undertakings reallocating a one-fifth of IDO’s radio spectrum in the 
Tokyo region to accommodate users of Motorola’s cellular system and providing for 
increased spectrum allocation if this proved insufficient to satisfy future demand. The 
third-party radio provisions reflected even stronger results-oriented characteristics. As 
well as streamlining licensing procedures, the agreement set out specific quantitative 
guidelines for future sequencing of Japanese and foreign access to radio licenses. Former 
Deputy USTR and chief negotiator of the agreement, Linn Williams, describes the US 
government’s intent to ensure the negotiations secured commercial room for Motorola 
products in the Japanese market: ‘I went back twice to Ozawa on a little war path on 
telecoms. And the message was: “You guys have messed this up; we have to fix it or 
we’re going to come with sanctions”. And we could deliver sanctions. And they came 
around. So we wanted results’.2̂
The 1989 agreement designated IDO (rather than DD1) as the operating company for 
Motorola’s TACS standard in the Tokyo-Nagoya region with an initial infrastructure 
investment for the new service estimated at nearly 10 billion yen (almost $70 million).
In 1990, Motorola was awarded the relevant IDO contract to supply relay stations and 
exchange systems for the first instalment of a new TACS service in Tokyo from 1 
October 1991.2"4 The Clinton Administration would later revisit cellular phone market 
access complaining of delays in IDO’s infrastructure program, but the 1989 agreement 
had nevertheless given the US firm a demonstrably “managed” foothold in the Japanese 
market. Meanwhile. American commercial interests would herald the new arrangements 
for third-party radio access as an unqualified results-oriented success (ACCJ 1997: 29). 
Under quantitative guidelines in place until new bandwidth was made available in 
November 1990, MPT allocated new licences in Tokyo on a one-for-one basis between 
Motorola’s JSMR system and the MRC system. By August 1991, US officials could 
claim that American firms (i.e. Motorola) held more than half of the Japanese market in 
third-party radios.2:0 Within a relatively short period of time, the Bush Administration
252 Williams, interview, 1996. At the agreement’s signing ceremony, Williams’ Japanese counterpart Ichiro 
Ozawa remarked: ‘This morning I have back pains and even walking is difficult to me, which shows how 
strongly I was whipped by the US side’. ‘Japan agrees to open cellular phone, radio markets’ by Stuart 
Auerbach, Washington Post, 29 June 1989, p. E01.
25 ’ ‘Telecom agreement leaves Japan uneasy’, Japan Economic Journal, 8 July 1989, p. I.
234 ‘US-Japan trade friction pays off for Motorola’ by Yasushi Takano, Japan Economic Journal, 17 
February 1990, p. 14.
233 US Congress, Senate Committee on Finance (1991: 7).
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could point to tangible market access improvement under a telecommunications sectoral 
policy that tended more towards market sharing than arms-length market competition. Or 
as one prominent supporter of a results-oriented Japan policy concluded about the 1989 
telecommunications agreement, 'on a continuum between trade management through 
better rules and managed trade through quantitative targets, these negotiations were 
clearly closer to the latter’ (Tyson 1992: 74).
Cases where the Japanese government had either a direct or indirect role as purchasing 
agent represented the line of least resistance for a selective, results-oriented US sectoral 
policy through the second Reagan and Bush Administrations. There is no simple metric 
to identify policy change over time or across industries, but such cases as Japanese 
procurement of supercomputers and satellites (two of the three Super 301 cases against 
Japan in 1989) and US efforts from 1986 to open the Japanese public sector construction 
market have been identified with movement away from process-oriented demands 
(Brainard 1995: 338).2Mi While bilateral agreements remained consistent with norms of 
transparency and non-discrimination, the market access barometer of concrete results 
(sales or contracts to US firms) can be seen as part of the logic in deciding sectors to 
target based on scope for Japanese official “guidance”.
The negotiations over Japanese public sector purchases of supercomputers illustrated the 
particular procurement dimension and the purposefulness of US market access policy 
where American high-technology supremacy was seen as at s t ake . Al l ega t ions  of 
Japanese government targeting were at the core of the market access complaint from 
American corporate interests keen to preserve international market dominance. As in 
other high-technology disputes, it was equally possible to point to the important role the 
US government had played in supporting the American supercomputer industry through 
military procurement and R&D funding.259 Two American firms (Cray Research Inc. and
256 Brainard, a staff member of the CEA in the Bush Administration, nominates Reagan/Bush agreements 
on auto parts, cellular phones, supercomputers, construction and wood products as having results-oriented 
aspects.
257 Supercomputers are commonly identified based on their mathematical processing capacity and multi­
million dollar cost. Examples of their application are found in such areas as weather forecasting, aerospace 
design and automobile crash analysis.
2’s For more detailed discussion of public policy issues raised by the supercomputer dispute, see Office of 
Technology Assessment (1991), Tyson (1992) and Bayard and Elliott (1994).
259 Critics of Japanese procurement policies nonetheless concede that ‘defense-based industrial policy has 
played an essential nurturing role in the supercomputer industry’ (Tyson 1992: 82).
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Control Data Corporation) first marketed supercomputers in the mid 1970s and their 
multi-million dollar cost ensured public sector applications remained a major source of 
demand. Access to the potentially large Japanese procurement market first attracted the 
attention of the US government in the early 1980s when Japanese industrial policy 
became a high-profile bilateral issue.260 That the Japanese government began an 
aggressive program of acquisitions only when the first Japanese-made supercomputers 
became available in 1983 fuelled American suspicions about the intent of targeting 
policies (Prestowitz 1988: 135-136). As the acknowledged industry leader, Cray 
Research assumed the role as the central US complainant arguing that its superior 
performance machines were being discriminated against by the Japanese government 
given Cray held sizeable shares of US and European markets and had successfully 
penetrated the private sector market in Japan.261
Between 1983 and 1986, Cray sold three of the 22 supercomputers installed by Japanese 
public agencies." American claims of Japanese targeting echoed themes well 
established since the NTT procurement negotiations — closed bidding procedures due to 
the absence of public notices by Japanese public agencies of their intention to buy 
supercomputers, a lack of clear performance criteria in tender documents and an unstated 
Buy Japan bias. Again the Japan market access issue was entangled with the strategic 
threat which new Japanese supercomputer makers (Fujitsu, Hitachi, and NEC) posed to 
the market dominance of US firms in the American market. One aspect of Cray’s market 
access complaint concerned aggressive discounting of up to 80 per cent on Japanese 
public procurement bids by the large Japanese electronics groups. The American 
supercomputer manufacturer linked this to artificially low procurement budgets set by 
Japanese agencies, but it also signalled concern about Japanese capacity to penetrate the 
US market. Indeed, it was the prospect of NEC moving aggressively into the US market 
that was an important catalyst for increased sectoral conflict after 1985-86.26j
260 The VLSI cooperative research programs of MITI and NTT are credited by some analysts as critical to 
Japan’s entry into supercomputers in the 1980s (Office of Technology Assessment 1991).
2(>l The fact that only US and Japanese firms produced supercomputers contributed to the narrow 
commercial focus of the supercomputer dispute. The US government’s identification with Cray’s interests 
was even more pronounced from 1989 after Control Data Corporation’s supercomputer subsidiary (ETA 
Systems) was forced to close (Bayard and Elliott 1994: 103).
262 JEl Report 46B, 19 December 1986.
26’ ‘Accord will let Honeywell sell NEC supercomputers’, Japan Economic .Journal, 12 July 1986, p. 12.
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In December 1986, USTR launched a Section 305 investigation of Japan’s 
supercomputer trade practices that led to bilateral market access talks under the MOSS 
electronics framework.264 Bilateral friction quickly escalated following initial talks in 
January 1987 in which MIT1 Vice Minister Makoto Kuroda allegedly told US 
negotiators that the United States could not expect to sell supercomputers to Japanese 
government agencies and that if Cray was to survive it might have to be nationalised.265 
Intensified negotiations under threat of a Section 301 action led to a bilateral agreement 
in August 1987 as well as emergency funding by the Japanese government for two 
supercomputer purchases.266 This process-oriented agreement was geared towards non­
discrimination and transparency with the goal of bringing Japanese supercomputer 
procurement practices in line with the GATT Government Procurement Code. It 
included provisions for advance notice of purchasing decisions, greater reliance on 
performance specifications, longer time periods in which companies could prepare bids, 
and procedures for monitoring and registering complaints. At the time, USTR Clayton 
Yeutter noted that ‘the proof of the pudding will come in sales’ given that "there have 
been many market-opening announcements by the government of Japan that have not
267been meaningful'.
The Japanese government's emergency budget provisions saw two purchases of 
American machines announced in October 1987.268 Yet the lack of further public sector 
sales under the 1987 agreement led US industry and government officials to view it as a 
failure. By 1989, US machines accounted for five of 51 public sector supercomputers 
installed in Japan and three of these (including the two announced in October 1987) were
264 International Trade Reporter, 3(50) 17 December 1986, p. 1520.
2<° The exchange reported in a leaked State Department cable from Tokyo became one of the periodic 
rallying points for hardliners seeking more aggressive trade action against Japan. See ‘Remark fires US 
campaign to retaliate against Japan’ by Stuart Auerbach, Washington Post, 26 March 1987, p. AI. Kuroda 
later denied the widely publicised interpretation of his remarks. Kuroda, interview, 1997.
266 ‘Japan to ease way for US computers’ by Todd J. Gillman, Washington Post, 8 August 1987, p. C01. 
Through the course of the 1986-87 negotiations, NTT announced two orders for Cray supercomputers, but 
neither was counted as public procurement by the US government as both were resold to the Recruit 
Corporation (Bayard and Elliott 1994: 108).
26 International Trade Reporter, 4(32), 12 August 1987, p. 1008. Cray’s complaints about Japanese 
discounting practices were not dealt with in the 1987 agreement in part because US agencies could not 
agree on their legitimacy. And as Bayard and Elliott (1994: 107) point out, discounts were well-established 
in the United States based on commercial considerations such as improving the possibility of future sales 
and the existence of software design externalities.
265 A Cray computer was sold to MITI’s Agency of Industrial Science and Technology while the Tokyo 
Institute of Technology purchased an ETA machine. ‘US makers seek supercomputer buyers’ by Takayuki 
Kamada, Japan Economic Journal, 9 July 1988, p. I.
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considered 'managed' by the Japanese government to defuse trade tensions (Tyson 1992: 
78). Cray representatives maintained that the vague language of the 1987 pact meant US 
firms were still disadvantaged by such practices as reliance on “theoretical” peak 
performance evaluations and the tailoring of specifications to disqualify or discourage 
foreign vendors from making bids.26l) They further criticised the 1987 agreement for 
doing nothing to rectify low procurement budgets and large discounting by the Japanese 
computer manufacturers.
As evidence of informal barriers, Cray cited the sort of circumstantial evidence that the 
semiconductor industry had used to good effect. Low sales in the Japanese procurement 
market up to 1989 were contrasted with shares of over 21 per cent of installed machines 
in the Japanese private sector, 84 per cent of the total European market and 81 per cent 
of the North American market. Former USTR official Glen Fukushima notes that 
frustration with the process-oriented 1987 supercomputer agreement led to renewed 
market access demands by the Bush Administration. Fie recalls how:
Those of us at the working level were saying that the August 1987 supercomputer 
agreement was a failure in that it was a procedurally-oriented agreement that had no 
indication whatsoever of progress or results. John Rollwagen, then Chairman of Cray 
Research, said his company was worse off after the agreement than before the 
agreement.
Before the agreement, Cray wouldn't know when certain government entities were 
buying supercomputers. But as a result of the 1987 procurement agreement the Japanese 
government was obligated to publish in the government gazette when Japanese 
government agencies were going to buy supercomputers. That meant that Cray would 
know when purchases were going to be made and therefore expended the time, effort and 
money to translate documents and go to information sessions; and yet end up with zero 
procurements. ... It was as a consequence of that that the Super 301 case on 
supercomputers was initiated in the summer of 19897
The Bush Administration took up the complaint and in May 1989 USTR Carla Hills 
named Japanese supercomputer procurement as one of three targets for Super 301 action. 
The fact that supercomputer purchases fell directly under the purview of the Japanese 
government was an important factor behind the action in conjunction with the strong 
support which the case received across the executive, Congress and industry
269 US Congress, Senate Committee on Finance (1990).
270 US Congress, Senate Committee on Finance (1990).
271 Glen Fukushima, interview with author, 16 May 1996, Tokyo.
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(Mastanduno 1992a).272 The closure of ETA Systems, Control Data's supercomputer 
subsidiary and Cray’s only American-owned competitor, only heightened American 
concern about the potential loss of technological leadership to Japan in an important 
industry.273 During the 1989-90 negotiations, the Japanese government again took a 
series of actions which supporters of the US industry would cast as ‘leaning on Japanese 
companies and public agencies to make room for foreign suppliers’ (Tyson 1992: 80).
274The outline of a new supercomputer procurement pact was announced in March 19902
Finalised in May, the degree of detail in the agreement set a new standard for future US- 
Japan procurement negotiations." * On the issue of performance standards, Japanese 
government entities were required to draw up their specifications in terms of ‘actual 
minimum needs’ based on ‘minimally acceptable benchmark results that demonstrated 
the operational performance of the supercomputers’. The agreement also tackled the 
more controversial US industry demands about heavy discounting by encouraging 
budget allocations and contract bids to be based on market prices and urging stronger 
enforcement of Japan’s Anti-Monopoly law. In addition, extensive procedures were 
agreed for a more formal Procurement Review Board mechanism to hear complaints 
about procurement decisions. Bush Administration negotiators stopped short of explicit 
sales goals. But echoing former USTR Yeutter's remarks in 1987, one US official noted
^76more obliquely that ‘the real test will be when the cash register rings’. According to 
one senior Bush Administration trade official, a more outcome-oriented follow-up 
process buttressed the process-oriented formal agreement.
In many ways the supercomputer negotiations we did were rule changes but with a 
political understanding—  never articulated in the way the 20 per cent in semiconductors 
was —  that they would start buying supercomputers which they did. We set that up as a 
measuring device. W e’d go back to revisit these understandings. And in supercomputers
272 Congress had inserted Section 1307 in the 1988 Trade Act expressing concern about alleged Japanese 
targeting of supercomputers and about lack of adherence to the 1987 agreement. Industry support for a 
Super 301 designation came from Cray, IBM and the AEA (Mastanduno 1992a: 744).
27' ‘Can US protect lead in supercomputers? Control Data’s pullout, Japan’s aggressiveness raise stakes’ 
by John Burgess and Evelyn Richards, Washington Post, 7 May 1989, p. H01.
271 ‘US, Japan reach supercomputer agreement’ by Stuart Auerbach, Washington Post, 24 March 1990, p. 
D12.
’ ‘Procedures to introduce supercomputers’, attachment to letter from USTR Carla Hills to His 
Excellency Ryohei Murata Ambassador of Japan, Office of the US Trade Representative, 15 June 
1990.
27(1 International Trade Reporter, 7(13), 28 March 1990, p. 427.
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really it was not the rule changes; when we'd go back to talk to them it was: “How many
277
have you bought? how many are our firms?”
Former MITI official Makoto Kuroda has identified the results-oriented dimension of the 
supercomputer case as part of the broader class of procurement negotiations. He 
maintains that there was ‘some impression that in a government procurement type [of 
issue] a target could easily be converted into a commitment because the government 
buys. And 1 think MITI may have worked in favour of Cray in certain circumstances’.
In the first two years of the 1990 agreement’s operation, Cray won three of the 11
279recorded supercomputer contracts awarded by Japanese government institutions. 
Dispute surrounds the exact dimensions and interpretation of any Japanese government 
guidance in these cases. Ironically, actions portrayed from a Japanese perspective as 
favouring Cray have been interpreted by analysts sympathetic to American commercial 
interests as ‘orchestrated sales [which] ... simply confirm Cray’s contention that public 
procurement decisions in Japan were not the outcome of market competition’ (Tyson 
1992: 80). And even to the extent that the Reagan and Bush Administrations established 
results as an implicit 'measuring device’, this failed to prevent the reemergence of 
supercomputer market access complaints. In July 1992, Cray initiated the first test of the 
1990 agreement’s review mechanism complaining that inadequate information and 
slanted specifications had seen a contract awarded unfairly to NEC.280 Echoing the 
familiar grievance of unmet American expectations, Cray Chairman John Rollwagen 
maintained at the time that ‘the agreement is fine, it’s just not being followed'.
Renewing the semiconductor agreement and securing 20 per cent
The Reagan Administration’s March 1987 decision to impose $300 million in punitive 
sanctions against Japanese exports was a dramatic response to the alleged violation of the 
1986 semiconductor agreement’s market access and third-country dumping provisions. 
Dumping charges subsided through 1987 as Japanese chip producers were forced to 
conform to MITI’s comprehensive export and production control regime, but a recovery 
in global semiconductor demand also opened up new tensions in semiconductor trade
277 Williams, interview, 1996.
2 8 Kuroda, interview, 1997.
279 JEI Report 17B, 7 May 1992, p. 9.
280 ‘Cray cries foul over lost contract’ by Edmund Klamann, The Nikkei Weekly, 25 July 1992, p. 8.
281 ‘Cray chief protests’, Japan Times, 10 October 1992.
168
politics. Within weeks of the US government’s retaliation coming into effect, major 
American computer manufacturers were complaining not only of high prices but also of 
serious shortages of Japanese DRAMs.~8~ With rising chip prices worldwide, the Reagan 
Administration removed the last of the third-country dumping sanctions in November 
19 8 7.283 At the time, both the American and Japanese governments also publicly 
disavowed production and investment controls on the Japanese industry. An 
electronics industry boom in 1988 resulted in substantial price increases for the first time 
in the history of the semiconductor industry and unprecedented differentials between 
DRAM prices in Japan and in other markets (Flamm 1996: 201-216). This drove a much 
deeper wedge into domestic industry politics in the United States as semiconductor users 
opposed to the hardline approach of the SIA organised against the supply-side impact of
285the semiconductor agreement.
Not surprisingly, the 20 per cent foreign market access ‘expectation' remained a constant 
source of dispute between the United States and Japan after September 1986. Japanese 
officials and chip producers rejected outright the US position embodied in the sanctions 
decision that the figure amounted to a government commitment and that a ‘gradual and 
steady’ improvement required something akin to a linear increase in market share. 
Dispute also surrounded how to measure foreign market access in Japan with the US 
government-favoured statistic consistently lower than the MITI-endorsed figure.286 The 
former indicated a rise in foreign share from 8.6 per cent at the time the agreement was 
sign to just over nine per cent by the second half of 1987 following a jump in purchases 
by the large vertically-integrated Japanese electronics firms targeted by tariff
Inside US Trade, 5(22), 29 May 1987, p. 12.
2S' International Trade Reporter, 4(44), 1 1 November 1987, p. 1382.
2X1 However, Flamm (1996: 272) concludes from Japanese press reports that investment “guidance” 
continued through at least early 1988 and hence probably affected supply through 1989.
2X’ An analysis of the economic impact of the original semiconductor agreement’s production and price 
control system is beyond the scope of this study. Other research has identified the windfall profits Japanese 
firms received under the arrangement as well as evidence that the agreement facilitated, at least for a time, 
a de facto cartel among Japanese DRAM producers after MITI production and investment guidance was 
halted. The main US beneficiaries of the pact were the remaining DRAM producers — Texas Instruments, 
Micron Technology and Motorola. The major losers were global semiconductor users, especially computer 
manufacturers dependent on DRAMs. For more detailed analyses of these aspects of the semiconductor 
agreement, see Flamm (1996), Irwin (1996) and Dohlman (1993).
2X6 One reason was that the MITI calculation included captive shipments by IBM Japan to its Japanese 
subsidiaries (Flamm 1996: 280).
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• * 2 8 7  • • >retaliation." But with Japanese imports still short of American expectations, $165 
million in market access sanctions were kept in place when the dumping-related tariffs
- >o u
were lifted in November 1987." One provision of the 1986 agreement was fulfilled in 
1987 with the establishment by M1TI of the International Semiconductor Cooperation 
Center (INSEC) to promote purchases of foreign chips in Japan, but its initial aspirations 
were modest.289
The Reagan Administration’s strategy for reaching the 20 per cent market share 
objective was based on two assumptions. The first was the need to target Japanese chips 
users beyond the major electronics groups. The second was that foreign chips would 
need to be ‘‘designed-in” at an early stage of product development in a number of 
product lines. A US government proposal in January 1988 sought to enlist MITI leverage 
in extracting firm-specific import plans, including ‘expected’ levels of foreign purchases. 
This was aimed at a wide group of users including small and medium-sized firms in the 
automotive and consumer electronics industries where customised devices were widely 
used.290 Early 1988 also saw the first signs of joint industry initiatives between the SIA 
and the EIAJ designed to promote imports." While both industry groups remained far 
apart on the issue of a market share target, in June the EIAJ moved to establish a Users 
Committee of Foreign Semiconductors (UCOM) comprising 56 companies and 
accounting for roughly three-quarters of all semiconductor purchases in Japan. " By the 
end of the year, this expanded group of Japanese users was targeted for regular visits by 
Mi l l officials acting as ‘salesmen for foreign companies’.29j
The US government's pressure for design-in arrangements reflected the structural 
differences in semiconductor demand and production in the two economies. Reduced 
American capacity in DRAM production was one factor highlighting the difficulties 
Japanese producers faced in switching easily to foreign products. American producers 
were estimated as capable of supplying only around six per cent of the semiconductor
2X7 ‘IC makers move to ease dispute’, Japan Times, 6 August 1987.
28x ‘US remains unhappy with chip share’, Japan Economic Journal, 14 November 1987, p. 1 1.
2X9 ‘Sales of foreign semiconductors to be promoted’, Nikkei News Bulletin, 3 March 1987. ‘INSEC to 
issue foreign semiconductor catalogue’, Nikkei News Bulletin, 7 December 1987.
290 Inside US Trade, 6(4), 29 January 1988, p. 1.
291 ‘Japan, US groups to promote chip access’, Japan Economic Journal, 9 April 1988, p. 18.
292 ‘Coming to terms on semiconductors’, Japan Times, 7 June 1988.
2K' Inside US Trade, 6(46), 18 November 1988, p. 17.
170
devices purchased by Japan's consumer electronics sector which represented over one- 
third of total Japanese semiconductor sales (Dohlman 1993: 88). As one US trade official 
noted later, ‘it was the “design-ins" that made the difference because the semiconductor 
mismatch was awful’.294
The foreign share of the Japanese semiconductor market remained below 11 per cent 
through 1988. The Reagan Administration kept market access sanctions in place despite 
Japanese government efforts, supported by free traders in the Council of Economic 
Advisers and the State Department, to have them lifted before President Reagan left 
office. ' For its part, the SI A was anxious to keep alive the prospect of increased 
retaliation if sales failed to improve substantially, but American chip users continued to 
oppose further retaliation. In the 1988 election campaign, Vice President George Bush 
supported the existing market access sanctions, but stopped short of endorsing stronger 
actions to pursue the market share goal." Meanwhile, the Japanese government 
continued to proclaim its efforts to boost foreign sales while simultaneously drawing 
attention to US firms’ shortcomings in quality and commitment to the Japanese market. 
With the formerly secret 20 per cent figure in the public domain, the official Japanese 
position nonetheless remained that the semiconductor agreement ‘does not guarantee any 
specific share or share increase, and it is clear that no one can make a commitment on a 
market share under free competition in a free economy’.297
The mandates of the 1988 Trade Act provided an early test of the Bush Administration’s 
approach on semiconductors. The SIA and its supporters in Congress urged USTR Carla 
Hills to identify Japanese non-compliance with a ‘gradual and steady’ increase in market 
access as a ‘priority’ practice under the Super 301 provision. But the Bush 
Administration rejected a hardline stance given opposition from major US chip users and 
their concern that a Super 301 designation might only provide Japan with justification to 
abandon or reconsider the 1986 agreement (Mastanduno 1992a: 738). American trade
271 Not-for-attribution interview.
2)5 Inside US Trade, 6(35), 2 September 1988, p. 12.
2% Inside US Trade, 6(38), 23 September 1988, p. 3.
297 ‘Hidden deal with US draws criticism’ by Satoshi Takeuchi, .Japan Economic .Journal, p. 2. Inside US 
Trade, 6(46), 18 November 1988, p. 17.
2,s International Trade Reporter, 6(10), 8 March 1989, p. 290.
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officials continued the path of cajoling the Japanese government and semiconductor 
users in Japan to announce more specific purchasing plans while supporting the private 
sector measures coordinated by the peak trade associations. Through 1989 an array of 
officially-endorsed taskforces, seminars and trade missions targeted the full range of 
Japanese chip users. American officials prevailed upon MITI to secure Market Access 
Plans (MAPs) from over 50 Japanese companies to be updated and forwarded to the US 
government semi-annually.299 The MAPs included explicit preferences for foreign 
products and company-wide sales targets (SIA 1990: 18). In December 1989, the EIAJ 
released a new program aimed at boosting foreign sales in the final 18 months of the 
semiconductor arrangement, especially from smaller US chip suppliers. Japanese firms 
undertook to release more detailed commercial information on semiconductor 
requirements, to schedule special purchasing missions to the United States and to further 
encourage alliances in manufacturing, technology and distribution.300
The open conflict between the SIA and the major US computer manufacturers 
underpinned the Bush Administration’s reluctance to escalate the semiconductor dispute. 
In June 1989, IBM, Hewlett-Packard and Tandem launched the Computer Systems 
Policy Project (CSPP) designed to ensure their interests found greater voice in US-Japan 
semiconductor trade.301 While complaining that measured foreign access failed to exceed 
13 per cent of the Japanese market, the SIA again failed in its attempt to have Japan cited 
under Super 301 in 1990.102 But with the semiconductor agreement approaching its end- 
July 1991 deadline well short of the 20 per cent foreign share figure, the trade 
pragmatists in the Bush Administration developed a stronger interest in seeing US chip 
producers and users reach an accommodation. In October 1990, the SIA and the CSPP 
agreed on terms to promote a second semiconductor pact critically shaping the US 
government’s next move in the semiconductor dispute.’0’ The deal saw US chip 
producers exchange weaker dumping provisions for a unified position with computer 
manufacturers supporting the market access provision of the original agreement. The two 
trade associations called for a new five-year agreement in which the 20 per cent foreign
Inside US Trade, 7(35), 1 September 1989, p. I.
300 Inside US Trade, 7(50), 15 December 1989, p. 7.
301 Inside US Trade, 7(24), 16 June 1989, p. 3.
'°2 ‘Japan ready to say “no” to US chip accord renewal’ by Tsuyoshi Sunohara, Japan Economic Journal,
3 1 March 1990, p. I.
See Computer Systems Policy Project and Semiconductor Industry Association, ‘Semiconductor and 
Computer Industry Executives Release Joint Trade Policy Recommendations’, 4 October 1990.
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share objective would be recognised explicitly, but with the deadline on Japanese 
compliance extended to the end of 1992.304
The pragmatists in the Bush Administration had to shepherd the renegotiation of the 
semiconductor agreement past a significant free trade-oriented wing of the 
administration with a decidedly negative view of market share arrangements. A number 
of senior officials including CEA Chairman Michael Boskin, OMB Director Richard 
Darman, White House chief-of-staff John Sununu and Housing and Urban Development 
Secretary Jack Kemp carried reputations as unvarnished free traders strongly opposed to 
interventionist trade and industrial policies (Fratantuono 1993). As the administration’s 
senior trade official, USTR Carla Hills’ public position was that the agreement was ‘on 
the books’ and hence she would ‘seek to enforce it.’305 But unlike her predecessor 
Clayton Yeutter, Hills (an anti-trust lawyer) held little enthusiasm for the results-oriented 
market share target. Still, her reservations were outweighed by the imperatives of 
retaining industry support and negotiating credibility. She stated later that:
The industry, and hence their elected representatives, felt very keenly that that number 
was significant. And 1 said: “Look, 1 think you’re going down the wrong road for three 
reasons. 1 don’t like numerical targets, but particularly with Japan. One, it is going to 
cause MIT1 to be more involved because they’ll have to monitor. In my opinion we want 
to get M1TI out of the picture and get industry in. Second, if ever there was a country 
which did not need encouragement to cartelisation it is Japan. Once you say you have to 
share this percentage opening you get yourself backed into a non-defensible economic 
position. And third, it sells us short”. I asked: “Why in the world are you people willing 
to settle for 20 per cent when you have a 56 per cent market share in head-to-head 
competition in Europe?” But they wanted the 20 per cent so in negotiating the agreement 
we put the 20 per cent in, but with the words that this 20 per cent is neither a floor nor a 
ceiling nor a guaranteed share, which was not in the other agreement. ... Anyway, I 
recoiled from it, but politically 1 put it in with that proviso.306
The lead negotiator of the 1991 agreement offers a further view of the prevailing 
argument leading up to the Bush Administration’s decision to maintain the market share 
target at the centre of a new agreement. According to Deputy USTR Linn Williams, 
‘liiere was strong sentiment for letting it die in the American government. I would guess
' The importance of the truce between the SIA and the computer manufacturers is highlighted by Linn 
Williams, the lead negotiator of the second semiconductor agreement. ‘The SIA wanted us to use 301. And 
we said: “No, you already have the agreement”. ... They said: “What do you think about it?” I said I like it, 
but if it is you guys versus the computer people you’re dead. So Alan Wolffand the semiconductor people 
made their peace with the computer people’. Williams, interview, 1996.
305 Inside US Trade, 7(42), 20 October 1989, p. I.
0<’ Carla Hills, interview with author, 30 August 1996, Washington DC.
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half — sub-cabinet and cabinet — didn’t want it. Carla Hills didn't want it; Boskin, 
Kemp, a lot of opposition. But institutionally we took the view that there was a role for 
the government encouraging market forces and that was particularly important in Japan. 
... And 1 would not underestimate the appeal of “a deal is a deal" within the
^07
administration. Frankly, I think that was the biggest appeal to President Bush'.
The US proposal for a new semiconductor accord was presented to Japanese officials in 
January 1991.308 It basically mirrored the deal struck between US producer and user 
groups the previous year — a watering down of the original agreement’s dumping 
provisions along with an explicit recognition of the 20 per cent market access goal, but 
with the deadline extended to the end of 1992.300 The Japanese government, after 
initially opposing any new agreement, eventually agreed to a second semiconductor pact 
in June 1991 on the condition that the 20 per cent figure not be cast as a guaranteed share 
and that the remaining sanctions against Japanese exports be lifted.310 The main text of 
the agreement included the statement that The Government of Japan recognizes that the 
US semiconductor industry expects that the foreign market share will grow to more than 
20 per cent of the Japanese market by the end of 1992 and considers that this can be 
realized. The Government of Japan welcomes the realization of this expectation. The two 
governments agree that the above statements constitute neither a guarantee, a ceiling nor 
a Boor on the foreign market share’ (Flamm 1996: 281). Japanese officials had attempted 
to elevate other market access indicators (such as the number of design-in relationships) 
to equal status with the 20 per cent figure, but US officials successfully secured language 
that identified market share as the key indicator of progress.111 The agreement again 
called for ‘gradual and steady’ improvement in access over the five-year life of the 
agreement, but no market share target was set for the post-1992 period.
Williams, interview, 1996. A Deal is a Deal was the title of a major SIA (1990) report setting out the 
case for a new semiconductor agreement.
308 Inside US Trade, 9(2), 1 1 January 1991, p. 1.
'tl') In a related development, at the beginning of 1991 US officials initiated bilateral talks on Japanese 
government procurement practices in the computer industry. Inside US Trade, 9(5), 1 February, p. 14.
' m International Trade Reporter, 8(23), 5 June 1991, p. 845. The 1991 agreement replaced the Commerce 
Department-administered floor prices with a fast-track anti-dumping procedure based on expedited 
delivery of data collected by Japanese companies.
11 Sect. 11, para. 7 of the agreement stated that: ‘In making an overall assessment of progress achieved 
under the Arrangement, particular attention should be given to market share. The two Governments should 
also take into specific consideration other important quantitative and qualitative factors, including the 
development of foreign semiconductor design-ins and other long-term relationships between Japanese 
semiconductor purchasers and suppliers, and foreign capital-affiliated semiconductor suppliers’.
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President Bush’s January 1992 visit to Japan saw renewed US government pressure to 
secure the 20 per cent goal. MITI announced an expansion from 60 to 226 in the number 
of companies targeted to buy more foreign semiconductors while US trade officials 
directed a new campaign at loosening ties between Japan’s electronics manufacturers and 
their affiliates.’12 By March 1992, the SI A pronounced the 1991 agreement ‘on the verge 
of failure’ with foreign market share measured at 14.4 per cent in the last quarter of 
1991.11J And despite an emergency purchasing program announced by the E1AJ, USTR 
Hills foreshadowed in August 1992 the likelihood of new sanctions ‘if substantial 
improvement is not achieved'.1,4
The fruits of the Reagan-Bush results-oriented policy on semiconductors only 
materialised in early 1993 after the Republican Party’s defeat at the November 1992 
election (Figure 6.3). Contrary to expectations, foreign market share in Japan jumped 
from below 16 per cent to 20.2 per cent in the final quarter of 1992, the deadline under 
the 1991 agreement.31'̂  The 4.3 percentage point increase from the third quarter of 1992 
was three times the next largest single period rise in market share. After years of 
wrangling over semiconductors and increasing calls for a results-oriented Japan policy, 
hardliners and pragmatists could proclaim an identifiably successful agreement.
It is impossible to identify precisely the respective roles of government action and 
commercial forces in securing the increased foreign market share in Japan by the end of 
the Bush Administration. Observers who emphasised the role of market forces pointed to 
both the large depreciation of the US dollar vis-a-vis the yen after 1985 and the 
competitive strength of US producers in microprocessors and other semiconductor 
devices as the key determinants of increased Japanese imports.316 But there is strong 
evidence to suggest that overt government pressure played more than a marginal role in
,l2 Inside US Trade, 10(4), 24 January 1992, p. 8.
1' JE! Report 1 IB, 20 March 1992, p. 9. The 14.4 per cent figure was based on the new US-favoured 
market access formula (FI ) calculated following the 1991 agreement.
314 Inside US Trade, 10(32), 7 August 1992, p. 5.
’13 International Trade Reporter, 10(12), 24 March 1993, p. 487.
' u> ‘Yen appreciation does reduce Japan’s surplus’ by William R. Cline, Wall Street Journal, 20 May 1993, 
p. A 16.
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Figure 6.3 Foreign Share of Japanese Semiconductor Market
( % )
WSTS
Sources: SIA (1990), Inside US Trude (various issues), JEI Report No. ///?, 26 March 1993 p. 5.
Note: The World Semiconductor Trade Statistics (WSTS) market share figure was the indicator favoured 
by the US government and semiconductor industry during the life of the 1986 semiconductor agreement. 
The 1991 agreement led to the establishment of two official indicators of market access. Formula 1 (FI) 
favoured by the US government identified foreign semiconductors based on ‘final assembly’ and excluded 
‘captive’ production (e.g. IBM Japan) not sold in the merchant market. Formula 2 (F2) favoured by the 
Japanese government identified foreign semiconductors by ‘brand' and included 'captives’.
the rise in foreign market share by the end of 1992. Then Deputy USTR Linn Williams 
provides an insider's perspective on the impact of the government-to-government 
agreement in Japanese commercial decisions. Describing the government action as 
'riding a market wave', Williams maintains that:
The value of the agreement was that it did focus the attention of the [Japanese] 
government and Japanese private industry on doing more outsourcing. If you were inside 
a Japanese company and you were looking at outsourcing, you could do it in Milwaukee 
or you could do it in Yokahama. It’s close and you have got people saying do it in Japan. 
And you have this other voice which says that there is this agreement; you have got the 
Mi l 1 guy coming in on Thursday and he is going to be asking how many foreign 
semiconductors have you bought. ... The [US] price is a little lower and the problem is 
the reject rate and you can get the reject rate down —  let’s take Milwaukee. And that
happened. And the agreement did that. If the market forces weren’t there it would not
31 7have happened, but the agreement gave voice to foreign production.
,|7 Williams, interview, 1996.
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More tangible evidence suggesting a critical role for government intervention and 
guidance comes from Flamm’s (1996) careful study of the semiconductor agreement. In 
particular, he singles out the ‘sharp declines in Japanese EPROM production and soaring 
imports of EPROMs into the Japanese market' as likely outcomes of the agreement's 
market share target.
The circumstances of this decline are consistent with the suggestion that the Japanese 
retreat in EPROMs may have been a deliberate political decision. ... The analysis of 
available data on the growth of foreign companies’ share of the Japanese semiconductor 
market supports the notion that pressures associated with the STA |Semiconductor Trade 
Agreement] may have played an important role in increasing foreign sales. Only a small 
part of the increase in foreign market share could be attributed to shifts in the 
composition of Japanese demand toward products in which foreign firms already had a 
greater presence; most of the increase is clearly due to greater foreign penetration into 
individual product niches. Furthermore, a large part of the growth in foreign market 
share was associated with ASICs [Applied Specific Integrated Circuits] and memory 
chips, where foreign firms enjoyed no huge technical advantage relative to Japanese 
firms (Flamm 1996: 293).
Whatever the precise breakdown in contributing factors, the demonstration effect from 
the semiconductor agreement only reinforced the policy authority of the hardliners 
within the US trade policy community. The element of ambivalence and, in certain areas, 
active opposition to the agreement within the US government largely dissipated once an 
identifiable market access improvement materialised. In key sections of the US trade 
policy process, the semiconductor agreement acquired a special status. According to 
Joseph Massey, an Assistant USTR for Japan and China during the Reagan and Bush 
Administrations, at least the line officials in the chief trade policy agency were ‘very 
pleased and proud about the success of the semiconductor negotiations; of the 
demonstrated cause-effect relationship of using leverage of access to the US market to
T I o
generate action by the Japanese government'. Michael Armacost, a career State 
Department official and the Bush Administration’s Ambassador to Japan, also highlights 
the demonstration effect while alluding to the wider debate on policy options that the 
semiconductor agreement touched off.
If you look at the chart on improving market share, it tended to go up as the deadlines 
approached so the agreement had some effect. So I was somewhere between the negative 
to agnostic at the outset when I wasn’t involved, but my experience out in Tokyo led me 
to be quite a supporter of the agreement. I don’t think our market share would have 
increased nearly to the extent it did without it; certainly not in that time frame. I thought
ls Joseph P. Massey, telephone interview with author, 18 September 1996.
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the semiconductor agreement proved its worth. Where I fell off was in regarding this as 
some principle that could be replicated in every other sector.31}
The Reagan-Bush Legacy
By the presidential election year of 1992, US market access policy towards Japan was 
results-oriented to the extent that in a number of areas steady increases in US sales was 
something more than an implicit benchmark for successful market access negotiations 
with Japan. Explicit demands for enforceable quantitative targets (ala the semiconductor 
agreement) remained exceptional and anathema to the free trade wing of the Bush 
Administration. But the pattern of grey area negotiations suggested demonstrably fewer 
reservations among trade officials about VIE-type arrangements or very specific results- 
oriented demands in politically-sensitive sectors at politically-sensitive times. In the 
often ambiguous world of negotiating strategy and tactics, results-oriented policy could 
turn less on the formal wording of market access agreements than on the configuration of 
monitoring, measurement, follow-up threats and occasional retaliatory actions — all 
stronger facets of American aggressive bilateralism after 1985. Leaving aside the 
automotive case that centred largely on purchases by Japanese companies located in the 
United States, other agreements negotiated in the context of President Bush’s January 
1992 visit to Japan capture the degree to which US market access policy had moved 
beyond process-oriented negotiations.
The January 1992 agreement on Japanese government procurement of computer 
hardware and services refected the cumulative experience of over a decade of US-Japan 
procurement negotiations dating back to the Tokyo Round and the 1980 NTT agreement. 
The general charge was familiar with American companies claiming that Japanese 
bidding processes and procurement specifications discriminated against foreign firms. 
Informing the US case were data putting the foreign share of the Japanese public sector 
market for mainframe computers at six per cent in 1990 while the equivalent share in the 
private sector was around 40 per cent." Championing principles of ‘non-discrimination, 
transparency, and fair and open competition’, the procurement agreement nonetheless 
highlighted the range and specificity of American demands where the Japanese public
,iy Michael Armacost, interview with author, 5 July 1996, Washington DC. 
'-ll Inside US Trade -  Special Report, 10 January 1992.
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sector assumed the role of purchasing agent. '21 The Japanese government agreed to 
improve access to pre-bid information, reduce the practice of single (sole-source) 
tendering, include foreign participation in study groups on product specifications, rely 
less on price and more on ‘overall best value' (performance and price) in evaluating bids, 
establish a bid protest mechanism, facilitate stronger enforcement of Japan's Anti- 
Monopoly law, promote multi-vendor distribution of computer products and conduct 
periodic bilateral consultations to assess progress. No numerical benchmarks were 
established, but the agreement identified 'relevant information’ (including purchasing 
data broken down by foreign and domestic categories) to be used to assess market access 
trends.322 Bush trade official Merit Janow (1994: 62) has drawn attention to the fact that 
‘unlike other procurement agreements, the computer accord stated explicitly that its 
objective was to expand Japan’s procurements of competitive foreign computer products 
and services, and it included various quantitative criteria to be used to assess 
implementation of the agreement’.
The bilateral market access agreements on flat-glass and paper products in early 1992 
linked the type of structural issues US trade officials were pursuing on a broader front 
(close relationships between Japanese manufacturers and distributors) with more specific 
sectoral demands/'2' Japanese glass distributors, it was claimed, would not carry foreign 
glass for fear of upsetting relationships with the three dominant Japanese glass producers 
— Asahi Glass, Nippon Sheet Glass Company, and Central Glass Company. As part of 
the January 1992 glass agreement, the Japan Fair Trade Commission (JFTC) agreed to 
launch a study of competition in the Japanese glass market and to encourage Japanese 
glass manufacturers to adopted stronger anti-trust compliance procedures. MITI began a 
campaign to encourage large glass users to increase imports, while the Ministry of 
Construction agreed to facilitate efforts by foreign firms to meet Japan's building 
standards for glass materials.324 The paper products negotiations had a stronger results- 
oriented dimension with Japan committing to ‘substantially increase market access for
'2I ‘Measures related to Japanese public sector procurement of computer products and services’, Office of 
the US Trade Representative, 22 January 1992.
,22 The definition of “foreign” was based on capital affiliation rather than production location, an extension 
of US policy approaches in semiconductor and automotive talks. Thus hardware and software produced by 
foreign subsidiaries of Japanese companies and shipped to Japan were excluded from the measure of 
foreign market access.
‘Glass, paper: new sources of friction’, Daily Yomuri, 17 December 1991, p. 9.
,24 Inside US Trade, 10(3), 17 January 1992, p. 1.
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foreign firms exporting paper products to Japan’. At the time of the Bush visit, MITI 
orchestrated pledges from more than 100 paper distribution and processing companies to 
increase purchases of foreign paper products, again in conjunction with a JFTC study of 
competitive conditions in the Japanese paper market.32:1 Signed in April 1992, the paper 
accord cited Japanese government measures to encourage long-term relationships 
between Japanese users and foreign producers, non-discriminatory purchasing practices, 
and a range of process-oriented changes. The agreement also identified seven qualitative 
and quantitative factors as indicators of the agreement’s performance, including change 
in the level of import penetration (Janow 1994: 65).
Conclusion
The semiconductor agreement was not the only bilateral agreement with a strong results- 
oriented character in the wake of the trade regime crisis. Emerging from the MOSS 
process, a number of negotiations blurred the line between process and results-oriented 
policy with VIEs, company-specific sectoral deals, and increasingly detailed agreements 
which, in some cases, included quantitative criteria. The selective results-oriented policy 
of the second Reagan and Bush Administrations can be discerned in agreements struck 
on auto parts, telecommunications, supercomputer and computer procurement, glass and 
paper products. Notwithstanding its strong free trade disposition, the Bush 
Administration’s decision to recognise explicitly the semiconductor agreement’s 20 per 
cent target in a new agreement in 1991 highlighted the steady shift towards support for a 
results-oriented approach in the American trade policy community. The next chapter 
describes the larger backdrop to this shift based on the progressive ascendancy of the 
hardliners over the free traders.
‘,25 JE! Report 3B, 24 January 1992, p. 7.
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7 The Hardliners Advance
Introduction
The crafting by Congress of a vehicle for a results-oriented Japan policy in the form of the 
Super 301 provision of the 1988 Trade Act established a clear congressional intent that the 
Bush Administration declare Japan a bad trading actor. The progressive shift of 
internationally-oriented American firms into the hardline coalition in the second half of the 
1980s also placed a results-oriented Japan policy firmly on the official trade policy agenda. 
In particular, the February 1989 report on the Japan problem by the US Trade 
Representative’s Advisory Committee on Trade Policy and Negotiations (ACTPN) signalled 
the hardline ascendancy across a heavyweight business coalition. Chapter 4 examined the 
rather loose hardline coalition of actors in the American trade policy community taking shape 
in the late 1970s and early 1980s associated with the idea that Japan was a fundamentally 
different type of capitalist economic actor. This chapter traces the main strands of the 
ascendancy of the hardliners over the free traders in the wake of the mid 1980s trade regime 
crisis.
One dimension of the way in which the regime crisis left the power of the hardliners 
enhanced can be seen in the imprint of an inter-temporal cognitive process: a process of 
learning in the American trade policy community that Japan plays by different rules 
economically. The coupling of learning about the Japan problem with politically “fertile 
soil” of US-Japan disputation helps in understanding the content and timing of change in 
US market access policy towards Japan. The rise of the so-called revisionists as a 
knowledge-based network directly challenged the orthodox, free trade view of the Japan 
problem. Revisionism crystallised the otherwise loose collection of hardline experiences 
and beliefs into a tighter paradigm from which to argue the case for a results-oriented 
Japan policy. The fertile soil revisionist ideas found in the second half of the 1980s 
paved the way for the hardliners to frame the case against Japan in a way that put the free 
traders increasingly on the defensive. An important element of this fertile soil was a 
notable deterioration in American elite attitudes towards Japan through this period.
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Congress, Japan and Super 301
A Congress intent on reasserting its constitutional role in US trade policy remained a 
major driving force of hardline trade advocacy after 1985. The Reagan Administration’s 
new trade strategy of aggressive bilateralism announced in September 1985 could not 
derail overwhelming bipartisan momentum in Congress towards an omnibus trade bill. 
This would culminate in the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, the first 
major trade law since 1930 to be drafted by Congress rather than the executive. Two 
major themes ran through this legislation: (1) US commercial interests, perceived by 
Congress as subordinated to national security concerns, needed to be more forcefully 
pursued; and (2) Congress needed to be afforded equal partnership in US trade policy as 
befitting its constitutional authority. More specifically, Congress sought to increase the 
tools for the executive to target foreign trade barriers and to limit the president’s 
discretion to waive aggressive enforcement actions. Amendments to Section 301 and a 
series of new action-forcing statutory triggers as part of the Section-301 family were the 
principal instruments of congressional demands. Of these, the Super 301 provision was 
aimed principally at securing measurable trade results from Japan (Schwab 1994, 
Bhagwati 1990, Kuroda 1990). The crafting of Super 301 simultaneously highlights a 
number of features of American trade policy in the wake of the trade regime crisis: a new 
balance of institutional initiative and control between a resurgent Congress and a 
defensive executive branch, the salience of the Japan problem for a bipartisan, hardline 
congressional leadership, and the pressures on a free trade-oriented executive to secure 
tangible results from Japan in market access negotiations.3 6
Congressional parameters for the 1988 Trade Act were set by those who wanted To be 
tough on trade and those who claimed to be tougher’ (Schwab 1994: 111). In effect, two 
wings of the hardline coalition set the direction for a post-1985 trade bill: “protectionist 
hardliners” and “reciprocity hardliners”. This distinction can be thought of in terms of 
relative interest in seeing potentially trade-restrictive laws (including retaliatory actions) 
implemented. Protectionist hardliners appear motivated by an underlying preference for 
protection so that, for example, trade retaliation would be considered a successful policy
As the multiple references imply, this section draws heavily on Susan Schwab’s comprehensive, insider’s 
account of the making of the 1988 Trade Act. Schwab was Senator John Danforth’s legislative director during 
this process.
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outcome. Although reciprocity hardliners might outwardly appear equally hardline, they 
would tend to score retaliation leading to increased US protection as a policy failure. 
Their basic interest lay in putting increased pressure on the executive to use the leverage 
of the US domestic market more aggressively to level the playing field for American 
business.
The Japan problem was front and centre for both groups of hardliners in the framing of 
the 1988 Trade Act. Protectionist hardliners made the initial running in 1986 with the 
Gephardt amendment which, as the previous chapter noted, was part of a sweepingly 
protectionist trade bill (H.R. 4800) passed by the House of Representatives in May 1986. 
The Gephardt amendment, entitled “Mandatory Negotiations and Action Regarding 
Foreign Countries Having Unwarranted Trade Surpluses with the United States”, 
provided for the imposition of quotas against large bilateral trade surplus countries — at 
the time, Japan, West Germany and Taiwan — in the absence of a multiyear rollback of 
bilateral surpluses by 10 per cent per year. '2 The remarks in opposition to the Gephardt 
amendment by Daniel Rostenkowski, Chairman of the House Ways and Means 
Committee, encapsulated the basic difference between the two wings of the hardline 
coalition, but also their common focus on the Japan problem. Rostenkowski cautioned 
that foreign countries might be tempted to apply a similar measure to US exports and that 
inclusion of the Gephardt amendment would guarantee a veto by President Reagan that 
Congress would be unable to override. Such a result would ‘merely serve to strengthen 
Japan's view that Congress is interested in sending unenforceable messages rather than 
actually enacting a tough trade bill’. Summing up, the Ways and Means chairman 
argued, ‘The Gephardt amendment is too draconian to be effective’. Instead, he favoured 
an alternative which ‘changes the current practice of inaction, but ... with a surgical 
knife, rather than a meat axe. ... I would rather see us pass a bill that is so tough the 
Japanese can't ignore it, but so fair the President has no choice but to sign it' (Schwab 
1994: 111-112).
A combination of executive branch opposition and Senate preoccupation with tax reform
,:7 Congressman Gephardt received support for his amendment from leading House Democrats including 
Speaker Jim Wright (D, TX) and Democratic Whip Tony Coelho (D, CA) and a business coalition led by 
Chrysler’s Lee Iacocca and including steel, textile, and auto parts producers as well as some major 
multinationals including Motorola and Ford Motor Company (Schwab 1994: 109).
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legislation blocked major trade legislation in 1986, but two developments late in the year 
redrew the legislative boundaries. First, the Democratic Party won control of the Senate 
at the November 1986 election adding an even more partisan political dynamic to the 
trade issue. Second, the Reagan Administration decided to become a player in the 
congressional trade deliberations by indicating a desire for new trade negotiating 
authority to undertake the recently launched Uruguay Round of multilateral negotiations. 
In the new Congress, the House again passed a reintroduced trade bill (HR. 3) in April 
1987, but the narrow margin of approval for the Gephardt amendment (218-214) 
signalled a peak in the momentum of the protectionist hardliners (Destler 1995: 93). 
Attention shifted to the Senate's trade bill (S. 490) introduced in February 1987 by new 
Finance Committee Chairman Senator Lloyd Bentsen and the committee’s ranking 
Republican member Senator John Danforth. Senator Bensten’s decision to promote a 
politically viable, bipartisan bill without the protectionist connotation of the Gephardt 
provision laid the basis for a broader and more durable hardline approach to the Japan 
problem. The alternative to the Gephardt amendment in the Senate Finance Committee 
bill was entitled “Negotiations in Response to Adversarial Trade” and was aimed with 
little subtlety at Japan. It instructed the president to negotiate the elimination of barriers 
with countries found to be ‘maintaining a consistent pattern of barriers and market 
distorting practices, as in the case of Japan'. It further required the president to report on 
action taken in response to the barriers or on ‘evidence that the level of United States 
exports ... [w'as now] commensurate with the level ... reasonably expected to result from 
the elimination of [such practices]’ (Schwab 1994: 123).
In hearings on the Senate Finance bill, Senator Danforth articulated the perceptions and 
frustrations of the broad hardline coalition in Congress when it came to Japan:
Nothing really works. Take Japan, as obviously everybody’s leading example of the 
trade problem. ... We negotiate, we harangue, we cry, we sob, we plead, and nothing 
happens.
... you negotiate down one barrier and, as soon as you have gotten that out of the way, 
you find five more have cropped up to take its place.
... why do I believe in retaliation, mandatory retaliation, almost automatic retaliation? 
Why? Because I think that a Japan has to feel that it is their choice. ... Let them decide. 
... But that decision has to carry with it a down side; that decision has to trigger, 
automatically, something bad that happens to them. ...
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Now, (he reason I think we should rewrite the trade laws is not out o f  joy o f retaliation.
... But what I do believe is that there must be penalties which are surely imposed on 
those who don’t want to do business with the United States. And if we don’t have such 
penalties, then I fear that nothing happens (Schwab 1994: 127-128).
The key players in drawing up Super 301 (based on the Adversarial Trade provision) 
looked to craft a law that would attract overwhelming bipartisan support and that 
presented legislators with ‘a real alternative to the political pariah the Gephardt 
amendment had become’ (Schwab 1994: 151). The original Senate version was drafted 
by the offices of Senators Danforth, Riegle (D, MI), Dole (R, KN) and Byrd (D, WV) 
with a supporting cast made up of protectionist hardliners (Chrysler, the UAW and the 
AFL-CIO) and what could be termed “pragmatic free traders” (the office of Senator 
Packwood and Reagan Administration trade off cials). According to one closely involved 
in the process, Super 301 was designed ‘to be action-forcing, focus on barriers rather 
than balances, and contain a means of measuring results; and it was to be sufficiently 
flexible for the president to avoid having to take draconian action’ (Schwab 1994: 152). 
With the reciprocity hardliners as the lead advocates, it passed the full Senate by an 
overwhelming vote of 87-7 in July 1987.328
The August 1987 commencement of the conference committee phase designed to 
reconcile the House bill (HR. 3) and the Senate bill (S. 1420) illustrated the new political 
salience of trade as well as its increased institutional complexity. " Twenty-three 
congressional committees were represented — 14 from the House and nine from the 
Senate — and a 199-member conference committee was appointed to reconcile the two 
bills — 155 representatives and 44 senators (Destler 1995: 94). But in keeping with the 
tradition of powerful Committee chairmen, Representative Rostenkowski and Senator 
Bentsen used their authority to strip the two trade bills of virtually all provisions that 
were directly trade-restrictive. This was critical in signalling congressional intent to 
present to President Reagan a bill that he could sign, or at least that would make 
sustaining a veto difficult. For their part, the free traders in the Reagan Administration 
were presented with the decision of whether to negotiate with Congress to secure a bill 
the executive could “live with” or to pursue a veto strategy with the risks that would 
entail. Debate over how broad to make the executive’s list of objections to Congress saw
,2X Schwab (1994: 149) records that in the debate, 'the amendment expected to cause the most controversy — 
the Senate’s answer to the Gephardt amendment — ultimately caused little more than a ripple’.
',29 The committee stage saw S. 1420 added to H R. 3 as a single amendment.
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the trade pragmatists line up against the more unvarnished wing of the Free Trade-Good 
Relations coalition within the Reagan Administration. According to Schwab (1994: 203):
The most important factor was the split between the various agencies, pitting those 
wanting to work to bring about sufficient change to recommend a presidential signature 
against those who had already concluded that no amount o f  work could make the bill 
salvageable. This divergence of views primarily involved USTR and Commerce on the 
side o f negotiations; OMB, CEA, and the NSC firmly on the other; State generally siding 
with bill opponents; and Treasury either uncommitted or leaning toward the trade 
agencies on issues other than its own. Agriculture and Labor generally favored 
negotiations, but were lesser players in the debate.
The heart of the trade bill centred on the Section 301 provisions, including the Senate's 
Super 301 that eventually secured endorsement in the conference process at the expense 
of the Gephardt amendment in the House bill (Bello and Holmer 1990). The general 
outcome on Section 301 would apply also to the new 301-based provisions applying to 
intellectual property (Special 301), telecommunications (Section 337), and Super 301. 
The major issue for the executive was the Senate demand for a retaliatory mechanism in
O T A
Section 301 that was "mandatory but waivable’. The reciprocity hardliners ‘did not 
want to create a legal right to retaliation, [but] they felt it necessary to put enough 
pressure on the executive to force whatever action was most likely to achieve the desired
O O 1
result, that is elimination of the adverse foreign practice’ (Schwab 1994: 187).
With Senators Bentsen and Danforth taking the lead, Japan remained the focus of 
negotiations over Super 301. The Senate bill targeted those countries that maintained ‘a 
consistent pattern of import barriers and market distorting practices’. Section 301 
investigations would then be initiated against that country’s ‘major barriers ... the 
elimination of which are likely to have the most significant potential to increase US 
exports’. In addition, evidence of results was to be reported annually and contrasted with 
earlier estimates of the increase in US exports that could have occurred had the barriers 
not existed in the first place (Schwab 1994: 152). In negotiations over the provision, the 
pragmatic free traders of the Reagan Administration pressed the Senate conferees ‘to 
drop “the name calling’’ through a shift in focus from “bad actors” to one of “bad
Other changes saw a limited transfer of authority from the president to USTR and an expansion in 
actionable practices.
In the end. conferees agreed to maintain existing discretionary language in Section 301 cases of 
‘unreasonable’ and ‘discriminatory’ practices, and to add a number of exceptions to mandatory action in case 
of ‘unjustifiable’ practices.
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actions’” (Schwab 1994: 194). A compromise hammered out between USTR Clayton 
Yeutter and Senator Danforth’s office saw Super 301 cast in terms of ’trade liberalization 
priorities’, including both ‘priority practices’ and ‘priority foreign countries’ (Schwab 
1994: 196). But there were few illusions as to the priority country congressional actors 
had in mind.
By April 1988, the pragmatists in the Reagan Administration led by Treasury Secretary 
James Baker and USTR Clayton Yeutter had determined that if the trade bill was 
stripped of the administration’s two main concerns — a provision mandating notification 
of plant closings by companies employing 100 or more workers, and the “Bryant 
amendment” threatening to restrict foreign investment in the United States — there was a 
real possibility a presidential veto could not be sustained. The decision by Baker and 
Yeutter not to pursue a broader veto strategy with a longer list of complaints (including 
Section 301 and Super 301 issues) was informed by the judgement that ‘no matter what 
they did. State, Defense, OMB, CEA, and the NSC would probably still recommend a 
veto’ (Schwab 1994: 204, 205). The inability of congressional trade leaders to secure the 
removal of the plant closing provision from the final legislation left Congress facing a 
presidential veto. On April 21, the House voted 312-107 in favour of the reworked 
omnibus trade bill, more than 20 votes clear of the margin needed to override a veto. The 
Senate also passed the bill on April 27 by 63-36, a margin short of a veto-proof majority. 
President Reagan exercised his veto power but in very narrow terms, urging Congress to 
promptly pass a second trade bill stripped of only two offending provisions. This 
proved forthcoming and on 23 August 1988 President Reagan signed the Omnibus Trade 
and Competitiveness Act of 1998 into law. Whilst opposing it, the Reagan 
Administration decided it could live with Super 301, a new hardline tool designed 
largely as a means of pressuring results from Japan. The choice as to how to implement it 
would fall to President George Bush in 1989.
The two provisions concerned plant closings and a ban on certain oil exports from Alaska. The State 
Department and the CEA fought an unsuccessful campaign against Treasury Secretary Baker, USTR Yeutter 
and White House political advisers for a “long list” version of the President’s veto grievances (Schwab 1994: 
215).
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American Business and the Japan Problem
Congressional activism on the Japan problem not surprisingly drew support from a cross- 
section of American corporate and labour interests seeking relief from trade-related 
structural change and other competitive pressures magnified by the appreciating US 
dollar through the first Reagan Administration. The private sector free trade coalition of 
internationally-oriented firms and agricultural interests that had supported past liberal 
trade initiatives fragmented in the trade regime crisis of the mid 1980s. Increased US 
trade exposure and the record trade deficits of the early 1980s saw a range of US 
manufacturing industries granted import relief. Major business lobby groups such as the 
Business Roundtable, the US Chamber of Commerce and the National Association of 
Manufacturers (NAM) were subject to more intense cross-pressures within their 
memberships (Destler 1995: 195). By 1985, the scale of Japan’s competitive challenge to 
American industry was dramatised less by high-profile “Japan-bashing” than by the 
defection of long-time free traders in support of Japan-specific import relief. For 
knowledgeable observers, the weakening of the business base of the free trade coalition 
was underlined when Hewlett-Packard chairman David Packard lent support to demands
T ' l ' l
lor temporary quotas against Japan in early 1985. ~ Declining support for multilateral 
trade policy approaches and a frustration with GATT was evident in May 1985 when 
USTR received a distinctly lukewarm response from American corporate interests to its 
efforts to kick-start a new multilateral round. The trade agency’s private sector advisory 
committees argued that a new round ‘might divert attention from other pressing domestic 
and international economic problems, such as the creation of a tough US trade policy, the 
value of the dollar, budget deficits, and other financial and monetary issues’.
A central theme in the weakening of support for new trade initiatives was ‘the growing 
perception, across pretty much the entire community of US traded-goods producers, that 
the United States has been asymmetrically the victim of unfair foreign trade practices’ 
(Destler and Odell 1987: 120). Exploring the erosion in ‘generic anti-protection activity’, 
Destler and Odell (1987: 121) cited one ‘balanced and sophisticated [free trade] coalition 
member’ as complaining that ‘the Japan thing is serious in undermining the anti-
Destler (1995: 192), William Frenzel, interview with author, 17 July 1996, Washington DC. Packard was 
also co-chair of the bi-national US-Japan Advisory Commission.
3,4Inside US Trade, 3(22), 31 May 1985, p. 1 1.
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protection coalition. The Japanese are particularly protectionist’ (Destler and Odell 1987: 
121). The distinction drawn between protectionist hardliners and reciprocity hardliners 
seems commensurate with new patterns of corporate trade policy preferences under the 
umbrella of complaints about unfair trade. Analysts have drawn attention to the 
emergence in the 1980s of a more complex set of American corporate trade preferences 
away from the standard poles of free trade and protection (Milner and Yoffie 1989). 
Milner and Yoffie (1989: 239-240) found that increasing numbers of American 
multinational firms ‘that historically supported unilaterally opening their home market 
have publicly advocated a third type of policy — a “strategic” trade policy of demanding 
trade barriers for the home market if foreign markets are protected’. They cite industries 
such as semiconductors and telecommunications equipment (both facing their stiftest 
competition from Japan) as moving from preferences for ‘unconditional’ free trade to 
demanding ‘strategic action’ rather than ‘unconditional’ protectionism. As in Congress, 
the general trend was towards a strengthening broad coalition of protectionist and 
reciprocity hardliners at the expense of the postwar free trade coalition.
With their diverse memberships, large industry groups such as the US Chamber of 
Commerce, the Business Roundtable and the NAM tended to distance themselves from 
protectionist hardliners on Japan (the likes of Chrysler's Lee lacoeea). And while, for 
example, the NAM strongly supported the Section 301 case against Japan brought by the 
SI A in 1985-86, at the time it continued to push a moderate trade agenda which stopped 
short of singling out Japan for special attention.” '’ In Congress, the major business 
groups campaigned actively against the Gephardt amendment, but as the more moderate 
trade push gathered momentum they progressively developed a brokering role between 
the reciprocity hardliners in the congressional leadership and the free traders in the 
Reagan Administration. According to Schwab (1994: 168):
the positions taken by these groups usually placed them somewhere between the 
adamantly free-trade stance of the administration and the tougher, more activist approach 
o f  the congressional trade leaders. ... In essence, there had been an inversion in 
traditional roles in the development of trade legislation: Instead of the executive branch 
drafting a bill and rallying the private sector to lobby it on the Mill, in this case Congress 
drafted the bill and turned to the business community to help with the administration.
‘Free-trade coalition fades’ by Hobart Rowan, Washington Post, 20 September 1987, p. HOI. See Destler 
and Odell (1987) on some of the new anti-protection groups (e.g. retailers) whose activities sought to balance 
against protection in the United States.
International Trade Reporter, 3(10), 5 March 1986, p. 3 1 1. International Trade Reporter, 3(47), 26 
November 1986, p. 1417.
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On Japan trade issues, individual corporate hardliners such as the semiconductor 
producers, Motorola's chief executive Robert Galvin and Cray Research's John 
Rollwagen were key actors. Their capacity to enlist support for results-oriented actions, 
including credible threats of retaliation, was apparent across the trade policy community, 
not least in USTR and the Commerce Department. Their influence was partly a reflection 
of the fragmentation of trade policy authority as well as the wider ‘advocacy explosion’ 
in Washington DC which tended to undermine the influence of large, broadly-based 
lobby groups. In this more crowded policy environment, the more that ‘member 
companies have their own expertise and activist presence in Washington, the more their 
CEOs are likely to take their cues from their on-the-ground staffs rather than those of the 
umbrella organizations’ (Destler and Odell 1987: 122).
An important landmark in terms of business advocacy for a results-oriented Japan policy 
came with the release in February 1989 of an “Analysis of the US-Japan Trade Problem”
^37by USTR's Advisory Committee on Trade Policy and Negotiations. With a statutory 
mandate to advise the president on US trade policy, ACTPN drew its heavy-weight 
representation from across the spectrum of American industrial, agricultural and service
■j o o
sectors. The Japan report was the result of a special ACTPN taskforce formed in 
November 1987 ‘to analyze the factors driving the US-Japan trade imbalance and to 
forge a consensus on a comprehensive approach to trade relations with Japan’.339 
Released to coincide with the newly-elected Bush Administration’s deliberations over 
Super 301, the ACTPN report recommended that given ‘the different structures of the 
two economies, trade policy solutions lie somewhere between free trade and managed 
trade’ (ACTPN 1989: vii). It highlighted ‘a growing frustration with what is perceived as 
an approach to managing the bilateral relationship that is too piecemeal, too 
confrontational, and too process-oriented' (ACTPN 1989: viii). It called instead for a 
‘results-oriented trade strategy’ geared towards ‘concrete evidence that US-Japan
“ 7 The Advisory Committee for Trade Negotiations was originally established in the Trade Act of 1974 to 
advise the president on all aspects of the Tokyo Round of multilateral trade negotiations. The 1988 Trade Act 
expanded the mandate of the group to provide advice to the president on all aspects of US trade policy, hence 
the renamed ACTPN.
" s Major multinationals represented within ACPTN at the time included IBM Corporation, General Motors 
Corporation, General Electric Company, American Express Company, Johnson & Johnson, Philip Morris Inc., 
and the Boeing Company.
Advisory Committee on Trade Policy and Negotiations, Letter to the Honorable Carla Hills, 10 February 
1989.
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negotiations are succeeding’ and that ‘works within Japan’s unique economic structure’ 
(ACTPN 1989: xv-xvi).
While stressing the role of macroeconomic policy in explaining the bilateral imbalance, 
the report maintained that the US-Japan trade deficit was also the result of ‘Japanese 
microeconomic policies which reduce the role of imports substantially below what would 
normally be expected of an industrial economy with Japan’s economic attributes’ 
(ACTPN 1989: x). Emphasis was given to ‘Japan’s invisible or informal barriers, buying 
preferences arising from Japan’s industrial group structure (keiretsu), and attitudes and 
predispositions against imports’ (ACTPN 1989: xiv). Such barriers, the report argued, 
did not ‘lend themselves to discipline through a rules-based system’ (ACTPN 1989: 
xxii). Hence the US government was called on to: (1) establish sectoral priorities; (2) 
define ‘successful outcomes’; and (3) negotiate ‘successful outcomes’ using US trade 
laws (in particular the Super 301 provision) as a lever.
For hardliners across the American trade policy community, the ACTPN report was seen 
as offering unprecedented legitimacy to their claims about the Japan problem and to 
demands for policies that focused on results rather than processes or rules. Its support 
from an activist Congress was a given. But equally, hardliners in the executive branch 
embraced the report with the Commerce Department’s Maureen Smith proclaiming it as 
‘a landmark. Those are mainstream, Establishment business people’.341 Echoing the view 
that a new threshold in hardline advocacy had been crossed, one former US trade official 
has suggested that ‘the ACTPN report of early 1989 was I think the first indication that 
this [a results-oriented Japan policy] was something to be considered seriously on a 
government level’.342
Revisionism: Hardliners learn to paradigm
The capacity of hardliners in politics and business to credibly place a results-oriented 
Japan policy on the official policy-making agenda by the end of the 1980s cannot be
■’4() The report recommended that the United States offer to delay Super 301 procedures against Japan for one 
year while an effort be made to negotiate new agreements (ACTPN 1989: xvii).
11 ‘Rethinking Japan’, Business Week, 7 August 1989, p. 20.
4~ Not-for-attribution interview.
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understood simply in terms of their institutional position or material interests. It was 
bound up with a process of learning about the Japan problem within the American trade 
policy community. In this connection, cognitive factors (shared beliefs/ideas) do not 
determine outcomes independently, but they play an important role in framing policy 
debate — what does and does not count as an object of contestation — and in delimiting 
boundaries for policy innovation. The rise to prominence of a more codified set of ideas 
about the Japan problem that attracted the label revisionism was part of this learning 
process, especially relevant within the hardline advocacy coalition. The core revisionist 
proposition that Japan plays by different rules economically became the dominant 
cognitive prism through which the American trade policy community debated the Japan 
problem by the second half of the 1980s. For hardliners in the American policy 
community, revisionism helped crystallise, strengthen and legitimate core beliefs and 
arguments for a results-oriented Japan policy, in the process directly challenging the 
credibility of traditionalist views of the Japan problem within the free trade coalition. At 
the same time, revisionism’s persuasive capacities can be detected across the policy 
community, especially in areas less directly involved in advocacy roles — researchers, 
analysts, journalists etc. — where it posed as a source of new information and 
enlightenment about the way Japan works. Finally, the political power of revisionism can 
be seen in its fit with beliefs among “latent” hardliners in the wider American 
community (outside the trade policy elite) anxious about Japan's growing economic 
power and American decline.
A 1989 cover story in Business Week magazine attached the label revisionism to a set of 
ideas directly challenging the traditionalist, free traders’ view that Japan’s political- 
economic system was fundamentally similar to, or at least converging with, other 
Western capitalist democracies.343 The main revisionist arguments were distilled and 
generalised from the writings of a small group individuals tagged subsequently as the 
Gang of Four — political science professor Chalmers Johnson, former Reagan 
Administration trade official Clyde Prestowitz, and journalists James Fallows and Karel 
van Wolferen. The revisionist paradigm centred on four interrelated propositions: (1) that 
Japanese capitalism represented a fundamentally different political-economic model
,4’ ‘Rethinking Japan’, Business Week. 7 August 1989. The article drew attention to ‘a radical shift in US 
thinking’ around the view that ‘Japan really is different — and that conventional free-trade policies won’t 
work’.
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when compared with Anglo-American, consumer-oriented capitalism; (2) that the 
model's success at some level posed a threat to American wealth and power; (3) that 
strong continuity characterised the Japanese system contrary to claims of convergence 
with Anglo-American capitalism; and (4) that a drastic change in US policies towards 
Japan was required, including some form of managed trade or results-oriented market 
access trade policy. Revisionism’s claims to displace a traditionalist interpretation of 
Japan were made very directly on the grounds of superior knowledge about Japan. 
Hence, the acknowledged dean of the revisionists asserted that it constituted ‘merely the 
intellectual recognition that Japan’s alleged fundamental similarity to the Western 
capitalist democracies was always based on ignorance of Japan itself (Johnson 1990; 
107). Notwithstanding differences in emphasis among the revisionists, the core ideas are 
embedded in the following statement by Johnson.
The Japanese economy is the product of a different history of industrialization from that 
of the United States, of a different role for the state in economic affairs, of a different 
role for the economy in the overaii scheme of things and of a different kind of 
economics; American economic policy toward Japan should be premised on these 
differences. ... In order to maintain our economic independence, we have no alternative 
than to manage our trade with Japan — as the Japanese have always managed their trade 
with us to their advantage — and to implement an industrial policy to ensure that US 
manufactured goods are attractive to American consumers.344
Similarly, Prestowitz (1993: 75, 81,95) maintained that revisionists:
see the Japanese economy as being based on principles and having objectives, structures, 
and operating practices that deviate very substantially from the neoclassical Western 
model. In this view, the [economic] frictions arise not from the poor performance of the 
Americans or the cheating of the Japanese, but from a clash of two very different 
systems that is unlikely to be ameliorated by the application of general rules on which 
the two countries do not agree. ... negotiations always lead to agreements, but the 
agreements never produce the anticipated results. ... [This calls for] negotiating specific 
measures to overcome or offset the impact of structural or policy differences.
Revisionism offered a form of paradigmatic wrapping for the core hardline proposition 
that Japan was different. This encompassed codification and legitimation of core beliefs, 
the refinement of causal relationships and interpretive strategies internal to a belief 
system, and the logical extension to policy proposals for attaining core values/interests. 
As a binding element, revisionism connected in its cognitive web salient events, shared
‘The “revisionist” stance on trade with Japan’ by Chalmers Johnson, Letter to the editor, Washington Post, 
I 1 August 1992, p. A16.
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• it 145experiences and perceived anomalies into a set of ideas akin to a “paradigm”. In the 
words of one US trade official, revisionism was ‘the textbook written of this learning 
experience. ... In terms of the view of Japan and an understanding of Japan it was 
definitely influential’.346
It is impossible to trace a singular path for the emergence and dissemination of 
revisionist ideas. Focusing simply on the rise to prominence of the Gang of Four offers a 
distorted picture of the intellectual pedigree of revisionism and the wider reservoir of 
hardline-friendly analysis of the Japan problem. Indeed, as others have noted, an 
emphasis on Japan as different is not especially revisionist in light of the intellectual 
tradition surrounding study of Japanese uniqueness (Nihonjinron) in Japan itself 
(Samuels 1992). Nor could such an emphasis be considered especially new in relation to 
the history of US-Japan relations (Benedict 1972, Johnson 1988). Moreover, discussion 
of peculiar features of Japanese capitalism was hardly alien to orthodox economists in 
the United States prior to the 1980s (Patrick and Rosovsky (eds.) 1976). In terms of what 
Kingdon (1984: 134) calls the ‘softening up’ process for ideas, Japanese industrial policy 
had already been subject to intense criticism in the US policy process in the early 1980s 
that made the path for revisionism in the late 1980s all the smoother. The trade crisis of 
the mid 1980s was a catalyst creating demand for new views on the Japan problem. Still, 
with its distinctive paradigmatic packaging, revisionism left an imprint on how the 
American trade policy community debated the Japan problem, including policy 
options.’47 The words of one former USTR official through the Reagan and Bush 
Administrations are suggestive of this distinctive element within the hardline coalition:
By the time I joined USTR in 1985, those people who were dealing with Japan on trade 
negotiations —  at least in Commerce, USTR, and probably Agriculture as well —  by 
that time knew that dealing with Japan was different from dealing with other advanced, 
industrial trading partners.
But 1 think until Clyde Prestowitz wrote Trading Places and Karel van Wolferen came 
out with his book and Jim Fallows wrote those articles and Chalmers Johnson’s Mi l l
'45 In the learning literature, Hall (1993) relies most explicitly on the Kuhnian idea of paradigm shifts in 
exploring the shift from Keynesianism to monetarism in economic policy making in Britain.
,46 Maureen Smith, interview, 1996.
,47 Kingdon (1984: 131) makes a strong case for thinking in terms of an evolutionary process where "origins 
become less important than the processes of mutation and recombination that occur as ideas continuously 
confront one another and are refined until they are ready to enter a serious decision stage. ... evolution 
proceeds not so much by mutation, or the sudden appearance of a wholly new structure, as by recombination, 
or the new packaging of already familiar elements’.
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book was taken more seriously, I think there was really not much codification or 
crystallising of those experiences. '48
The revisionist challenge to traditionalist conceptions of the Japan problem associated 
with the Free Trade-Good Relations coalition can be dissected across three dimensions 
characteristic of beliefs about a policy problem: (1) the stakes involved; (2) causal 
relationships; and (3) policy implications. The starting point for revisionism was the size 
of the political-economic stakes for the United States seen as arising from differences 
between American and Japanese political-economic systems. In general, traditionalists 
saw the Japan problem in much narrower and secondary terms (for example, as 
economic problems which should not be allowed to undermine more important security 
objectives, or as reflecting largely domestic problems such as the US budget deficit or 
protectionist pressures). By contrast, revisionists saw a primary threat to American 
interests in ‘the persistently unbalanced economic and industrial relationship between 
Japan and the rest of the world, including the continued displacement of industrial 
sectors and the shift of technological capability toward Japan. ... If today’s trade and 
industrial patterns continue, we contend, their natural result will be a substantial decrease 
in the Western, and especially American capacity for independent economic and political 
action’.349
The revisionists viewed the success of Japan’s economic system as a wholesale 
challenge to traditionalist conceptions of American foreign policy priorities based on 
containment of communism as an overriding Cold War national security objective. The 
prospeet of Japanese economic dominance and declining American wealth, power and 
independence was such as to warrant an American strategy of ‘Containing Japan’ 
(Fallows 1989a).3 0 Johnson (1990: 135) warned that the United States ‘must either begin 
to compete with Japan or go the way of the USSR1 (Johnson 1990: 135). Prestowitz 
(1988: 22) similarly intoned that, ‘Today the real challenge to American power is not the 
sinister one from the Eastern bloc, but the friendly one from the Far East' (Prestowitz 
1988: 22). Indeed, the former US trade official’s seemingly more fatalistic view had the 
battle already lost with the United States and Japan Trading Places, and the latter
' tx Not-for-attribution interview.
,49 ‘Beyond Japan-bashing: The “Gang of Four” defends the revisionist line’ by James Fallows et af,
US News & World Report, 7 May 1990, pp. 54-55.
0(1 Fallows’ (1989a: 42) famous article was premised on the claim that ‘the major external threat to America’s 
ability to pay the costs of leadership is Japan’s uncontrolled, unbalanced economic growth’.
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economically victorious. Only magnifying the stakes was the spectre of other states in 
East Asia emulating the Japanese model and threatening "to turn West Coast high-tech 
areas such as Silicon Valley into electronic rust belts’ (Johnson 1987a: 71). ‘The major 
threat to the free-trade system does not come from American protection. It comes from 
the example set by Japan. Japan and its acolytes, such as Taiwan and Korea, have 
demonstrated that in head-on industrial competition between free-trading societies and 
“capitalist development states”, the free traders will eventually lose’ (Fallows 1989a: 
54).
Going beyond the litany of complaints about Japanese unfairness, the revisionists 
articulated a more holistic view of Japan as a "mercantile power’ with a state-guided 
strategy to dominate the global economy. 01 02*4Again, the Gang of Four was part of a larger 
analytic enterprise focusing on Japan’s trade and industrial strategies that included 
researchers, analysts and industrial policy advocates from such centres as Harvard 
Business School (Bruce Scott and George Lodge) and the Berkeley Roundtable on the 
International Economy (John Zysman, Michael Borrus, Stephen Cohen and Laura 
Tyson). Perhaps the most influential packaging of the Japan problem in the wake of the 
trade crisis came from management expert Peter Drucker. ~ Writing in the Wall Street 
Journal in April 1986, Drucker singled out Japan as an exponent of ‘adversarial trade’ 
(as distinct from ‘competitive trade’) whose significance went beyond such statistics as 
the US-Japan trade imbalance. According to Drucker, Japan’s adversarial trade ‘creates 
serious social dislocation in the importing country and is seen as a hostile act rather than 
as fair competition. ... [it] threatens to drive out and to destroy an already weak industry 
and thus to create major economic damage. But above all, it creates massive 
unemployment and social dislocation’. " Revisionists simply magnified this picture of a 
deindustrialising America infusing it with claims to expertise on the underpinnings of 
Japan's deliberate political strategy of economic domination.354 "International 
domination in as many industrial areas as possible is part of an uncoordinated and never
01 Johnson’s (1990: 108) conception of Japan as a mercantile power was o f ‘a nation that uses state action to 
export the utmost possible quantity of a nation’s own manufactures and to import as little as possible of those 
made in other countries’.
02 ‘Japan and adversarial trade’ by Peter F. Drucker, Wall Street Journal, 1 April, 1986. See also Drucker 
(1986-87).
As noted earlier, the term adversarial trade found its way into the original Senate alternative to the 
Gephardt amendment, the forerunner to the Super 301 provision.
04 For the more sophisticated groundings of revisionist economics, see Johnson, Tyson and Zysman (eds.) 
(1989).
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delineated yet powerful campaign to make the world safe for Japan’ (van Wolferen 1990: 
48).
The spectre of American high-tech de-industrialisation at the hands of Japan (and its 
Asian ‘acolytes’) was at the core of revisionist arguments for going beyond Japan­
bashing over unfairness to focusing on a Japan playing by different rules and winning the 
commanding heights of the international economy (Fallows 1987). Of the episodes that 
the revisionists and other hardline analysts sought to illuminate and dramatise, none was 
more central than the story of America’s loss of DRAM capacity and market share in the 
global semiconductor industry (chapter 5). The case of America ‘losing the chips’ to 
Japan, with the US semiconductor industry threatened with a similar fate to television 
and automobile manufacturers in the United States, remained a signature of revisionist 
analysis of the Japan problem.3:0 The eventual acclaim associated with the outcome of 
America’s results-oriented market share deal on semiconductors only reinforced the 
general policy stance of the revisionists that such outcomes were both desirable and 
obtainable. Again, the revisionists were part of a larger chorus bemoaning the decline of 
American manufacturing and the loss of high-technology leadership and hence 
connecting with the beliefs and interests of hardliners throughout the US trade policy 
community.3Ml It is impossible to separate the revisionist quest to illuminate Japan's 
success from the mirror image painted of American failure with the US government cast 
as unwilling or unable to come to grips with Japan. A theme of all the revisionist writers, 
it proved espeeially potent in the case of Clyde Prestowitz, a former “insider” in the 
Reagan Administration determined to expose the Reagan Administration’s ‘intellectual 
and bureaucratic blunders’ in its dealings with Japan.
Beneath the high-stakes Japan problem lay the eausal relationships of revisionism and 
the means by which Japan was seen as having rewritten the rules of international 
economic relations. Fundamental and enduring differences in institutions, in the role of
Prestowitz (1988: chapter 2) introduces his larger thesis with the ‘losing the chips’ story, as does Fallows 
(1994: chapter I) in his later tract on the economic rise of East Asia.
,56 See, for example, Cohen and Zysman (1987), Dornbusch, Poterba and Summers (1987), Dertouzos, Lester 
and Solow (1989), and Ferguson (1989).
Quoted from Chalmers Johnson’s endorsement of Trading Places. The list of endorsements for 
Prestowitz’s 1988 book reads like a who’s who of a high-level coalition of hardliners: Senators Robert Dole, 
John Danforth, Robert Byrd, Paul Simon (D-IL), businessmen David Packard (Hewlett-Packard), Robert 
Galvin (Motorola) and Lee Iacocca (Chrysler), and union leader Lynn Williams (United Steel Workers 
Union).
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the state in economic affairs, and in economic doctrines provided the causal mechanisms 
by which the revisionists sought to explain outcomes and perceived anomalies. Analysis 
of the new institutions of capitalism developed by Japan was designed to displace the 
traditionalist emphasis on private sector economic activity and orthodox macroeconomic 
policy in understanding Japan’s rapid postwar development and patterns of international 
economic interaction. Johnson’s (1982) historical-political study of Japan as a 
‘capitalist development state’ provided the intellectual anchor for the larger revisionist 
paradigm that took shape in the second half of the 1980s.3 9 Japan’s rise as a global 
economic power was seen as the result principally of a successful industrial policy in 
which MITI pursued developmental state goals by directing resources, structuring 
markets and influencing enterprise decisions. Johnson’s capitalist analytic comparator 
was the United States, a ‘capitalist regulatory state’ that set rules for economic 
competition but tended not to concern itself with what industries ought to exist (Johnson 
1982: 19). Where the ‘Anglo-American’ system was cast as institutionally oriented 
towards consumer welfare, Johnson and the other revisionists maintained that the 
Japanese system actively pursued producer-oriented, economic nationalist goals with the 
purpose of dominating the key (strategic) industries of the international economy. The 
result was a ‘system whose goals and performance may not be accurately described by
O Z. 1
the Western model of democratic capitalism’ . The way the Japanese system worked, 
its external economic posture and its postwar economic success were seen as discrediting 
orthodox, neo-classical economic analysis. Indeed, revisionists went so far as to argue
362that Japan did not respond to economic forces as conceived by orthodox economics.
,5X In terms of American literature, Patrick and Rosovsky (eds.) (1976) remains the standard reference for 
more traditionalist analysis of Japan’s postwar economic development.
09 In his survey of Japanese political studies in the United States, Samuel (1992: 32) lauds Johnson’s work as 
‘probably the most widely read and influential scholarly book by a Japan specialist ever’ which ‘ushered in an 
era of research by American Japan specialists that addressed the political economy ... a beacon that 
illuminated equally theory and Japan’.
’60 Johnson qualifies his categorisation by noting that ‘the role of the US government in economic affairs has 
never been exclusively regulatory any more than the Japanese government’s role has been exclusively 
developmental. But over the past 125 years each role has been sufficiently salient in one country for economic 
ideologies to develop asserting or pretending that the American government regulates its economy while the 
Japanese government develop Japan’s’ (Johnson 1987a: 78). Johnson and others have drawn attention to 
industry-specific policies to support agricultural and defense industries in the United States. See, for example, 
David Vogel (1996).
’6I ‘Beyond Japan-bashing: The “Gang of Four” defends the revisionist line’ by James Fallows et al.,
US News & World Report, 7 May 1990, pp. 54-55.
In terms of intellectual foes, the revisionists directed much of their attack on ‘the influence of a set of 
theological principles — the doctrine of free trade — serviced by an entrenched priesthood — the professional 
economists — that is much more interested in defending articles of faith than in understanding what is going 
on in international economic relations’ (Johnson 1990: 107).
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The revisionist interpretation of Japan’s rapid postwar growth and external trading 
performance, with causal inferences grounded in different institutions and interventionist 
industrial and trade strategies, directly challenged the traditionalist thesis emphasising 
Japan’s similarity/convergence with Western capitalism and adherence to basically 
orthodox economic policies. 'Japan's achievement of the status of the second most 
productive economy that ever existed is no longer simply an enigma; it is a challenge to 
the main political and economic doctrines that currently dominate global thinking about 
human social organization’ (Johnson 1987b: 136). ‘From the vantage of traditional 
economics, Japan has made very serious policy errors ... traditional American economic 
and political conceptions about the dynamics of international trade and domestic 
development are flawed and must be reconsidered in view of Japan’s spectacular 
development success’ (Tyson and Zysman 1989: xiii). Revisionist claims to expert 
knowledge reflected a capacity to weld institutional detail to a plausible story of Japan’s 
different capitalist system which 'far from "beating the West at its own game”, might not 
be playing the Western “game” at all’ (van Wolferen 1989: 406).
In terms of a process of learning internal to the hardline coalition, revisionism can be 
seen in more-or-less instrumental terms: refining, extending and legitimating the cause- 
effect relationships embodied loosely in prior images of an omnipotent, impenetrable 
‘Japan Inc’. That the revisionists assumed a status akin to a knowledge-based network of 
expertise on Japan was in part a reflection of their claims to uncovering the sort of 
‘informal’ or ‘invisible’ bases of power in Japan’s political-economic system which 
traditionalists were seen as having ignored or downplayed. Markedly different causal 
inferences reflected a paradigm in which the sorts of overt, legal bases of power 
characteristic of Anglo-American capitalism were seen as much more circumscribed in 
the case of Japan. In this connection, van Wolferen’s 1986-87 article on ‘The Japan 
Problem' in Foreign Affairs refers to the Japanese System as:
structurally protectionist in the sense that all kinds of informal, if not official, barriers to 
imports must ensure that foreign competition will not undermine its aims. ... A select few 
foreign firms receive assistance to serve as fresh examples of Japanese openness. What 
we should look at, however, are distribution systems in a few controlling hands, 
regulations dictated by Japanese competitors, new product standards, and other barriers 
that a potentially powerful foreign competitor faces in the Japanese market. The 
bureaucrats in Tokyo are extremely inventive when it comes to subtle controls and
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euphemisms for rendering them more palatable to foreigners’ (van Wolferen 1986-87: 
293).
Rather than attacking perceived unfairness, the revisionists stressed that outcomes simply 
reflected fundamentally different understandings of the purposes and workings of a 
national economy; an economy where the imperative is ‘to resist foreign penetration of 
their own market, while relentlessly pursuing markets abroad, as the natural course in 
their scheme of things: natural in respect to their governmental bureaucracy, to their 
industrial policies, and to the way companies operate in Japan’ (Prestowitz 1988: 24). By 
the late 1980s, the more scholarly godfather of revisionism had sharpened his 
historically-based concept of a capitalist developmental state into a more enduring closed 
and collusive system. Where traditionalists saw a scaling back of the role of the state in 
the Japanese economy, Johnson (1987b: 159) stressed that the ‘Japanese economic 
bureaucracy has long found that its most effective powers are tailor-made, verbal, ad hoc 
agreements implemented through “administrative guidance’” . The collective weight of 
administrative guidance, industrial groups (keiret.su relationships), and government 
organisation of R&D created ‘competitive conditions in Japan that consistently 
discriminate against foreigners’. Johnson went so far as to argue that because of 
administrative guidance ‘a foreigner can never master the rules of doing business in 
Japan’ (Johnson 1989: 23).363
The capacity of revisionists to contrast their institution-centred view of how Japan 
worked with the more abstract interpretive framework of orthodox economics informed 
their very direct attack on the intellectual credentials of the free trade-good relations 
coalition. Thus Johnson argued that ‘capitalist economic theory is an utterly abstract and 
even utopian body of thought until it is translated into action through concrete 
institutions. ... Macroeconomic theory uninformed by variations in institutions is a 
fundamental source of error in public policymaking’ (Johnson 1987a: 77). Among the 
exhibits revisionists and other hardliners used as interpretive ammunition against the free 
traders was the perceived failure of movements in the yen-dollar exchange rate to adjust 
trade flows and correct trade imbalances (van Wolferen 1986-87: 297, Fallows 1989a: 
43-44). At an industry level, the SIA had effectively enlisted support for its claims in the
'(l' By way of contrast, Johnson’s 1982 work on MITI offered an account of Japanese trade and capital 
liberalisation up to the 1980s broadly consistent with a traditionalist perspective (Johnson 1982: chapter 8).
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mid 1980s with a chart publicising the failure of US industry market share in Japan to 
rise above about 10 per cent despite upward swings in the yen and formal Japanese trade 
liberalisation (SIA 1985: 12, Prestowitz 1988: 63). The continued growth of the US- 
Japan trade imbalance in dollar terms from 1985 through 1988, despite the large fall in 
the US dollar, was one of the perceived anomalies boosting the credibility of the 
institution-centred revisionists, not only within the hardline coalition but also across the 
wider American trade policy community.
This wider influence can be detected in centres of policy expertise not readily aligned 
with the major advocacy coalitions. Raymond Ahearn, a long-time analyst of US-Japan 
trade relations in the highly-regarded Congressional Research Service, provides one 
perspective on revisionism’s emergence as an influential dissent from economic 
orthodoxy:
1 started in 1978 at the time of the Strauss-Ushiba agreement not having a clue as to 
major trade barriers in Japan. But then all the revisionist critique started to come in and it 
was like a revelation to those of us who knew nothing that this is how Japan actually 
worked. We felt we’d been fools and ignorant not to have had a better insight into how 
the economy worked. It doesn’t work as all the neoclassical economists have argued in 
the past. Where the hell have we been? So I think you felt duped, and then you think 
you’ve got sort of an insight, and then you overreact. 1 think that was part of this 
dynamic that went on with people.'''4
Edward Lincoln, an economist and Japan scholar who moved from the Japan Economic 
Institute of America (funded by the Japanese Foreign Ministry) to the prestigious liberal 
think-tank the Brookings Institution in the mid 1980s, highlights the durable influence of 
revisionism in terms of its focus on Japanese institutions. ’I would agree with the 
revisionists that many economists have been reluctant to think about institutions because 
institutions are hard to put into an econometric model. Economics can contribute useful 
things, but there is a social and institutional context that economic activity takes place in. 
The revisionists correctly identified a need to know more about institutional context’.36''
A central premise informing the policy implications of revisionism concerned the strong 
continuities in Japan’s political-economic system in terms of economic institutions and 
state-guided, mercantilist industrial and trade strategies. The Reagan and Bush
'M Raymond Ahearn, interview with author, 22 May 1996, Washington DC. 
165 Edward Lincoln, interview with author, 24 January 1997, Washington DC.
201
Administrations were assailed for their traditionalist naivety in seeking to reshape Japan 
in the direction of a liberal capitalist economic model. Fallows (1989b: 60-62) asserted 
that ‘the constant expectation that Japan is about to change is the central intellectual tlaw 
in our trading policy ... It is foolish for America to adopt a policy that will fail unless 
[fundamental changes in Japan] occur — which is what all our market opening strategies 
boil down to. ... We should base our plans on the assumption that Japan’s internal order 
is not going to change'. In a similar vein, van Wolferen (1989: 17) argued that 'barring 
some great upheaval unforeseeable at present, it is unlikely that Japanese institutions will 
come to mesh more smoothly with the outside world, because this would entail the 
break-up of the bureaucracy-business partnership that forms the heart of the System’.366 
Again, the Gang of Four was able to draw strength from other respected analysts arguing 
for American recognition of the basic continuity of Japan’s ‘infant industry 
techniques’.367 The continuity argument comported with an emphasis on informal and 
invisible mechanisms used to sustain causal relationships despite the outward appearance 
of change. Those entertaining the traditionalist convergence thesis were cast as simply 
not understanding how Japan worked given its long history and the particular features of 
Japanese state-society relations and culture. Thus, for example, Prestowitz (1988: 1 15) 
criticised Americans’ 'obtuse tendency to interpret Japan in terms of the United States 
and to assume that if there is not an overt legal basis for power, it does not exist. To 
accept this fallacy is vastly to overemphasize the actual loss of power and to ignore the 
subtle, nonlegalistic nature of Japanese society’. The revisionist emphasis on continuity 
in this high-stakes, institution-centred paradigm took aim not only at American naivety 
but also at a deliberate Japanese strategy to 'foster the illusion of change’ (Johnson 1990: 
124).
The logical policy conclusion from revisionist premises was that if Japan was not about 
to change, the United States needed to take action to reorder the political-economic 
relationship. The case for an explicitly results-oriented Japan policy carried special force 
when made by a former US trade negotiator proclaiming past American policy failure 
based on wrong-headed thinking about Japan. In his 1988 book Trading Places, 
Prestowitz (1988: 322) articulated the revisionist case with particular clarity:
” 6 van Wolferen referred to this aspect as the anyth of slipping control’ (van Wolferen 1989: 394).
See, for example, ‘Trade, Japan, and the Year 2000’ by Henry Rosovsky, New York Times, 6 September 
1985.
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Our negotiations should always be for results. To negotiate over the procedures o f  a 
foreign culture in hopes of obtaining an undefined “open” market is to court failure and 
frustration. We can negotiate to alter a revision in a law. We can negotiate to prevent a 
law from passing. We can negotiate a market share or a specific amount o f  sales or a 
sliding scale. We can negotiate anything identifiable and concrete. We cannot negotiate 
philosophy or perception and should not try to do s o /68
For revisionists, the rule-oriented multilateral trading system was all but irrelevant to 
trade with Japan. As such, Johnson (1987a: 75) argued, The GATT rules are fatally 
Hawed because they do not take into account variations in national institutions’. When 
confronted with the charge that revisionists demanded managed trade, this was countered 
with the claim that management of trade (via cartels and collusive activity sanctioned by 
the state) was already endemic to the Japanese system and would encounter no obvious 
conceptual barrier if the United States accepted the way Japan worked and was clear 
about what it wanted. Thus, Johnson (1990: 121) maintained, ‘managed trade is already a
fact of life ... the issue is not whether managed trade is desirable but the failure of the
369United States to manage its trade as effectively as Japan does’ (Johnson 1990: 121).
Fertile soil and the “latent” hardliners
The revisionist paradigm has been explored so far in terms of its core economic 
representation of America’s Japan problem: high-stakes economic rivalry, the causal 
significance of Japan’s different institutions and doctrines, the strong continuity of 
Japan’s political-economic system, and the need for radical change of American trade 
policies. The focus has been on refinement and legitimation of a hardline coalition’s 
belief system, plus an element of “new information” enlightenment across other parts of 
the trade policy community. This evolutionary cognitive process would interact with 
external events outside the trade domain and, in turn, feed back into debates about the 
Japan problem. In the second half of the 1980s, the most dramatic external change 
outside the trade policy domain that opened up political space for hardline thinking about 
Japan was the rapid thaw in US-Soviet relations culminating in the end of the Cold War.
'<>s Prestowitz nominated the managed system of bilateral airline agreements as a model for the type of results- 
oriented approach he favoured more generally with Japan. For similar statements recommending the United 
States adopt some form of results-oriented Japan policy, see Fallows (1989b: 62) and Johnson (1990: 133).
369 For similar statements arguing managed trade sat comfortably with Japan’s political-economic system, see 
van Wolferen (1986-87: 303) and Fallows (1989a: 51).
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Despite the fact that the revisionists focused much of their scorn about ignorance of 
Japan on professional economists seen as upholding the ideological tenets of the free 
trade coalition, self-consciously underpinning revisionism was a fundamental political 
assault on traditionalist thinking about Japan through a Cold War foreign policy 
paradigm. Revisionism posed as a reaction to ‘the ideological redefinition of Japan 
during the Cold War era in accordance with the interests of the Western alliance and with 
the role Japan will play now that the Cold War is ending’ (Johnson 1990: 107). The 
reduced relevance of Cold War doctrine as an orienting factor in US-Japan relations by 
the late 1980s ensured traditionalists were reliant more than ever on debating the Japan 
problem on narrow economic grounds. Claims of the primacy of economics and that 
America was fast approaching a new order of “competing capitalisms” further 
strengthened revisionism’s claims to contest debate on Japan policy, not simply on 
economic grounds but as part of a post-Cold War reordering of American foreign policy 
purpose (Islam 1990, Bergsten 1992, Thurow 1992, Garten 1992). Not to be outdone, the 
dean of the revisionists is reported to have obliged with an epithet for the times: ‘The 
Cold War is over; and Japan won’.
The Cold War dimension highlights the connection of revisionism to political currents 
and non-trade events and the “fertile soil” revisionists could exploit to frame debate on 
the Japan problem in hardline-friendly terms. The rise to prominence of the Gang of Four 
as carriers of new thinking about Japan was testimony not simply to the content of their 
ideas, but also to their capacity to fit with prevailing trends in elite and mass opinion in 
the United States. These included increasingly negative images of Japanese motivations 
and actions. Kingdon (1984: 76, 81) has argued persuasively that the key to 
understanding the role of ideas in the policy process ‘is not where the idea came from but 
what made it take hold and grow. ... the critical thing to understand is not where the seed 
comes from, but what makes the soil fertile’. Reinforced by mass media coverage of 
endemic conflict in US-Japan relations, a set of ideas emphasising the economic threat 
Japan posed to American interests found a favourable political setting in general anxiety
' 1 Prestowitz (1993: 80) also grounds American misperception in Cold War doctrine and the ‘predisposition 
in the United States to see postwar Japan as a chip off the US block’.
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about Japan’s economic power projection and American decline.371 Revisionism 
resonated with “latent” hardliners in the American political system, outside the elite trade 
policy community. This suggests a dual image of revisionism (both cause and effect) in 
light of the unprecedented postwar conflict in US-Japan relations through the 1980s.
External factors such as real structural changes in relative economic positions of the two 
countries and the macroeconomic shocks of the early 1980s remain central to the 
economic and political salience of America’s Japan problem and heightened US-Japan 
conflict. Moreover, well before terms such as ‘capitalist development state’ had found a 
place in elite discourse, perceptions of Japan as an unfair trader were solidly planted in 
the United States (Angel 1978). The early 1980s witnessed a deterioration in overall 
public attitudes towards Japan reflective largely of concern about the trade impact on 
American jobs (Watts 1984). In the shadow of a sharply rising trade deficit and 
increasing economic friction, Watts reported on a more ‘troubled partnership' and a new 
pattern to the relationship in that what had been ‘for many years a subject area reserved 
for experts and career officials has become daily fare for the American people at large’ 
(Watts 1984: 89). Progressively through the 1980s, American public perceptions of 
Japan came to be filtered almost solely through the prism of economic interactions 
(Okimoto and Raphael 1993: 139). Much of the polling data and studies of American 
public opinion through the 1980s and into the 1990s affirmed that the trade issue
^72provided the catalyst for more negative attitudes towards Japan. “ A consistently 
negative finding related to the percentage of Americans who deemed Japan's trade 
behaviour “unfair”. As one careful study has noted, the trade problem registered in the 
minds of many Americans not just as an economic irritant, but also as a moral issue 
reinforced by negative mass media coverage of US-Japan economic relations. The image 
portrayed was ‘of a liberal economic system (that of the United States), based on 
principles of equal opportunity, openness, and fair competition, being challenged by a 
system that is essentially closed, collusive, and unprincipled (or unfair)' (Okimoto and 
Raphael 1993: 142). To be sure, the American public also retained ambivalent and often
’7I In their studies of newspaper coverage of three episodes of US-Japan conflict from the late 1980s, Budner 
and Krauss (1995: 346) found that "the arguments most frequently cited in American stories seemed to 
emphasize a concern about Japanese behavior as threatening the economic well-being of the United States 
combined with a fear of actual or potential American decline’.
,72 See, for example, ‘American and Japanese polls on the bilateral relationship: Trends and implications’, JEI 
Report, 2 March 1990. For an account critical of media use of polling data to emphasise negative attitudes, see 
Okimoto and Raphael (1993).
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schizophrenic attitudes towards the broader US-Japan relationship (for example, Japan as 
a rival and Japan as a partner) that acted as sources of stability and continuity (Johnson 
1988, Okimoto and Raphael 1993). Nonetheless, by 1990 one highly-regarded survey 
found that 60 per cent of the American public saw the ‘economic power of Japan’ as a 
‘critical threat’ to ‘the vital interest of the United States in the next 10 years’. Seventy- 
one per cent agreed that Japan practiced ‘unfair trade with the United States’ (Reilly (ed.) 
1991: 20, 22).
While public opinion may set broad constraints on political action, it is important not to 
overstate its impact or portray it as providing overly binding or uniform signals. It is a 
slippery notion ‘partly because there are many publics with many different opinions and 
partly because opinion on all but relatively simple matters tends to be uninformed, 
unstable, and sensitive to different ways of asking poll questions’ (Wilson and Dilulio 
1995: 128). Against this backdrop, a striking observation made by a number of 
sophisticated observers is that broad public opinion often displayed more balanced and 
less accusatory views on Japan compared with the hostility among large sections of 
American elite opinion through the 1980s (Watts 1984: 48, Frost 1987: 14, Okimoto and 
Raphael 1993: 139). The richer, more fertile soil for revisionism after 1985 was found 
less in mass opinion than in the deterioration of American elite attitudes towards Japan. 
Samuels (1992: 33) has pointed to two separate Japan booms in the broader American 
intellectual community in the 1980s:
The first was flattering and Pogoesque: “We have met the enemy and he is us”. The 
central lesson of this first boom was that the United States could compete successfully 
with Japan if we fixed what is broken at home, preferably by learning the secrets of 
Japanese success. The second was a finger pointed across the Pacific. Often it was 
hostile and accusatory: Japan (indeed, “the Japan problem”) was replacing the Soviet 
Union as America’s most pressing foreign policy problem.
Historically, American elites paid only sporadic attention to Japan, except during times 
of difficulty in the US-Japan relationship (Glazer 1975, Samuels 1992). The bilateral 
conflict of the 1980s marked it as the most difficult decade in US-Japan relations since 
World War II. The trade crisis provided the catalyst for American elites to look at Japan 
in a less than flattering light with one close observer noting an ‘eruption of ill will’ in the 
mid 1980s in which not just politicians but ‘respected academics and a broad range of 
private sector spokesmen have been increasingly critical of Japan’ (Lincoln 1985: 22).
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Esteemed American journalist Theodore H. White’s New York Times magazine article of 
July 1985 on ‘The danger of Japan’ has been cited as a harbinger of more negative 
American elite opinion. White likened Japan’s 1980s drive for markets with the 1930s 
drive for empire, casting Japan's external economic policies as the equivalent of a 
counterattack against the United States after World War II. The fact that the Gang of 
Four would themselves eventually wear the tag of “Japan-bashers” (both in Japan and the 
United States) illustrates the degree to which their ideas were seen to mesh with prior 
anti-Japan sentiment displayed by high-profile actors in American polities and business. 
Again, more negative attitudes towards Japan need to be seen alongside mirror images of 
Japanese success and American decline, the latter theme developing its own intellectual 
cottage industry in the late 1980s (Kennedy 1988, Schlossstein 1984, Nye 1990).
In the context of this deterioration in American elite attitudes towards Japan, issue-areas 
beyond the trade domain provided fertile soil for the mobilisation of latent hardliners in 
the second half of the 1980s. A more politicised and fractious environment surrounded 
the nexus of American economic and security interests — traditionally policy domains 
that central decision makers in both countries strived to keep operationally separate. A 
series of conflicts left a residue of increasingly negative attitudes towards Japan, the 
most notable being the controversy over Toshiba’s violations of the COCOM regime, the 
saga over Japan’s development of the FSX fighter aircraft, and the perceived failure of 
Japan to adequately support American military operations in the Persian Gulf (Trezise 
1989-90, Watanabe and Imperiale 1990, Ortmayer 1992). As outlined in chapter 3, the 
wave of Japanese foreign investment in the United States in the second half of the 1980s 
also generated a sharp political response (Burstein 1988, Tolchin and Tolchin 1988, 
Yamamura (ed.) 1989). And drawing strength directly from these political currents and 
bringing the revisionists into increasingly bitter disputes with American traditionalists 
were claims of inordinate Japanese influence in the American political system (Choate 
1990, Holstein 1 990).^7:i The result emerging from this broader front of US-Japan 
conflict was an elite community increasingly polarised over what sort of Japan problem
j7’ ‘The danger from Japan’ by Theodore H. White, New York limes Magazine, 28 July 1985, pp 18-23.
' 4 Samuels (1992: 34) describes White as ‘the first policy intellectual to question the benefits to the United 
States of the postwar alliance with Japan’. Others to identify the White article as symbolic of a sea-change in 
American elite opinion include Packard (1987-88: 358) and former Japanese Ambassador to the United States 
Yoshio Okawara, interview with author, 14 February 1997, Tokyo.
' ’ See also ‘The Japan-Bashers are poisoning foreign policy’ by George Packard, Washington Post, 8 October 
1989.
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confronted the United States and whether a Japan “threat” was in the process of 
becoming the basis for far-reaching bilateral rivalry in the wake of the waning military 
threat of the Soviet bloc.376
Conclusion
By the end of the 1980s, the hardliners had placed demands for a results-oriented Japan 
policy squarely on the official policy-making agenda. Demands of congressional and 
business hardliners drew strength from the emergence of revisionism as a coherent 
hardline paradigm geared around high-stakes economic rivalry between Japan and the 
United States, the causal significance of Japan’s particular economic institutions and 
doctrines, the strong continuity of the Japanese system, and the need for radical change 
in US policy towards Japan. The scaling down of the Cold War and other events outside 
the trade policy domain created the fertile soil for the revisionists to rise to prominence. 
While this was aided by more negative attitudes identified in American public opinion, 
the more telling trend was the sharp deterioration in images of Japan held by elite 
opinion-makers. This in turn helped to shift the balance of initiative within the American 
trade policy community further in the direction of the hardliners. The next chapter 
analyses the reaction of a more defensive free trade coalition to these developments.
176 ‘Washington polarized over Japan policy’ by Peter Ennis, Tokyo Business Today, March 1990, pp. 16-17. 
Ennis reports on the debate sparked by a proposal from US State Department official Kevin Kearns for the 
creation of a “Team ET panel of hardline trade, defense, and foreign policy specialists critical of the Bush 
Administration’s Japan policy.
208
8 Free traders and Japan’s “structural impediments”
Introduction
The enhanced position and influence of the hardliners in the American trade policy 
community in the wake of the regime crisis had its corollary in a more fragmented and 
defensive free trade coalition. As noted in the previous chapter, the easing of Cold War 
tensions through the second half of the 1980s left traditionalists in the Free Trade-Good 
Relations coalition reliant more squarely on economic arguments in countering the sort 
of hardline definition of the Japan problem which the revisionists had articulated 
forcefully. After 1985, a process of puzzling about Japan by professional economists in 
the United States lent greater credibility to the notion that the way Japan worked 
challenged core parts of the traditional free trade paradigm. Pragmatic free traders in the 
Bush Administration co-opted aspects of this policy learning across the American trade 
policy community in a deliberately process-oriented framework.
This chapter focuses on these two aspects of the free traders’ reaction to the hardline 
challenge in the late 1980s. Greater analysis of the Japan problem saw reputable 
economists in the American trade policy community draw conclusions about Japan not 
dissimilar to those of the hardliners. Based on econometric analyses and micro- 
institutional studies of the Japanese economy, many within the group renowned as the 
bastion of free trade opinion concluded that Japan was indeed different from other 
industrialised economies in terms of its international openness. The coupling of this 
analysis of Japan with new theories of international trade lent weight to arguments that 
not only might the Japan problem be a source of political conflict, it may have far 
reaching economic implications. This process of learning would leave an imprint on 
policy with the Bush Administration’s Structural Impediments Initiative. As the Bush 
Administration's key innovation in Japan policy, SI I was geared both at warding off 
demands for a results-oriented approach and at dealing with what many free traders saw 
as the underlying structural sources of bilateral trade tension.
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Economists and the Japan Problem
The influence of professional economists in policy-making in the United States remains 
a curiously under-explored topic of analysis. Even so, a number of studies have pointed 
to analysis of policy problems by economists playing an important role in framing 
discussion of issues and influencing policy outcomes. The creation and staffing of 
specific federal government institutions by economists provides the obvious base for 
such influence with Kingdon (1984: 144) identifying ‘a long-range trend toward more 
economists (and people receptive to their thinking) in government’. This is clearest in the 
executive branch where the Treasury, the President’s CEA, OMB and, more recently, the 
National Economic Council (NEC) are important sources of economic analysis of US 
government policies. ’7 Economists and their language of efficiency and opportunity cost 
have been seen as influential in steering policy towards more market-oriented regulatory 
approaches in domestic issue-areas such as aviation, trucking and communications 
(Kingdon 1984. Derthick and Quirk 1985).
A more qualified picture emerges in the case of US trade policy. Those who note the 
influence of liberal trade ideas of the sort economists have advocated are also careful to 
point to the centrality of long-standing fairness and reciprocity norms in US trade policy 
debate (Destler 1995; Goldstein 1988, 1993; Mucciaroni 1995). Hence, real world 
circumstances have figured most prominently in explanations of America’s generally 
liberal postwar trade regime — specifically, the association of the Smoot-Hawley tariff 
of 1930 with the deepening of the Great Depression, the subsequent record of strong 
economic growth associated with a more open policy in the postwar years, and the 
strategic basis for a liberal trade policy during the Cold War. Judith Goldstein has made 
a particular point of identifying a role for ideas in US trade policy, but she has sought 
nonetheless to link ideas closely to specific political interests. At odds with the more 
abstract public welfare arguments of economists has been the importance of legal, client-
In the mid 1980s, Rhoads (1985: 7) noted that, ‘Increasingly, economists hold important political 
offices in their own right. Under President Reagan economists have headed the State Department, the 
Federal Trade Commission, and the White House’s domestic policy council. Under President Carter 
four PhD economists served as secretaries of cabinet departments, and two others headed the Civil 
Aeronautics Board and the Interstate Commerce Commission’ (Rhoads 1985: 7-8).
'?x Goldstein (1993: 239) maintains, for example, that 'American commercial policy is not a story of 
enlightenment in which a progressive idea — liberal free trade — triumphed. Liberal policy gained 
support in the United States in the 1930s for the same reasons as did protectionism in the I 860s: elected 
leaders conceived of each policy as the best means to further their interests’.
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based norms in the American trade policy process. Tensions created relate not simply to 
competition for bureaucratic influence but to ‘competing visions, sometimes invested 
with a good deal of emotion, as to how to discharge a public responsibility’ (Wilson 
1989: 61).' The strong legal orientation of US trade policy can be seen in the institution 
of the United States Trade Representative's office, created by Congress under the Trade 
Expansion Act of 1962 based on concerns that central decision-makers in the executive 
were less than aggressive in demanding trade “concessions” from America’s trading 
partners (Destler 199 5: 19).380 Still, economists have been active players in the US trade 
policy process by virtue of their institutional position and presence on such bodies as the 
inter-agency, sub-cabinet Trade Policy Committee. More broadly, networks of 
economists (in government, academia, and the think tank community) have been 
prominent advocates in US trade policy debate, playing something akin to a “gate- 
keeping” role in trade discourse, differentiating legitimate economic arguments and 
policy innovations from illegitimate ones. As such, how American economists have
puzzled about the Japan problem forms part of the wider process of learning about Japan
181within the American trade policy community.'
Writing in the wake of the trade regime crisis, Mi l' economics professor Paul Krugman 
outlined his own and what he saw as the prevailing view of the Japan problem among 
professional mainstream economists in the United States.'1' He argued that in contrast 
with hardline conventional wisdom, ‘few economists’ would agree with a view of Japan 
that takes ‘unfair advantage of our open market while closing its own' (Krugman 1987a: 
16). He maintained that ‘US-Japanese trade tension in fact owes little to Japanese trade 
and business practices' (1987a: 35). ‘The accusations about these practices in the United 
States, I argue, are rationalizations for protectionist demands that would be there in any
",79 Wilson (1989: 61) highlights these tensions whereby lawyers are prone to refer to economists as 
"dogmatic’ or ‘ideological’. For their part, economists ‘see themselves as social scientists — as 
“dispassionate searchers for the truth”; lawyers, on the other hand, are seen as people less interested in 
truth than in finding facts to support a predetermined case’.
,S(I Four of the six USTRs through the Carter, Reagan, Bush and Clinton Administrations have been 
lawyers (Robert Strauss, Carla Hills, Mickey Kantor and Charlene Barshefsky). Clayton Yeutter stands 
out in having a PhD in economics. William Brock was a former Senator and member of the House of 
Representatives.
'Xl As chapter 7 notes, whatever the actual influence of economists, it is clear from the writings of the 
revisionists and other hardliners that they certainly perceived American mainstream economists as their 
main intellectual opponents in contesting American policy debate on the Japan problem.
'82 In an American context, the term “mainstream” encompasses a clear majority of economists — 
liberal and conservative, Democrat and Republican but excludes radical, socialist or Marxist 
economists (Rhoads 1985: 3).
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case. If the Ministry for International Trade and Industry (MITI) did not exist, the 
Amerieans would have to invent it'. The main analytical and policy problem for 
economists then was not one of economics but politics: ‘How should those who view 
US-Japanese trade as mutually beneficial protect that trade from the political frictions 
menacing it?’ (Krugman 1987a: 16).
A few years later, Krugman had a somewhat different take on the Japan problem. He 
described the conventional wisdom in the US policy community whereby:
despite its relative absence of legal barriers to trade, the Japanese market is de facto 
protected because it is not competitive in the same way as other countries. Collusive 
behavior involving both firms and a highly cartelized distribution sector effectively shut 
out many foreign products, even when imports would be cheaper and/or of higher quality 
than the Japanese version. Foreign direct investment is similarly choked off by an 
inability to get local business cooperation, and the inability to establish local subsidiaries 
inhibits exports to Japan. And this more or less conspiratorial system tends particularly 
to close ranks when a key new technology is at stake, assuring Japanese firms of a 
chance to capture new markets even when foreign firms have an initial lead (Krugman 
1991 a: 2-3).
Rather than assailing the conventional wisdom as the creation of protectionists, Krugman 
(1991a: 3) found that ‘on the whole ... the conventional wisdom survives crude empirical 
testing more or less intact'. Drawing lessons from a 1989 conference of American and 
Japanese academic specialists hosted by the National Bureau of Economic Research, 
Krugman (1991a: 8) concluded that ‘Japan is different. ... [and] in some ways Japanese 
difference does contribute to trade tensions (which is not the same thing as saying that it 
is in any sense “unfair"). Japan does appear to be marked by a style of relationships 
between firms that makes it difficult for outsiders, including foreigners, to break in'. 
What at face value appears as a case of individual learning about the Japan problem 
seems to be reflected in a wider pattern of learning within the American economics 
profession, at least the more “liberal” mainstream. Within a few years, a long list of 
American economists, including highly reputable figures in international economics, had 
lent support to the view that Japan was indeed different in terms of its international 
openness and the pervasiveness of collusive, insider relationships. Among academic 
economists, this list included inter alia: Bela Belassa, Robert Lawrence, Rudiger
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Dornbusch, Paul Krugman and Alan Blinder. In the world of policy think tanks, 
prominent scholars at traditional centres of free trade opinion — the Brookings 
Institution (Edward Lincoln) and the Institute for International Economics (C. Fred 
Bergsten and Marcus Noland) — drew similar conclusions about Japan’s asymmetrical 
openness. While the issue of Japan’s relative openness remained (and still is) 
controversial, a reputable wing of American professional economists, the traditional 
bastion of free trade opinion, added legitimacy and credibility to the core hardline 
premise that Japan plays by different rules. This in turn weakened and fragmented the 
free trade coalition in an already hostile political environment.
As with tracing the rise of revisionism, there is no pretence to uncover a specific path by 
which a number of highly regarded American economists came to learn broadly similar 
lessons to Paul Krugman. What is suggestive in terms of timing, however, is the sharp 
increase in economic analysis of Japan’s economic openness and its micro-institutional 
features after 1985. Prior to the mid 1980s, analysis of Japan’s impact on the world 
economy was largely the preserve of a relatively small network of specialists on the 
Japanese economy. A general view of Japan as on a path of economic liberalisation in 
conformity with international trade norms found expression in authoritative analysis by 
mainstream US economists (Patrick and Rosovsky (eds.) 1976). Contrary to 
pronouncements by hardliners on Japan’s closed market, Japan economy specialists 
stressed the conformity of Japan’s trade structure with an orthodox view of international 
trade based on comparative advantage. As noted in chapter 4, the standard for this 
analysis was set by Michigan economist Professor Gary Saxonhouse and his widely cited 
papers of the early 1980s (Saxonhouse 1982, 1983a). Based on a Heckscher-Ohlin 
empirical model of international trade, Saxonhouse concluded that Japan’s trade 
structure (defined in terms of sectoral net exports) was well explained by factor 
endowments and distance from trading partners. In effect, Saxonhouse concluded that, 
based on his sample, Japan was neither more nor less open than other countries. Later 
work by Saxonhouse, often in reply to analysis reaching contrary conclusions, 
incorporated alternative trade models into the study of Japan’s trade structure but yielded 
the same basic conclusions (Saxonhouse 1989, Saxonhouse and Stern 1989).
’s ' In this group, Dornbusch was undoubtedly the most outspoken advocate of a more aggressive Japan 
policy. See ‘Give Japan a target and say “import”’ by Rudiger Dornbusch, New York Times, 24 
September 1989, Sect. 3, p. 2.
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Saxonhouse’s contribution to this increasingly controversial area of debate has been 
summarised as concluding that Japan’s informal barriers ‘however vexing, are ultimately 
of little quantitative significance. ... however unusual Japan’s trade pattern, it can be 
explained on the basis of Japan’s equally unusual factor endowments, without reference 
to trade policy, much less trade policy of a sub rosa sort' (Bergsten and Noland 1993: 
180).
Centres of economic analysis closely involved in free trade advocacy appear broadly to 
have shared the Saxonhouse perspective in the first half of the 1980s. The central 
message was that hardliners miscast the Japan trade problem that was basically generated 
by factors independent of Japanese practices or policies. This view of the Japan problem 
as largely one of macroeconomic imbalances and politically active American 
protectionists registered in analyses by both conservative and liberal economists. Chapter 
4 highlighted the special attention President Reagan’s CEA devoted to the Japan problem 
in its February 1983 annual report.384 While advocating the benefits of further Japanese 
liberalisation, the CEA was at pains to explain Japan’s trade patterns and its bilateral 
surplus with the United States in terms of its limited natural resources that ensured large 
deficits in primary products. More liberal mainstream economists at the HE largely 
mirrored analysis by conservative Reagan Administration economists. In their 1985 
study entitled The United States-Japan Economic Problem, Bergsten and Cline (1985) 
paid particular attention to the macroeconomic factors which underpinned the trade 
imbalance noting that virtually the entire growth in the bilateral imbalance, from about 
$12 billion in 1980 to almost $40 billion in 1984, could be explained by exchange rate 
misalignment and differences in economic growth rates. While acknowledging the role 
of individual barriers as sources of frustration and conflict, they drew attention to Japan's 
path of liberalisation arguing that the ‘explanation for the rapid escalation of tensions 
must lie elsewhere, notably at the macroeconomic level' (Bergsten and Cline 1985: 5). 
On the issue of Japan’s trade structure, Bergsten and Cline found that Japan’s import 
share, although lower than most OECD countries, was basically normal after controlling 
for economic size, natural resource endowments, and distance from trading partners 
conclusions virtually identical to those of Saxonhouse.
,M See CEA (1983: 56-58) on ‘The Issue of Trade With Japan’.
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The Saxonhouse and Bergsten and Cline studies were among the earliest examples of a 
chain of puzzling by the economics profession (especially in the United States) aiming to 
shed light on the same basic question: Does Japan import less than it should? By the end 
of the 1980s, one survey reported an ‘astonishing diversity' of conclusions (Takeuchi
o o  r  _
1989: 144)/ ' At the very least, this diversity pointed to a more fragmented set of views 
on the Japan problem within the traditional free trade coalition. A significant wing of 
mainstream economic opinion sided with the view that Japan was different in terms of 
abnormally low foreign penetration of its economy (both trade and investment) and that 
micro-institutional features amounted to plausible evidence of collusive insider 
relationships.386 One class of studies in the tradition of Saxonhouse and Bergsten and 
Cline applied empirical models of trade, but concluded that Japan was indeed an outlier 
in terms of abnormally low imports. The diverse findings of these studies relate in part to 
significant differences in underlying trade models and in the measured variables/1 For 
example, Balassa (1986a) and Balassa and Noland (1988) used a similar regression 
technique to Bergsten and Cline, but with slightly different variables, and found that 
Japan was an under-importer among industrial countries in terms of imports to GDP. 
Balassa (1986b) undertook a similar exercise focused narrowly on manufactured imports 
reaching the same conclusion.
Arguably the most influential of the studies concluding Japan to be an outlier in terms of 
low imports was by Robert Lawrence (1987), an associate at the Brookings Institution 
and subsequently a professor at Harvard University. From his analysis grounded in a 
theoretical model of trade (the Krugman-Helpman model of intra-industry trade in 
differentiated products), Lawrence concluded that Japan’s manufactured imports were 
about 40 per cent lower than one would expect of a typical industrial economy. He did 
not, however, draw specific conclusions as to causal factors (officially-sanctioned 
barriers, market structures, or unusual preferences). And while Lawrence’s study not
,85 See Golub (1994: 1 1) for a later survey of relevant literature that also concludes that economists 
‘seemquite evenly divided' on whether Japan’s unusual trade patterns ‘indicate unusual protection or 
unusual economic characteristics and comparative advantage’.
j86 The main focus of this section is on the trade issue. See Mason (1992) and Encarnation (1992) for 
studies on Japan’s relatively low internal foreign investment.
,S7 Goub (1994: 17) points to a pervasive problem in interpreting results from all such trade model 
Studie; ‘as it is a joint study of the validity of the model and the normalness of Japan’. Hence a finding 
that JaDan’s trade is not consistent with the model is not necessarily an indication of import barriers.
,8X Lavrence’s work set off a long-running debate with Saxonhouse. For later perspectives of both 
scholar, see Saxonhouse (1993) and Lawrence (1993).
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surprisingly was subject to academic criticism, at least one knowledgeable observer 
scored it as providing 'the seal of approval of the economics establishment to the charge 
that Japan’s markets for manufactures are tacitly closed to imports’ (Krugman 1987b: 
549). Hardliners drew directly on the Lawrence analysis in making their case for a 
results-oriented policy. The business community’s ACTPN (1989) report made a point of 
citing the studies of Balassa and Lawrence and highlighting Krugman’s ‘seal of 
approval' statement. Other work by the Brookings Institution’s Edward Lincoln (1988, 
1990) reinforced the outlier thesis based on Japan’s relatively low level of intra-industry 
trade.
Economists’ puzzling about Japan also took the form of more concerted attention to the 
micro-institutional features of the Japanese economy around which claims about 
abnormally low imports and peculiar structural barriers to balance of payments 
adjustment could be plausibly grounded. As noted previously, the exchange rate/trade 
deficit adjustment puzzle was one of the central arguments hardliners used to attack the 
credibility of mainstream economists and their non-institutionalist analysis of Japan. It 
provoked a stream of work by economists on factors which might explain the persistence 
of the US trade deficit and Japan’s continued high trade surpluses despite the large
T Ü Q
depreciation in the US dollar from its early 1985 peak. One line of inquiry on the 
external adjustment issue concerned the pricing strategies of Japanese firms in response 
to exchange rate changes and the conjecture that this reflected strategic behaviour 
permitted by the presence of a sanctuary market at home. This ‘'pricing to market’’ 
behaviour by Japanese firms ensured their capacity to alter their cost-price margins in 
order to stabilise their level of demand (Marston 1990, 1991).390
Other studies looked to identify non-tariff barriers or “insider relationships’’ as structural 
impediments and hence sources of economic friction. This work focused on the alleged 
impact of keiretsu business arrangements and purchasing practices, imperfectly 
competitive market structures and Japan's complex distribution system. A widely-cited 
study by Kreinin (1988) compared purchasing behaviour of Japanese, American and
,X9 See, for example, Krugman and Baldwin (1987), Baldwin (1988), Hooper and Mann (1989) and 
Lawrence (1990). For persuasive evidence that the external adjustment process as postulated by a 
conventional Mundell-Fleming model remained operative through the second half of the 1980s, see 
Krugman (1991b) and Bosworth (1993).
'w See Dornbusch (1987) on the theoretical basis for pricing to market.
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European manufacturing subsidiaries operating in Australia and concluded that Japanese 
firms were much more inclined to use closed procurement practices and to source 
products from home suppliers.341 Applying a cross-industry framework, Petri (1991) 
found that imports into Japan tended to be relatively lower when the Japanese 
government was the buyer, when goods were sold to other businesses, or when high 
distribution margins suggested oligopolistic behaviour. Lawrence (1991b) added keiretsu 
affiliation to Petri's model finding that while vertical keiretsu affiliation may be 
efficiency enhancing (leading to lower imports and higher exports), horizontal keiretsu 
affiliation was not (reducing imports only). Another study by Fung (1991) found that 
(ceteris paribus) keiretsu structures tended to increase Japan’s trade surplus with the rest 
of the world in general, and the United States in particular. Using a cross-national 
framework, Noland (1992) concluded that keiretsu were consistently associated with 
higher than expected net exports and with lower than expected imports, but cautioned 
that whether this reflected efficiency-enhancing keiretsu affiliation or barriers to entry 
was indeterminable.392
Complementing the wave of trade model studies and micro-institutional analyses of 
Japan was greater attention to relative prices in Japan and the inference that large and 
sustained price differentials for similar or identical products provided plausible evidence 
of informal trade barriers. The much remarked upon “47th Street Photo Phenomenon” 
was perhaps the most famous anecdote on the price differential issue, although 
subsequent evidence suggested a mixed picture concerning the relative price of Japanese 
goods in Japan relative to the United States (Saxonhouse 1993). At least one set of 
statistics generated much less controversy — the degree to which imported goods in 
Japan were more expensive than in their home markets (Golub 1994: 21). Evidence that 
traded goods generally were priced significantly higher in Japan compared with other 
industrial countries figured prominently in debates about Japanese structural 
impediments in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Economic Planning Agency of Japan- 
1989; US Department of Commerce 1989, 1991; Lawrence 1991a). A joint survey by the 
US Commerce Department and Mi l l  under the bilateral Structural Impediments
yM For a contrary view arguing that Kreinen’s findings largely reflect the more recent origins of 
Japanese manufacturing operations in Australia, see Drysdale (1993).
,92 For studies emphasing the economic logic and efficiency benefits of keiretsu and challenging the 
barriers-to-entry view, see Sheard (1991, 1992, 1994) and Aoki (1994).
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Initiative found that two-thirds of the products surveyed were on average 37 per cent 
more expensive in Japan than in the United States.
This virtual cottage industry of research on Japan's openness that sprung up in the 
second half of the 1980s was preceded, and to some extent informed, by new 
perspectives on trade theory and policy in the economics profession. For the most part, 
traditionalist free trade orthodoxy maintained that free trade was the most appropriate 
policy for maximising national welfare regardless of what other countries did.394 Hence, 
if Japan was seeking to shield its economy from foreign competition it was mostly 
hurting itself; effects on other countries were distinctly secondary. By contrast, the so- 
called unew trade theory” and its policy-oriented counterpart -  “strategic trade policy” -  
carried a distinct message that the economic stakes of Japan being different and 
relatively closed could be very high. The new trade perspective provided important 
legitimation for government intervention and an activist trade policy, although the strict 
assumptions in strategic trade models meant most mainstream economists remained 
cautious about declaring free trade passe.
The late 1970s witnessed the origins of new trade theory based on the integration into the 
trade literature of insights from industrial organisation theory with models assuming 
imperfect competition, production externalities or some combination.395 As originally 
conceived, new trade theory was overwhelmingly an exercise in positive rather than 
normative economics.396 The starting point was the idea of non-comparative advantage 
trade and that underlying differences in national resources and aptitudes do not fully 
determine the pattern of international trade specialisation. That the fastest growing 
component of trade after World War II was between industrial countries with similar 
factor endowments provided one of the real world puzzles for questioning the hegemony 
of the traditional comparative advantage view. Another was that many of the goods that 
entered into international commerce were produced in imperfectly competitive
y ' Later studies concluding that price differentials are suggestive of informal barriers have included 
Knetter (1994), Sazanami, Urata and Kawai (1995) and Noland (1995). 
y ‘ The static optimal tariff argument was the long-standing exception.
y° Important early contributions to the new trade theory are Krugman (1979, 1980, 1981), Dixit and 
Norman (1980), Lancaster (1980), Helpman (1981) and Ethier (1982). See Krugman (ed.) (1986) for an 
accessible introduction to this literature.
y;<’ Proponents of the new view readily concede antecedents, not least in Adam Smith’s (pre-Ricardo) 
idea that division of labour lowers unit costs. Indeed, it has been argued that the new view should be 
seen largely in terms of formalisation and a synthesis of old and new views (Dixit 1993: 17).
218
industries. The basic insight of the new trade view was that trade patterns among 
countries were indeterminate under economies of scale and imperfect competition 
implying the importance of increasing returns as a cause of trade and the need to model 
international markets as imperfectly competitive. According to one new trade theorist, 
the ‘key feature of the new trade theory was that it offered models in which increasing 
returns were allowed their natural affinity with imperfect competition — which made a 
huge difference in terms of plausibility and persuasiveness’ (Krugman 1992: 426). With 
indeterminate trade patterns, the new trade view was grounded in a world in which 
‘expectations matter, and historical accidents and temporary government policies can all 
matter forever. ... Countries can inherit shares in a given alternative by historical accident 
or can stake claims to shares by policy aimed at getting there (that is, reaching some 
preferred alternative) first’ (Richardson 1993: 91).
The new trade theory provided a source of internal dissent from the traditionalist free 
trade view in terms of the positive economics of trade. Its crossover into the realm of 
policy in the form of strategic trade policy proved more controversial given its capacity 
to justify neo-mercantilist policy demands. With a view of markets as imperfect, the new 
view of trade opened the door to a rigorous economic justification for international trade 
policies that were not only interventionist but involved an element of international 
confrontation. Of the early contributions in this literature, the most famous models 
identified a capacity for governments to shift oligopolistic profits towards one’s own 
firms (Spencer and Brander 1983, Brander and Spencer 1985) and for import protection 
to serve as export promotion (Krugman 1984). Such insights were quickly incorporated 
into a raft of hardline-friendly diagnoses of the Japan problem by analysts whose view of 
the world stressed competitive advantage of firms (rather than comparative advantage), 
pervasive externalities and the imperative of an industrial policy to promote “high value“ 
industries, especially in manufacturing. The new trade view saw external economies as a 
legitimate and potentially high-stakes international competitive issue and pointed to the 
possibility that a country that systematically tries to promote industries subject to 
external economies can raise its standard of living at the expense of other countries. This 
was precisely the sort of Japanese motivation and strategy which analysts at the Berkeley 
Roundtable on the International Economy promoted as the “real story of why Japan 
works’’ with the notion of Japan's ‘moving band of protection’ and a superior
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development strategy of targeting industries on the basis of their potential for economic 
growth and technological change (Tyson and Zysman 1989, Tyson 1992).
The more economically mainstream intersection of the new trade view with the Japan 
problem focused less directly on Japan’s trade and industrial policies, but nonetheless 
stressed ‘the ability of a government to create the moral equivalent of a border policy by 
its choice of non-border policies’ (Richardson 1993: 101). This, in turn, provided a basis 
for legitimate grievances about Japan’s weak competition policy, barriers to foreign 
direct investment (including tightly regulated financial services markets), permissive 
policies towards recession cartels among weak firms, and the real and long-lasting 
impact of a restrictive distribution system. The upshot, according to Richardson’s careful 
survey, was a new pragmatism among a large section of mainstream international 
economists courtesy of the new trade literature. According to this pragmatism, 
‘Competition and open markets are on balance good things. But there are exceptions, 
and these exceptions may warrant policy intervention. ... The new view has hardly killed 
the case for free trade; if anything, it has probably strengthened it ... what has been killed 
though, is the ability to defend free trade on the basis of ideology alone — and that may 
be just as well* (Richardson 1993: 93-94).397
The new trade view saw the emergence of a reputable wing of mainstream economists 
less enthralled by the twin ideas of comparative advantage and unconditional free trade 
and more pragmatic in their willingness to countenance interventionist and 
confrontational policy reactions, especially in the presence of plausible evidence of 
strategic or collusive behaviour in imperfectly competitive markets. That such work 
found its way into the thinking of pragmatic free traders in the US policy process is 
hardly surprising given the salience of the Japan problem. One long-time US Treasury 
Department official offers a sense of this evolution from the laissez-faire high tide 
associated with the first Reagan Administration:
There used to be sharper cleavages between the Chicago school view versus the
Berkeley Roundtable view. Now it is closer to a merger; people see market
imperfections. The theoretical work on imperfect competition and economies of scale —
'97 Ricardson's (1989) own empirical work has been cited widely as evidence of how the new view can 
strengthen the case for free trade.
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Krugman models — have had an effect. There are few who argue pure free trade with
398Japan. Before you had two schools; now it's harder to perceive two schools.
Of course, there are obvious limits in focusing narrowly on the role of specialist learning 
around the ebbs and flows of scholarly literature. There is no clear reason to suspect 
perceptions of economists to be any less influenced by non-eognitive circumstances or 
human motivations grounded in self-interest (in the case of the latter possibly less). The 
basic point, however, is to draw attention to the fact that by the end of the 1980s a 
significant wing of the American economics profession was willing to countenance that 
the way Japan worked challenged core parts of a traditional free trade paradigm. In 
effect, some of the lessons drawn by the hardliners were not radically different from 
lessons drawn by hitherto avowed free traders. Writing in 1990, for example, Princeton 
economics professor Alan Blinder argued at length that the way Japan worked ‘should 
make economic theorists squirm’.
Our intellectual conceptualization of the Japanese economic system undergirds policies 
towards Japan. If our picture is distorted, our policies will be, too.
Studying the Japanese economy has led me to a tentative conclusion: that market 
capitalism, Japanese-style, departs so much from conventional Western economic 
thought that it deserves to be considered a different system. ...
Who is right? I’m not sure. My only claim is that the Japanese do not do business the 
American way. ... The Japanese seem to seek a degree of economic autarchy that 
standard theory sees as inappropriate. ... All in all, economists weaned on Western 
economic theory must conclude that Japan does almost everything wrong. ...
American capitalism rests on a grand theory begun by Adam Smith. There is no 
comparable theory of Japanese capitalism, but we need one if we are to formulate an 
intelligent economic policy toward Japan. The Japanese themselves seem less concerned 
with conceptualizations than with results. So, we may have to produce that theory 
ourselves.399
The Structural Impediments Initiative
This process of puzzling about Japan by free traders in the American trade policy 
community found a form of policy expression in the Bush Administration’s Structural 
Impediments Initiative. The previous chapter highlighted the significant pressures on the 
Bush Administration to adopt a more confrontational approach to Japan. With SII,
98 Not-for-attribution interview.
‘There are capitalists, then there are the Japanese’ by Alan Blinder, Business Week, 8 October, 1990 
p. 9.
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pragmatic free traders in the administration sought to deal with what they saw as the 
underlying structural sources of US-Japan trade tension, without resorting to a results- 
oriented market access policy. In the words of one of its key architects, SI1 'was seen as 
a way of demonstrating to ourselves, the Japanese and the US Congress that there was a 
serious initiative underway in the Bush Administration to tackle the underlying problems 
which led to 301-type tensions’.400
‘Suggested remedies for dealing with the “Japan problem” ran the gamut of the policy 
spectrum’ when the Bush Administration took office (Janow 1994: 55). The 
administration’s immediate challenge was the implementation of Super 301 and hardline 
demands that Japan as a country be declared an unfair trader.401 At her confirmation 
hearing in January 1989, new USTR Carla Hills told the Senate Finance Committee that 
she would ‘aggressively implement’ the 1988 trade law, using the ‘credible threat' of 
retaliation to provide ‘essential leverage'.40" As she recalls, ‘the Bush Administration 
didn’t think that that law was the way to accomplish the objective, but it was on the 
books and the Trade Representative was required to carry out the law’.40’ At hearings in 
March 1989, Senator John Danforth ensured Bush Administration officials were under 
no doubt about the view of hardliners in Congress, saying that ‘Super 301 was designed 
to be aimed at more than Japan but no less than Japan. ... Super 301 was written with 
Japan in mind’.404
Against this backdrop, SII was tactically important in demonstrating to Congress that the 
administration had its own ideas about how to deal with the Japan problem.40" It also had 
a wider purpose in that Bush Administration officials were keen to avoid fall-out from 
Super 301 compromising their top trade priority that was to make progress on the 
Uruguay Round of GATT talks. As Mastanduno (1992b: 237-238) suggests:
400 Charles Dallara, interview with author, 28 August 1996, Washington DC.
101 Schoppa (1997: 69) notes that ‘as Bush’s cabinet appointees appeared before the Senate for 
confirmation hearings, Senators like John Danforth and Max Baucus (both of whom had led the fight 
for the Super 301 provision of the [ 1988] Trade Act) made it clear that Congress would not be satisfied 
unless the administration “named” Japan’.
402 Statement of United States Trade Representative-designate Carla Hills before the Senate Finance 
Committee, 27 January 1989.
,0' Hills, interview, 1996.
404 Inside US Trade, 7(9), 3 March 1989, p. 1.
As one former USTR official put it, SII was ‘in part a response to Congress’ demands that we do 
Super 301 against Japan; a way to fend off “results-oriented” negotiations’. Massey, interview, 1996.
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Executive officials believed that without the SI I, Congress was likely to adopt measures 
that would jeopardize the successful completion of the Uruguay Round of multilateral 
trade negotiations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) -  the 
administration’s top priority in trade policy -  and drive American policy in the illiberal 
direction of managed trade.
Bush Administration officials in Treasury and USTR began piecing together the 
components of SII in March 1989.4(Ul The central objective was to address the 
macroeconomic sources of the trade imbalance and the structural regulations, laws and 
business practices in the Japan seen as impeding balance of payments adjustment. To be 
sure, the ‘idea of a structural initiative had been floating around the bureaucracy’ for 
some time (Mastanduno 1992b: 245). The Reagan Administration had initiated the 
United States-Japan Structural Economic Dialogue chaired by State Department officials 
between April 1986 and October 1988 (Wallis 1987). This had followed a speech by then 
Secretary of State George Shultz at Princeton in April 1985 addressing the internal 
macroeconomic imbalances underlying the large US trade deficit.407 Treasury took the 
lead on SII as the key agency charged with macroeconomic coordination and drawing on 
its earlier experience with the yen-dollar talks. The frustration of Treasury officials with 
their unsuccessful attempts to influence Japanese fiscal policy through the G7 and 
through one-on-one pressure on the Ministry of Finance led to greater interest in a cross­
agency approach (Schoppa 1997: 79). Critical in the thinking of Treasury officials was 
the slow adjustment of Japan’s external surplus in the wake of the sustained appreciation 
of the yen following the Plaza Accord of 1985. They concluded that structural barriers 
were getting in the way of market mechanisms and that macroeconomic adjustment had 
to occur in tandem with tackling issues such as Japan’s distribution system, keiretsu 
business relationships and land policy. Charles Dallara, the key Treasury official in the 
development of SII, reflects on the ambitious nature of the exercise:
The fact is when you try to deal with the so-ealled micro problems in any particular 
sectors, you find that you run into similar structural impediments -  industry to industry 
to industry. Obviously, they vary, but problems in the distribution system in Japan were 
not unique to any particular sector, so trying to tackle those problems through a sector-
l0<> The key figures in the formulation and selling of SII in the US system were Treasury official 
Charles Dallara and Deputy USTR S. Uinn Williams. Dallara recalls that, ‘Linn was in some ways my 
primary partner in shaping these SII talks because we had the germ of an idea, but if USTR had not 
jumped on board very soon it would have probably not gone very far because building support for it 
wasn’t that easy’. Dallara, interview, 1996. Also see Schoppa (1997: 78).
407 The Bush Administration’s Ambassador to Japan has described the structural dialogue as ‘an 
intellectual forerunner of the structural talks because it acknowledged that the trade problems were 
embedded in the macroeconomic approach of each government’. Armacost, interview, 1996.
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by-sector approach is kind o f an endless game and so it seemed to us a lot more sensible 
to go to the bigger problem.
We used the analogy that structural impediments in the Japanese economy are a bit like 
roots in a swamp; there are just so many o f them and they are tied together and you 
really have little choice but to go down there and start cutting away at the roots. If you 
try just by chopping down individual trees in the swamp, 1 don’t think you are going to 
get too far. And it seemed to us that whether the issue was the distribution system, lack 
of enforcement o f  anticompetitive laws, the lack o f openness in the direct investment 
system, the policies on land use -  all of those really played fundamental roles.'1()S
SI I would emerge as ’the broadest attempt ever undertaken to address underlying 
differences in structure between the US and Japanese economies’ (Janow 1994: 70). It 
underlined how many in the free trade-oriented agencies in the US government had 
signed on to elements of the hardline/revisionist view that the market was not working as 
it should in Japan. Still, some of the more ardent free traders in the Bush Administration 
had reservations with SI I. As then Deputy USTR Linn Williams recalls:
The cabinet officials bought off on it with some difficulty. I think that the ideological 
free traders -  Darman, Kemp, Boskin slightly less -  didn’t like it because they thought it 
was intervention in another country’s system. The cabinet bought off on it for pragmatic 
reasons. I think they bought our [USTR’s] argument that it could make a difference, but 
they understood that if it did make a difference it would be over an extended period o f 
time. What really made the difference to them, and I know it made the difference to 
Bush, was that it softened Super 301.409
Along with the tactical considerations, Schoppa (1997: 74-75) highlights the role of ideas 
in explaining the content of SII. At least in part, it was the product of ‘the ideological 
battle between traditional liberal economic and Cold War principles on the one hand and 
the emerging “revisionist” views on the other’. While hardliners were keen to focus on 
results, most of the team assembled by President Bush ‘saw such creeping revisionism as 
a threat to US leadership of the global trade regime and its continued good relations with 
its Western allies. For these officials, SII represented a chance to articulate a constructive 
alternative to the managed trade approach, to tackle exactly those barriers that bothered 
the revisionists, but with a rule-based approach’ (Schoppa 1997: 75). The Commerce 
Department’s Mike Farren sums up SB’s appeal to some of the more hardline officials in 
the Bush Administration:
When we got to the review of Japan most of the people around the table had been
through the MOSS process and been actively engaged in the 301 process ... And it was
408 Dallara, interview, 1996.
409 Williams, interview, 1996.
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also pretty clear that if you were to cite specific practices for 301 and then tried to define 
it by sector into a matrix, the same practices would show up in every sector. There was 
actually a discussion about “Super 301-ing” all of Japan. That, everyone finally agreed, 
was perhaps too provocative, although it would have satisfied Congress and it also would 
have been very accurate. You could have easily justified it intellectually. ...
So it was agreed that instead we would propose to the Japanese in a positive fashion a 
bilateral set of negotiations on structural impediments. Basically all the same practices 
you would have cited in Super 301 and all the practices that cut across sectors, but do it 
in a nonconfrontational, much less provocative way.410
Linn Williams acknowledges the influence of revisionism, but also highlights the degree 
to which SI I was premised on a different view of the scope for change in Japan. He 
argues that:
The notion was that there are structural barriers and that they are removable. That’s 
where we parted company with the revisionists. The revisionists say there are structural 
barriers and they are there forever; there is nothing you can do and therefore all we 
should do is negotiate sectoral deals. ...
1 think one of the things that had taken root in the Bush Administration was that element 
of revisionism which says that the Japanese system is functioning differently in many 
ways. That had taken root. What had not taken root is the darker side of revisionism 
which is that the system is antithetical to our agenda of change and one has to just strike 
a Faustian peace. That never took hold.411
On 25 May 1989, the Bush Administration proposed structural talks at the same time that 
it announced that Super 301 was to be targeted narrowly on three government-related 
barriers in Japan (on supercomputers, satellites and forest products). USTR Hills 
declared that, ‘These negotiations would initially focus on major structural barriers to 
imports such as rigidity in the distribution system and pricing mechanisms. The 
negotiations sought by the United States in the structural adjustment initiative will 
address broader issues and will take place outside of Section 301’. The Bush 
Administration went to great lengths to paint SI I as distinct from the confrontational
410 Farren, interview, 1996.
111 Williams, interview, 1996.
412 International Trade Reporter, 6(22), 3 1 May 1989, p. 684.
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posture struck by the Super 301 provision.' In a statement to hearings by the House 
Ways and Means subcommittee on trade, Ambassador Hills stated that a different 
mechanism was needed to take up such issues as Japan’s distribution system and 
competition laws because ‘a rigorous time frame might not be conducive to constructive 
negotiations’ (Naka 1996: 52). Even so, Japanese officials approached S1I warily, laying 
down three conditions for their involvement: (1) that it was not a ‘"negotiation”, (2) that it 
was a two-way dialogue discussing structural problems not only in Japan but also in the 
United States, and (3) that the outcomes not be interpreted as trade agreements 
actionable under US trade law (Naka 1996: 25-26).
President Bush and Prime Minister Uno formally launched SI I on 14 July 1989, stating 
that the talks were designed to ‘identify and solve structural problems in both countries 
that stand as impediments to trade and to balance of payments adjustment with the goal 
of contributing to the reduction of payments imbalances’.414 The two leaders agreed to 
establish a joint interagency working group at sub-cabinet level to undertake the talks 
and to present a final report to the heads of government within a year.41:1 The United 
States proposed six issues related to the operation of Japan’s economy: (1) the savings- 
investment imbalance, (2) the price mechanism, (3) the distribution system, (4) collusive 
business practices, (5) land reform, and (6) keiretsu arrangements. In order to at least 
give an appearance of two-way dialogue, Japanese officials nominated seven areas of the 
US economy: (1) US saving and investment patterns, (2) corporate investment activity 
and supply capacity, (3) corporate behaviour, (4) government regulation, (5) research 
and development, (6) export promotion, and (7) workforce education and training. As 
Armacost (1996: 49) notes:
41 ’ As then Deputy USTR Williams recalls, The political view was to bring Super 301 and Sll out 
together because it had the benefit of softening the Super 301 law. Unfortunately, it also had the 
detriment of characterising Sll as a trade negotiation, albeit a different kind of negotiation that did not 
have Super 301 behind it’. Williams, interview, 1996. Michael Armacost recounts that ‘in the initial 
presentation to the Japanese it was taken out of the 301 context and we rationalised it by saying: “we 
don’t want to put them in the framework that Congress has created”. So the aim was to secure some of 
the leverage Congress had provided without putting yourself in a straight-jacket that required all these 
things to be put in the context of Super 301 with all the deadlines and so forth that were associated with 
it’. Armacost, interview, 1996.
414 ‘Joint Statement by President Bush and Prime Minister Uno on Economic Issues’, White House 
Office of the Press Secretary, 14 July 1989.
41:1 On the US side, the SII working group included: Treasury, USTR, State, Commerce, Justice and the 
CEA; and on the Japanese side: Foreign Affairs, MITI, Finance, the Economic Planning Agency 
(EPA), and the JFTC.
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The Japanese reluctantly agreed to it for several reasons: they could not deny the need to 
do something about the trade imbalance; the proposal was advanced by President Bush 
himself; it allowed talks to take place outside the Super 301 framework; and since each 
side would be able to present its concerns, the Japanese could construe the process as a
- . * 416two-way street.
In order to present SII in the best possible light, American officials made maximum use 
of reform proposals from within Japan. This involved an exhaustive survey of 
suggestions that had emanated from Japanese sources, including the Maekawa 
Commission, the Administrative Reform Council, industrial federations like Keidanren 
and Keizai Doyukai, academic journals, as well as the popular press (Armacost 1996:50). 
As the Commerce Department’s lead SII official recalls:
We made the decision in SII to trace every one of our requests back to a Japanese source, 
for example, the Maekawa Commission. So at one point we presented 200 
recommendations in a consolidated list and we could have annotated every one of those 
recommendations back to a Japanese commission, government agency, scholar, or 
political leader. So it was clear these were not US demands. They were demands that 
Japanese experts had made of their own government over the last 10 to 15 years. And 
that was very persuasive to the Japanese press."7
For the Japanese government, however, the incursion of SII into such politically 
sensitive areas as land policy and the distribution system was something to be staunchly 
resisted. As Schoppa (1997: 12) observes, ‘the list of interests adversely affected by US 
proposals looked like a “who’s who” of the rich and powerful in Japanese politics’. From 
the first SII meeting in September 1989, Japanese officials rebutted criticisms made by 
their US counterparts of structural barriers, seeking to switch the focus to the US budget 
deficit and arguing that most of the US complaints were ‘misunderstandings’. ‘ By the 
end of the second round of SII talks in November, US officials vented their frustration 
with the lack of progress. Treasury Assistant Secretary Charles Dallara complained that 
there was ‘less flexibility [than expected from the Japanese side] in reaching a common 
ground on the nature of the problems, even problems generally recognized as problems 
in Japan. ... There was a general unwillingness to look at ways to make changes’. At 
this point, US officials intensified work on a more concrete list of Japanese impediments
416 Yamamura (1990: 4) suggests that the Japan’s agenda was accepted "only to make it easier for the 
Japanese to participate’.
417 Farren, interview, 1996.
418 InternationaI Trade Reporter, 6(36), 13 September 1989, p. 1138.
417 Inside US Trade, 7(45), 10 November 1989, p. 7. International Trade Reporter, 6(45), 16 November 
1989, p. 1466.
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and measures to address them.
The Bush Administration also faced a sullen Congress, less than impressed with what 
they saw as a minimalist deployment of Super 301 against Japan. Scepticism about SII, 
especially in relation to enforcement, was evident at congressional hearings in November 
1989, and again in February-March 1990. Congressional hardliners continued to favour a 
more draconian Super 301 response to Japan’s structural barriers. Even before hearings 
in November, key congressional hardliners led by Senator Max Baucus (D, MT), chair of 
the Senate Finance Committee’s international trade subcommittee, began threatening to 
‘require Section 301 to be used against Japanese structural barriers should the SII fail’.420 
This scepticism was mirrored by revisionist hardliners such as Clyde Prestowitz, by now 
a regular panellist before congressional hearings on US-Japan trade relations. Appearing 
before the Joint Economic Committee on 11 October 1989, Prestowitz criticised SII as 
the United States ‘spinning its wheels’ in efforts to reduce structural barriers. Advocating 
an approach geared towards ‘cutting a deal’, Presowitz said that, ‘We need to be honest 
and see that certain markets just aren’t going to open’.4“1
By early 1990, American demands had become more specific following the presentation 
of a list of 240 demands under the six SII headings (Naka 1996: 55) 422 This was later 
narrowed to a list of 18 items as the deadline for an interim agreement approached (Naka 
1996: 79). Increased American pressure was brought to bear at a summit meeting 
between President Bush and Prime Minister Kaifu in March 1990. Following the 
meeting, Prime Minister Kaifu pledged to make ‘maximum efforts’ to resolve 
outstanding trade disputes and convened a cabinet-level group to find results on SII.42, 
An interim report was released in early April 1990 with Japan agreeing to US demands 
in a range of areas. The major focus was on commitments to increase public works 
spending over ten years, a shortening of administration and approval times under the 
Large Retail Store Law, and a proposed increase in cartel surcharges under Japan’s Anti- 
Monopoly law. USTR Hills described the interim report as ‘enough to be a good
120 International Trade Reporter, 6(39), 4 October 1989, p. 1264.
421 International Trade Reporter, 6(41), 18 October 1989, 1349-1350.
122 In response, Japan developed a list of 80 items of structural reform in the United States. 
International Trade Reporter, 7(14), 4 April 1990, p. 461.
International Trade Reporter, 7(10), 7 March 1990, p. 324. Inside US Trade, 8(12), 23 March 1990, 
P-3.
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downpayment' and a ‘blueprint we need to build on’. “ The US seetion of the interim 
report did not include many new commitments on the part of the Bush Administration.
In subsequent weeks, officials argued over the details of the SI I package, with the 
Japanese government resisting American demands for a specific target for public works 
spending as a share of GNP.42? On 28 June 1990, the US and Japan announced the final 
SI1 report stating that measures ‘should contribute to the promotion of open and 
competitive markets, the reduction of trade and current account imbalances, and an 
improved quality of life’.426 While rejecting a specific share of GNP on public works, 
Japan agreed to a $2.8 trillion package over the 1990s. Other commitments announced 
included the shortening of the approval process for applications to build Large Retail 
Stores to 12 months, foreshadowed legislation on land taxation reform, and more 
‘vigorous enforcement’ of Japan’s Anti-Monopoly law with ‘much stronger criminal 
enforcement’. Officials agreed to follow up the final report with annual reports on each 
country’s progress in solving problems raised in SIT while affirming that These talks 
have taken and will take place outside seetion 301 of the US Trade Act'.427
424
Various interpretations have surrounded the results secured by the US across the 
different SII agenda items. Schoppa (1997: 9) found that the US ‘achieved much of what 
it wanted' in the areas of Japan’s savings-investment imbalance, distribution system and 
land policy, but ‘came away with very little’ on collusive business practices and keiretsu 
arrangements.428 Naka (1996: 222) similarly found a high level of Japanese concession 
on savings and investment patterns, a medium level of concession on the distribution 
system and on land policy, a low level of concession on exclusionary business practices, 
and lower still on keiretsu. While US officials sought to exert further leverage on issues
424 International Trade Reporter, 7(15), I 1 April 1990, p. 496. Inside US Trade, 8(15), 13 April 1990, 
p. I 1. On 27 April, USTR Hills announced that Japan would not be named under Super 301 in 1990. 
‘Perhaps Japan had the farthest to go, but it moved farther and faster than any of our trading partners in 
the past 12 months’. Hills told a press conference. International Trade Reporter, 7(18), 2 May 1990, p. 
614.
425 International Trade Reporter, 7(23), 6 June 1990, p. 790. The reported target was an average 9 per 
cent public works spending to GNP ratio. As Dallara observes, the infrastructure spending issue 
‘became a real sort of cause celebre for both sides’. Dallara, interview, 1996.
426 inside US Trade -  Special Report, 29 June 1990, p. 1. International Trade Reporter, 7(27), 4 July 
1990, p. 982.
427 Inside US Trade, 8(27), 6 July 1990, p. 9.
42S Within a “two-level game” approach, this variation in outcomes is seen as reflecting largely the 
variable efficacy of different strategies employed by the United States to take advantage of divisions of 
opinion and interest on the Japanese side. (Schoppa 1997).
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such as keiretsu business arrangements where Japan made only minor concessions, SI1 
would suffer from a loss of momentum following the 1990 agreement. Armacost (1996: 
56) writes that:
June 1990 proved to be the high-water mark for the S1I process. Successful resolution of 
differences over some unusually sensitive issues had been achieved without provoking a 
serious nationalist backlash in either country. ... Regrettably, negotiations went downhill 
from there. Not that any organized effort on either side sought to roll back the 
commitments made. But the momentum for collaboration gradually dissipated.
... On the Japanese side, the bureaucracy, which detested the SI I process, dug in its heels 
about making any new commitments. More generally, the impetus for reform in Japan 
stalled in 1991 as the bubble economy burst. Implementing an agreement could not 
command the kind of press attention that negotiating it had, and the public gradually lost 
interest.
Likewise, former USTR official Merit Janow highlights the stalemate SI I had reached in 
the last years of the Bush Administration. She recalls that:
It was extremely time intensive in terms of research at the first stage and outreach at all 
stages — with Japanese academics, business, opposition, consumers and actively with 
the press — the results of which were often inchoate. It was seen as very positive if a 
major newspaper took up an issue and did its own series on it. ... But it was enormously 
time intensive and SI I was not met with very much enthusiasm in this country. It was 
very hard to say how the Japanese business environment had been substantially altered 
as a result of the terribly time- and resource-intensive process. So you began to see both 
US businesses and the Congress get very tired of Sll. ... By the end it was an 
excruciating process, and I believed in it.429
By 1992, the Bush Administration was under a more general assault from critics arguing 
that the president was out of touch with the economic anxieties of average Americans. 
The political circumstance favoured a policy entrepreneur adept at forming a new 
governing coalition and at articulating the need for policy redirection. For the first time, 
the hardline ascendancy was about to find voice in the highest levels of the US policy 
process.
Conclusion
By the start of the 1990s hardline propositions on which the case for a results-oriented 
Japan policy rested had gained a new level of credibility within the American trade 
policy community. This reflected both a more politically defensive free trade coalition
429 Merit Janow, interview with author, 12 March 1996, New York.
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and learning across the American trade policy community that the way Japan worked 
challenged free trade orthodoxy. Within a few years, a long list of American 
economists, including highly reputable figures in international economics, had lent 
support to the view that Japan was indeed different in terms of its international 
openness and the pervasiveness of collusive, insider relationships. The Bush 
Administration’s Structural Impediments Initiative incorporated lessons from this 
puzzling about Japan by the free traders, but in a deliberately process-oriented 
framework. S1I was designed to deal with what pragmatic free traders saw as the 
structural sources of trade tensions, but with the additional aim of holding off 
pressures for a high-profile, results-oriented approach. The following chapter looks at 
the final stage in the ascendancy of the hardliners as a coupling of hardline ideas with 
politically advantageous times ensured such pressures encountered no such resistance 
in the Clinton Administration.
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9 The Revisionist Moment with a Hardliner-in-Chief
He [Democratic Party Leader in the House, William Larkinj became passionate, and very 
detailed, about the intransigence o f the Japanese in trade negotiations. Stanton [Southern 
Governor running for president] showed he could be equally passionate, and even more detailed, 
on the same subject ’.
Anonymous (1996), Primary Colors, p. 241.
Introduction
The first term of the Clinton Administration was the culmination of a somewhat 
haphazard shift by the United States towards a results-oriented market access policy 
towards Japan. It marked the final phase in the ascendancy of the hardliners in the 
American trade policy community and the high tide of their efforts at securing 
measurable results across a range of sectors. As in the past, the United States requested 
that Japan take specific actions to open its market. What distinguished the first term ol 
the Clinton Administration was the emphasis on quantitative indicators of market access, 
and on demands for trend-line improvements. In the words of one US government 
official, ‘the main difference was in taking what had been an exceptional policy ol the 
Reagan and Bush Administrations and putting it at the centre of our policy'.4’0
The Clinton Administration’s Japan policy was a marriage of political entrepreneurship 
to hardline policy ideas. With the Democratic Party capturing the White House for the 
first time in 12 years, an obvious political logic attached to embracing a supposedly new 
and better approach while casting the policies of previous Republican administrations as 
synonymous with failure. The Arkansas Governor’s election campaign meshed domestic 
coalition-building with a more aggressive commercial policy by appealing to 
constituencies threatened by economic change and anxious about American economic 
decline. Soon after he was elected, President Clinton promised to ensure "that economics 
is no longer a poor cousin to old school diplomacy' (Dryden 1995: 383). As one 
knowledgeable analyst has observed, "When Clinton said economics should get a higher 
priority in US foreign policy, it was Japan that was foremost in his mind' (Destler 1996: 
21-22).
1,0 Not-for-attribution interview.
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I he Clinton Administration exemplified how deeply a process of learning about the 
Japan problem had lodged in the American trade policy community by the early 1990s. 
With the White House setting the tone, executive branch agencies that traditionally had 
sought to temper a hardline approach -  the Treasury, the CEA and the State Department 
-  were key institutional actors in formulating and defending a results-oriented policy 
towards Japan. Revisionist articles of faith -  that the Japanese market was closed, that 
past negotiations and agreements (with the odd exception) had not yielded results, and 
that Japan’s government already managed trade -  encountered negligible intellectual 
resistance. Officials might emphasise different aspects of the Japan problem and debate 
negotiating tactics (often inconclusively). But, from the president down, the Clinton 
Administration was determined to make a Japan policy based on quantitative indicators 
of market access the distinguishing element of its trade policy.
The first phase of this process was the period from the negotiation of the July 1993 
Framework Agreement to the impasse at the February 1994 summit meeting between 
President Clinton and Japanese Prime Minister Morohiro Hosokawa. Exactly what the 
Clinton Administration demanded of Japan in this initial phase of Framework talks 
remains an issue of contention. The range of actors involved and the clouding of US 
goals in the often-vague language of negotiating tactics complicate the picture. Yet the 
evidence suggests that in key sectors the United States sought to secure specific 
numerical commitments in market access agreements with Japan. This in turn generated 
intense resistance from the Japanese government to anything that smacked of a numerical 
target.
The key agreements secured by the Clinton Administration between 1994 and 1996 
established some new benchmarks in bilateral negotiations. But, at the same time, the 
Japanese government was successful in blunting demands for explicit quantitative 
indicators or targets. The high-profile dispute over automotive products in 1995 proved a 
critical test of the Clinton Administration’s leverage to realise its results-oriented 
objectives. The renegotiation of the US-Japan semiconductor agreement in 1996 with 
reduced government involvement signified a more general retreat from a market access 
strategy focused on quantitative indicators that had proved contentious and difficult to 
implement.
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By the end of the Clinton Administration's first term in office, a range of factors helped 
to explain the reduced impetus for an aggressive results-oriented policy. The two primary 
factors were the strong and sustained resistance by Japan to quantitative market access 
indicators and the increasingly divergent economic performances of the United States 
and Japan. The negotiation of a stronger set of global trade rules with the establishment 
of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and renewed attention to bilateral security 
issues further reinforced the scaling back of American demands. By the mid 1990s, the 
sense of competitive threat from Japan that had underpinned the rise of the hardliners 
had been largely overtaken by an air of “Japan fatigue" in Washington.
The Clintonites take charge
Bill Clinton’s election to the presidency in November 1992 ushered in a period of intense 
conflict in US-Japan trade relations arising from US demands for measurable 
improvements in market access in Japan. To be sure, relations with Japan were not 
among the major issues in the 1992 US election. The successful Clinton campaign was 
centred on an activist plan to restore American economic growth and competitiveness 
and to address pressing domestic issues such as health care, education, and crime 
(Clinton and Gore 1992). While recognising that America’s economic performance 
hinged overwhelmingly on domestic economic policies, the Clinton team also argued 
strongly for a more aggressive trade policy to open world markets for American 
products. As described by one senior Clinton Administration official, it was committed 
to ‘an export-activist trade policy directed at opening markets, expanding trade, and 
ensuring that our major trading partners bear a greater responsibility for supporting the 
global trading system’.431
As a presidential candidate, Bill Clinton supported efforts to conclude the Uruguay 
Round of GATT and, with certain qualifications, to ratify the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA). But he also decried a history of ‘empty promises on trade’ 
and proposed the revival of the controversial Super 301 provision as a unilateral tool for 
forcing open markets. In a speech before the election, Clinton said that, ‘Although the
4,1 Statement by Lawrence Summers, Undersecretary of Treasury for International Affairs, before the 
Japan Society in New York, 20 May 1993.
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US has negotiated many trade agreements, particularly with Japan, results have been 
disappointing. 1 will ensure that all trade agreements are lived up to' (Lincoln 1999: 
123). Journalist John Judis recounts that:
During the campaign, Clinton began educating himself on trade strategy and US-Japan 
economic relations. At the urging of Derek Shearer, the campaign’s unofficial 
spokesman on US-Japan relations, Clinton read the writings of former US trade 
negotiator Glen Fukishima; he also read [Clyde] Prestowitz’s Trading Places, Lester 
Thurow’s Head-to-Head, Robert Kuttner’s The End o f Laissez-Faire and [Laura] 
Tyson's Who's Bashing Whom? Together, these authors argued for a revision of US 
trade strategy and of the American view of Japan.4 ’2
Common threads connected the Japan hardliners and revisionists with calls for the 
United States to adopt a more activist, “strategic" trade policy. The premise was that 
with the end of the Cold War economic competition between states had displaced 
military competition at the centre of international affairs. This loose collection of ideas 
appeared to resonate with a president keen to display his hands-on commitment to 
putting economic issues at the centre of foreign policy. In his critical analysis of the so- 
called “strategic traders” and their newfound influence in the Clinton Administration, 
economist Paul Krugman (1994: 267) would argue that:
one should not have in mind a picture of the President being sold a set of ideas that he 
did not understand. ... Bill Clinton wasn’t captured by the strategic traders: he was a 
strategic trader himself. He was in one person both policy entrepreneur and politician.
In what would prove a trademark of his policy disposition, President Clinton's first 
major address on international economic issues combined messages of economic 
orthodoxy with calls for new policy approaches.4" Saying that America ‘must compete, 
not retreat’, he sort to dispel any notion that this “New Democrat" president would cave- 
in to protectionism. At the same time, President Clinton argued that 'it is time for us to 
make trade a priority element of American security’. The new administration would 
avoid the ‘extremes’ of the trade debate -  the views that ‘government should build walls 
to protect firms from competition' or that ‘government should do nothing in the face of
4,2 ‘Rougher Trade’ by John B. Judis, The New Republic, 3 1 May 1993, p. 28. Advisers on Japan 
included Glen Fukushima, former director of the Japan office in USTR, Derek Shearer, a professor at 
Occidental College outside Los Angeles, and Michael Mochizuki, a professor at the University of 
Southern California. Inside US Trade, 10(46), 13 November 1992, p. 6. JEI Report 39A, 14 October 
1994.
l" Remarks by President Bill Clinton at American University Centennial Celebration, White House 
Office of the Press Secretary, 26 February 1993.
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foreign competition’. The president said his administration’s trade policy would ‘bypass 
the distracting debates over whether efforts should be multilateral, regional, bilateral, or 
unilateral. The fact is that each of these efforts has its place’. President Clinton’s early 
support for completion of the Uruguay Round and NAFTA left Japan policy as the 
obvious outlet for a more aggressive trade stance.
The new president sat at the apex of an administration determined to overturn the 
perceived historical bias in favour of US-Japan security relations to the detriment of 
American economic interests. According to Roger Altman, Treasury Deputy Secretary 
and a key architect of the Clinton Administration’s Japan policy, the administration 
‘began with a sense that prior administrations had put security and foreign policy issues 
ahead of economic and trade issues. They may well have had fine reasons for that, but 
we were going to reverse the priorities’.4 4 Distinguishing the Clinton Administration 
from earlier administrations was the degree of unity behind this objective and the extent 
of presidential involvement in reversing priorities. The administration ‘was filled with 
officials who saw themselves as “Japan hawks’” (Destler 1996: 22). The White House 
itself set the tone. Edward Lincoln (1999: 123) notes that, ‘The interest of President 
Clinton in spending time on these issues in speeches and meetings represented a change. 
So the incoming administration chose to shift the emphasis on Japan from security to 
economics and assigned these issues a higher priority on the crowded presidential 
agenda’.40 In his first formal press conference on 23 March 1993, the president 
highlighted the US-Japan trade imbalance and the market access problems faced by 
American companies, saying that ‘the persistence of the [trade] surplus the Japanese 
enjoy with the United States and with the rest of the developed world can only lead one 
to the conclusion that the possibility of obtaining real, even access to the Japanese 
market is somewhat remote’.4’6
Early statements by key Clinton appointees underscored the administration’s intention to 
get tough with Japan and to distance itself from past policies. At his Senate confirmation 
hearing in January 1993, new USTR Mickey Kantor pointedly rejected any attachment to
1,1 Roger Altman, telephone interview with author, 5 August 1996.
4.5 Lincoln served as economic adviser to Walter Mondale, US Ambassador to Japan during the first 
Clinton Administration.
4.6 MacKnight (1994, Appendix: 5).
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‘trade theology’, stating his intention ‘not to engage in endless debate about whether 
someone is a free trader, a protectionist, a managed trader, or results-oriented’ (Lavin 
1993: 30). Before the Senate Finance Committee on 9 March 1993, Kantor argued that 
‘the US-Japan trade relationship needs immediate and serious attention. ... despite 
efforts by both sides, we still find ourselves with an intolerable trade deficit, and still 
limited access to this critical market’.437 On an early visit to Japan, President Clinton’s 
Commerce Secretary Ron Brown provided a textbook articulation of a hardline policy 
approach informed by revisionist ideas. Brown stated that:
The Clinton Administration intends to end our American obsession with process. Our 
focus will, instead, be on results. Markets will be considered open not when rules and 
regulations and arrangements change, but when we see that American products, 
successful all over the world, have an equal opportunity for success in Japan. By this 
measure, our semiconductor agreement is a success. ... What we are doing, is freeing 
ourselves from the bonds of trade dogma.* 4 ’8
More significant than the views of senior figures in USTR and Commerce was the 
general blurring of the dividing line between hardliners and free traders when it came to 
Japan. According to one Clinton Administration Treasury official:
A feature of this administration was a much more unified view on the need to be 
consistently tough. In the past, Treasury and State were often viewed as checks on the 
“hawks”, but in this administration there was a much stronger consensus that unless you 
were able to make significant progress in resolving trade problems [with Japan] you were 
going to see more damaging corrosion in the relationship over time. That’s why the 
credible “dove” position became quite “hawkish” .4 ’9
A number of key Clinton Administration officials, including Chairman of the National 
Economic Council Robert Rubin, NEC Deputy Director W. Bowman Cutter, Treasury 
Deputy Secretary Roger Altman, and Commerce Undersecretary for International Trade 
Jeffrey Garten, shared a hawkish view of Japan shaped by private sector business 
dealings prior to joining the administration. Rubin, for example, was quoted as saying 
that ‘we have all learned from our experience with Japan. I do believe in free trade, but I
4,7 Testimony of United States Trade Representative Ambassador Mickey Kantor before the Senate
Finance Committee, 9 March 1993.
4 ,8 Remarks by Secretary of Commerce Ronald H. Brown before the American Chamber of Commerce 
in Japan, 23 April 1993, Tokyo.
4 ,9 Not-for-attribution interview.
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believe in two-way free trade, and we haven’t had two-way free trade’. Cutter, who 
previously had managed a business-consulting firm, recounted how:
Company after company with whom 1 did business wouldn’t even consider initiating 
operations in Japan or strategically pinpointing Japan as a potential major market; not 
because of their view that their products weren't better than Japanese products on price 
or whatever, but [due to] the sense that what they would do is spend an endless amount 
of time doing it and, at the same time, the Japanese business-government relationships 
would ensure they would fail.441
440
Surveying the Clinton team after a year in office, Washington Post journalist Clay 
Chandler concluded that:
The team the president has assigned to manage America’s relationship with its most 
important trade partner is made up of neither scholars steeped in the subtleties of 
Japanese ’language and culture, nor striped-suit diplomats versed in the complexities of 
the US-Japanese security relationship. Instead, most of them are business professionals -  
like Altman, National Economic Council Chairman Robert E. Rubin and Rubin’s deputy, 
W. Bowman Cutter -  who gained their knowledge of Japan in the school of hard knocks, 
trying to help US companies pry open markets in Japan and fend off a seemingly 
unstoppable invasion of Japanese competitors at home. ... they acknowledge privately 
that their experiences have left them fed up with Japan's restrictive business practices, 
wary of Japanese assurances and convinced of the need to precisely quantify Tokyo’s 
progress in opening its markets.442
This hard-edged view of Japan was replicated across the traditional free trade agencies in 
the executive branch. As Treasury Secretary, Lloyd Bentsen was a stout defender of 
fiscal conservativism and open trade. Even so, the former chairman of the Senate 
Finance Committee had been one of the main architects of Super 301 and the 
congressional strategy to pressure the Bush Administration into a tougher Japan policy. 
Bentsen’s Undersecretary of International Affairs at Treasury, Lawrence Summers, 
married strong credentials as an academic economist with a tough line on Japan. In 1989, 
Summers endorsed a results-oriented Japan policy in a stinging attack on the book The 
Japan That Can Say No by Akio Morita and Shintaro Ishihara. Writing in the New York 
Times, Summers argued that:
The United States learned a lesson in dealing with civil rights. Only when policy shifted
to a results-based standard, in which companies were presumed to have discriminated if
440 "Old Master’ by John B. Judis, The New Republic, 13 December 1993, p. 24. Destier (1996: 37) 
notes that on Japan trade issues, ‘Rubin considered himself a hawk on the matter, having had unhappy 
experiences with Japan at Goldman Sachs’.
441 W. Bowman Cutter, telephone interview with author, 29 August 1996.
442 ‘Japan team has learned the hard way’ by Clay Chandler, Washington Post, 22 February 1994, p. 
Al.
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they did not achieve certain hiring goals, did it start to have real effects. The same logic 
suggests that we should lead a worldwide effort to establish goals for Japanese imports of 
manufactured goods. If these goals are not met, we should Und ways of retaliating that
443would harm Japanese commercial interests without hurting American consumers.
Summers set out the Clinton Administration’s approach to Japan with particular clarity 
in the Financial Times in June 1993:
Strategic continuity in the [US-Japan] relationship will require economic discontinuity -  
a fundamental change in Japan in the way economic integration is promoted and its
benefits shared......Japan has an imbalance problem -  a chronic external surplus rooted in
macroeconomic forces. And it has a penetration problem -  a peculiar resistance to 
foreign goods, services and investment that cannot be explained by benign factors like 
geography, a modest endowment of natural resources, or the competitiveness of its 
products.
... the ultimate test of any trade agreement is the changes it brings about. And it is 
difficult to see any other way than by looking at benchmarks to monitor progress. ... The 
lesson of trade negotiations with Japan is that exceptional measures are sometimes
444necessary.
President Clinton’s choice of Laura Tyson as chair of the Council of Economic Advisers 
was especially notable given her clearly articulated view that some forms of managed 
trade were preferable to free trade with an economy such as Japan.44:1 Tyson’s 1992 
book, Who 's Bashing Whom? Trade Conflict in High Technology Industries, argued that 
America’s competitiveness problems were attributable, at least in part, to manipulative 
trade and industrial policies of its trading partners, especially Japan. She shared the 
revisionist view that whatever the differences between American and European 
capitalism, they paled in comparison with those between American and Japanese 
capitalism. While a critic of protectionism, Tyson made the case for ‘cautious activism’ 
in America's trade and industrial policies. She was comfortable with unorthodox 
approaches towards Japan, arguing that ‘in Japan something akin to managed trade is 
often required to achieve something akin to a market outcome' (Tyson 1992: 263). She 
offered support for VIEs such as the semiconductor agreement, ‘if the alternative is a
44 ’ ‘Tough Talk from Tokyo: What to do when Japan says “No”’ by Lawrence Summers, New York 
Times, Section 3, p. 2. According to one observer, 'Bentsen and Treasury Undersecretary Lawrence 
Summers stressed revaluation [of the yen] over results in dealing with Japan, but they have not been 
against choosing sectoral targets’. ‘Rougher Trade’ by John B. Judis, The New Republic, 3 I May 1993, 
p. 29.
111 ‘Now is the time to spend -  Japan must boost demand-led growth and open its markets’ by 
Lawrence Summers, Financial Times, 29 June 1993, p. 14.
445 Drew (1994: 26) writes that President Clinton ‘admired’ Tyson’s work, 'especially her writings on 
trade policy’, seeing her as someone who was less of a purist on trade.
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situation in which a given national market is reserved for national suppliers' (Tyson 
1992: 264). In her Senate confirmation hearing, Tyson noted that the US ‘needs to 
recognise that the kind of international competition we are engaged in is not simply a 
market phenomenon' and that hence ‘free trade is not necessarily and automatically the 
best policy'.446
Alan Blinder of Princeton University, another CEA member closely involved in the early 
formulation of Japan policy, exemplified how sections of the economics profession 
traditionally at the core of the free trade coalition were prepared to discard orthodoxy in 
the case of Japan. He has argued that:
Japan involves a perversion of what economists say trade is about ... you gain from 
importing and you export in order to earn money to import. The Japanese don't see it that 
way. It’s a very clannish, clubbish style of capitalism. It is hard for outsiders to penetrate 
and foreigners are almost automatically outsiders. ... The rationalisation for the sort of 
approach we took was that the Japanese were managing trade. In some sense all trade in 
Japan is managed and it didn’t really make sense to take this holier than thou attitude.447
The 1994 Economic Report o f  the President would highlight how free trade opinion on 
the Japan problem had fragmented since the early 1980s, when the Reagan 
Administration’s top economists vigorously attacked hardline arguments. The Clinton 
Administration’s CEA argued that:
Japan presents a special case for the United States. ... certain of Japan’s trade patterns 
appear to differ from those of other major industrial countries. Japan has an unusually 
low share of manufactured imports in domestic consumption, an unusually low share of 
intraindustry trade, an unusually small stock of inward foreign direct investment, an 
unusually small share of domestic sales accounted for by foreign-owned firms, and an 
unusually high share of intrafirm trade, which is predominantly controlled, moreover, by 
Japanese rather than foreign-based firms. ... The existence of such a large, 
technologically dynamic, and distinctive economy as Japan poses special trade problems 
for the United States (CEA 1994: 15-20).
Mainstream economists were not the only elements of the Free Trade-Good Relations 
coalition supportive of a more aggressive Japan policy. The end of the Cold War had left 
the role o f the State Department in international economic policy diminished, but also no
(> Inside US Trade, I 1 (3), 22 January 1993, p. 1.
44 Alan Blinder, interview with author, 6 August 1996, Princeton NJ.
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longer so clearly at odds with the hardliners.448 Winston Lord, Assistant Secretary ot 
State for East Asia and the Pacific in the first term of the Clinton Administration, saw an 
aggressive market access policy as necessary to maintain ongoing support for the US- 
Japan relationship in the American political system.
From the beginning it was clear, particularly given the tie-in to the domestic economy 
(exports and jobs), that economic matters had increasing importance generally and 
specifically with Japan. ... The relationship was in good shape, but the one area that 
needed attention and fixing was the economic side -  the persistent deficit, closed nature 
of their market, [Japan’s] global surplus. ... We knew we were going to run into some 
problems if we took the Japanese on hard over these issues, but we had no choice. If we 
let the deficit fester, and if we didn't make an effort to open that market, and be seen by 
our domestic audience (including the Congress) that we were going to do this, then over 
time the rest of the relationship could be affected. We would lose support for the security 
alliance, for our presence of troops and so on.44'*
By any measure, the Clinton Administration displayed a remarkable degree of consensus 
behind a hardline policy approach. Defenders of Japan were virtually non-existent and 
the old free trade coalition that had sought to block results-oriented market opening 
policies towards Japan over many years was in eclipse. As Destler (1996: 37) notes:
Unlike in previous administrations, there was not a serious gap between “hawks” at 
USTR and Commerce and “doves” at State and Treasury. ... neither was there a strong 
NSC-State-Defense move to mute economic conflict for the sake of the broader security 
relationship.
Contributing to this new level of unity on Japan across the executive branch was 
President Clinton’s major institutional innovation in high-level policy-making, the 
National Economic Council. President Clinton was keen that the NEC avoid the 
allegedly fractious economic debates within the Bush Administration, and that it play the 
role on international economic issues that the NSC had played traditionally on security 
issues. Where existing agencies maintained sway on other domestic and international 
economic issues, the NEC’s so-called “deputies group” took the lead operational role on 
Japan policy. Indeed, as Destler (1996: 22) points out, ‘the Japan issue dominated NEC
448 Craib (1994: 4) notes that by the Clinton Administration, the State Department 'instead of being 
paired primarily with the Department of Defense on international issues, now would find itself on “the 
same page” as other agencies, particularly those overseeing trade matters’.
449 Winston Lord, interview with author, 21 June 1996, Washington DC. A criticism made of the 
Clinton Administration was that none of the senior ofllcials in the State Department had significant 
experience dealing with Japan. One Japan watcher noted at the start of the administration that the 
Clinton team was well staffed with China experts (including Lord) but had 'not a Japan veteran in the 
lot’. ‘Foreign policy arm missing Japan hand’ by Don Oberdörfer, Washington Post, 30 January 1993.
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deliberations during the administration’s first 18 months, particularly at the deputies 
level'.
In fact, for substantial periods, it seems that the Japan process was the NEC at the 
deputies level. The deputies committee convened two and three times a week to discuss 
everything from large issues -  how and why the Japanese market was so closed -  to 
tactics -  who should meet with whom and what the common US message would be. ... 
This [experience] ... brought the main participants to talk the same line. Japanese seeking 
to find discrepancies between agency positions in order to play one official off against 
another were generally frustrated. And this was no mean achievement: in prior 
administrations the Japanese had done this all too well (Destler 1996: 37).4NI
The early months of the Clinton Administration saw considerable speculation 
surrounding what a results-oriented Japan policy would look like in practice. According 
to one Commerce Department official closely involved in Japan trade issues over a 
number of administrations, the shared view was that:
While there were some successful agreements, by and large the agreements that we 
negotiated through all those years were typically not particularly successful because they 
assumed that if you put rules in place that were based on market forces, then the problem 
would fix itself. ... The focus on results was really designed to get around the fact that the 
kinds o f procedures we typically think are going to work do not; you need something 
else.45'
fimed to take advantage of an administration formulating its policy was another report 
on US-Japan trade relations by the high-profile Advisory Committee on Trade Policy 
Negotiations issued in January 1993. Following on its report at the start of the Bush 
Administration, ACTPN (1993) argued even more strongly for a results-oriented Japan 
policy asserting that the ‘problem of market access in certain sectors of the Japanese 
market is unique, thus requiring unconventional solutions’. The ACTPN report suggested 
that ‘where invisible barriers exist, temporary quantitative indicators (TQIs) to measure 
progress toward achieving an open market should be used when appropriate to achieve 
true market access. These indicators should reflect a level of global imports which would 
result if commercial considerations were the sole determinant of the level of imports in a 
particular sector'. The ACT PN report recommended as a target the doubling of Japan’s 
imports of manufactured goods as a percentage of apparent consumption by the end of
450 The key participants were Bowman Cutter (NEC), Lawrence Summers and Roger Altman 
(Treasury), Joan Spero and Daniel Tarullo (State), Charlene Barshefsky (USTR), Laura Tyson and 
Alan Blinder (CEA) and, at a later point, Jeffrey Garten (Commerce) (Destler 1996: 37). The Defense 
Department was not included in NEC deliberations.
451 Marjory Searing, interview with author, 15 July 1996, Washington DC.
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the decade. In February, President Clinton met with the leadership of ACTPN, praising 
the Japan report.4̂ 2 Merit Janow, who left her position as Deputy Assistant USTR for 
Japan and China after a hand-over period to the new Japan team, recalls that the ACTPN 
report:
was latched onto by the new team as what needed to be done because it sounded sensible. 
It had the support of major American companies and this administration wanted to be 
pro-business in some areas because it had associated with labour in others. The fact that 
our trading partners hated it was not part o f  the thinking, and the fact that it was so 
heavily resisted contributed to the feeling that this must be the right way to go.45’
Particular attention focused on the sorts of agreements that might provide models for the 
Clinton team, especially the semiconductor agreement and the auto deal negotiated by 
the Bush Administration in 1992. What outgoing US Ambassador to Japan Michael 
Armacost (1996: 177) found ‘particularly noteworthy' from his discussions with Clinton 
Administration officials in February 1993 was the ‘widespread supposition -  particularly 
at the US trade representative’s office and the White House -  that the semiconductor 
agreements of 1986 and 1991 and the auto parts understandings of January 1992 were 
virtually the only bilateral trade agreements that had produced any noteworthy results’. 
Early statements and actions concerning both the semiconductor agreement and the 1992 
automotive deal did nothing to allay Japanese concerns that the Clinton Administration 
would pursue a policy of numerical targets in trade agreements. Speaking in March 1993, 
when the 20 per cent market share on semiconductors had been attained, USTR Kantor 
stated that the US expectation was one of continued market share growth over the next 
three years, and that ‘we would expect growth regardless of what happened to the 
Japanese economy’. Commenting on the wider applicability of the semiconductor 
agreement, Ambassador Kantor said that the administration would "need to evaluate it in 
terms of other sectors to see if it might bear some fruit for us. It certainly is consistent 
with the ACTPN report ... quantitative indicators and strategic industries coming 
together. And so we certainly would look at this carefully and have some interest in its 
applicability in other areas’.J a p a n e s e  fears that any explicit reference to numbers 
could take on a life of its own were heightened by a letter from USTR Kantor and
4’2 ‘Trade issues take the lead: Inside Clinton’s Japan team’ by Peter Ennis, Tokyo Business Today, July 
1993, p. 8.
Janow, interview, 1996.
454 USTR Background Briefing with Mickey Kantor and a senior US trade official, Washington DC, 19 
March 1993.
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Commerce Secretary Brown to Mi l l Minister Mori in early April 1993 characterising 
the 1992 auto parts plans announced by Japanese car manufacturers as ‘pledges’ backed 
by the Japanese government.4:0
Predictably strong messages from hardliners in Congress, plus the array of statutory 
deadlines which Congress had put in place since the mid 1980s, reinforced the Clinton 
Administration’s determination to be tough on trade with Japan. House Majority Leader 
Richard Gephardt and Senate Finance Committee chair Max Baucus endeavoured to 
keep pressure on Japan with bills almost identical to those introduced during the Bush 
Administration. In February 1993, Senator Baucus introduced bills to revive and extend 
for five years the Super 301 trade provision (S. 268) and to allow private parties to 
petition the US government for a review of whether a foreign country is complying with 
a trade agreement (S. 269).4Ml The announcement in February that Japan’s trade surplus 
with the United States had widened to $43.6 billion in 1992 was cited by Representative 
Gephardt as 'a call to action -  an end to the policies of the past and a move to a results- 
oriented trade policy’.4̂ 7 The end of March saw the release of the annual NTE report 
cataloguing unfair foreign trade practices, with 28 pages devoted to Japan. In advance of 
an end April deadline to announce any action against government procurement 
discrimination under Title VII of the 1988 Trade Act, US officials sought to secure a 
Japanese commitment for ‘a specific allocation for foreign goods and services’ as a way 
to ensure implementation of various government procurement agreements, including 
construction, computers, and supercomputers.
This hawkish coalition across a new American administration, Congress and the business 
community provided the backdrop to the first meeting between President Clinton and
455 Inside US Trade, 1 1(13), 2 April 1993, p. 9. The letter asked Minister Mori to ‘inform us of the 
steps Japan intends to take to meet this pledge to expand US auto parts sourcing’, and said that Japan 
‘must accelerate the progress that has been made to date’. As Destler (1996: 37) notes, the letter had the 
‘undesired effect of hardening Tokyo’s resistance to anything that looked like the quantitative import 
targets that Commerce and USTR favored’.
456 Inside US Trade, 11(5), 5 February 1993, p. 9.
”  JEI Report 6A, 19 February 1993, p. 9.
1 ,s Inside US Trade, 1 1(13), 2 April 1993, p. 10. International Trade Reporter, 10(13), 31 March 1993, 
p. 526. On 30 April, USTR Kantor identified Japan under Title VII as a target for special consultations 
over alleged discrimination against US firms in procurement of construction, architectural, and 
engineering services, and announced a review of Japan’s implementation of the 1990 supercomputer 
agreement. A delay in sanctions was later announced following the 60-day period for construction 
consultations. International Trade Reporter, 10(27), 7 July 1993, p. I 109.
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Japan’s Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa on 16 April 1993. The president called for The 
rebalancing of the relationship through an elevated attention to our economic 
relations’.4'̂ 9 Citing the ‘successful’ US-Japan semiconductor agreement, President 
Clinton called for a ‘focus on specific sectors and specific structures, with a view toward 
getting results’. In response, Prime Minister Miyazawa reiterated Japan’s strong 
opposition to numerical targets saying that solutions to trade problems must be ‘based 
upon the principle of free trade’ and ‘cannot be realised with managed trade or under the 
threat of unilateralism’. The two leaders agreed to set up a new framework to discuss 
US-Japan trade issues with details to be worked out before the July meeting of the G7 
industrial countries in Tokyo.
“You get as much as you can”: A Framework for confrontation
In the weeks following the April meeting between President Clinton and Prime Minister 
Miyazawa, the NEC deputies group led by Bowman Cutter and Roger Altman met 
regularly to develop a framework for negotiations with Japan. Consensus developed 
around pushing for market access results through a mechanism that simultaneously 
addressed macroeconomic imbalances, structural issues, and product-specific barriers in 
Japan. The key elements of the US proposal for a new bilateral dialogue were approved 
at cabinet-level in mid May and forwarded to President Clinton. The proposal included a 
macroeconomic goal framed in terms of an overall reduction of Japan’s current account 
surplus, and a microeconomic goal of achieving measurable results under five ‘baskets' 
of sectoral and structural issues. ‘Multiple benchmarks’ would be used to assess progress 
in the opening of the Japanese market in various sectors.460 Speaking at the Japan Society 
in New York on 20 May, Treasury Undersecretary for International Affairs Lawrence 
Summers outlined the rationale for the US strategy towards Japan describing 
macroeconomic policies directed at imbalances and microeconomic policies directed at 
import penetration as ‘like two blades of a scissor'. Criticising ‘grand, but vague designs 
to remake Japan in our own image’, an obvious allusion to the Bush Administration’s
439 ‘A promise kept: Clinton presses Japan on trade, meets election pledge’ by Susumu Awanohara, Far 
Eastern Economic Review, 29 April 1993, p. 15.
460 Inside US Trade 11(20), 21 May 1993, p. 18, Inside US Trade, 1 1(22), 4 June 1993, p. 8.
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SII, Summers argued it was time to focus ‘less on process and more on results, and 
results have to be measurable’.461
An outline of the US proposal was delivered to Japanese officials on 7 June in advance 
of meetings to thrash out the new framework. The paper laid out what the Clinton 
Administration described as the ‘basic bargain' for future negotiations.462 On the 
macroeconomic front, it called for Japan to ‘reduce its [global] current account surplus to 
a range of 1.0 to 2.0 percent of GDP within three years’. And on the microeconomic 
front, Japan should commit to ‘increase its manufactured imports by one-third as a share 
of GDP within three years’.46’ Where the US was looking to tackle structural and 
sectoral barriers, 'multiple benchmarks will be established in order to monitor progress 
in improving market access’ with the precise benchmarks to be negotiated bilaterally. 
The other key plank of the US strategy was to make the proposed framework subject to 
unprecedented high-level attention through semi-annual heads of government 
meetings.464 On the central issue of quantitative indicators, USTR Kantor maintained that 
the ‘one thing we don’t want to do, is continue along this trail where you reach 
agreements, and they’re not concrete, and you don’t have a measure of whether or not 
both sides are adhering to their responsibilities. And that’s what we’re going to insist 
upon. In certain cases, it may not mean so-called “quantitative indicators”. In certain 
cases, it might’
Discussions in advance of President Clinton’s visit to Tokyo for the G7 summit pointed 
to the hardening of attitudes among American and Japanese negotiators that would dog 
US attempts to operationalise a results-oriented policy. The deepest divisions were over 
the ground-rules for the proposed market access negotiations. Officials from MITI 
opposed any Japanese concessions, suspecting that ‘multiple benchmarks’ were just a
'461 Statement by Treasury Undersecretary for International Affairs, Lawrence Summers, before the 
Japan Society in New York, 20 May 1993.
162 Inside US Trade, 1 1(23), 1 1 June 1993, p. 1.
' The United States would agree as its part of the ‘bargain’ to ‘carry through its plans to substantially 
reduce the budget deficit, and to increase public investment’, and to ‘maintain its open market and 
investment policies, provided that there is satisfactory progress towards a more open trade and 
investment regime in Japan’.
464 Inside US Trade, 1 1(23), 1 I June 1993, pp. 13-14.
165 International Trade Reporter, 10(23) 9 June 1993, p. 934. Soon thereafter, Ambassador Kantor told 
the Senate Finance subcommittee on international trade that ‘we reserve the right to establish such 
benchmarks ourselves in order to evaluate progress in an objective manner’. Inside US Trade, 1 1(24),
I 8 June 1993, p. 6.
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guise for market share or import volume quantitative targets. It was left to Prime 
Minister Miyazawa to break the deadlock. In a personal letter to President Clinton on 2 
July he indicated that, although numerical targets were unacceptable, Japan could live 
with an ‘illustrative set of criteria’, whether qualitative or quantitative. Talks again 
reached an impasse with US officials rejecting Japanese language that the criteria would 
be used only to gauge progress, not ‘as targets or commitments for the future’.466
After difficult negotiations in Washington and Tokyo, President Clinton and Prime 
Minister Miyazawa announced the so-called Framework Agreement for a New Economic 
Partnership on 10 July.46 In line with American goals, it covered macroeconomic 
objectives and foreshadowed sectoral and structural negotiations under five baskets. 
Japan agreed to pursue policies ‘intended to achieve over the medium term a highly 
significant decrease in its current account surplus, and at promoting a significant increase 
in global imports of goods and services, including from the United States’. American 
officials had sought firmer commitments and would continue to stress their interpretation 
that the agreement should see a reduction in Japan’s external surplus within four to live 
years from over three per cent of GDP down to ‘historical norms’ of the previous two 
decades of less than two per cent (Altman 1994: 4). At the microeconomic level, the 
negotiated language called on Japan to ‘deal with structural and sectoral issues in order 
substantially to increase access and sales of competitive foreign goods and services 
through market-opening ... measures’. American officials interpreted this to mean a one- 
third increase in manufactured imports as a share of GDP over the medium term of three 
to four years (Altman 1994: 4). The nominated five baskets mirrored those proposed by 
the United States. These were (1) government procurement, especially medical 
equipment, telecommunications equipment and services, computers (including 
supercomputers) and satellites; (2) regulatory reform and competitiveness, in particular 
insurance and financial services and structural issues such as competition policy and 
distribution systems; (3) other major sectors (most notably automotive vehicles and 
parts); (4) economic harmonisation, encompassing issues such as foreign direct
4(5(5 JEI Report 26B, 16 July 1993, p. 6.
167 US State Department Dispatch, 4(28), 12 July 1993, pp. 493-496.
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investment, intellectual property rights and buyer-supplier relationships in Japan; and (5) 
implementation of existing agreements.468
The agreement largely papered over the key area of contention concerning the sort of 
market access benchmarks acceptable to both sides. The accord called for progress to be 
assessed by using ‘objective criteria, either qualitative or quantitative, or both as 
appropriate, which will be established using relevant information and/or data that both 
Governments will evaluate. ... These criteria are to be used for the purpose of evaluating 
progress achieved in each sectoral and structural area’. Important for the Clinton 
Administration’s results-oriented agenda was the insertion of language referring to the 
direction of change expected in economic variables. In the area of government 
procurement, the agreement noted that measures negotiated should ‘aim at significantly 
expanding Japanese government procurement of competitive foreign goods and 
services’. In the automotive sector, the agreement called for ‘significantly expanded sales 
opportunities to result in a significant expansion of purchases of foreign parts by 
Japanese firms in Japan and through their transplants’. While this language was 
doubtless more vague than the Clinton Administration would have wanted, it provided 
sufficient grounds for US negotiators to herald the Framework Agreement as a policy 
breakthrough.469 Negotiations on insurance, automotive products and government 
procurement of telecommunications and medical equipment were identified as ‘high 
priority areas’ with agreements to be sought within six months of the agreement, or by 
the first heads of government meeting in 1994. Agreements on remaining issues were to 
be reached by July 1994. The two sides pointedly drafted side-letters in addition to the 
Framework text. Rejecting a Japanese request, the United States reserved all rights to 
apply its national trade laws and noted explicitly that all agreements and measures 
arising under the Framework would be actionable under Section 301. In a parallel letter, 
the Japanese government reserved its right to withdraw from any negotiation if the US 
government launched Section 301 investigations on any matters under negotiation.
1<,s Apart from some minor concessions, Japan was unsuccessful in expanding the framework to include 
practices that the Japanese government and industry believed restricted business activity in the United 
States.
1<,') ‘Clinton achieves trade framework in Japanese pact’, by David Sanger, New York Times, p. 1. 
Lincoln (1999: 128) suggests that since ‘both sides make concessions in any negotiation, presumably 
the Clinton administration had initially asked for language stronger than “significant increase” on 
particular sectoral issues’.
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Announcing the Framework Agreement, President Clinton stated that, ‘We should have 
no illusions. We announced today a framework to govern specific agreements yet to be 
negotiated. Negotiating those agreements will surely be difficult. But now, at least, we 
have agreed what the outcome of these negotiations needs to be: tangible, measurable 
progress’.4'0 In practice, however, two factors would mitigate against agreement in future 
negotiations. The first was the difficulty the Clinton Administration had in specifying 
exactly what it wanted from Japan. The second was the resolve of Japanese negotiators 
to avoid any ‘objective criteria’ which could ultimately become numerical targets subject 
to the full force of US trade law.
The interagency process chaired by NEC Deputy Director and lead Framework 
negotiator Bowman Cutter had been effective in building consensus and collegiality on 
Japan policy in the early months of the administration. But it would struggle to 
operationalise a results-oriented policy when negotiations got under way.4/l For 
example, there was disagreement in the case of automotive vehicles and parts between 
those in the administration prepared to build on the processes established by the MOSS 
talks and those who saw past approaches as a complete failure, preferring simply to 
negotiate objective criteria and then hold Japan to these benchmarks.472 After 
interviewing many of the key US officials, Destler (1996: 38) quotes one participant as 
bemoaning a process:
producing “a massive amount of paper,” including draft language and “a single set of 
talking points" for negotiations, “a common press strategy”, etc. A higher-level official 
from a different agency saw much that was positive in the process but noted that the 
NEC “never got its act together in terms o f organizing the discussions in a really efficient 
way." The meetings did generate decision memos to the president from time to time, but 
they seemed to participants to be recycling the same questions over and over.
The central issue remained the nature and specificity of US demands for quantitative 
objective criteria. In congressional testimony on 22 July 1993, Deputy USTR Charlene 
Barshefsky continued to emphasise specific numerical measures of progress.
What we will be seeking in each sector are data points that will be gathered and then 
jointly monitored. We will utilize quantitative information where appropriate on such
47,1 International Trade Reporter, 10(28), 14 July 1993, p. 1 150.
1 1 With Cutter as the overall head of the US team, responsibility for the 16 subgroups identified under 
the five Framework baskets was shared between USTR and the departments of State, Treasury and 
Commerce. Inside US Trade, 11(34), 27 August 1993, p. 13.
472 Inside US Trade, 1 1(35), 3 September 1993, p. 20.
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factors as relevant market trends, market share statistics in Japan, or comparisons 
between the public and private sector. We will also employ quantitative indicators where 
helpful, such as the nature of the business links between Japanese manufacturers and 
their suppliers in the United States, or changes in the business and regulatory 
environment favoring foreign firms. There will most likely be several such data points in 
each sector; no single benchmark will determine the success or failure of a sectoral 
agreement (Ahearn 1994:2).
Bowman Cutter would reflect later on the extent to which there was ‘unstated and 
undigested disagreement' on the issue of quantitative indicators.
Probably from the beginning there was a different point of view on the part of Commerce 
and USTR as against the more macro agencies. But it was not very much debated in 
those early months because I think it was assumed by everyone that words were being 
heard in the same way. ... In part, I think something like that emerges because of the 
general intense desire of a new administration to function as a team. So no one wants to 
start a big fight by asking: “What exactly do you mean there?” ... If you distinguish 
between the word goal and the word target, it probably was the case that the 
macroeconomic agencies thought of things as goals and micro agencies thought of things 
as targets. ... I think the more micro agencies saw things much more as percentage share 
targets or growth of imports targets.4 73
Despite intense interagency discussions prior to the first round of talks in September 
1993, the United States had yet to agree on specific objectives for the targeted areas of 
insurance, automotive products and government procurement of telecommunications and 
medical equipment.4 4 At the second round of negotiations in mid October, the US team
47Stabled a range of data, along with proposals for agreements in the four priority areas.
By the third round of negotiations in November, the two sides were arguing over US- 
drafted agreements calling for ‘prompt, substantial and continuous’ increases in sales in 
targeted areas. The draft text for automotive products triggered a strong Japanese 
reaction against what was perceived as the ultimate intent of American negotiators. It 
identified quantitative criteria for foreign vehicle sales in Japan, sales of parts to 
Japanese transplants in the United States, and purchases of foreign parts in Japan, and 
stated that for these criteria ‘specific expectations shall be included in the Arrangement 
pending further discussions between the two governments’.476 The draft also called on
47-1 Cutter, interview, 1996. Lincoln (1999: 144) also argues that the administration ‘moved too quickly’ 
and ‘had not really reached internal agreement on how it wanted to proceed on issues such as how to 
define the vague notion of results-oriented negotiations’.
474 One report noted that ‘at best, apparently, the American participants could only outline the White 
House’s general objectives in each of the three targeted areas’. JE! Report 36B, 1 October 1993, p. 8.
4 ’ Inside US Trade, 1 1(42), 22 October 1993, p. 19. JE! Report 40B, 29 October 1993, p. 9.
476 Inside US Trade -  Special Report, 1 November 1993. In interviews for this study, a number of US 
officials highlighted this draft agreement, and its discovery by the press, as an important factor making 
the administration vulnerable to charges of seeking managed trade.
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the Japanese government to use ‘administrative guidance’ to secure increased sales of 
foreign vehicles and parts. In the case of parts sales to Japanese transplants in the United 
States, ‘guidance’ was demanded to ensure ‘special consideration for non-Japanese US 
auto parts’. Draft agreements on government procurement of telecommunications and 
medical equipment were framed based on an expectation that sales should lead, over the 
medium term of three to four years, to foreign market shares comparable to those of
4 77other developed countries.
According to Edward Lincoln, US negotiators faced the problem, having secured the 
Framework commitment to objective criteria, that 'nobody knew what it meant’.
In the [northern] fall of 1993, they were still trying to figure that out. They were floating 
little balloons with the Japanese: "We understand you can’t accept market share 
numbers. We’re not going to do managed trade, but how about inserting language such 
as that the goal of the Japanese government in this area will be to move over time closer 
to the OECD average”. And the Japanese came back and said, ‘'Absolutely not, that’s a 
number. You can calculate that average and you will come to us and say you have not 
reached this market share for foreign penetration”. ... 1 think the administration got
478caught in its own logic because they couldn’t argue back with this.
The sense of distrust between the two sides made the search for compromise formulas all 
the more difficult. Armacost (1996: 178) writes that ‘the distrust was mutual. If US 
negotiators assumed that Japanese trade pledges were worthless unless they were 
reduced to quantitative targets, the Japanese team believed that even the vaguest 
promises made to Americans would be transformed into explicit pledges to accomplish a 
specific result within a fixed time frame’. Each side accused the other of flouting global 
trade principles in an intense public relations battle over their respective free trade 
credentials. Japanese officials proved very effective in tagging the Clinton 
Administration as intent on managing trade through numerical targets, armed with 
hardline statements from US government officials and draft agreements suggesting 
American demands for specific targets. A group of high-profile economists (including 
five Nobel Prize winners) joined the criticism in a joint letter to President Clinton and the 
new Japanese Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa in September 1993. Organised by 
Columbia University’s Jagdish Bhagwati, the letter urged President Clinton to abandon
477 Inside US Trade -  Special Report, 1 1(43), 29 October 1993. Inside US Trade, 1 1(44), 5 November 
1993, p. 18.
Lincoln, interview, 1997.
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the course of ‘managed-trade targets’, saying that to ‘start down that road is to take risks 
for the world trading system that are both large and unwarranted’.479 The American side 
was not without its supporters from the ranks of economists, the most notable being the 
conversion of key figures at the Institute for International Economics to the selective use 
of VIEs in the case of Japan (Bergsten and Noland 1993).480 But for the most part the 
Japanese government successfully painted the Clinton Administration as pursuing a 
radical departure from free trade norms and won support for this view from other trading 
partners. In the words of one senior US official, ‘in terms of what we aimed for and what
481was debated, we did a lousy PR job’.
There remain sharply different views on exactly what the US negotiating team was 
pursuing in the Framework talks.48- Marjory Searing, then Deputy Assistant Secretary ot 
Commerce for Japan and the lead US negotiator in the government procurement talks on 
medical equipment, provides a useful perspective on where the US position had evolved 
to by late 1993:
The theology is subtle. It was not meant to be: “Sales have to be X by date Y or it would 
be an agreement violation”. The line was: “If you truly negotiate an agreement that opens 
the market then we should be able to see sales rise to X. If they don’t then we go back 
and see what the problem is”. It was recognized that we were not likely to get a 
semiconductor-type agreement (or sales target) in each case. But if you were clear up 
front on what is a successful agreement then you get as much as you can. Nobody 
expected numbers to survive in agreements, but if you say that afterwards nobody will 
believe you.48.
This statement highlights the problem the Clinton Administration faced in searching lor 
what, if anything, could be inserted in agreements to ensure measurable results without 
succumbing to the charge of seeking numerical targets. In part, it reflects the nature of 
the negotiating process with both ambit claims and fallback positions cast under the
479 Inside US Trade, 11(40), 8 October 1993, p. 18.
480 The Economist magazine editorialised that even ‘true believers in free trade, such as the denizens of 
Washington’s International Institute for Economics (sic), have recently begun to argue that “managed 
trade” also has its place’. The Economist, 3 July 1993, p. 17.
481 Lord, interview, 1996. The Commerce Department’s Jeffrey Garten would remark later that, ‘In one 
of the great ironies of the late 20lh century, Japan which has rigged its economic systems for over a 
hundred years -  branded the US as wanting to “manage trade”. From Seoul to Sydney, from London to 
Frankfurt, and even around the US, the image stuck. From a public relations standpoint we never 
recovered’. International Trade Reporter, 1 1(48), 7 December 1994, p. 1887.
4X2 While reaching different conclusions, Lincoln (1999) and Schoppa (1997) provide two of the more 
sophisticated analyses of US demands in the Framework negotiations.
48 ’ Searing, interview, 1996.
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banner of a results-oriented policy. This factor has been emphasised by analysts such as 
Lincoln (1999: 151) who remain sympathetic to US policy objectives:
A major difficulty in assessing the administration’s strategy in these early phases of the 
negotiations stems from the nature of the negotiating process. Negotiators begin with 
requests that they know are unacceptable to the other side. Which parts of the initial 
negotiating drafts represented core parts of the administration’s agenda and which were 
fluff to be discarded as negotiations became more serious is often difficult to disentangle.
Still, evidence from the negotiations in the final quarter of 1993 points on numerous 
occasions to US demands for explicit quantitative indicators, albeit short of market share 
targets. By the end of 1993, with a deadline looming of early February 1994 when the 
heads of government were due to meet, the two sides remained far apart on all priority 
sectors. Japan came forward with its own carefully defined sets of qualitative and 
quantitative criteria.484 American negotiators maintained calls for more specific language 
to establish ‘trend-lines’ for the movement of Japanese import indicators more into line 
with other G7 economies. Trend-line demands were cast as establishing standards for 
measuring progress rather than setting numerical targets. But Japanese negotiators saw 
little difference. MITI Vice Minister Sozaburo Okamatsu dismissed new formulations of 
the American position. He was quoted as saying that ‘the US said Japan should move in 
line with the other G7 nations, but it remains vague how it differs from the so-called 
numerical targets’.
Japanese officials were wary of any terminology -  indicators, benchmarks, standards, 
yardsticks, targets -  which could be interpreted as a government commitment 
enforceable under US trade law. Experiences surrounding the semiconductor agreement 
and the ‘voluntary’ automotive plans were critical in this context. A letter from Vice 
Minister Okamatsu to Commerce Undersecretary Garten following talks on automotive 
products at the end of 1993 underlined the resolve of the Japanese government to avoid 
similar arrangements in the future. Responding to American attempts to clarify its 
demands in the automotive sector, Okamatsu wrote:
While you stressed the differences between your proposal of setting standards or trend- 
lines and numerical target setting, the two appear to be no different from our point of 
view. ...
484 International Trade Reporter, 10(48), 8 December 1993, p. 2060.
4S’ ‘Japan, US poles apart in auto talks’ by Hiroshi Nakamae, Nikkei Weekly, 27 December 1993-3 
January 1994.
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During negotiations concerning semiconductors, the US Government emphasized that 
the 20% figure was merely a benchmark to assess progress and not a guarantee or a 
commitment. The language of the arrangement, reflecting such an explanation, 
characterized the 20% figure as the expectation of the US industry. However the 20% 
figure had a life of its own which left a painful lesson for us. No matter how the US side 
explains its intention, and no matter how the language is carefully drafted, once number 
relating to the future is referred to, the nature of the number will be subject to distortion. 
The explanation by the US side regarding the standard for assessment or trend-line 
reminded me of the similar explanation the US side had provided to us during the 
semiconductor negotiations.
Your idea of having the private sector make a statement concerning their plans or 
intentions also raises serious concerns among us. The Action Plan of January 1992 
regarding auto parts, was a set of voluntary action plans announced by Japanese 
automobile companies. The Government of Japan only aggregated the numbers 
announced by each company. However, the aggregated number was eventually 
characterized as a “pledge” by the US Government (sic) in the letter sent to our former 
Minister Mori. This experience left us with another lesson that private sector 
announcement can be easily turned into a commitment of the Japanese Government.486
By January 1994, USTR Mickey Kantor assumed a more prominent role in talks with 
Japan, having finalised negotiations on the Uruguay Round and secured congressional 
approval for NAFTA. Describing the objective criteria issue as The heart' of the 
Framework Agreement, Kantor restated the Clinton Administration’s determination to 
pursue quantitative indicators of trend-line improvement in market access towards levels 
similar to other industrialised countries. He argued that, ‘What you would look for is a 
trajectory of progress which would lead finally to convergence. Now it could be the 
number of years you would indicate or the percentages, and how you would measure that 
could be quite different as you look at any particular sector. But the ideas would remain 
the same’.487
In the days before the Clinton-Hosokawa summit, American assurances of flexibility on 
the selection of indicators and denials that market share goals were being sought met 
firm Japanese resistance. Japanese officials were in turn accused of thwarting the original 
intent of the Framework. With officials shuttling between Washington and Tokyo, USTR 
Kantor warned that the United States would look for ‘other options’ if the Framework
Inside US Trade, 12(2), 14 January 1994, p. 14.
4X7 International Trade Reporter, 1 1(3), 19 January 1994, p. 79.
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talks failed.488 At the final pre-summit meetings American officials said they were ready 
to put in writing that the quantitative indicators would not be used later as ‘targets’.489 
Still, the prospect of a summit failure did not elicit any last minute concessions from the 
Japanese side. Tsutomu Hata, then Japan’s Foreign Minister, summed up the reason for 
the impasse saying, ‘You don't trust us without numbers; we don't trust you with 
numbers .
After seven months of negotiations, President Clinton and Prime Minister Hosokawa 
announced that the two countries had failed to reach accords in the sectors assigned 
priority. Speaking at a joint White House press conference, President Clinton said, 'We 
could have disguised our differences with cosmetic agreements. But the issues between 
us are so important ... that it is better to have reached no agreement than to have reached 
an empty agreement’. The problem, Clinton suggested, ‘may be one of words, or it may 
be one of the feelings behind the words. ... We couldn't agree on what constitutes a 
market opening’. In reply, Prime Minister Hosokawa said that Japan had not ‘been able 
to clear the hurdle of numerical targets, and we regret that very much’. In a rebuff to a 
US President without precedent in modern US-Japan relations, Hosokawa politely 
remarked that both sides ‘need a cooling off period'.4 M
Speaking on February 15, President Clinton said that he agreed with Prime Minister 
Hosokawa on the need for a ‘period of reflection’, but said that the administration is 
‘reviewing all of our options, and we haven’t ruled anything out'.4;“ On the same day, 
USTR Kantor announced that the United States was drawing up a list of sanctions 
against Japanese products, worth up to $300 million, for its alleged violation of the 1989 
agreement granting Motorola greater access to Japan’s cellular phone market. The
188 International Trade Reporter, 1 1(6), 9 February 1994, p. 202. Both sides remained furthest apart in 
the automotive negotiations with Commerce Undersecretary Garten saying that despite intensive 
negotiations ‘held almost continuously since July, not to mention the years of previous discussion, we 
do not seem to have even a common understanding of the problem, let alone consensus on the 
solutions’. International Trade Reporter, 11(6), 9 February 1994, p. 204.
489 The Economist, 19 February 1994, p. 33.
490 International Trade Reporter, 1 1(23), 8 June 1994, p. 892.
191 International Trade Reporter, 1 1(7), 16 February 1994, p. 242-243. ‘Going cellular’ by Fred 
Barnes, The New Republic, 7 March 1994, p. 1 \ .JEI Report IB, 18 February 1994, pp. 13-14. 
Illustrating the degree to which Japanese characterisations of the talks had put the United States on the 
defensive. President Clinton mentioned three times during the half-hour press conference that the US 
had not asked Japan to commit to a specific volume of imports within a certain period of time.
492 Inside US Trade, 12(7), 18 February 1993, p. 8.
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Japanese company. IDO. was accused of having made 'only token progress' in building a 
network of base stations to allow Motorola’s cellular phones to compete in the Tokyo- 
Nagoya region.493 Kantor described the case as 'the best possible example of why we 
adopted a results-oriented approach in the Framework talks’.434 On 3 March, with 
Congress threatening to legislate even tougher action against Japan, President Clinton 
signed an executive order reinstating for two years the lapsed Super 301 provision 
requiring the targeting of priority foreign trade barriers.499 The order gave the 
Administration until 30 September to identify priority sectors based on the NTE report to 
be released at the end of March.199
In the words of one Clinton Administration official, the US strategy was to ‘slowly 
ratchet up the psychological pressure on Japan until it makes the next move to get the 
talks going again. We’re prepared to wait them out, but the next phone call is going to 
have to come from them’.497 The threat of sanctions in the cellular phone case saw an 
agreement concluded by mid March. This committed IDO to expand the infrastructure 
necessary to cover 90 per cent of the Tokyo-Nagoya market by December 1995.'ns At the 
end of March, a politically-weakened Hosokawa Government came forward with a 
package of economic reform measures aimed, in the Prime Minister's words, at ‘fully 
responding to international criticism that our market remains closed'. The package 
included measures on deregulation, competition policy, government procurement and 
import promotion, as well as voluntary measures in the priority sectors of the Framework 
negotiations. The same week, a number of Japanese automotive companies announced 
new goals for future purchases of US and other foreign automotive parts, extending their 
former voluntary plans from the end of fiscal year 1994 to the end of JFY-1996. But the
49'’ International Trade Reporter, 1 1(8), 23 February 1994, p. 281.
494 Inside US Trade, 12(7), 18 February, p. 3.
49r’ The Super 301 provision did not carry some of the elements of the 1988 measure legislated by 
Congress. For example, it called only for the identification of priority practices rather than priority 
practices and priority countries. JE! Report 10B, 11 March 1994, p. 8. Bayard and Elliott (1994: 42). 
490 The NTE report saw 44 pages devoted to Japan, including new sections highlighting barriers in 
Japanese procedures on standards and testing, import clearance and utility company procurement. 
Inside US Trade, 12(13), 1 April 1994, p. 21.
497 ‘Tough Talk: Are the US and Japan headed for a trade war’, Business Week, 28 February 1994, p. 
15.
498 The Japanese government agreed to guarantee implementation of a plan requiring IDO to meet 
scheduled quarterly commitments to transfer 1.5 megahertz of frequency to the Motorola system, and 
to build 159 new base stations within 18 months. USTR Kantor hailed the agreement as validating a 
results-oriented approach by establishing a ‘step-by-step plan of action associated with specific and 
measurable actions by the government of Japan and the Japanese commercial entities involved’. Inside 
US Trade, 12(11), 18 March 1994, p. 13.
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increase (from $19 billion to roughly $21.3 billion) fell well below the 20-30 per cent 
increase reportedly sought by US officials in the Framework negotiations. The Clinton 
Administration’s signalled its unwillingness to return quickly to the negotiating table. 
USTR Kantor dismissed the Japanese reform package as having ‘limited substance’. The 
auto plans were criticised both for being ‘not as large as we might have expected' and 
because ‘the government of Japan is not involved in these so-called voluntary efforts’.499
Modest results: The first Framework agreements
After a cooling off period of over three months, US and Japanese officials agreed on 24 
May to resume negotiations on the four priority sectors. The United States also secured 
agreement to expand the Framework talks to include financial services, flat glass, and 
intellectual property. As part of the terms for the restart of negotiations, Japan reaffirmed 
the original Framework commitment to pursue a ‘highly significant decrease in its 
current account surplus, and to promote a significant increase in global imports of goods 
and services, including from the United States’.500 It also acknowledged that talks in the 
priority sectors would aim ‘substantially to increase access and sales’ with agreements to 
include quantitative and qualitative objective criteria. For its part, the United States 
affirmed that these criteria 'do not constitute numerical targets, but rather are to be used 
for the purpose of evaluating progress achieved toward the goals of the Framework’. The 
US also agreed that no single indicator would govern the assessment of any agreement. 
The critical issue left unresolved was whether the quantitative indicators ultimately 
agreed would establish specific expectations as to when a significant increase in access 
or sales had occurred.
Resumed negotiations on telecommunications and medical equipment took place under 
the shadow of a 30 June deadline for a US decision on whether to cite Japan under Title 
VII of the 1988 Trade Act for discrimination against US firms in government 
p r o c u r e me n t . I n  the wake of further political uncertainty in Japan, US officials delayed
111 Inside US Trade -  Special Report, 1 April 1994, pp. S 1-S4.
"° Inside US Trade -  Special Report, 27 May 1994, p. SI.
On 30 April, USTR Kantor deferred a decision for 60 days following the resignation of Morihiro 
Hosokawa and his replacement as Prime Minister by Tsutomu Hata. International Trade Reporter,
1 1(18), 4 May 1994, p. 708.
257
a decision until the end of July.ML On 1 August, Japan was cited under Title VII with 
USTR Kantor stating that ‘the time has come to use our trade laws’.Mb This established a 
60-day consultation period prior to any initiation of sanctions, ending at a time that 
coincided with the 30 September deadline for naming countries with serious trade 
barriers under Super 301. Among the stumbling blocks in the telecommunication talks 
were the level of the threshold above which any new procurement rules would apply, and 
whether the language negotiated in any government-to-government agreement would 
cover NTT/04 In the medical equipment negotiations, Japanese negotiators continued to 
oppose American requests for a high-level Japanese government directive encouraging 
procuring entities to seek out competitive foreign suppliers. But the issue of quantitative 
indicators remained the major point of contention. While Japan came forward with a 
modified proposal on procurement in July, US officials continued to insist on a clear link 
between the overall goal of significantly increased access and sales and the individual 
criteria used to measure progress.5(b Having drawn back from demands for trend-line 
improvements, the United States now called on Japan to commit to ‘significant annual 
increases’ in the value of procurements made by government entities.506 This was later 
modified to ‘annual progress’ in the value and share of foreign products.'07
The resumption of automotive talks yielded little evidence of substantive change in 
positions. Negotiations remained deadlocked over US demands that Japan commit to a 
certain number of dealerships that would sell foreign cars, that the voluntary 
commitments by Japanese carmakers to purchase US parts be accelerated and included in 
some form in an official agreement, and that Japan deregulate the after-market for parts 
to allow access for US firms. Japanese officials continued to insist that key demands by
508US negotiators in the auto parts sector were simply numerical targets by another name.'
In contrast with the other priority sectors, quantitative criteria were not the major 
obstacle to an agreement on insurance. These negotiations continued to have a largely
31,2 In early July 1994, Tomiichi Murayama, the fourth Japanese Prime Minister since President Clinton 
was elected, replaced Tsutomu Plata as Prime Minister.
3(b International Trade Reporter, 1 1(31), 3 August 1994, p. 1208.
304 At that time, purchases by NTT still accounted for more than half of the Japanese 
telecommunications equipment market.
505 Inside US Trade, 12(30), 29 July 1994, p. 1.
506 Inside US Trade, 12(31), 5 August 1994, p. 4.
507 Inside US Trade, 12(39), 30 September 1994, p. 20.
MIS The reported US demand was that Japan increase purchases of foreign parts from an anticipated $19 
billion at the end of JFY-1994 to $40 billion by the end of JFY-1998. Inside US Trade, 12(39), 30 
September 1994, p. 19.
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procedural focus on the transparency of regulations, the schedule of deregulation, and the 
liberalisation of restrictions on the rate and form of insurance products firms could offer 
in the Japanese market. A central US demand was that Japan not deregulate the so-called 
“third-area” of specialised niche insurance products (where US and other foreign insurers 
had gained a presence covering sickness and injury insurance) ahead of the life and non­
life markets where Japanese firms were dom inant/09
With negotiations again at a crisis point due to looming statutory deadlines, on 1 October 
1994 the United States and Japan reached agreements covering insurance and 
government procurement of telecommunications and medical equipment/ 10 Both sides 
also reached an ‘in-principle’ agreement on flat glass to be finalised within 30 days.511 
However, officials from the two countries were unable to settle differences in the 
contentious automotive negotiations. In response, the US initiated a Section 301 trade 
action targeting regulation of the Japanese after-market, in particular the Japanese 
Transport Ministry’s vehicle safety inspection system, or shaken. Japanese officials 
continued to insist that the regulatory system was necessary for safety and environmental 
reasons.
Elements of compromise and ambiguity coexisted in the procurement agreements 
announced on 1 October. Under the ‘Quantitative Criteria’ heading, the agreements 
called for ‘annual evaluation of progress in the value and share of procurements ... to 
achieve, over the medium term, a significant increase in access and sales' of competitive 
foreign products. Evaluation would take place with reference to ‘recent trends in the 
value, rate of growth and share of procurements’. Among the other quantitative and 
qualitative criteria included to assess implementation of the telecommunications and 
medical equipment agreements were the annual number of entities procuring foreign 
products and services and the annual number and value of contracts awarded as a result 
of the decrease in single-source tendering. Officials from both sides sought to place their 
own interpretation on what had been agreed. One senior US official praised the
509 Inside US Trade, 12(35), 2 September 1994, p. 12.
11 International Trade Reporter, I 1(39), 5 October, p. 1522. On 15 August, the United States and 
Japan had reached an agreement on patent harmonisation, the first accord reached in the Framework 
talks. Inside US Trade, 12(33), 19 August 1994, p. 6.
In addition to these sectoral deals, Japan signalled a macroeconomic commitment to extend a $55 
billion cut in personal income tax, and to delay offsetting tax rises until April 1997.
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agreements as meeting the US goal of having ‘forward-looking indicators connected to 
the value and share and connected to a commitment to achieve a significant increase over 
the medium term'/ By contrast, a Japanese Foreign Ministry official labelled the 
objective criteria as ‘basically neutral'/11
The United States could claim at least a partial victory for its results-oriented approach 
with the concessions made by Japan in the government procurement agreements. Japan 
had seemingly backed away from its earlier refusal to commit to a ‘forward-looking’ 
process of evaluation based on recent trends in data. As Lincoln (1999: 152) notes, the 
government procurement agreements ‘put on record the Japanese government 
acquiescence to the concept that greater market openness should result in some real 
increase in the foreign presence in the market, without attaching any numerical 
dimensions’. And yet Japan achieved its overriding objective of avoiding any reference 
to specific sales expectations in the future. Schoppa’s (1997: 267) critical analysis of the 
Clinton Administration’s results-oriented approach concluded that:
the Clinton team failed to achieve its most critical aim of securing a Japanese 
commitment to “results” which would be explicit enough to allow the US to hold the 
Japanese government accountable under US trade law. ... the more innocuous phrase 
“annual progress in the value and share” of foreign procurements, which could have been 
interpreted as having committed the government to guaranteeing at least some increase 
every year, was excised. The final language, with multiple words requiring an element of 
interpretation, simply fell short of what the US needed in order to hold Japan 
accountable.
In the other key area of contention in the telecommunications negotiations, Japan held 
firm in insisting that the language on objective criteria and recent purchasing trends not 
apply to N TT/14 On medical technology, Japan met a key US goal by agreeing to issue a 
directive to government hospitals encouraging the use of foreign medical technology and 
services. On insurance, Japan agreed to compile and publish its standards for approval of 
licences and new products and to allow companies to introduce new products simply by 
notifying regulators rather than obtaining prior approval. Japan also agreed to avoid any
Inside US Trade, 12(40), 7 October 1994, p. 23.
31' International Trade Reporter, I 1(39), 5 October 1994, p. 1522.
314 A subsequent letter agreed to the weaker commitment that NT T ‘believes that the improvement in 
NTT’s procurement procedures will increase access to its procurement opportunities and can lead to an 
increase in the foreign value and share of its procurement over the medium term’. Inside US Trade, 
12(44), 4 November 1994, p. 3.
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'radical change’ in the third area of specialised markets until ‘meaningful and substantial 
liberalization' took place in the life and non-life markets.^17
The agreements overwhelmingly took the form of procedural changes, notwithstanding 
the disproportionate focus on quantitative indicators during the negotiations. The Clinton 
Administration placed particular emphasis on what it proclaimed as a new era of more 
intense monitoring of agreements with considerable data to be collected and annual 
review processes built into the agreements/1(1 But the change from earlier 
administrations was a matter of degree. As Lincoln (1999: 152-153) states in the case of 
the procurement deal:
the indicators and follow-up meetings did not constitute the core of the agreement, which 
consisted of 20 pages of detailed changes in government procurement procedures 
intended to make procurement more transparent and objective.
This language was quite similar to what the Bush administration had obtained in some of 
its agreements -  vague references to increased sales of foreign goods coupled with a 
bilateral review process. ...
In reality, the phrase “substantial increase” was not very precise or distinctive, so that the 
administration did not have any clear definition of “success” in carrying out its 
assessment of agreements. Nevertheless, the institutionalization of a review or 
assessment process based on a basket of qualitative and quantitative indicators was an 
important innovation of the 1990s, with due credit to the Bush Administration.
The Clinton Administration was less willing to compromise on its position in the 
automotive negotiations. While focusing its Section 301 action on the Japanese after- 
market for parts, USTR Kantor made clear additional progress was required in the other 
areas under discussion, namely on automotive dealerships and parts sales. In response to 
the Section 301 action, Japanese officials suspended further automotive negotiations. 
MITI Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto affirmed the Japanese position of ‘limiting the 
“government reach” to within what the government can influence [over the private 
sector] in automobiles and auto parts and all other areas of the framework while refusing 
numerical targets’/''17 In two letters to Ambassador Kantor in October 1994, Mr 
Hashimoto insisted that US demands on dealerships and parts purchasing plans could not 
be discussed under the Framework because they were beyond the reach of
515 Inside US Trade, 12(40), 7 October 1994, p. 24.
516 According to one US official, the extent of monitoring to be undertaken was ‘very different from 
what we had in the past’. Inside US Trade, 12(44), 4 November 1994, p. 3.
517 International Trade Reporter, 1 1(39), 5 October 1994, p. 1525.
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government/18 Kantor and Commerce Secretary Brown responded to Hashimoto 
restating that a comprehensive solution to the automotive dispute needed to address these 
two elements, plus deregulation in the Japanese after-market/19
Despite strong pressure from industry and Congress, the Clinton Administration stopped 
short of levelling a Super 301 action against Japan in the automotive sector.' Having 
secured at least some agreements, the administration chose instead to identify Japan's 
market access for wood and paper products as areas warranting future attention as part of 
a Super 301 ‘watch list’. Japan was cited for failing to provide detailed information on 
steps to encourage the use of foreign wood and paper products contrary to a 1990 wood 
products agreement and a 1992 action plan for increased access for paper products. The 
October 1994 sectoral agreements also provided the basis for the United States to focus 
more on deregulation, administrative reform and competition policy enforcement in 
Japan under the ‘regulatory reform and competitiveness’ basket of the Framework. On 
November 15, US officials presented a comprehensive set of demands under 36 
categories, covering over 200 specific items.' The US proposal called on Japan to adopt 
a broad and continuous review of all regulations, a policy of regulation as the exception, 
enhanced transparency and accountability, prohibition of informal delegation of 
government authority and promotion of market mechanisms.322
A sharper sense of the constraints on US action accompanied this greater emphasis on 
deregulation by the end of 1994. In early December 1994, Commerce Undersecretary 
Garten spoke of a ‘growing fatigue and weariness among the negotiators on both sides of 
the Pacific’. He also acknowledged the limits growing economic interdependence placed 
on US leverage, saying ‘our ability to take tough trade action -  while an option we must 
preserve and use when necessary -  is constrained increasingly by a world economy
518 Inside US Trade, 12(43), 28 October 1994, p. 1.
519 Inside US Trade, 12(44), 4 November 1994, p. 6.
’2tl USTR Kantor argued that, ‘Given the success of reaching five trade agreements today under the 
framework, given the fact that, of course, 301 and Super 301 have the same effect, as you know it’s 
only a timing difference we thought it would be appropriate to act under 301 and to self-initiate than 
to initiate a Super 301 action’. International Trade Reporter, I 1(39), 5 October 1994, p. 1524.
’2I International Trade Reporter, 11(46), 23 November 1994, p. 1804. Inside US Trade - Special 
Report, 1 8 November 1994, p. 1. Japan had already signalled its intention to pursue a five-year 
deregulation program to be finalised in the first half of 1995.
''22 Specific proposals were identified in a number of sectors: agriculture, automobiles and auto parts, 
construction materials, distribution, energy production and delivery, financial services, investment, 
legal services, medical equipment, and pharmaceuticals and telecommunications.
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which has become so interconnected ... When it comes to negotiations such as the 
Framework, results are difficult to achieve and slow in coming1/ 2' Garten’s Commerce 
Department colleague Marjory Searing was even more direct, conceding that the Clinton 
team 'may have oversold the framework as a panacea for all our economic problems with 
Japan’.524
After an extra two months of discussions on how to measure progress, a final agreement 
on fat glass was reached in mid December/2' The agreement called for the Japanese 
distributors of fat glass to announce publicly their intention to diversify their sources of 
supply to include competitive foreign suppliers, while Japanese glass manufacturers were 
to support diversification in their distribution networks. The agreement also gave a direct 
role to M1TI, both in collecting data about glass sales and in ensuring diversification to 
foreign suppliers.526 January 1995 saw an agreement reached on financial services 
liberalising access to Japan’s corporate securities market and cross-border financial 
transactions, and allowing foreign investment advisory companies to compete in the
*S27management of public pension assets and a larger share of corporate assets/ This left 
the automotive negotiations as the remaining priority sector of the Framework 
Agreement when talks resumed in January 1995.
To the brink on autos
The automotive negotiations stood as a critical test of the Clinton Administration’s trade 
strategy towards Japan. They were described by one of the lead US negotiators as ‘the 
one that matters most, where the stakes are highest’/ 25 The statement foreshadowing the 
resumption of talks affirmed that discussions would continue on the three elements
523 International Trade Reporter, 1 1(48), 7 December 1994, p. 1887.
324 Inside US Trade, 12(49), 9 December 1994, p. 4. For a discussion of how financial market factors 
put constraints on US trade threats towards Japan in 1994, see ‘The great bond market massacre’ by A1 
Ehrbar, Fortune, 17 October 1994, pp. 57-68.
323 International Trade Reporter, I 1(49), 14 December 1994, p. 1931. Inside US Trade, 12(50) 16 
December 1994, p. 11.
326 Japan successfully rejected a US demand that progress under the agreement be based on capital 
affiliation of the exporting companies so that imports from Japanese-affiliated companies located 
abroad could be distinguished from imports of US-owned and other non-Japanese companies. Inside 
US Trade, 12(49), 9 December 1994, p. 3.
527 Inside US Trade, 13(2), 13 January 1995, p. 4.
528 Remarks by Office of the US Trade Representative General Counsel Ira Shapiro to the Japan 
Society, New York, 21 April 1995.
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identified by the United States as essential to an agreement -  access to Japan's motor 
vehicle market through dealerships, auto parts purchases by Japanese auto 
manufacturers, and deregulation of the Japanese auto parts after-market. The critical 
divergence related to Japan's much narrower definition of the scope of government 
responsibility in these areas. The agreement to resume negotiations made no reference to 
the Section 301 investigation of barriers in the Japanese after-market for parts. With 
the Section 301 action providing for a one-year investigation process through to October 
1995, US officials quickly became frustrated at their limited leverage to secure 
concessions from Japan. Soon after talks began, the NEC decided to speed up the Section 
301 case in the absence of significant progress in the negotiations by the end of 
March.530 This date coincided with the end of the Japanese fiscal year, marking the end 
point of the 1992 voluntary commitments by the Japanese automotive companies.
Part of the US strategy was to use direct talks with the Japanese automotive 
manufacturers to raise both parts purchases and access to dealerships in Japan. In a sharp 
exchange of letters in March 1995, MITI Minister Hashimoto warned USTR Kantor that 
the US could be violating international trade rules if it ‘requests that Japanese auto 
companies increase their purchases of particular auto parts in a “de facto" coercive or 
discriminatory manner’/ ' 1 Hashimoto demanded that the US affirm that the issue of 
voluntary company purchasing plans was outside the scope of government-to- 
government negotiations. He also reiterated Japan's resolve to bring a case to the World 
Trade Organization if the US launched trade sanctions in the dispute. In reply, 
Ambassador Kantor stressed that new voluntary plans were central to any agreement, 
saying that the Japanese government played an important role in securing the 1992 plans, 
‘and frankly, the situation should not be different at this time’. Kantor also warned that 
the United States would be prepared to demand ‘a broad inquiry into Japan’s lack of 
effective adherence to the market opening objectives of the WTO’/ ' 2
',2V USTR Kantor was quoted saying that the administration would ‘continue with our investigation and 
possible action, but these talks will be carried on on a separate track’. Inside US Trade, 13(1), 6 
January 1995, p. 3.
Inside US Trade, 13(10), 10 March 1995, p. 7. International Trade Reporter, 12(10), 8 March 1995, 
p. 450. Automotive industry groups had urged the administration to bring forward the Section 301 
deadline since early December 1994.
531 Inside US Trade, 13(12), 24 March 1995, p. 1.
” 2 Adding to the sense of looming confrontation in the automotive talks was the sharp criticism 
levelled by the United States at Japan’s five-year deregulation plan outlined at the end of March. USTR 
Kantor criticised the plan as ‘not specific ... it has no time frames, or at least not the time frames we 
would want’. Inside US Trade, 13(14), 7 April 1995, p. 4.
264
A revised US proposal on access to Japanese dealerships and after-market deregulation 
was presented in late March. It sought public statements by the Japan Automobile 
Manufacturers' Association (JAMA) and the Japanese government that they would 
actively support the ‘substantial expansion of sales of foreign vehicles in Japan'. The 
proposal also called for Japan's largest association of vehicle dealers to announce 
publicly ‘the intention and desire’ of dealers to enter into franchise agreements with 
foreign vehicle manufacturers. Japanese officials continued to focus on the need for US 
companies to improve the quality and cost of their products, to ensure stable delivery of 
their products and after-sales service, and to introduce new models (especially compact 
cars) suitable for the Japanese market. The US proposal on deregulation of Japan’s 
vehicle inspection system called for a drastic reduction in the “critical parts" list -  those 
parts for which a vehicle must be reinspected by Japan’s Ministry of Transportation 
unless a ‘certified garage' performed the work/° It also called for Japan to change the 
system of certified garages to allow specialised repair operations to be established. 
Japan's counter proposal provided for only a narrow focus on specific cases where the
r  O A
US alleged that a particular regulation posed a barrier to parts imports/ Japanese 
officials accused the Clinton Administration of ratcheting up its demands on foreign 
access to Japanese dealerships and after-market deregulation as a tactic to increase 
pressure over the parts purchasing issue. Particular sensitivity surrounded continued US 
demands for some form of Japanese government endorsement of any plans, with MITI 
Vice-Minister Yoshihiro Sakamoto accusing the US of ‘still insisting on a numerical 
targeting approach’/ '0
The Clinton Administration’s preparedness to move towards sanctions became more 
explicit following a meeting of the NEC in April 1995. Speaking on 13 April, White 
House Press Secretary Mike McCurry said that if the negotiations continued to drag on 
President Clinton was ‘willing to proceed to consideration of other options, and failing a 
negotiated solution to our concerns ... he is prepared to act if necessary’. McCurry
The draft US text stated that the immediate review of the critical parts list was ‘expected to result’, 
within six months in the removal from the list o f ‘a substantial percentage of parts replacement 
operations’. It also demanded that Japan immediately remove trailer hitches, shock absorbers and 
struts, and routine brake service from those measures requiring reinspection.
’’ Inside US Trade, 13(16), 21 April 1995, p. 6.
5,5 Inside US Trade, 13(16), 21 April 1995, p. 25. International Trade Reporter, 12(17), 26 April 1995, 
p. 724. Mr Sakamoto had replaced Sozaburu Okamatsu as MITI Vice Minister and lead negotiator in 
the automotive talks in January 1995.
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pointedly said that if Japan was ‘to enjoy the full benefits’ of the bilateral relationship in 
other areas, 'there must be progress in the economic sphere, and that's what the trade 
talks have been aimed to achieve’.336 By the end of April, US officials had agreed on a 
final damage estimate in the Section 301 case that provided the basis for a sanctions list 
against Japan. On 10 May, following the breakdown of talks between USTR Kantor and 
MITI Minister Hashimoto, the United States announced a two-pronged strategy: a 
retaliation list would be published as part of the Section 301 case; simultaneously, a 
WTO case would be launched against Japanese automotive practices alleging that 
Japanese government actions had ‘nullified and impaired’ the benefits that should have 
been enjoyed by the US and other countries under the multilateral trading system. 
Calling the US plan for retaliation ‘very regrettable’, Hashimoto said that the initiation of 
the WTO dispute alongside the move towards sanctions ‘is a contradictory decision that 
goes against one of the basic principles of the WIT) -  prohibition of unilateral action in 
trade disputes -  and such a decision in incomprehensible to us’.' Japan viewed 
continued insistence by the United States on new voluntary parts plans by the Japanese
c o o
manufacturers as the main stumbling block to an agreement. "
The escalation of the automotive dispute in the 1995 carried a heavy political dimension 
in the wake of the Democratic party’s loss of control of Congress in November 1994 and 
President Clinton’s bid for reelection in 1996. Difficult trade battles (especially over 
NAFTA) left the administration looking to shore up support for its trade policy in 
Congress, particularly among Midwestern Democrats.339 President Clinton used two 
public addresses, including one at an auto assembly plant, to underline his determination 
to pressure Japan to accept American demands (Lincoln 1999: 133). In his regular 
Saturday radio address of 13 May President Clinton assured Americans that he was 
prepared to ‘fight for a fair shake for American products’ as the US had been ‘hitting a 
brick wall’ in 20 months of talks with the Japanese (Woodward 1996: 202).340 Not 
surprisingly, the Clinton Administration found strong support on Capitol Hill for its
536 Inside US Trade, 13(15), 14 April 1995, p. 18.
Inside US Trade, 13(19), 12 May 1995, p. 1.
's Mr Hashimoto stated that the demand for voluntary plans ‘is nothing more than de facto numerical 
targets and would lead to managed trade. If the US stops demanding voluntary plans, we feel there is 
ample room for an agreement’. International Trade Reporter 12(19), 10 May 1995, p. 840.
'y’l) One analyst noted that, ‘In the auto war with Japan, the underlying issue was how to gain political 
support in the rust belt states, especially from unions’ (Malmgren 1995: 15).
540 The President rejected a more inflammatory text for his address prepared by his political advisers 
described as ‘raw-meat rhetoric for auto workers in Michigan’ (Woodward 1996: 202).
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move towards sanctions and on May 10 the Senate passed a resolution (S. Res. 118) 
supporting the action by a vote of 88-8/41
On 16 May, USTR Kantor unveiled a sanctions list that threatened 100 per cent tariffs on 
$5.9 billion worth of Japanese luxury car imports.542 President Clinton defended the US 
action saying, ‘We can’t deny this or sweep it under the rug. We’ve got to go forward, 
and we’re going to do that’. Japan responded on 17 May with the first step in a WTO 
case, a request for bilateral consultations on the dispute. Convinced by mid June that the 
White House was serious about retaliation, Japan signalled its intention to go part of the 
way towards meeting US objectives with speculation surrounding announcements of new 
purchasing plans by the five Japanese auto manufacturers/43 Still, the Japanese 
government continued to rule out specific numerical projections or government 
endorsement of any plans. An agreement was secured only hours before the tariffs were 
to come into effect, and only when USTR Kantor abandoned the Clinton administration's 
demand for specific numbers. This concession, it has been noted, ‘which had 
repercussions for resolution of the dealer access issue in addition to its primary impact 
on the nature of the Japanese automotive industry’s parts purchasing plans, was the one 
compromise Washington previously had refused to make even while it backed away
544from most of its original specifications for a comprehensive auto pact’.'
On 28 June, the United States and Japan announced an agreement averting punitive 
tariffs. Japan withdrew its WTO complaint against unilateral sanctions and the United 
States announced that it saw no reason to pursue its case against Japan in the WTO. The 
official agreement was supplemented by a collection of statements from Japanese and 
American automotive groups that left room for both sides to claim victory and to 
interpret the nature of that victory for their respective audiences. In what one trade 
official described as ‘creative deal-making’, a joint statement was released with figures 
left blank until the US government devised its own numerical estimates of the impact of 
new Japanese business plans on auto parts purchases and of the expansion of Japanese
541 Inside US Trade, 13(19), 12 May 1995, p. 23. International Trade Reporter, 12(19), 10 May 1995, 
p. 837.
342 The list comprised 13 models of luxury cars made by Honda, Toyota, Nissan, Mazda, and 
Mitsubishi. While timed to go into effect on 28 June, the sanctions were slated to apply retroactively 
from 20 May. International Trade Reporter, 12(20), 17 May 1995, p. 848.
543 Inside US Trade, 13(24), 16 June 1995, p. 1.
544 JEI Report 24B, 30 June 1995, p. 9.
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dealerships carrying foreign vehicles. Significantly, each side agreed that the plans were 
outside the scope of government negotiations and, therefore, would not be subject to 
domestic trade law sf4'̂ The plans foreshadowed an increase of vehicle production by 
Japanese manufacturers in the United States from 2.1 million units to 2.65 million units 
by 1998 and increasing North American content. The US government unilaterally 
estimated that parts purchases in the United States would increase by $6.75 billion by 
1998 while foreign parts bought in Japan would rise by about $6 billion. Forming part of 
the joint announcement was the astonishingly frank statement to the effect that: ‘Minister 
Hashimoto said the Government of Japan has had no involvement in this calculation 
because it is beyond the scope and responsibility of government. He said that USTR’s 
estimates are solely its own’.546
On the issue of dealerships, the agreement called for a letter from M1TI to all Japanese 
auto dealers affirming their freedom to carry foreign vehicles, the establishment of 
contact points in the Japanese government and the major manufacturers to facilitate 
foreign partnerships, and a government survey to determine the interest of Japanese 
dealers in selling foreign vehicles. Again, the US government was left to envision its 
own estimate of approximately 200 new sales outlets for foreign cars in the agreement’s 
first year and 1000 new outlets by the end of 2000. And again, the joint announcement 
carried a clear Japanese disclaimer whereby: ‘Minister Hashimoto said that the 
Government of Japan has had no involvement in this forecast because it is beyond the 
scope and responsibility of government. Minister Hashimoto said that these forecasts are 
solely those of the Government of the US’/ 47
The United States could claim progress on after-market deregulation designed to raise 
the number of garages that were likely to carry foreign auto repair parts, reduce the
3 4 3 The agreement stated that: ‘The two ministers recognize and understand that the plans by the US or 
Japanese companies are commitments and are not subject to the trade remedy laws of either country. 
Rather, they are business forecasts and intentions of the companies based on their study of market 
conditions and other factors. Both ministers recognize and understand that changes in market 
conditions may affect the fulfilment of these plans’. Joint Announcement by Ryutaro Hashimoto, 
Minister of International Trade and Industry of Japan, and Michael Kantor, United States Trade 
Representative, Regarding Autos and Auto Parts, 28 June 1995.
546 Joint Announcement by Ryutaro Hashimoto, Minister of Trade and Industry of Japan, and Michael 
Kantor, United States Trade Representative, Regarding the Japanese Auto Companies’ plans, 28 June 
1995.
347 Joint Announcement on Dealerships by Ryutaro Hashimoto, Minister of Trade and Industry of 
Japan, and Michael Kantor, United States Trade Representative, 28 June 1995.
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inspection requirements for after-market parts, and allow Japanese garages to specialise 
in specific repairs using parts that may be imported. Japan agreed to a one-year review of 
its critical parts list with the goal of deregulating any parts not central to health and 
safety concerns/48 It also agreed to ease the requirements for the establishment of 
‘designated garages’ allowed to self-certify repairs under the shaken system, and to 
establish a system of ‘specialized certified garages', reducing the areas where repairs 
would be subject to reinspection by the Ministry of Transport. The US claimed that these 
measures would increase purchases of American parts by almost $9 billion or 50 per cent 
over three years. Even so, the US Government failed to achieve its ultimate objective of 
separating repair shops from shaken facilities and it reserved the right to resort again to 
Section 301 or to a WTO case if it was not satisfied with the results of the agreement.
Announcing the auto agreement, President Clinton described it as one that ‘will begin to 
truly open’ Japan’s auto and auto parts markets to American companies ‘after two 
decades of presidential attempts to fix this problem. This agreement is specific. It is 
measurable. It will achieve real, concrete results’/ 49 USTR Kantor insisted that, ‘What 
we have here are objective criteria, both qualitative and quantitative, which will hold 
Japan's feet to the fire to make sure there is significant increase in access, sales, and 
opportunities for US autos and auto parts manufacturers. ... Remember that “significant 
increase” commitment by Japan can be enforced by US trade laws’/ " 0 Minister 
Hashimoto said simply that ‘the result of these talks is that Japan was able to maintain its 
basic principles’.""1 Beyond the rhetoric, the United States accepted an agreement 
without the specific numerical forecasts for purchases of foreign auto parts or Japanese 
dealerships selling foreign cars that they had set previously as the benchmarks for a 
settlement. The Washington Post reported that ‘the Clinton administration’s assault on 
the barriers in Japan’s automotive market has ... [been] notable for the bellicose US 
threats -  but not for the significance of its results’/""2 On what many observers saw as the 
central interest of the United States, Malmgren (1995: 13) noted that:
348 Among items delisted immediately were struts, shock absorbers, power steering systems and trailer 
hitches.
549 ‘Clinton says trade deal will make inroads in Japan’ by Steve Holland, Reuters News Service, 28 
June 1995.
550 International Trade Reporter, 12(27), 5 July 1995, p. I 132.
551 International Trade Reporter, 12(27), 5 July 1995, p. 1133.
552 ‘An auto market left undented’, by Paul Blustein, Washington Post National Weekly Edition, 3-9 
July 1995, p. 22.
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it was clear the Japanese had not given one centimeter on two key points: there was no 
Japanese commitment to quantitative targets for increased automotive parts purchases; 
and there was no Japanese government official guarantee that Japanese automotive 
industry forecasts would be carried out.
Working in favour of the agreement in 1995 and a major factor driving the relocation of 
Japanese auto production capacity and sourcing of auto parts offshore was the strength of 
the yen in the first half of the 1990s. By 1994, production of Japanese-owned plants in 
the United States had reached over 20 per cent of all cars sold in the American market 
with the strong US expansion after 1992 adding to incentives for the expansion of US 
production bases (Nanto, Cooper and Bass 1995).vv' In response to the Japanese auto 
manufacturers’ business plans, then Chrysler Chairman Robert Eaton was quoted as 
saying, "That was all stuff that was going to happen anyway. As far was I’m concerned, 
nothing’s changed at all’.554
The agreement to avert sanctions did not prevent further sparring by US and Japanese 
officials over the accord’s interpretation, while discussions continued for six weeks over 
how to monitor progress toward the agreement’s goals. In mid August, USTR published 
a 30 page version of the agreement which included two general gauges of progress -  
market conditions in the two countries and follow-through on individual provisions -  and 
15 specific quantitative and qualitative objective criteria to be assessed on an annual 
basis.ro:' This was followed by a US government announcement in early September of 
‘unprecedented collaboration’ between government and industry to track Japan’s 
compliance with the automotive agreement. The monitoring effort called for expanded 
data collection by government and industry, as well as six-monthly assessments of the 
accord’s effectiveness. It also foreshadowed the establishment of an interagency 
monitoring team headed by officials from USTR and the Department of Commerce.^
The automotive monitoring exercise was part of a broader shift by the Clinton
” ' See also MacKnight (1996).
‘More Japanese US production may hurt Detroit’ by David Lawder, Reuters News Service, 29 June 
1995.
555 An exchange of letters between USTR Kantor and Commerce Secretary Brown on behalf of the 
United States and Japan’s Ambassador to the United States, Takakazu Kuriyama, on 23 August put into 
effect the finalised auto trade agreement. Japan also released a separate document still claiming that 
statements in US background documents on the auto agreement were misleading or inaccurate. 
International Trade Reporter, 12(35), 6 September 1995, p. 1469.
Inside US Trade, 13(36), 8 September 1995, p. 5.
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Administration from targeting new product areas under the Framework to implementing 
and monitoring agreements already reached. In the words of one senior US official, the 
administration had moved 'into a phase in which we are going to be monitoring, 
implementing, and making sure our agreements have the results we all hoped to 
achieve’. ^  This meshed with the increased US emphasis on deregulation and 
administrative reform in Japan that had begun the previous year.^8 Overshadowed by the 
automotive dispute in mid 1995 was a decision by President Clinton and Prime Minister 
Tomiichi Murayama to extend the US-Japan Framework for a New Economic 
Partnership, originally due to expire in July 1995, but without specifying any new areas 
that would be discussed during the extension.5'̂ 9 In the aftermath of the automotive 
dispute, Clinton Administration officials settled on a strategy of trumpeting the 
unprecedented 20 trade agreements reached between the United States and Japan since 
the start of the administration. To vindicate the administration’s Japan policy, the CEA 
and Treasury released research in November 1995 which found that in the sectors 
covered by the 20 trade agreements US exports to Japan had grown by nearly 80 per cent 
since the Clinton Administration took office, nearly two and a half times greater than 
growth in other US exports to Japan. By the end of 1995, both USTR and the Commerce 
Department had devised plans for permanent offices devoted exclusively to monitoring 
and enforcement of trade agreements.560
The hardliners scale back
Speaking on 4 December 1995. US Ambassador to Japan Walter Mondale referred to ‘a 
cycle’ in trade talks, with the United States now ‘in the second generation of concerns, 
which is implementation and monitoring of these agreements’. At the same time, he 
identified two issues as ‘looming on the horizon’, namely the semiconductor agreement 
timed to expire in July 1996, and a Section 301 investigation of an Eastman Kodak 
complaint alleging anticompetitive practices in the Japanese film and photographic paper
Internationa/ Trade Reporter, 12(36), 13 September 1995, p. 1531.
” s In November 1995, the United States presented Japan with a revised proposal on deregulation 
broadly similar to the previous year’s attempt to influence the Japanese deregulation announcements. 
Inside US Trade, 13(46), 17 November 1995, p. 6.
Inside US Trade, 12(25), 23 June 1995, p. 5.
560 Inside US Trade, 13(50), 15 December 1995, p. 1. Inside US Trade, 13(51), 22 December 1995, p.
I . Alongside the automotive agreement, the 1994 insurance agreement emerged as a particular target of 
US enforcement efforts in the light of US concerns that Japan was proceeding with plans to open the 
third-area market.
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market. While the automotive dispute largely exhausted the Clinton Administration’s 
appetite for high-profile attempts to secure quantitative market access indicators, dispute 
remained over what, if anything, would replace the signature example of this approach -  
the US-Japan semiconductor agreement. The SIA flagged its desire for a new agreement 
early in 1995. USTR Kantor registered the US government’s interest in a new agreement 
in September 1995, while stopping short of setting out desired terms and conditions/61 
Soon after, Minister Hashimoto rejected the US demand, saying that ‘the objectives of 
the agreement have already been fulfilled. There is no need for a government-to- 
government arrangement. Our market is already open’.662 Japan’s opposition to a new 
agreement w'as reinforced with the release of figures in November 1995 showing that 
foreign market share in Japan had risen to 26.2 per cent / 63
Significantly, the Clinton Administration decided not to seek a new numerical target 
while maintaining that a government-to-government agreement was essential to sustain 
further expansion in market access. American officials focused their attention on 
Japanese sectors seen as lagging in terms of foreign semiconductor sales (such as 
automotives, telecommunications and video games) and also called for more to be done 
in the areas of design-ins and sales to small and medium-sized Japanese companies. 
Through the early months of 1996, Japan continued to reject official negotiations on a 
new agreement, emboldened by its capacity to blunt US demands under the 
Framework.564 The first sign of flexibility came in a letter from now Prime Minister 
Hashimoto to President Clinton in advance of an April 1996 summit meeting. He 
indicated that his government supported efforts by US and Japanese semiconductor 
industry representatives to come to an accord, ‘barring some kind of very strange
565agreement .
361 Kantor was quoted as saying, ‘we’ve almost reached the critical mass where we’ll have a good and 
solid and legitimate percentage ofthat market, but a new agreement would be very helpful’. Inside US 
Trade, 13(38), 22 September 1995, p. 1.
562 International Trade Reporter, 12(42), 25 October 1995, p. 1760.
563 Inside US Trade, 13(50), 15 December 1995, p. 7.
364 MIT1 Vice Minister Sakamoto went as far as to suggest in March 1996 that ‘the era of bilateralism is 
over’ in US-Japan trade relations. Acknowledging that bilateral disputes would not disappear,
Sakamoto foresaw that ‘any such friction from now on will have to be solved in accordance with the 
WTO and other international rules and by following market mechanisms’. The Mi l l official’s 
American counterparts were less than impressed with what one US official labelled as ‘MlTI’s wishful 
thinking’. Inside US Trade, 14(12), 22 March 1996, p. 3.
565 Inside US Trade, 14(15), 12 April 1996, p. I.
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Talks between the respective industries remained deadlocked with the Japanese side 
continuing to rule out US industry demands for an agreement which would include 
government monitoring, language similar to the earlier agreements calling for ‘steady 
and gradual progress’ in market share, and provisions allowing for rapid response to 
dumping allegations.'^66 A June proposal by the EIAJ called for a three-year industry 
agreement that explicitly disavowed government involvement in favour of cooperative 
activities between chip users and suppliers in the Japanese market. It also called for the 
creation of a World Semiconductor Council to promote industrial cooperation with the 
aim of further diminishing any bilateral government involvement in the semiconductor 
industry.Ml/ The fact that semiconductor sales by non-Japanese affiliated companies 
topped 30 per cent for the first time in the first quarter of 1996 only made it harder for 
American negotiators to secure Japanese government endorsement for further market 
share gains and for continued monitoring by capital affiliation.568
With a looming deadline of 31 July 1996, both sides made minor concessions. Japan 
modified its opposition to government involvement by proposing a Global Governmental 
Forum on the semiconductor industry alongside the private sector body proposed by the 
EIAJ. The United States signalled that it would be willing to accept private sector 
monitoring of market share.569 The two sides remained split over how governments could 
use this data to assess market access conditions in Japan with the Japanese government 
determined to avoid language that would imply a guarantee of further improvement in 
market share.
A new semiconductor arrangement that unwound key parts of the framework in place 
since the mid 1980s was announced on 1 August 1996. The SI A and the EIAJ agreed 
under the new arrangement to establish a private sector Semiconductor Council ‘to 
enhance mutual understanding, to address market access matters, to promote cooperative 
industry activities and to expand international cooperation in the semiconductor sector in 
order to facilitate the healthy growth of the industry from a long-term, global 
perspective’. The Council would make quarterly reports to governments on market
566 Inside US Trade, 14(16), 19 April 1996, p. 4. Inside US Trade, 14(18), 3 May 1996, p. 1. 
367 Inside US Trade, 14(23), 7 June 1996, p. 1.
568 Inside US Trade, 14(25), 21 June 1996, p. 1.
569 Inside US Trade, 14(26), 28 June 1996, p. 1. Inside US Trade, 14(30), 26 July 1996, p. I.
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developments through regular ‘analysis of semiconductor market data', including on 
‘market size, market growth, and market shares of foreign semiconductor products in 
Council member markets and other major semiconductor markets’. The agreement stated 
that the ‘purpose of this analysis is not to create numerical targets, but instead to assess 
trends, better comprehend market dynamics, and promote deeper understanding. No 
piece of data will be determinative of the assessment of market developments’.̂ 70
The official statement announced the establishment of a Global Governmental Forum on 
semiconductors and provided for annual meetings of the US and Japanese governments 
to review industrial cooperation and market developments, including data gathered by 
the industries. This was the minimum which would allow Acting USTR Charlene 
Barshefsky to proclaim that the agreement would ‘further enhance the strong position of 
American firms in the Japanese semiconductor market ... [and] allow our countries to 
build on the progress achieved under the 1991 US-Japanese semiconductor 
arrangement’. Welcoming the ‘new multilateral cooperative framework’ for 
semiconductors, MITI Minister Shumpei Tsukahara stressed that the new deal ‘put[s] an 
end to a system of managing trade by reviewing market share [and] taking into account 
numerical targets’/ 71
The 1996 semiconductor agreement highlighted the scaling back of US demands for 
quantitative market access indicators in Japan by the end of the Clinton Administration's 
first term in office. A number of factors contributed to the quiet shelving of a results- 
oriented Japan policy. Part of the explanation lies in the natural policy cycle spoken of 
by Ambassador Mondale following the auto dispute. American officials could claim 
plausibly that at least some of their stated goals had been achieved, thus assisting them to 
downplay the Japan problem. By the end of 1996, Japan’s overall trade surplus had 
fallen from more than three per cent to 1.4 per cent of GDP. And a mini import boom in 
Japan in the first half of the 1990s allowed the White House to highlight areas of
5 " Inside US Trade -  Special Report, 5 August 1996.
’7I Inside US Trade -  Special Report, 5 August 1996. Japan also denied the US language in the 
agreement along the lines of the 1991 requirement for Japanese producers to provide cost and pricing 
data on an accelerated basis in the event that the US industry filed an antidumping case.
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impressive US export growth. 572
A combination of underlying political factors and international economic conditions 
provide the more fundamental reasons for the paring back of US demands. Critical was 
the strong and sustained resistance from Japan to American demands for quantitative 
indicators. The complete lack of support in Japan for the Clinton Administration’s policy 
objectives set limits on the implementation of hardline policy preferences. The resolve of 
key Japanese actors not to make major concessions to a US president underscores in a 
Japanese context the power of domestic incentives and the permissiveness of 
international constraints. The binding constraint proved to be Japanese policy 
preferences. As Schoppa (1997: 272) notes:
With the bureaucrats, the media, and other opinion leaders uniformly against the Clinton 
demands, there was little incentive for political leaders to intervene to broker a deal ... 
The key politicians during the Framework, Prime Minister Hosokawa in the lead-up to 
February 1994 and MITI Minister Hashimoto since the summer of 1994, both earned 
accolades, not for smoothing out relations with the Americans but by refusing to give in.
Reinforcing the demise of a results-oriented Japan policy by the mid 1990s was a 
transformation in the economic performances of Japan and the United States. The 
bursting of the late 1980s “bubble economy” in Japan left a legacy of financial crisis, 
industrial hollowing-out, corporate bankruptcy and rising unemployment. The Japanese 
economy entered a period of prolonged economic stagnation, experiencing its worst 
recession since the 1920s and its first major financial failures and bank runs of the 
postwar era. Between 1992 and 1995, Japan’s economy averaged 0.5 per cent growth per 
annum. By contrast, following a relatively mild recession in 1990-92, the United States 
began a period of sustained economic growth. A sustained fall in the unemployment rate 
to 5.4 per cent by 1996, with inflation remaining at between two and three per cent, 
allowed the Clinton Administration to go to the 1996 election proclaiming the American 
economy as the healthiest it had been in three decades. It also provided the space for US 
trade officials to quietly de-emphasise trade complaints against Japan. While various 
indicators suggested a resurgence of American industrial power, nothing so caught the
' 1 ~‘ Some scholars argue that most of the credit for strong import growth rested with the dramatic 
appreciation of the yen between 1993 and 1995 (Asher 1996).
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eye of White House speechwriters as the chance to claim by the election year that 
‘America is selling more cars than Japan for the first time since the 1970s’. '73
Other secondary factors worked to muzzle American market access policy towards Japan 
by the mid 1990s. The establishment of the World Trade Organization in 1995 created a 
more binding set of rules for the conduct of international trade, including a dispute 
settlement system with the potential to find US threats of sanctions to be inconsistent 
with these rules. By giving it an opportunity to appeal to a dispute settlement panel if 
subject to sanctions, the WTO ‘improved Japan’s “no agreement” options’ (Schoppa 
1997: 293).v 4 The record of the automotive dispute points to the WTO dispute 
settlement system changing the way the US calculated the costs and benefits at stake in 
disputes, in this case influencing the Clinton Administration’s decision to accept a deal. 
A high level of uncertainty surrounded the prospects of the United States winning its 
WTO case against Japan, while Japan more confidently approached its case against 
unilateral US trade action/7'’ Schoppa (1997: 288-289) suggests that the net impact was:
slightly in Japan’s favor since it reduced the impact of US threats. Japan had made it 
clear that it would take the US to the WTO if it followed through on its threats -  
regardless of any damage this might do to the WTO. Japan knew that the US, faced with 
this choice, would seek a negotiated settlement. It therefore discounted the US threats, 
forcing the US to accept a deal without meaningful results.
Notwithstanding American official statements to the contrary, the WTO worked to blunt 
American aggressive bilateralism via the tools of Super 301 and Section 301. Prestowitz 
(1995: 2) captured the frustration of the hardliners in the wake of the auto dispute, 
bemoaning that ‘this case demonstrated that Section 301 is dead: the United States’ 
ability to act unilaterally on trade issues has come to an end’. While American 
membership of the WTO did not diminish the ability of the United States to initiate 
Section 301 cases, it did require it to submit cases involving WTO trade agreements to
^ ' ‘State of the Union Address of the President’, Office of the Press Secretary, The White 1 louse, 23 
January 1996.
’7I The former GATT processes only provided for a weak system of dispute settlement with countries 
able to delay dispute panels and to block panel findings on appeal. Under the WTO, a member could 
automatically get the formation of a panel to hear its complaint that international trade rules have been 
violated. Once a panel makes such a finding, the offending party either can correct the cited practices 
or negotiate compensation with the accusing party. While the WTO cannot force nations to bring their 
laws into line with panel rulings, it can authorise the party whose trade rights had been violated to 
impose WTO-legal sanctions to put pressure on the offending party to modify its behaviour. 
v ’ Also, third-parties -  in this case, the EU and Australia -  were able to assert their rights in seeking to 
avoid a deal which could have been a de facto source of discrimination.
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the WTO for dispute settlement. At the same time, the WTO has strengthened the 
multilateral option for the United States in seeking to remove formal or informal 
restrictions on access to the Japanese or other markets/76
Increased efforts by parts of the Free-Trade-Good Relations coalition to rejuvenate 
bilateral security ties also led Washington to check its aggressive Japan policy by the 
mid 1990s (Funabashi 1999). Concerned about fall-out from regular trade disputes and 
signs that Tokyo was becoming increasingly sceptical of US reliability as Japan’s ally 
and protector, policy-makers in the Pentagon became convinced that the United States 
had to act quickly to demonstrate the importance of the US-Japan security alliance. 
Under the direction of US Assistant Secretary of Defense Joseph Nye, a series of 
measures was initiated to reaffirm American security commitment to Japan and to East 
Asia more generally (Nye 1995). The Nye Initiative culminated in an April 1996 
agreement between President Clinton and Prime Minister Hashimoto to establish a new 
set of guidelines for US-Japan defense cooperation. One analyst would go so far as to 
argue that ‘by the end of its first term the administration had reversed course and headed 
down the same “defense first, trade later” path trodden by its predecessors’ (Asher 1997: 
343).
Conclusion
The Clinton Administration arrived in office determined to make the aggressive pursuit 
of quantitative indicators in market access negotiations with Japan its distinctive trade 
policy feature. The Framework negotiations begun in 1993 saw demands in a range of 
areas for specific numerical benchmarks and trend-lines to be inserted in bilateral 
agreements. While American negotiators achieved some modest gains over previous 
sectoral efforts, Japan successfully rebuffed demands for explicit numerical indicators. 
The back-down by the United States in the automotive dispute of 1995 was the last gasp 
for an aggressive results-oriented approach. By 1996, momentum behind a high-profile 
results-oriented approach had waned due to a confluence of factors. Especially important 
were the strong resistance of the Japanese government and changing economic fortunes
' 6 By the end of 1999, the United States could claim out of 49 complaints made under the dispute 
settlement process it had prevailed in 22 out of 24 cases settled to that point winning 12 cases in 
litigation and favourably settling in 10 cases without litigation (CEA 1999: 25).
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of the United States and Japan. The final chapter analyses briefly the experience of the 
second Clinton Administration, draws out some key theoretical perspectives from this 
study and flags how the framework developed here might apply to future research on US 
trade policy.
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10 The Eclipse of the Japan Problem?
The second Clinton Administration
By 1996, the US government had stepped back from making quantitative indicators in 
market access agreements the key objective of its trade policy towards Japan, placing 
greater emphasis on monitoring and enforcing existing agreements. During the 
Clinton Administration’s second term, the sense of looming crisis in US-Japan trade 
relations subsided. There was no shortage of criticism of Japan, but now it was 
synonymous with Japanese weakness rather than economic strength. The main target 
was the inability of Japanese policy-makers to stimulate Japan’s economy, a 
complaint that was amplified with the onset of the Asian economic crisis in late 1997. 
There were periodic sectoral tensions, but for the most part market access concerns
'S 77centred on disappointment at the slow pace of Japanese deregulation.
In June 1997, President Clinton secured endorsement from Prime Minister Hashimoto 
for a US-Japan Enhanced Initiative on Deregulation and Competition Policy. 1 The 
emphasis on accelerated regulatory reform underscored the reversion to a more 
process-oriented market access focus by US negotiators. American officials continued 
to articulate the Japan problem in familiar terms of ‘closed distribution systems, 
exclusionary business practices, over-regulation, discriminatory and nontransparent 
procurement procedures, and inappropriately close relationships between ministries 
and the industries they regulate’. ^  They continued to charge that Japan was failing to 
implement a long list of market access arrangements on such products as flat glass, 
insurance, autos and auto parts, telecommunications, computers, wood products and 
construction services. But the appetite for high-profile disputes backed by credible 
threats of retaliation if Japan did not agree to specific market access commitments had
577 The major sectoral negotiations during the second Clinton Administration related to insurance, 
telecommunications, port services and civil aviation.
578 JEI Report 24B, 27 June 1997, p. 1. This initiative grew out of American frustration with the 
perceived modest results of Japan’s three-year deregulation initiative completed in March 1997. 
Working groups were created to focus on a number of economy-wide structural issues as well as 
regulatory reform in specific areas: housing, financial services, telecommunications, medical devices 
and pharmaceuticals, and later the energy sector.
579 Remarks of US Trade Representative Ambassador Charlene Barshefsky to the Japan National Press 
Club, Tokyo, 17 September 1998.
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disappeared. Bilateral deregulation talks produced an annual cycle of announcements 
that went a long way to ensuring that market access issues no longer dominated
S80summit talks between President Clinton and his Japanese counterpart.
Significantly, the Clinton Administration faced virtually no pressure from Congress to 
revive an aggressive sectoral approach towards Japan. The Japan problem was no 
longer a hot issue in Congress, partly due to the loss of control of Congress by the 
Democratic Party at the 1994 mid-term elections. The new Republican majority had 
priorities altogether different from trying to extract market access victories from an 
Asian ally no longer seen as threatening American economic ascendancy. A year into 
the Clinton Administration’s second term, one analyst would conclude that:
Japan will continue to fade from the radar screen of American policymakers. Most 
members o f  the Republican majority in the House of Representatives, for example, 
have no personal experience with the transpacific trade frictions o f the 1980s. They 
know Japan, if at all, as an ailing neighbour of the People’s Republic o f  China or as 
the home o f  a multilateral company w ith a plant in their district. Neither perception is 
likely to induce a rush to the ramparts o f  a future bilateral trade war (Ostrom 1997: 
15).
The Clinton Administration’s less confrontational approach was tested by an adverse 
decision in the Kodak case when a WTO panel in December 1997 rejected the US 
complaint that the Japanese government had systematically discriminated against 
foreign competitors in the consumer photographic film and paper market in Japan.581 
While USTR Charlene Barshefsky criticised the decision as focusing on ‘narrow 
technical issues’, the US reaction was notably muted.' Importantly, the United 
States could point to seven WTO dispute settlement victories prior to the Kodak 
decision.'* 1 A surging American trade deficit alongside growing Japanese global and 
bilateral trade surpluses through the second half of the 1990s provided a further test of
>MI In July 2000, President Clinton and Japan’s Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori agreed to extend the 
Enhanced Initiative on Deregulation and Competition Policy for a fourth year. Inside US Trade, 18(30), 
28 July 2000, p. 9.
581 Lincoln (1999: 160) notes that the US government ‘lost on all the substantive allegations made, 
winning only a small moral victory on some of the theoretical issues (concerning the possible WTO-
i 1 legality of administrative guidance)’.
:’82 ‘Statement by Ambassador Charlene Barshefsky regarding the WTO Dispute on Photographic Film 
and Paper’, Office of the US Trade Representative, 5 December 1997. ‘Kodak’s loss’, Washington 
Post, 9 December 1997, p. A24.
58’ Rather than appeal the Kodak decision, the US government established a monitoring and 
enforcement committee in February 1998 to review Japan’s implementation of representations made to 
the WTO regarding its efforts to ensure the openness of its photographic film and paper market.
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the Clinton Administration’s low-key approach. But in a growing US economy the 
chief complaint against Japan came from a more traditional source, with the steel 
industry forcing the administration in 1999 to press Japan and other nations to cut 
back their steel exports.’ Not even a sharp fall in sales of US-produced automotive 
products in Japan after 1997 could ignite an aggressive response with the US side 
acknowledging the impact of industry restructuring and the Japanese recession on the 
automotive sector in Japan.’ ' Renewed speculation about a more confrontational 
approach accompanied President Clinton’s reinstatement by executive order of Super 
301 in January 1999/86 But Japan market access targets were conspicuously missing 
from major announcements of American trade priorities in both 1999 and 2000, even 
though difficult negotiations continued over insurance, flat glass and internet 
interconnection rates.' The half-hearted attempt by the Clinton Administration to 
secure a follow-up agreement to the 1995 auto pact pointed to how Japan market 
access issues had become of second-order importance towards the end of the Clinton 
presidency -  somewhere below discussions on the launch of a new round of 
multilateral negotiations in the WTO, talks surrounding China’s accession to that 
body, and a series of thorny WTO disputes, especially involving the EU.
By the end of 2000, the Clinton Administration could claim to have secured 39 
bilateral and multilateral market access agreements with Japan. A passing reference to 
these agreements was the only mention of Japan in a speech by Charlene Barshefsky 
marking the end of her tenure as USTR/88 In the minds of US trade officials, the 
Japan problem had not so much disappeared as been eclipsed.
January 2001 saw a new administration assume power in Washington, even less 
inclined towards an aggressive Japan market access policy. With its strong emphasis 
on alliance relationships, the Republican team of President George W. Bush made no
584 Inside US Trade, 17(2), 8 January, 1999, p. 1. Inside US Trade, 17(32), 13 August 1999, p. 6.
385 ‘Statement by US Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky and Commerce Secretary William M. 
Daley upon release of US-Japan Automotive Agreement Monitoring Report’, Office of the United 
States Trade Representative, 3 June 1999.
386 Barshefsky announces Super 301 and Title VII Executive Order’, Office of the United States 
Trade Representative, 26 January 1999.
387 ‘USTR sets priorities for global trade expansion and enforcement’, Office of the United States Trade 
Representative, 30 April 1999. ‘USTR Charlene Barshefsky highlights Clinton Administration 2000 
trade policy agenda and 1999 annual report’, 2 March 2000. JEI Report 18B, 5 May 2000, p. 6.
388 ‘Thoughts at a Moment of Transition’, Remarks by Ambassador Charlene Barshefsky, Economic 
Strategy Institute, Washington DC, 19 December 2000.
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secret of the fact that it thought the Clinton Administration had spent too much time 
lecturing Japan about its economic inadequacies/89
Theoretical perspectives
Tracing the rise and fall of America’s results-oriented Japan policy provides lessons 
on the key factors which shape US trade policy. This study’s core focus has been on 
explaining what drove the United States to depart radically from traditional process- 
oriented market access negotiations with Japan in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The 
scaling back of US market access demands in the second half of the 1990s in turn 
raises questions about the future of US-Japan relations. Are we simply at the low- 
point of a cycle of attention to the Japan problem, or is it truly the end of an era? If 
indeed the Japan market access issue has become less important what remains of the 
hardline ideas that previously framed debate on the Japan problem?
The state-society framework of this study points to the primary determinants of 
American trade policy arising from the interaction of large-scale international 
political-economic conditions, macroeconomic forces and shifts in the broad 
governing coalitions of American politics. The American trade policy regime provides 
the most appropriate vantage-point for identifying the broad determinants of change in 
US market access policy towards Japan. The policy sequence that culminated in 
America’s results-oriented Japan policy was part of a broader response to a crisis in 
the institutions, rules and norms of the American trade policy regime in the first half 
of the 1980s. This crisis saw a resurgence of congressional trade activism that forced 
the second Reagan Administration in September 1985 to adopt a more aggressive 
bilateral market access policy, in contrast with the dominant multilateral approach of 
the postwar era.
The interaction of long-term change in America’s international economic position and 
macroeconomic policy decisions of the first Reagan Administration were the 
fundamental sources of the regime crisis and, ultimately, the broad determinants of 
change in US market access policy towards Japan. The internationalisation of US
589 Inside US Trude, 18(49), 8 December 2000.
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manufacturing industry and the emergence of new sources of surplus capital in the 
world economy eroded America’s postwar economic dominance. By the 1980s, Japan 
had emerged as the broadest and deepest economic challenger to the United States. 
But a central argument of this study is that a focus purely on international forces can 
obscure how and when such forces matter. What was special about the mid 1980s in 
producing a major policy turning point? What shaped the nature of America’s 
response in the direction of a more aggressive bilateralism versus other possibilities 
such as a shift towards state-sanctioned protectionism? International-level variables 
help to shape the broad contours of policy, but they do so in indeterminate ways.
Domestic policy decisions, in particular the macroeconomic policies of the first 
Reagan Administration, were critical in shaping the timing and intensity of the trade 
regime crisis in the first half of the 1980s. Via its effects on the US dollar, the 
American traded goods sector, and US external deficits, a marked loosening in fiscal 
policy by the first Reagan Administration helped to push the American trade policy 
regime to crisis point. In short, Reaganomics had large, unintended consequences for 
US trade policy.
Japan was the primary target of American grievances about unfair trade barriers given 
the scale of its competitive challenge and the size of the bilateral trade imbalance. But 
a more fine-grained explanation of the shift towards a results-oriented policy draws 
attention to the political fortunes of key advocacy coalitions contesting Japan policy. 
Hardliners and free traders approached the Japan market access problem with 
different views about what was at stake and what, if anything, America should do 
about it. Hardliners coalesced around the view that Japan was different from other 
industrialised economies in terms of its international openness and responsiveness to 
process-oriented negotiations. To the free traders, the idea that Japan was sufficiently 
different to warrant a departure from process-oriented negotiations was either 
challenged on intellectual grounds, or it was considered irrelevant in the light of more 
important challenges facing the United States.
The regime crisis had a far-reaching impact on the institutional influence and standing 
of these key advocacy coalitions. Prior to the regime crisis, the dominant free trade 
coalition kept the hardliners in check, largely through their institutional dominance of
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the executive branch. The regime crisis enabled hardliners to exert more influence 
over US policy as evident by the increased number of formal bilateral agreements and 
the move by the second Reagan Administration and the Bush Administration towards 
a selective, results-oriented Japan policy.
The political contest between the hardliners and the free traders was also a battle of 
ideas. This study explored the fit between politics and ideas as a way of highlighting 
the circumstances that led to a major departure by the United States from the norms of 
process-oriented negotiations. The policy sequence after 1985 points to a role for 
policy learning where changing beliefs about the Japan problem helped to alter the 
boundaries for policy innovation. The emergence of revisionism as a coherent 
hardline paradigm in the second half of the 1980s drew strength from the fertile 
political soil of US-Japan disputation, the end of the Cold War and a deterioration of 
elite attitudes towards Japan. A fragmented and defensive free trade coalition was 
further weakened by reputable economists in the American policy community 
concluding that Japan was indeed different from other industrialised economies in 
terms of its international openness. Over time, hardline ideas left an imprint on Japan 
policy in a way that cannot be tied simply to changes in the relative positions of the 
US and Japanese economies, macroeconomic circumstances or the superior resources 
of one coalition over another.
The Bush Administration's Structural Impediments Initiative incorporated elements of 
this learning across the American trade policy community in a process-oriented 
framework. The coupling of fertile political soil with hardline ideas saw the Clinton 
Administration pursue a policy of demanding quantitative indicators in market access 
agreements. That this policy proved short-lived reflected determined Japanese 
opposition and a reversal in the economic fortunes of both countries in the 1990s. The 
former underscored why an emphasis on policy preferences (what states want) does 
not mean that states get what they want. Japanese policy preferences proved the 
binding constraint on the hardliners. At the same time, increasingly divergent 
performances by the US and Japanese economies through the 1990s lessened the 
stakes for US policy-makers from aggressively pursuing market access results in 
Japan.
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The demise of a results-oriented Japan policy by the second half of the 1990s resulted 
from a powerful reassertion of the core (non-cognitive) factors which this study 
portrays as the primary drivers of policy change. By the beginning of the 21st century, 
the economic resurgence of the United States and the “lost decade” in Japan had 
sharply reduced the political and economic salience of the Japan problem. 
Significantly, America’s resurgence was bound up with an orthodox economic 
strategy of fiscal prudence and continued economic openness, reinforcing core 
premises of the free traders.
This highlights the complex picture surrounding the role of learning about the Japan 
market access problem. In particular, it underscores the importance of focusing on 
fertile political soil and not simply the nature of ideas themselves. The fertile soil 
revisionists exploited to frame debate on the Japan problem reflected a particular set 
of circumstances that have now changed dramatically. Most notably, Japan’s 
economic malaise has dealt a blow to core hardline beliefs about the stakes 
surrounding the Japan problem. This highlights the need when probing the links 
between politics and ideas to focus not simply on ideas but also on what makes them 
take hold and grow. This study illuminates the peculiar combination of circumstances 
by which radical ideas made their way into the policy process. Underlying concerns 
about the Japan problem have not disappeared, but the particularly fertile soil of the 
1980s and early 1990s has.
The key conclusions from this study build on insights from the historical 
institutionalist school of politics with its sensitivity to historical contingency, the 
importance of institutional factors, separately-located policy processes, and path 
dependency.
The powerful interaction in the early 1980s of Japan’s high-technology challenge and 
America’s self-inflicted budgetary wounds severely disrupted the institutional balance 
of American trade policy. The unintended consequences for US trade policy of 
macroeconomic developments reinforces the need to cast a broad eye over domestic 
politics. As well as altering the finely-balanced institutional bargain between 
Congress and the executive branch, the regime crisis favoured certain groups and their 
particular definitions of America’s trade problems over others. The hardliners became
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more influential in the second half of the 1980s and the path on which US trade policy 
was set saw their ideas gain in credibility. Still, the experience surrounding 
revisionism suggests that new ideas struggle to hold ground once more fundamental 
“real world” determinants of policy move against them.
Consistent with the pattern of recent years, America’s economic resurgence has 
ameliorated both the pressures on, and temptation for, US policy-makers to again 
make the Japan problem a major focus of US foreign economic policy. Japan remains 
the world's second largest economy and a major location of production, consumption, 
capital and technology. Yet no serious economic forecaster now believes that it will 
overtake the United States as the world’s major economic power.
Japan’s future growth prospects remain uncertain with some estimates suggesting that 
its long-term economic growth rate has declined to around 1 per cent a year in the 
absence of major restructuring in the way the economy operates (OECD 1999a)/90 
Many of the attributes that revisionist analysts saw as sources of Japanese strength in 
the past now appear as ailments, adding up to a ‘web of nonmarket mechanisms that 
allocate investment funds’ (Alexander 1998: 12). These include the residual influence 
of a state-led economic development model, weak private sector orientation towards 
profit, a banking sector not geared towards liberal financial decision-making 
structures and the absence of an active market for corporate control/91 The 
government sector is marked by considerable inefficiency, while Japan’s long-term 
fiscal outlook remains bleak following the dramatic increase in public debt in the 
1990s and with its population aging more rapidly than that of any other developed 
nation (OECD 2000b)/92 The OECD (1999b: 12) has identified a more general 
regulatory problem due to ‘the lack of a coherent concept of the role of the state in a 
period of market-led growth has left regulatory intervention fragmented, incoherent 
and vulnerable to a host of special interests’. The failure of Japanese policy-makers to
v,(l See Posen (1998) for an analysis arguing that correct macroeconomic policies rather than far- 
reaching structural reform is the key to restoring economic growth in Japan.
Among the symptoms are a net return on corporate capital in Japan which is half that earned in the 
United States, while productivity in the nonmanufacturing part of the Japanese economy is only around 
60 percent of the US level (Alexander 1998, Asher and Smithers 1998). Japan also lags well behind 
other developed economies in the use and development of information technology (IT) (OECD 2000a). 
v)" Gross debt in relation to GDP is already the highest in the OECD (well over 100 percent), and just 
to stabilise it at a significantly higher level in ten years would require a substantial amount of fiscal 
consolidation possibly 10 percentage points of GDP (OECD 2000b: 14).
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deal with the legacies of the “bubble economy” has severely damaged the reputation 
of Japan’s elite bureaucrats, especially the Ministry of Finance.593
There remains no shortage of high-level pronouncements on the need for structural 
reform.594 In May 2001, new Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi vowed to ‘ceaselessly 
advance structural reform’, urging his countrymen to ‘overcome barriers of vested 
interests and free ourselves of past limitations’.595 Still, such exhortations confront a 
system of institutionally weak leadership and entrenched resistance to any national 
consensus for wide-ranging reform (Katz 1998, Carlile and Tilton (eds.) 1998).596
By contrast, at least prior to the economic softening of late 2000, respected figures 
were prepared to venture that the United States had entered a new economic era with 
its economic structure well-adapted to innovation and to generating productivity 
improvements from the new economy.597 The US economic expansion from 1992 to 
2000 was the longest since records began to be kept around 1850 (OECD 2000c: 21). 
In each of the years 1997, 1998, 1999 and 2000 the US economy expanded by more 
than 4 per cent annually accompanied by large improvements in productivity. Trend 
labour productivity growth is estimated to have roughly doubled from the rate seen in 
the 20 years prior to the mid 1990s (OECD 2000c: 9). This has been linked to a surge 
in growth of the capital stock, particularly the stock of IT products (Oliner and Sichel 
2000, Jorgenson and Stiroh 2 0 00).598 The OECD (2000c: 3, 37) estimates that 
America's potential growth rate has increased to around 3.6 per cent a year from 
slightly over 2.5 per cent at the start of the 1990s, with the economy 'having 
recovered a considerable amount of the dynamism lost in the 1970s and 1980s’.
593 Restructuring in sectors such as real estate and construction remains a drag on the economy and the 
problems of bad debts and low rates of return still ail the banking sector.
594 A 1999 report on Policy Measures for Economic Rebirth by former Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi’s 
Economic Strategy Council laid out a comprehensive reform agenda. This has been followed by 
specific efforts to enhance Japan’s “new economy” capabilities.
593 Far Eastern Economic Review, 17 May 2001, p. 14. Mr Koizumi is the ninth Japanese Prime 
Minister since 1990.
396 The governing LDP reflects this absence of consensus where policy interests cut across competing 
factional affiliations linked with particular powerbrokers.
397 Speech by Alan Greenspan, ‘Challenges for Monetary Policy-Makers’, Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System, 19 October 2000.
598 For a sceptical view, see Gordon (2000).
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Demographie characteristics, including a high tolerance for immigration, give further 
cause for optimism about America’s long-term economic performance/99
The longer-term outlook for the United States will depend, inter alia, on whether the 
optimists or the sceptics are right about future productivity growth. Even so, there is 
evidence that the ongoing internationalisation of the US economy may not generate 
the same fractious sectoral trade politics that surrounded the economic imbalances and 
macroeconomic cycles of previous decades. With the exception of the steel sector and 
some parts of agriculture, the surge of imports into the United States in the 1990s 
failed to results in the sort of protectionist response many expected based on earlier 
experience. Despite record trade and current account deficits, ‘traditional 
protectionism remains surprisingly weak’ (Destler and Bahnt 1999: 1). At the same 
time, increased cross-ownership and corporate tie-ins between US and Japanese firms 
in sectors such as automotives and semiconductors have worked to lessened market 
access tensions between the US and Japan.
To the extent that major structural reform holds the key to Japanese economic 
renewal, it should also work against a repeat of past confrontations. The political 
paralysis that generates much of the current pessimism about Japan has not stopped 
important structural changes driven by market imperatives. One of the notable 
features of Japan’s economic stagnation in the 1990s is that import ratios have 
increased undermining hardline claims about the Japan problem. The share of 
manufactures in total imports has continued to rise even while the share of 
manufacturing in the Japanese economy has declined (Menon 1997, Ostrom 1998).600 
Also, FDI in Japan has surged in recent years, rising five-fold in the 1990s (De 
Brouwer and Warren 2001: 8).
This more or less sanguine view of US-Japan trade relations still needs to be tempered 
by recognition of the forces that can significantly alter the policy environment in the 
short to medium-term. America’s boom has left its own build-up of imbalances -  a
599 During the next 10 years, the working age population of the United States will expand by at least 10 
per cent, while in Europe it will stagnate and decline by 6 per cent in Japan (Hale 2000).
600 By 1996, imports accounted for 18.7 per cent of the supply of manufactures in Japan, up from 
around 10 per cent at the start of the 1990s (Ostrom 1998: 8-9).
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negative personal savings rate, high corporate and household debt, excess capaeity in 
some sectors, and a current account deficit of around 4 per cent of GDP (IMF 2001). 
Weaker profits and a sharp fall in capital spending and industrial production at the end 
of 2000 may yet foreshadow a US recession. To many critics of Japan, continued 
large bilateral and global trade surpluses remain a powerful symbol of the failure of 
US policy to address an unequal economic relationship. Any protracted downturn in 
the US economy has the capacity to induce renewed trade frictions with Japan, 
especially if hardliners in Congress and the business community decide once again to 
make these imbalances the barometer of trade policy success. Drawing on America’s 
particular tradition of economic nationalism, future domestic coalitions will doubtless 
bring forward new policy entrepreneurs with new or recycled ideas on how to restore 
fairness and reciprocity to America’s trading relationships, including with Japan.
Still, a new era of Japan policy focused on quantitative indicators seems unlikely. 
Such a radical departure by the United States from the norms of process-oriented 
negotiations is possible, but it would appear rare. There appear too many variables 
that are sui generis to the US-Japan case of the 1980s and early 1990s.
Some questions for the future
If Japan is not about to blindside the United States, should we expect a new economic 
challenger to emerge, generating a new era of aggressive bilateralism? For example, 
will the 21s1 century throw up a China problem for the United States and unleash a 
results-oriented market access policy of the sort that characterised the Japan problem 
in the late 20th century? Although a comprehensive analysis of this issue is outside the 
scope of this study, America’s approach to the Japan problem may provide some 
lessons for future US-China trade relations.
There would appear to be some key differences in the economic relationship 
suggesting that a parallel experience to the Japan results-oriented policy is unlikely. 
First, at least for many years to come, the relative levels of economic development 
should guard against anxiety that China is about to devastate America’s high- 
technology base. Above all, it was the scale of Japan’s high-tech challenge that fed 
concerns about America’s inability to compete in the 1980s. Second, a China market
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access problem does not exist in the same way based on the sorts of measures that 
were used to define America’s Japan problem. Manufactured goods dominate China’s 
imports, measures of intra-industry trade are larger than in Japan, and in the last two 
decades FDI has flooded into China at a rate without precedent in the developing 
world (Garnaut and Huang 2000: 26).601 Significantly, China’s openness to FDI has 
established a network of US corporate stakes in China that can strongly influence US 
government policy. Such interests were all but absent in the case of Japan policy in 
the 1980s and early 1990s. Finally, the different nature of the US-China relationship 
may make US policy-makers think twice before embarking on an aggressive market 
access approach of the sort that characterised the Framework talks with Japan. While 
it has not be a central focus of this study, the inherently unequal nature of the US- 
Japan relationship due to Japan’s ultimate security dependence on the United States 
underpinned the Clinton Administration’s premise in attempting to deal with 
economic and political-security issues on separate tracks. A new generation of 
hardliners may find arguments to justify confrontational economic diplomacy towards 
China. But the notion that this could be quarantined from political-security relations 
with China defies credibility (Kunkel 1995: 22).
Other factors have the potential to disrupt US-China trade relations in the future. One 
can assume that sustained high growth and deeper integration into the world economy 
will see China play a larger role in global economic affairs in coming decades. Long- 
range projections suggest that, unlike Japan, China may indeed surpass the United 
States as the world’s largest economy some time this century. Notwithstanding 
China's embrace of market-oriented reforms, the domestic political institutions of 
each country embody vastly different belief-systems about the role of the state and its 
relationship to the individual. And the United States and China carry distinctive views 
about appropriate norms of behaviour into the international arena (Foot 1995). As 
such, a myriad of issues make for a delicate bilateral relationship and caution against a 
reflexive economic determinism based on the inevitability of globalisation and its 
pacific effects.
’0I See Song (2000) and Zhang (1999) for more detail on trade and investment patterns in China.
290
Indeed, it is the home-grown backlash against globalisation that throws up perhaps the 
most interesting question surrounding future US trade policy. The United States has 
internationalised large parts of its “old economy” and captured the commanding 
heights of the “new economy”. It is the world’s dominant economic power and it is 
not about to trade places with anyone anytime soon. Yet its capacity to display 
international leadership on trade policy appears decidedly feeble. Is this a temporary 
phenomenon or is the current stalemate surrounding US trade leadership a more 
permanent condition?
The Clinton Administration’s initial successes on NAFTA and the Uruguay Round 
masked the emergence of a new era of division over trade/’0- Since then, America’s 
role as a leader of international trade liberalisation has remained hampered by 
politically powerful domestic constraints that have arisen mainly from concerns about 
the impact of globalisation and increased trade on labour and environmental standards 
(Destler and Balint 1999). The Clinton Administration remained without fast-track 
trade negotiating authority after it expired in December 1993. Its initial attempt to 
secure new authority as part of the Uruguay Round implementing legislation in 1994 
founded and a new fast-track bill was defeated in the House of Representatives in 
1998/’°’ In early 1999, President Clinton flagged his intention to rebuild a domestic 
consensus on trade and to push for a new round of global trade negotiations. The 
Seattle Ministerial Meeting of the WTO in late 1999 broke down amidst a lack of 
international support for a round, but it will be remembered mostly for the tear-gas 
and violence that spoke to a fractured trade debate in the United States. A number of 
mini-initiatives marked the final year of the Clinton Administration, but they fell well 
short of a legacy of trade leadership.
The Republican administration of George W. Bush elected in November 2000 has 
inherited a policy environment with the same concerns about globalisation, the same 
divided politics centred on environmental and labour issues, and the same high-level 
of partisanship in Washington that marked the final years of the Clinton
602 NAFTA was the lightening rod for these divisions, setting o f f ‘the most prominent and contentious 
debate on trade since the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930’ (Destler 1995: 217).
6(b The vote was 243-180 with only 29 of 200 House Democrats supporting renewal of fast-track 
(Baldwin and Magee 2000: 7).
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Administration.
At one level, this study points to why America may not easily recapture the mantle of 
leadership on trade. The state-society framework suggests that the structural position 
of the United States in the international economy is theoretically permissive. Policy 
preferences matter and this is especially the case for the largest actor in the 
international system. The United States can define its policy interests in different 
ways because it is the largest actor.
Inevitably, we are driven towards a more bottom-up approach to shed light on the 
circumstances and choices that are shaping US trade policy. This study recommends a 
focus on the key domestic institutions and actors at the interface of American state- 
society relations to uncover the dominant factors constraining American trade 
leadership. While the institutions of the American trade policy regime are a source of 
continuity, as trade has affected more peoples’ lives new coalitions have taken 
advantage of the essential openness of the regime to recast the definitions of 
America’s trade problems. As Destler and Balint (1999: 9) observe, the rise to 
prominence of labour and environment issues involves ‘not the balance to be struck 
among US commercial interests, but the proper balance between these interests and 
others that society values’. The new salience of these issues highlights the importance 
of having an analytical framework that is open to accommodating the complex ways 
in which ideas, values and interests are intertwined.
Under this view of politics, the same structures will not necessarily generate the same 
results. Policy-makers are pushed along particular paths by what they inherit from the 
past, but they still have choices to make. At the start of the 21st century, policy-makers 
keen to reassert American international leadership on trade are searching for what 
choices might lessen the domestic conflicts around labour and environment issues. 
Highly parsimonious and deterministic approaches to US trade policy are unlikely to 
tell us what the nature of those choices might be. We are left at what Evans (1995: 2) 
calls The eclectic, messy center’ of political analysis, somewhere short of the neat 
solutions of ahistorical formal models, but with an eye to the analytical lenses that are 
useful in identifying what is significant about particular cases.
292
References
Advisory Committee on Trade Policy and Negotiations (ACTPN) (1989) Analysis o f the 
US-Japan Trade Problem, Washington DC, February.
____________________________  (1993) Major Findings and Recommendations on
US-Japan Trade Policy, Washington DC, January.
Ahearn, Raymond J. (1986) ‘Protectionist legislation in 1985’, Congressional Research 
Service: 86-632E, The Library of Congress, Washington DC.
_________________ (1994) ‘Japan-US trade negotiations: Will the deadlock be
broken?’, Congressional Research Service: 94-724F, The Library of Congress, 
Washington DC, 13 September.
_________________(1995) ‘Japan’s response to US trade pressures: End of an era?’,
Congressional Research Service: 95-714F, The Library of Congress, Washington DC, 12 
June.
Alexander, Arthur (1998) ‘Japan’s mid-life economic crisis: Similarities and differences 
with East Asia’s troubles’, JEI Report 1A, 9 January.
Altman, Roger C. (1994) "Why pressure Tokyo?’, Foreign Affairs, 73(3), May-June, pp. 
2- 6 .
American Chamber of Commerce in Japan (ACCJ) (1997) Making Trade Talks Work: 
Lessons from Recent History, Tokyo: American Chamber of Commerce in Japan.
Angel, Robert C. (1978) Japan’s Most Serious Economic Problem in the United States: 
The Image o f an "Unfair Japan”, United States-Japan Trade Council, September.
Anonymous (1996) Primary Colors: A Novel o f Politics, London: Chatto & Windus.
Aoki, Masahiko (1994) ‘The Japanese firm as a system of attributes: A survey and 
research agenda’, in Masahiko Aoki and Ronald Dore (eds.) The Japanese Firm: The 
Sources o f Competitive Strength, Oxford UK: Oxford University Press.
Armacost, Michael H. (1996) Friends or Rivals? The Insider’s Account o f US-Japan 
Relations, New York: Columbia University Press.
Asher, David (1996) ‘Economic myths explained: What became of the Japanese 
miracle’, Orbis, 40(2), Spring, pp. 215-234.
___________(1997) ‘A US-Japan alliance for the next century’, Orbis, 41(3), Summer,
pp. 343-374.
Asher, David and Andrew Smithers (1998) ‘Japan’s key challenges for the 21st century: 
Debt, deflation, default, demography and deregulation", SAIS Policy Forum Series, 
March, photocopy.
293
Bailey, Martin Neil and Margaret M. Blair (1988) ‘Productivity and American 
management’, in Robert E. Litan, Robert Z. Lawrence and Charles L. Schultze (eds.) 
American Living Standards: Threats and Challenges, Washington DC: The Brookings 
Institution.
Balassa, Bela (1986a) ‘Japanese trade policies towards developing countries’, Journal o f 
International Economic Integration, 1(1), Spring.
__________ (1986b) ‘Japan’s trade policies’, Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, 122(4), pp.
745-790.
Balassa, Bela and Marcus Noland (1988) Japan in the World Economy, Washington DC: 
Institute for International Economics.
Balcerowicz, Leszek (1994) ‘Poland’, in John Williamson (ed.) The Political Economy 
of Policy Reform, Washington DC: Institute for International Economics.
Baldwin, David (1989) Paradoxes o f Power, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Baldwin, Richard (1988) ‘Hysteresis and import prices: The beachhead effect’, 
American Economic Review, 78, pp. 773-785.
Baldwin, Robert E. (1984a) ‘Trade policies in developed countries’, in Ronald Jones and 
Peter Kenen (eds.) Handbook of International Economics, vol. 1, Amsterdam: North 
Holland.
_______________ (1984b) ‘The changing nature of US trade policy since World War
IE, in Robert E. Baldwin and Anne O. Krueger (eds.) The Structure and Evolution of 
Recent US Trade Policy, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
_______________(1985) The Political Economy o f US Import Policy, Cambridge MA:
MIT Press.
Baldwin, Robert E. and Christopher S. Magee (2000) Congressional Trade Votes: 
From NAFTA Approval to Fast-Track Defeat, Washington DC: Institute for 
International Economics.
Baldwin, Robert E., Douglas R. Nelson and J. David Richardson (1992) ‘Mini­
symposium: The political-economy of international market access -  Introduction and 
overview’, The World Economy, 15(6), November, pp. 679-683.
Bass, Gwenell L. (1992) ‘Japan-US Automotive Trade’, Congressional Research 
Service, The Library of Congress, Washington DC, September.
Bauer, Raymond A., Ithiel de Sola Pool and Lewis A. Dexter (1963) American Business 
and Public Policy: The Politics o f Foreign Trade, Chicago: Atherton Press.
Bayard, Thomas O. and Kimberly Ann Elliott (1994) Reciprocity and Retaliation in US 
Trade Policy, Washington DC: Institute for International Economics.
294
Bello. Judith Hippier and Alan F. Holmer (1990) ‘The heart of the 1988 Trade Act: A 
legislative history of the amendments to Section 301', in Jagdish Bhagwati and Hugh T. 
Patrick (eds.) Aggressive Unilateralism: America's 301 Trade Policy and the World 
Trading System, Ann Arbor MI: University of Michigan Press.
Benedict, Ruth (1972) The Chrysanthemum and the Sword, New York: Meridian Books.
Bennett, Colin J. and Michael Howlett (1992) ‘The lessons of learning: Reconciling 
theories of policy learning and policy change', Policy Sciences, 25, pp. 275-294.
Bentley, Arthur (1908) The Process o f Government, Chicago: Chicago University Press.
Bergsten, C. Fred (1981) ‘The costs of Reaganomics’, Foreign Policy, 44, Fall, pp. 24- 
36.
_____________ (1982a) ‘What to do about the US-Japan economic conflict', Foreign
Affairs, 60(5), Summer, pp. 1059-1075.
_____________ (1982b) ‘The villain is an overvalued dollar’, Challenge. March-April.
______  (1987) ‘Economic imbalances and world politics’, Foreign Affairs,
65(4), Spring, pp. 770-794.
_____________ (1988) America in the World Economy: A Strategy for the 1990s,
Washington DC: Institute for International Economics.
_____________ (1992) ‘The primacy of economics’, Foreign Policy, 87, Summer, pp.
3-24.
Bergsten, C. Fred and William R. Cline (1985) The United States-Japan Economic 
Problem, Policy Analyses in International Economics 13, Washington DC: Institute for 
International Economics.
Bergsten. C. Fred and Marcus Noland (1993) Reconcilable Differences? United States- 
Japan Economic Conflict, Washington DC: Institute for International Economics.
Bergsten, C. Fred and John Williamson (1983) ‘Exchange rates and trade policy’, in 
William R. Cline (ed.) Trade Policy in the 1980s, Washington DC: Institute for 
International Economics.
Bhagwati, Jagdish (1990) ‘Aggressive unilateralism: An overview’, in Jagdish Bhagwati 
and Hugh T. Patrick (eds.) Aggressive Unilateralism: America’s 301 Trade Policy and 
the World Trading System, Ann Arbor MI: The University of Michigan Press.
Bluestone, Barry and Bennett Harrison (1982) The Deindustrialization o f America: 
Plant Closings, Community Abandonment and the Dismantling of Basic Industry, New 
York: Basic Books.
Borrus, Michael, James E. Millstein and John Zysman (1983) ‘Trade and development 
in the semiconductor industry: Japanese challenge and American response’, in John
295
Zysman and Laura D’Andrea Tyson (eds.) American Industry in International 
Competition: Government Policies and Corporate Strategies, Ithaca NY: Cornell 
University Press.
Bosworth, Barry (1993) Saving and Investment in a Global Economy, Washington DC: 
The Brookings Institution.
Brainard, S. Lael (1995) ‘Comments’ on Mark B. Cronshaw and James R. Markusen, 
‘The theory and consequences of results-oriented trade policy’, in Jim Levinsohn, Alan 
V. Deardorff and Robert M. Stern (eds.) New Directions in Trade Theory, Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press.
Brander, James A. and Barbara J. Spencer (1985) ‘Export subsidies and market share 
rivalry \  Journal o f  International Economics, 18, pp. 83-100.
Branson, William H. (1980) ‘Trends in United States trade and investment since World 
War IT, in Martin Feldstein (ed.) (1980) The American Economy in Transition, Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press.
Budner, Stanley and Ellis Krauss (1995) ‘Newspaper coverage of US-Japan frictions’, 
Asian Survey, April, pp. 336-356.
Burstein, Daniel (1988) Yen!: Japan 's New Financial Empire and Its 'Threat to America, 
New York: Simon and Schuster.
Caporaso, James A. (1993) ‘Global political economy’, in Ada W. Finifter (ed.) Political 
Science: The State o f  the Discipline //, Washington DC: The American Political Science 
Association.
Caporaso, James A. and David P. Levine (1992) Theories o f  Political Economy, 
Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press.
Carlile, Lonny E. and Mark C. Tilton (eds.) (1998) Is Japan Really Changing Its 
Ways? Regulatory Reform and the Japanese Economy, Washington DC: Brookings 
Institution.
Choate, Pat (1990) Agents o f Influence: How Japan Manipulates America's Political 
and Economic System, New York: Simon and Schuster.
Choy, Jon (1995) ‘A decade of deregulation and counting: Japan’s telecommunications 
market’, JEI Report 28A, 28 July.
Cline, William R. (1983a) ‘Introduction and Summary’, in William R. Cline (ed.) Trade 
Policy in the 1980s, Washington DC: Ins ’ ’ Economics.
________________(1983b) ‘“Reciprocity”: A new approach to world trade policy’, in
William R. Cline (ed.) Trade Policy in the 1980s, Washington DC: Institute for 
International Economics.
296
Clinton, Bill and AI Gore (1992) Putting People First: How We Can All Change 
America, New York: Times Books.
Cohen, Benjamin (1990) ‘The political economy of international trade’, International 
Organization, 44(2), Spring, pp. 261-281.
Cohen, Stephen D. (1985) Uneasy Partnership: Competition and Conflict in US- 
Japanese Trade Relations, Cambridge MA: Ballinger Publishing Company.
Cohen, Stephen D., Joel R. Paul and Robert A. Blecker (1996) Fundamentals o f US 
Foreign Trade Policy: Economics, Politics, Laws and Issues, Boulder CO: Westview 
Press.
Cohen, Stephen S. and John Zysman (1987) Manufacturing Matters: The Myth o f the 
Post- Industrial Economy, New York: Basic Books.
Collier, David (1993) ‘The comparative method’, in Ada W. Finifter (ed.) Political 
Science: 'The State o f the Discipline //, Washington DC: The American Political Science 
Association.
Conybeare, John A. (1984) ‘Public goods, prisoners’ dilemmas and the international 
political economy’, International Studies Quarterly, 28, pp. 5-22.
Cooper, William H. (1994) ‘Japan-US Trade Agreements, 1980-1993’, Congressional 
Research Service: 94-48 IE, The Library of Congress, Washington DC, 7 June.
Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) (1983) The Economic Report o f the President, 
Washington DC: US Government Printing Office.
______________________________ (1986) The Economic Report o f the President,
Washington DC: US Government Printing Office.
______________________________ (1994) The Economic Report o f the President,
Washington DC: US Government Printing Office.
______________________________ (1999) America's Interest in the World Trade
Organization: An Economic Assessment, 16 November.
Craib, Anne (1994) ‘The making of Japan trade policy in the Clinton Administration: 
Institutions and individuals’, JEI Report 39A, 14 October.
Crandall, Robert W. (1981) The Steel Industry in Recurrent Crisis, Washington DC: The 
Brookings Institution.
Crandall, Robert W. et al. (1986) Regulating the Automobile, Washington DC: The 
Brookings Institution.
Curran, Timothy J. (1982) ‘Politics and high technology: the NTT case’, in I.M. Destler 
and Flideo Sato (eds.) Coping with US-Japan Economic Conflicts, Lexington MA: 
Lexington Books.
297
Curzon, Gerard (1965) Multilateral Commercial Diplomacy: The General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade and its Impact on National Commercial Policies and Techniques, 
London: Michael Joseph.
Dam, Kenneth W. (1970) The GATT: Law and International Economic Organization, 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
_____________ (1984) kUS-Japan relations in perspective’, Address before the Japan
Society, Department o f  State Bulletin, 84:2084, March, pp. 11-15.
De Brouwer, Gordon and Tony Warren (2001) Strengthening Australia-Japan 
Economic Relations, Report commissioned by the Department of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade, Canberra.
Denison, Edward F. and William K. Chung (1976) ‘Economic growth and its sources’, 
in Hugh Patrick and Henry Rosovsky (eds.) Asia 's New Giant: How the Japanese 
Economy Works, Washington DC: The Brookings Institution.
Derthick, Martha and Paul J. Quirk (1985) The Politics o f  Deregulation, Washington 
DC: The Brookings Institution.
Dertouzos, Michael L., Richard K. Lester and Robert M. Solow (1989) Made In 
America: Regaining the Productive Edge, The MIT Commission on Industrial 
Productivity, Cambridge MA: MIT Press.
Dessler, David (1989) ‘What’s at stake in the agent-structure debate?’, International 
Organization, 43(3), Summer, pp. 441-473.
Destier, I.M. (1986) American Trade Politics: System under Stress, Washington DC: 
Institute for International Economics; New York: The Twentieth Century Fund.
__________(1995) American Trade Politics, 3rd edition, Washington DC: Institute for
International Economics; New York: The Twentieth Century Fund.
__________(1996) The National Economic Council: A Work in Progress, Washington
DC: Institute for International Economics.
Destier, I.M. and Peter .1. Bahnt (1999), The New Politics o f  American Trade: Trade, 
Lahor, and the Environment, Washington DC: Institute for International Economics.
Destier, I.M., Haruhiro Fukui and Hideo Sato (1979) The Textile Wrangle: Conflict in 
Japanese-American Relations, 1969-71, Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press.
Destler, I.M. and C. Randall Henning (1989) Dollar Politics: Exchange Rate 
Policymaking in the United States, Washington DC: Institute for International 
Economics.
298
Destier, I.M. and Hisao Mitsuyu (1982) ‘Locomotives on different tracks: 
Macroeconomic diplomacy, 1977-1979’ in I.M. Destler and Hideo Sato (eds.) Coping 
with US-Japan Economic Conflicts, Lexington MA: Lexington Books.
Destler, I.M. and John Odell (1987) Anti-protection: Changing Forces in United States 
Trade Politics, Washington DC: Institute for International Economics.
Destler, I.M. and Hideo Sato (1981) 'Political conflict in US-Japan economic relations: 
Where it comes from; what to do about it’, in Japan-United States Economic Relations 
Group. Appendix to the Report o f  the Japan-United States Economic Relations Group, 
April.
________________________ (1982) ‘Coping with economic conflicts’, in I.M. Destler
and Hideo Sato (eds.) Coping with US-Japan Economic Conflicts, Lexington MA: 
Lexington Books.
Diebold, William Jr. (1952) The End o f the ITC): Essays in International Finance, no. 
16, Department of Economics and Social Institutions, Princeton University.
Dillon, Patricia, John Odell and Thomas Willett (1990) ‘Future directions in the political 
economy of trade policies’, in John Odell and Thomas Willett (eds.) International Trade 
Policies: Gains from Exchange between Economics and Political Science, Ann Arbor 
MI: University of Michigan Press.
Dixit, Avinash (1993) ‘In honor of Paul Krugman: Winner of the John Bates Clark 
Medal', Journal o f  Economic Perspectives, 7(2), Spring, pp. 173-188.
Dixit, Avinash and Victor Norman (1980) Theory o f International Trade, Cambridge 
UK: Cambridge University Press.
Dohlman, Peter A. (1993) The US-Japan semiconductor trade arrangement: Political 
economy, game theory and welfare analysis, Ph.D. dissertation, Duke University.
Dornbusch, Rudiger (1987) ‘Exchange rates and prices’, American Economic Review, 
77, pp. 93-106.
Dornbusch, Rudiger and Jeffrey A. Frankel (1987) ‘Macroeconomics and protection’, in 
Robert M. Stern (ed.) US Trade Policies in a Changing World Economy, Cambridge 
MA: The MIT Press.
Dornbusch, Rudiger, James Poterba and Lawrence Summers (1987) The Case for  
Manufacturing in America ’s Future, Rochester NY: Eastman Kodak Company.
Drew, Elizabeth (1981) Portrait o f  an Election: The 1980 Presidential Election, New 
York: Simon and Schuster.
______________(1994) On the Edge: The Clinton Presidency, New York: Simon &
Schuster.
299
Drucker, Peter F. (1987) ‘Japan's choices’, Foreign Affairs, 65(5), Summer, pp. 923- 
941.
Dryden, Stephen (1995) Trade Warriors: US TR and the American Crusade for Free 
Trade, New York: Oxford University Press.
Drysdale, Peter (1993) ‘Japanese direct foreign investment in Australia in comparative 
perspective’, Pacific Economic Papers, no. 223, September.
____________ (1995) ‘The question of access to the Japanese market’, Pacific
Economic Papers, no. 247, September.
Duncan, William C. (1995) ‘US-Japan trade relations -  Myth and reality -  The case of 
the automobile negotiations’, Presentation to the Japan-America Society of Central Ohio 
Planning Committee, Columbus Council on World Affairs and the Institute for Japanese 
Studies at the Ohio State University, 10 November.
Eckstein, Harry (1975) ‘Case study and theory in political science’, in Fred I. Greenstein 
and Nelson W. Polsby (eds.) Handbook o f Political Science Volume 7: Strategies of 
Inquiry, Reading MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company.
Economic Planning Agency of Japan (EPA) (1989) ‘Commodity price report’, Tokyo.
Eichengreen, Barry and Peter B. Kenen (1994) ‘Managing the world economy under the 
Bretton Woods System: An overview’, in Peter B. Kenen (ed.) Managing the World 
Economy: Fifty Years After Bretton Woods, Washington DC: Institute for International 
Economics.
Encarnation, Dennis J. (1992) Rivals Beyond Trade: America versus Japan in Global 
Competition, Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press.
Ethier, Wilfred (1982) ‘National and international returns to scale in the modern theory 
of international trade’, American Economic Review, 72, pp. 389-405.
Evans, Peter B., Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol (eds.) (1985) Bringing the 
State Back In, Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press.
Evans, Peter B. (1995) ‘The role of theory in comparative politics: A symposium’, 
World Politics, 48, October, pp. 1-49.
Fallows, James (1987) ‘Playing by different rules’, The Atlantic Monthly, September, 
pp. 22-32.
____________(1989a) ‘Containing Japan’, The Atlantic Monthly, May, pp. 40-54.
_______ (1989b) ‘Getting along with Japan’, The Atlantic Monthly, December,
pp. 53-64.
___________ (1994) Looking at the Sun: The Rise of the New East Asian Economic
and Political System, New York: Pantheon Books.
300
Feldstein, Marlin and Charles Horioka (1980) ‘Domestic saving and international capital 
flows’, Economic Journal, 90, June, pp. 314-329.
Feldstein, Martin and Bacchetta Phillipe (1991) "National saving and international 
investment’, in B. Douglas Bernheim and John B. Shoven (eds.) National Saving and 
Economic Performance, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Ferguson, Charles H. (1989) ‘America’s high-tech decline’, Foreign Policy, 74, Spring, 
pp. 123-144.
Finger, J. Michael (1992) ‘Trade policies in the United States’, in Dominick Salvatore 
(ed.) National Trade Policies: Handbook of Comparative Economic Policies, vol. 2, 
New York: Greenwood Press.
Fiorina, Morris (1995) 'Rational choice and the new(?) institutionalism’, Polity, 
XXXVIII(l), Fall, pp. 107-115.
Flamm, Kenneth (1996) Mismanaged Trade? Strategic Policy and the Semiconductor 
Industry, Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press.
Foot, Rosemary (1995) The Practice o f Power: US Relations with China since 1949, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Frankel, Jeffrey A. (1984) The Yen/Dollar Agreement: Liberalizing Japanese Capital 
Markets, Policy Analyses in International Economics 9, Washington DC: Institute for 
International Economics.
_______________(1991) ‘Quantifying international capital mobility in the 1980s’, in B.
Douglas Bernheim and John B. Shoven (eds.) National Saving and Economic 
Performance, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Fratantuono, Michael J. (1993) Shifting Winds and Strong Currents: George Bush 
Charts a 'Trade-Policy Approach to Japan, Pew Case Studies in International Affairs, 
Case 153 Parts A&B, Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Georgetown University, 
Washington DC.
Frieden, Jeffrey (1986) ‘From economic nationalism to hegemony: Social forces and the 
emergence of modern US foreign economic policy, 1914-1940’, UCLA mimeo.
____________(1988) ‘Sectoral conflict and US foreign economic policy, 1914-1940’,
International Organization, 42(1), Winter, pp. 59-90.
Friman, FI. Richard (1990) Patchwork Protectionism, Ithaca NY: Cornell University 
Press.
Frost, Ellen (1987) For Richer, For Poorer: The New US-Japan Relationship, New 
York: Council on Foreign Relations.
301
Funabashi, Yoichi (1989) Managing the Dollar: From the Plaza to the Louvre, 2nd 
edition, Washington DC: Institute for International Economics.
Press.
(1999) Alliance Adrift, New York: Council on Foreign Relations
Fung, K.C. (1991) ‘Characteristics of Japanese industrial groups and their potential 
impact on US-Japan trade’, in Robert E. Baldwin (ed.) Empirical Studies o f  Commercial 
Policy, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Fuss, Melvyn A. and Leonard Waverman (1992) Costs and Productivity in Automobile 
Production, Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press.
Gaddis, John Lewis (1982) Strategies o f  Containment: A Critical Appraisal o f  Postwar 
American National Security Policy, New York: Oxford University Press.
Gardner, Richard N. (1980) Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy in Current Perspective: The 
Origins and Prospects o f  our International Economic Order, New York: Columbia 
University Press.
Garnaut, Ross and Yiping Huang (2000) ‘China and the future of the international 
trading system', in Peter Drysdale and Ligang Song (eds.) China's Entry to the WTO: 
Strategic Issues and Quantitative Assessments, London: Routledge.
Garten Jeffrey E. (1992)H Cold Peace: America, Japan, Germany and the Struggle for  
Supremacy, paperback edition, New York: Times Books.
George, Alexander L. and Timothy J. McKeown (1985) ‘Case studies and theories of 
organizational decision making’, Advances in Information Processing in Organizations, 
vol. 2, Santa Barbara CA: JAI Press.
Gerlach, Michael L. (1989) ‘Keiretsu organization in the Japanese economy: Analysis 
and trade implications’, in Chalmers Johnson, Laura D’Andrea Tyson and John Zysman 
(eds.) Politics and Productivity: How Japan 's Development Strategy Works, New York: 
HarperBusiness.
_______________ (1992) Alliance Capitalism: The Social Organization o f Japanese
Business, Berkeley CA: University of California Press.
Gilpin, Robert (1971) ‘The politics of transnational economic relations’, International 
Organization, Special Issue, 25, Summer, pp. 398-419.
___________ (1975) US Power and the Multinational Corporation: The Political
Economy o f  Foreign Direct Investment, New York: Basic Books.
____________(1977) ‘Economic interdependence and national security in historical
perspective’, in Klaus Knorr and Frank N. Träger (eds.) Economic Issues and National 
Security, Lawrence KN: The Regents Press of Kansas.
302
____________(1981) War, Change and International Politics, New York: Cambridge
University Press.
____________(1987) The Political Economy o f  International Relations, Princeton NJ:
Princeton University Press.
Glazer, Nathan (1975) ‘From Ruth Benedict to Herman Kahn: The postwar Japanese 
image in the American mind', in Akira Iriye (ed.) Mutual Images: Essays in American- 
Japanese Relations, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.
Goldstein, Judith (1988) 'Ideas, institutions and American trade policy’, International 
Organization, 42(1), Winter, pp. 179-217.
____________ (1993) Ideas, Interests and American Trade Policy, Ithaca NY: Cornell
University Press.
Golub, Stephen S. (1994) ‘The United States-Japan current account imbalance: A 
review’, IMF Paper on Policy Analysis and Assessment, March.
Gordon, Robert (2000) 'Does the ‘'New Economy” measure up to the great inventions 
of the past?'. Journal o f  Economic Perspectives, 4(14), Fall, pp. 49-74.
Gourevitch, Peter (1978) ‘The second image reversed: The international sources of 
domestic politics’, International Organization, 32(4), Autumn, pp. 881-912.
______________(1986) Politics in Hard Times: Comparative Responses to
International Economic Crises, Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press.
Gowa, Joanne S. (1983) Closing the Gold Window: Domestic Politics and the End o f  
Bretton Woods, Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press.
______________(1989a) ‘Rational hegemons, excludable goods and small groups: An
epitaph for hegemonic stability theory?’, World Politics, 41(3), April, pp. 307-324.
______________(1989b) 'Bipolarity, multipolarity and free trade’, American Political
Science Review, 83(4), December, pp. 1245-1256.
Grafstein, Robert (1992) Institutional Realism: Social and Political Constraints on 
Rational Actors, New Haven: Yale University Press.
Graham, Edward M. and Paul R. Krugman (1995) Foreign Direct Investment in the 
United Slates, 3ul edition, Washington DC: Institute for International Economics.
Gray, H. Peter, Thomas Pugel and Ingo Walter (1986) International Trade, Employment 
and Structural Adjustment: The United States, Geneva: International Labour Office.
Gresser, Julian (1980) High Technology and Japanese Industrial Policy: A Strategy for  
US Policymakers, report for the House of Representatives Committee on Ways and 
Means, Washington DC, October.
303
Grieco, Joseph M. (1990) Cooperation Among, Nations: Europe, America and Non-tariff 
Barriers to Trade, Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press.
Haggard, Stephan (1988) ‘The institutional foundations of hegemony: Explaining the 
Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934’, International Organization, 42(1), Winter, 
pp. 91-120.
______________ (1991) ‘Structuralism and its critics: Recent progress in international
relations theory’, in Emanuel Adler and Beverly Crawford (eds.) Progress in 
International Relations, New York: Columbia University Press.
Haggard, Stephan and Robert R. Kaufman (eds.) (1992) The Politics o f Economic 
Adjustment: International Constraints, Distributive Conflicts and the State, Princeton 
NJ: Princeton University Press.
Hale, David D. (2000) Will American Economic and Financial Performance 
Perpetuate American Economic Dominance in the 21s' Century?, photocopy.
Hall, Peter A. (1993) ‘Policy paradigms, social learning and the state: The case of 
economic policymaking in Britain’, Comparative Politics, 25(3), April, pp. 275-296.
Hall, Peter A. and Rosemary C.R. Taylor (1996) ‘Political science and the three new 
institutionalisms’, Political Studies, 44(5), pp. 936-57.
Heclo, Hugh (1974) Social Policy in Britain and Sweden, New Haven: Yale University 
Press.
___________(1978) ‘Issue networks in the executive establishment’, in Anthony King
(ed.) The New American Political System, Washington DC: American Enterprise 
Institute.
Helpman, Elhanan (1981) ‘International trade in the presence of product differentiation, 
economies of scale and monopolistic competition -  a Chamberlinian-Heckscher-Ohlin 
approach', Journal o f International Economics, 11, pp. 305-340.
Hillman, Arye L. (1989) The Political Economy o f Protection, Chur, Switzerland: 
Harwood Academic Publishers.
Hirschman. Albert O. (1945) National Power and the Structure o f Foreign Trade, 
Berkeley CA: University of California Press.
Hoda, Anwarul (1994) ‘Trade liberalisation’, in Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development, The New World Trading System: Readings, Paris: OECD.
Holbrooke. Richard (1991-92) ‘Japan and the United States: Ending the unequal 
partnership'. Foreign Affairs, Winter, 70(5), pp. 41-57.
Holstein, William J. (1990) The Japanese Power Game: What It Means for America, 
New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons.
304
Hooper, Peter and Catherine L. Mann (1989) ‘The US external deficit: its causes and 
consequences’, in Albert E. Burger (ed.) US Trade Deficit: Causes, Consequences and 
Cures, Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Horioka, Charles Y. (1990) ‘Why is Japan’s household savings rate so high? A literature 
survey’, Journal o f  the Japanese and International Economies, 4(1), pp. 49-92.
Howell, Thomas R., Brent L. Bartlett and Warren Davis (1992) Creating Advantage: 
Semiconductors and Government Industrial Policy in the 1990s, San Jose CA: 
Semiconductor Industry Association and Dewey Ballantine.
Hufbauer, Gary, Diane T. Berliner and Kimberly Ann Elliott (1986) Trade Protection in 
the United States: 31 Case Studies, Washington DC: Institute for International 
Economics.
Hufbauer, Gary C. and Kimberly Ann Elliott (1994) Measuring the Costs o f  Protection 
in the United States, Washington DC: Institute for International Economics.
Hughes, Helen (1986) ‘The political economy of protection in eleven industrial 
countries’, in Richard Snape (ed.) Issues in World Trade Policy: GATT at the 
Crossroads, London: Macmillan.
Hull, Cordell (1948) The Memoirs o f  Cordell Hull, vol. 1, New York: Macmillan.
Hunsberger, Warren S. (1964) Japan and the United States in World Trade, New York: 
Harper & Row.
Ikenberry, G. John (1993) ‘The political origins of Bretton Woods’, in Michael D. Bordo 
and Barry Eichcngreen (eds.) A Retrospective on the Bretton Woods System: Lessons for 
International Monetary Reform, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
•
________________ (1996) ‘Introduction’, in G. John Ikenberry (ed.) American Foreign
Policy: Theoretical Essays, New York: HarperCollins College Publishers.
Ikenberry, G. John, David A. Lake and Michael Mastanduno (1988) ‘Introduction: 
Approaches to explaining American foreign economic policy’, International 
Organization, 42(1), Winter, pp. 1-14.
International Monetary Fund (IMF) (1986) World Economic Outlook, April, IMF: 
Washington DC.
______________________________ (1991) Determinants and Systemic Consequences o f
International Capital Flows, Occasional Paper 77, Washington DC: International 
Monetary Fund.
Washington DC.
(2001) World Economic Outlook, May, IMF:
305
Irwin, Douglas A. (1996) ‘Trade politics and the semiconductor industry', in Anne O. 
Krueger (ed.) The Political Economy o f American Trade Policy, Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press.
Islam, Shafiqul (1990) ‘Capitalism in conflict', Foreign Affairs, 69(1), Spring, pp. 172- 
182.
Jackson, James K. (1990) ‘Japan’s financial stake in the United States: How stable is 
it?’, in Japan's Economic Challenge, Study papers submitted to the Joint Economic 
Committee, US Congress, 101s1 Congress, 2lui session, Washington DC: US Government 
Printing Office.
Jacobsen, John Kurt (1995) ‘Much ado about ideas: The cognitive factor in economic 
policy’, World Politics, 47(2), January, pp. 283-310.
Janow, Merit E. (1994) 'Trading with an ally: Progress and discontent in US-Japan trade 
relations’, in Gerald L. Curtis (ed.) The United States, Japan and Asia, New York: W.W. 
Norton & Company.
Japan Economic Institute of America (1981) Yearbook o f US-Japan Economic Relations 
in 1980, Washington DC: Japan Economic Institute of America.
__________________________________  (1982) Yearbook o f US-Japan Economic
Relations in 1981, Washington DC: Japan Economic Institute of America.
__________________________________  (1983) Yearbook o f  US-Japan Economic
Relations in 1982, Washington DC: Japan Economic Institute of America.
__________________________________  (1984) Yearbook o f US-Japan Economic
Relations in 1983, Washington DC: Japan Economic Institute of America.
__________________________________ (1986) US-Japan Economic Relations Yearbook
1984-1985, Washington DC: Japan Economic Institute of America.
Japan Times (1960) Economic Survey o f Japan, Tokyo: Japan Times Ltd.
Japan-United States Economic Relations Group (1981) Report o f  the Japan-United 
States Economic Relations Group, prepared for the President of the United States and 
the Prime Minister of Japan, January.
Jenkins-Smith, Hank C. and Paul A. Sabatier (1993) ‘The study of public policy 
processes’, in Paul A. Sabatier and Hank Jenkins-Smith (eds.) Policy Uhange and 
Learning: An Advocacy Coalition Approach, Boulder CO: Westview Press.
Jervis, Robert (1976) Perception and Misperception in International Politics, Princeton 
NJ: Princeton University Press.
Johnson, Chalmers (1982) MTT1 and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth o f  Industrial 
Policy, 1925-1975, Stanford CA: Stanford University Press.
306
_______________  (1987a) ‘How to think about economic competition from Japan’, in
Kenneth B. Pyle (ed.) The Trade Crisis: How Will Japan Respond?, Seattle WA: 
Society for Japanese Studies.
________________(1987b) ‘Political institutions and economic performance: The
government-business relationship in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan’, in F.C. Deyo (ed.) 
The Political Economy o f the New Asian Industrialization, Ithaca NY: Cornell 
University Press.
pp. 17-27.
(1989) ‘Their behavior, our policy’, The National Interest, Fall,
________________(1990) ‘Trade, revisionism and the future of Japanese-American
relations’, in Kozo Yamamura (ed.) Japan’s Economic Structure: Should It Change?, 
Seattle WA: Society for Japanese Studies.
Johnson, Chalmers, Laura D’Andrea Tyson and John Zysman (eds.) (1989) Politics and 
Productivity: How Japan ’s Development Strategy Works, New York: HarperBusiness.
Johnson, Leland L. (1993) US-Japan Trade Relations in Telecommunications 
Equipment Markets, Rand Center for US-Japan Relations. Santa Monica CA: Rand.
Johnson, Sheila K. (1988) The Japanese Through American Eyes, Tokyo: Kodansha 
International.
Jorgenson, Dale W., Masahiro Kuroda and Mieko Nishimizu (1987) ‘Japan-US industry- 
level productivity comparisons, 1960-1979’, Journal o f the Japanese and International 
Economies, 1(1), pp. 1-30.
Jorgenson, Dale W. and Kevin J. Stihoh (2000) ‘Raising the speed limit: US economic 
growth in the information age’, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity. 1, pp. 125-211.
Katz, Richard (1998) Japan: The System That Soured, New York: M.E. Sharpe.
Katzenstein, Peter (1978) ‘Conclusion: domestic structures and strategies of foreign 
economic policy’, in Peter Katzenstein (ed.) Between Power and Plenty: Foreign 
Economic Policies o f  Advanced Industrial States, Madison WI: University of Wisconsin 
Press.
________________(1985) Small States in World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe,
Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press.
Kennedy, Paul (1988) The Rise and Fall o f  the Great Powers: Economic Change and 
Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000, New York: Random Flouse.
Keohane, Robert O. (1984) After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World 
Political Economy, Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.
_________________ (1986) Reciprocity in international relations, International
Organization, 40(1), Winter, pp. 1-27.
307
_______________  (1997) ‘Problematic lucidity: Stephen Krasner’s “State power and
the structure of international trade’”, World Politics, 50(1), October, pp. 150-170.
Kindleberger, Charles (1973) The World in Depression, 1929-1939, London: Allen 
Lane.
Kingdon, John W. (1984) Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies, Boston: Little 
Brown and Company.
Knetter, Michael M. (1994) 'Why are Retail Prices in Japan so High?’, NBER Working 
Paper 4894, Cambridge MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Komiya, Ryutaro and Motoshige Itoh (1988) ‘Japan’s international trade and trade 
policy, 1955-84’, in Takashi Inoguchi and Daniel I. Okimoto (eds.) The Political 
Economy of Japan, Volume 2: The Changing International Context, Stanford CA: 
Stanford University Press.
Komiya, Ryutaro and Miyako Suda (1991) Japan's Foreign Exchange Policy, 1971- 
1982, Sydney: Allen & Unwin.
Krasner, Stephen D. (1976) ‘State power and the structure of international trade’, World 
Politics, 28(3), April, pp. 317-347.
_______________ (1978) ‘United States commercial and monetary policy: Unravelling
the paradox of external strength and internal weakness’, in Peter Katzenstein (ed.) 
Between Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States, 
Madison WE. University of Wisconsin Press.
________________(1979) ‘The Tokyo Round: Particularistic interests and prospects for
stability in the global trading system’, International Studies Quarterly, 23(4), pp. 491 - 
531.
________________ (1983) ‘Structural causes and regime consequences: Regimes as
intervening variables', in Stephen Krasner (ed.) International Regimes, Ithaca NY: 
Cornell University Press.
Press.
(ed.) (1983) International Regimes, Ithaca NY: Cornell University
_______________  (1984) ‘Approaches to the state: Alternative conceptions and
historical dynamics’, Comparative Politics, 16, January, pp. 223-246.
Kreinin, Mordechai E. (1988) ‘How closed is Japan’s market?: Additional evidence’, 
The World Economy, 11(4), December, pp. 529-542.
Krugman, Paul R. (1979) ‘Increasing returns, monopolistic competition and 
international trad C, Journal o f International Economics, 9, pp. 469-479.
308
_________________ (1980) ‘Scale economies, product differentiation, and the pattern
of trade’, American Economic Review, 70, pp. 950-959.
______________ _ (1981) ‘Intraindustry specialization and the gains from trade’,
Journal o f Political Economy, 89, pp. 959-973.
_________________ (1984) ‘Import protection as export promotion: International
competition in the presence of oligopoly and economies of scale’, in Henry Kierzkowski 
(ed.) Monopolistic Competition in International Trade, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.
_________________ (1987a) ‘Is the Japan problem over?’, in Ryuzo Sato and Paul
Wachtel (eds.) Trade Friction and Economic Policy: Problems and Prospects for Japan 
and the United States, New York: Cambridge University.
__________________(1987b) ‘Comments’ on Robert Z. Lawrence, ‘Imports in Japan:
Closed markets or minds?’, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2, pp 549-552.
_________________ (1991a) ‘Introduction’, in Paul R. Krugman (ed.) Trade With
Japan: Has the Door Opened Wider?, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
_________________ (1991b) Has the Adjustment Process Worked?, Policy Analyses
in International Economics 34, Washington DC: Institute for International Economics.
_________________ (1992) ‘Does the new trade theory require a new trade policy?’
The World Economy, 15(4), July, pp. 423-441.
_________________ (1994) Peddling Prosperity: Economic Sense and Nonsense in
the Age o f Diminished Expectations, New York: W.W. Norton.
Krugman, Paul R. (ed.) (1986) Strategic Trade Policy and the New International 
Economics, Cambridge MA: MIT Press.
Krugman, Paul R. and Richard E. Baldwin (1987) ‘The persistence of the US trade 
deficit', Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1, pp. 1-56.
Kunkel, John (1995) ‘US trade policy towards the Asia Pacific Region in the 1990s’, 
Pacific Economic Papers, no. 241, March.
___________(1998) ‘Realism and postwar US trade policy’, Pacific Economic Papers,
no. 285, November.
Kunz, Diane B. (1997) Butter and Guns: America ’s Cold War Economic Diplomacy, 
New York: The Free Press.
Kuroda, Makoto (1990) ‘Super 301 and Japan’, in Jagdish Bhagwati and Hugh T. 
Patrick (eds.) Aggressive Unilateralism: America's 301 Trade Policy and the World 
Trading System, Ann Arbor Ml: University of Michigan Press.
309
Laird, Sam and Alexander Yeats (1990) ‘Trends in nontariff barriers of developed 
countries, 1966-1986’, Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, 126, pp. 299-325.
Lake, David (1984) ‘Beneath the commerce of nations: A theory of international 
economic structures’, International Studies Quarterly, 24, pp. 143-170.
__________ (1988) Power, Protection and Free Trade: International Sources o f  US
Commercial Strategy, 1887-1939, Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press.
__________ (1993) ‘Leadership, hegemony, and the international economy: Naked
emperor or tattered monarch with potential?’, International Studies Quarterly, 37, pp. 
459-489.
Lancaster, Kelvin (1980) ‘Intra-industry trade under perfect monopolistic competition’, 
Journal o f  International Economics, 10, pp. 151-175.
Latham, Earl (1952) The Groups Basis o f Politics: A Study in Basing Point Legislation, 
Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press.
Lavergne, Real (1983) The Political Economy o f US Tariffs: An Empirical Analysis, 
New York: Academic Press.
Lavin, Franklin L. (1993) ‘Clinton and trade’, The National Interest, Summer.
Lawrence, Robert Z. (1984) Can America Compete?, Washington DC: The Brookings 
Institution.
__________________ (1987) 'Imports in Japan: Closed markets or minds?’, Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity, 2, pp. 517-548.
__________________ (1988) ‘The international dimension', in Robert E. Litan, Robert
Z. Lawrence and Charles Schultze (eds.), American Living Standards: Threats and 
Challenges. Washinton DC: Brookings Institution.
__________________ (1990) ‘US current account adjustment: An appraisal', Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity, 2, pp. 343-382.
__________________ (1991a) ‘How open is Japan?’, in Paul R. Krugman (ed.) Trade
With Japan: Has the Door Opened Wider?, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
__________________  (1991b) ‘Efficient or exclusionist? The import behavior of
Japanese corporate groups’, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1, pp. 311-330.
_________  _____  (1993) ‘Japan’s different trade regime: An analysis with particular
reference to keiretsu', Journal o f  Economic Perspectives, 7(3), Summer, pp. 3-19.
Lawrence, Robert Z. and Robert E. Litan (1986) Saving Free Trade: A Pragmatic 
Approach, Washington DC: Brookings Institution.
310
Levy, Jack S. (1994) ‘Learning and foreign policy: Sweeping a conceptual minefield. 
International Organization, 48(2), Spring, pp. 279-312.
Lijphart, Arend (1971) ‘Comparative politics and comparative method’, American 
Political Science Review, 84, pp. 481-496.
Lincoln, Edward J. (1984) Japan’s Industrial Policies: What are they, do they matter, 
and are they different from those in the United States?, Washington DC: Japan 
Economic Institute of America.
_______________ (1985) ‘Disentangling the mess in US-Japan economic relations’,
The Brookings Review, 4(1), Fall, pp. 22-27.
_______________ (1988) Japan: Facing Economic Maturity, Washington DC: The
Brookings Institution.
_______________(1990) Japan’s Unequal Trade, Washington DC: The Brookings
Institution.
_______________ (1999) Troubled Times: US-Japan Trade Relations in the 1990s,
Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press.
Lowi, Theodore J. (1964) ‘American business, public policy case studies and political 
theory’, World Politics, 16(4), July, pp. 677-715.
_______________ (1988) ‘The return of the state: Critiques’, American Political
Science Review, 82(3), September, pp. 885-891.
McConnell, Grant (1967) Private Power and American Democracy, New York: Knopf.
McKeown, Timothy J. (1991) ‘A liberal trade order? The long-run pattern of imports to 
the advanced capitalist states’, International Studies Quarterly, 35, pp 151-172.
MacKnight, Susan (1993) ‘US-Japan competition in automotive parts: No quick fixes’, 
JE1 Report 1 5A, 23 April.
_______ _______ (1994) ‘US-Japan economic relations in 1993: A look back', JE1
Report 9A, 4 March.
_______________(1996) ’Japanese investment in the American manufacturing sector:
The second phase’, JE1 Report 1 A, 12 January.
Maddison, Angus (1995a) Monitoring the World Economy: 1820-1992, Paris: 
Development Centre of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development.
________  ____ (1995b) ‘Standardized estimates of fixed capital stock: A six-
country comparison’, in Angus Maddison, Explaining the Economic Performance of 
Nations, Brookfield VT: Edward Elgar.
311
Magaziner, Ira C. and Thomas M. Hout (1981) .Japanese Industrial Policy, Berkeley 
CA: Institute for International Studies, University of California.
Magaziner, Ira C. and Robert B. Reich (1983) Minding America’s Business, New York: 
Vintage Books.
Magee, Stephen (1984) ‘Endogenous tariff theory: a survey’, in David Colander (ed.) 
Neoclassical Political-Economy. Cambridge MA: Ballinger.
Majone, Giandomenico (1980) ‘Policies as theories’, Omega, 8, pp. 151-162.
Malmgren, Harald (1995) ‘Who really won the US-Japan auto fight?’, The International 
Economy, July-August, pp. 13-15.
March, James G. and Johan P. Olsen (1989) Rediscovering Institutions: The 
Organizational Basis o f  Politics, New York: Free Press.
Marks, Stephen V. and John McArthur (1990) ‘Empirical analyses of the determinants 
of protection: A survey and some new results’, in John Odell and Thomas Willett (eds.) 
International Trade Policies: Gains from Exchange Between Economics and Political 
Science, Ann Arbor MI: University of Michigan Press.
Marris, Stephen (1987) Deficits and the Dollar, Policy Analyses in International 
Economics 14 (updated edition), Washington DC: Institute for International Economics.
Marston, Richard C. (1990) ‘Pricing to market in Japanese manufacturing’, Journal o f  
International Economics, 14, February, pp. 3-24.
_________________ (1991) 'Price behaviour in Japanese and US manufacturing' in Paul
R. Krugman (ed.) Trade with Japan: bias the Door Opened Wider?, Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press.
Mason, Mark (1992) American Multinationals and Japan: The Political Economy o f  
Japanese Capital Controls, 1899-1990, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.
Mastanduno, Michael (1992a) ‘Setting market access priorities: The use of Super 301 in 
US trade with Japan’, The World Economy, 15(6), pp. 729-753.
__________________  (1992b) ‘Framing the Japan Problem: The Bush Administration
and the Structural Impediments Initiative', International Journal, 47, pp. 235-264.
Mayhew, David R. (1974) Congress: The Electoral Connection, New Haven: Yale 
University Press.
Menon, Jayant (1997) ‘Japan’s intraindustry trade dynamics’, Journal o f  the Japanese 
and International Economies, XI(2), June, pp. 123-142.
Mikanagi, Yumiko (1996) Japan's Trade Policy: Action or Reaction?, London: 
Routledge.
3 12
Milner, Helen (1988) Resisting Protectionism: Global Industries and the Politics o f  
International Trade, Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.
Milner, Helen and David Yoffie (1989) ‘Between free trade and protectionism: Strategic 
trade policy and a theory of corporate trade demands’, International Organization, 43, 
Spring, pp. 239-272.
Moravcsik, Andrew (1997) ‘Taking preferences seriously: A liberal theory of 
international politics’, International Organization, 51(4), Autumn, pp. 513-553.
Mucciaroni, Gary (1995) Reversals o f Fortune: Public Policy and Private Interests, 
Washington DC: The Brookings Institution.
Nacht, Michael (1983) ‘The American mood’, in US-Japan Relations: Towards a New 
Equilibrium, Annual Review 1982-83, Harvard MA: The Program on US-Japan 
Relations, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University.
Naka, Norio (1996) Predicting Outcomes in United States-Japan Trade Negotiations: 
The Political Process o f  the Structural Impediments Initiative, Westport CT: Quorum 
Books.
Nanto, Dick K. (1982) ‘United States-Japan trade relations’, in US Congress, Joint 
Economic Committee, US International Economic Policy in the 1980s, February.
Nanto, Dick K. and Gwenell L. Bass (1992) ‘Automobile trade with Japan’, CRS 
Review’, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Washington DC, April- 
May.
Nanto, Dick K., William Cooper and Gwenell L. Bass (1995) ‘The Japan-US automobile 
and parts trade dispute’, Congressional Research Service: 95-725E, Library of Congress, 
Washington DC, June.
Nau, Henry R. (1990) The Myth o f  America’s Decline: Leading the World Economy into 
the 1990s, New York: Oxford University Press.
Nelson, Douglas R. (1988) ‘Endogenous tariff theory: A critical survey’, American 
Journal o f  Political Science, 32(3), pp. 796-837.
_________________ (1989) ‘Domestic political preconditions of US trade policy: Liberal
structure and protectionist dynamics’, Journal o f Public Policy, 9(1), pp. 83-108.
_________________ (1991) ‘Trade policy games’, in Craig N. Murphy and Roger Tooze
(eds.) The New International Political Economy, Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers.
_________________ (1996) ‘The political economy of US automobile protection’, in
Anne O. Krueger (ed.) The Political Economy o f American Trade Policy, Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press.
313
Nelson, Joan (ed.) (1990) Economic Crisis and Policy Choice: The Politics o f 
Adjustment in the Third World, Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.
Neustadt, Richard E. (1960) Presidential Power: The Politics o f Leadership, New York: 
John Wiley & Sons Inc.
Niskanen, William A. (1983) ‘Issues and nonissues’, in Edward R. Fried et al. (eds.) The 
Future Course o f US-Japan Economic Relations, Washington DC: The Brookings 
Institution.
_________________ (1988) Reaganomics: An Insider's Account o f the Policies and
the People, New York: Oxford University Press.
Noble, Gregory W. (1989) ‘The Japanese industrial policy debate’, in Stephan Haggard 
and Chung-in Moon (eds.) Pacific Dynamics: The International Politics o f Industrial 
Change, Boulder CO: Westview Press.
Noland, Marcus (1988) ‘Japanese trade elasticities and the J-curve’, Review of 
Economics and Statistics, pp. 135-139.
_____________ (1992) ‘Protectionism in Japan’, Washington DC: Institute for
International Economics, photocopy.
_____________ (1995) ‘Why are prices in Japan so high?’, Japan and the World
Economy, 7, pp. 255-261.
_____ ________ (1997) ‘Chasing phantoms: The political economy of USTR’,
International Organization, 51(3), Summer, pp. 365-387.
North, Douglass C. (1990) Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic 
Performance, Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press.
Nye, Joseph S. Jr. (1987) ‘Nuclear learning and US-Soviet security regimes’, 
International Organization, 41(3), Summer, pp. 371-402.
__________________ (1988) ‘Neorealism and neoliberalism’, World Politics, 40(2),
January, pp. 235-251.
___  ___ (1990) Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature o f American
Power, New York: Basic Books.
_________________ (1995) ‘East Asian security: The case for deep engagement’,
Foreign Affairs, 74(4), July-August, pp. 90-103.
Odell, John S. (1990) ‘Understanding international trade policies: An emerging 
synthesis’, World Politics, 43(1), October, pp. 139-167.
Office of Technology Assessment (OfA) (1991) Competing Economies: America, 
Europe and the Pacific Rim, US Congress, Washington DC.
314
Okimoto, Daniel I. (1986) ‘Regime characteristics of Japanese industrial policy’, in 
Hugh Patrick (ed.) Japan's High Technology Industries: Lessons and Limitations of 
Industrial Policy, Seattle WA: University of Washington Press.
Okimoto, Daniel 1. and James H. Raphael (1993) 'Ambivalence, continuity and change: 
American attitudes toward Japan and US-Japan Relations’, in The Aspen Strategy 
Group, Harness the Rising Sun: An American Strategy for Managing Japan ’s Rise as a 
Global Powder, Lanham MD: University Press of America Inc.
Okimoto, Daniel I., Takuo Sugano and Franklin B. Weinstein (eds.) (1984) Competitive 
Edge: The Semiconductor Industry in the US and Japan, Stanford CA: Stanford 
University Press.
Oliner, Stephen D. and Daniel E. Sichel (2000) ‘The resurgence of growth in the late 
1990's: Is information technology the story?’, Journal o f Economic Perspectives, 14(4), 
pp. 3-22.
Olson, Mancur (1965) The Logic of Collective Action, Cambridge MA: Harvard 
University Press.
_____________(1982) The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation
and Social Rigidities, New Haven: Yale University Press.
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (1985) The 
Semiconductor Industry: Trade-related issues, OECD: Paris.
_______________________________ (1992) Globalisation o f Industrial Activities, Four
Case Studies: Auto Parts, Chemicals, Construction and Semiconductors, OECD: Paris.
_______________________________ (1994) Manufacturing Performance: A Scorecard
o f Indicators, OECD: Paris.
_______________________________ (1995) World Steel Trade, 1983-93, OECD
Documents: Paris.
(1996? Indicators o f Tariff and Non-Tariff Trade
Barriers, OECD: Paris.
Paris.
(1999a) OECD Economic Outlook, June, OECD: 
(1999b) Review of Regulatory Reform in Japan,
OECD: Paris.
_______________________________ (2000a) Is There a New Economy? First Report
on the OECD Growth Project, OECD: Paris.
_______________________________ (2000b) Economic Surveys, Japan, OECD: Paris.
3 1 5
________ ___  _ ___________ (2000c) Economic Surveys, United States,
OECD: Paris.
Ortmayer, Louis L. (1992) The US-Japanese FSX Fighter Agreement, Pew Case Studies 
in International Affairs, Case 350, Parts A&B, Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, 
Georgetown University, Washington DC.
O’Shea, Timothy J.C. (1995) The US-Japanese Semiconductor Problem, Pew Case 
Studies in International Affairs, Case 139, Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, 
Georgetown University, Washington DC.
Ostrom, Douglas (1997) ‘US-Japan trade relations: Bilateral versus multilateral 
options’, JE1 Report 43A, 14 November.
______________(1998) ‘Japan's Imports in the 1990s: The Impact of Recession and
the Asian Crisis’, JE1 Report 37A, 2 October.
Packard, George R. (1987-88) ‘The Coming US-Japan Crisis’, Foreign Affairs, 66(2), 
Winter, pp. 348-367.
Pastor, Robert A. (1980) Congress and the Politics o f US Foreign Economic Policy, 
1929-1976, Berkeley CA: University of California Press.
Patrick, Hugh and Henry Rosovsky (eds.) (1976) Asia’s New Giant: How the Japanese 
Economy Works, Washington DC: The Brookings Institution.
Pearson, Charles S. (1989) Free Trade, Fair Trade? The Reagan Record, FPI Papers in 
International Affairs, Lanham MD: University Press of America.
Petri, Peter (1991) ‘Market structure, comparative advantage and Japanese trade under 
the strong yen’, in Paul R. Krugman (ed.) Trade with Japan: Has the Door Opened 
Wider?, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Pollard, Robert A. (1985) Economic Security and the Origins o f the Cold War, 1945- 
1950, New York: Columbia University Press.
Posen, Adam S. (1998) Restoring Japan’s Economic Growth, Washington DC: 
Institute for International Economics.
Powell, Robert (1994) ‘Anarchy in international relations theory: The neorealist- 
neoliberal debate’, International Organization, 48, Spring, pp. 313-344.
Pressman, Jeffrey and Aaron Wildavsky (1973) Implementation, Berkeley CA: 
University of California Press.
Prestowitz, Clyde V. Jr. (1988) Trading Places: How We Allowed Japan to Take the 
Lead, New York: Basic Books.
316
___________________ (1993) 'Japan and the United States: Twins or opposites?’, in
The Aspen Strategy Group, Harness the Rising Sun: An American Strategy for 
Managing Japan's Rise as a Global Power, Lanham MD: University Press of America 
Inc.
__________________ (1995) ‘The United States and Japan: Towards a new century’,
photocopy, 10 October.
Rapp, William V. (1986) ‘Japan’s invisible barriers to trade’, in Thomas A. Pugel and 
Robert G. Hawkins (eds.) Fragile Interdependence: Economic Issues in US-Japanese 
Trade and Investment, Lexington MA: Lexington Books.
Reich, Robert B. (1983) 'Beyond free trade’. Foreign Affairs, 61(4), Spring, pp 773-804.
Reilly, John E. (ed.) (1991) American Public Opinion and US Foreign Policy, 1997, 
Chicago: Chicago Council on Foreign Relations.
Rhoads, Steven E. (1985) The Economist’s View o f the World: Government, Markets & 
Public Policy, Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press.
Richardson, J. David (1989) 'Empirical research on trade liberalization with imperfect 
competition: A Survey’, OECD Economic Studies, no. 12, Spring.
_________________  (1991) ‘US Trade Policy in the 1980s: Turns -  and roads not
taken’, NBER Working Paper 3725, Cambridge MA: National Bureau of Economic 
Research.
______ _________ (1993) ‘New trade theory and policy a decade old: Assessment in a
Pacific context’, in Richard Higgott, Richard Leaver and John Ravenhill (eds.) Pacific 
Economic Relations in the 1990s: Cooperation and Conflict?, St. Leonards, Australia: 
Allen & Unwin.
Rodrik, Dani (1994) 'What does the political economy literature on trade policy (not) 
tell us that we ought to know?’, NBER Working Paper 4870, Cambridge MA: National 
Bureau of Economic Research.
_________ (1997) Has Globalization Gone Too Far?, Washington DC: Institute for
International Economics.
Rogowski, Ronald (1989) Commerce and Coalitions: How Trade Affects Domestic 
Political Alignments, Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.
Ruggie, John Gerard (1982) ‘International regimes, transactions and change: Embedded 
liberalism in the postwar economic order’, International Organization, 36(2), Spring, 
pp. 379-416.
___________________ (1986) ‘Continuity and transformation in the world polity:
Toward a neorealist synthesis’, in Robert O. Keohane (ed.) Neorealism and Its Critics, 
New York: Columbia University Press.
317
_______ ____________(1996) Winning the Peace: America and World Order in the
New Era, New York: Columbia University Press.
Russett, Bruce M. (1985) The mysterious case of vanishing hegemony; or Is Mark 
Twain really dead?’, International Organization, 39, Spring, pp. 20-32.
Ryan, Michael P. (1995) SI A, Japanese Electronics Giants and Global Competition in 
Semiconductors, Pew Case Studies in International Affairs, Case 707, Institute for the 
Study of Diplomacy, Georgetown University, Washington DC.
Sabatier, Paul A. (1978) The acquisition and utilization of technical information by 
administrative agencies’, Administrative Science Quarterly, 23, September, pp. 386-411.
______________(1987) ‘Knowledge, policy-oriented learning, and policy change: An
advocacy coalition framework’, Knowledge: Creation, Diffusion, Utilization, 8(4), June, 
pp. 649-692.
______________(1993) ‘Policy change over a decade or more’, in Paul A. Sabatier and
Hank C. Jenkins-Smith (eds.) Policy Change and Learning: An Advocacy Coalition 
Approach, Boulder CO: Westview Press.
Sabatier, Paui A. and Hank C. Jenkins-Smith (eds.) (1993) Policy Change and Learning: 
An Advocacy Coalition Approach, Boulder CO: Westview Press.
Sachs, Jeffrey and Peter Boone (1988) ‘Japanese structural adjustment and the balance 
of payments’, NBER Working Paper 2614, Cambridge MA: National Bureau of 
Economic Research, June.
Samuels, Richard (1992) ‘Japanese political studies and the myth of the independent 
intellectual’, in Richard J. Samuels and Myron Weiner (eds.) The Political Culture of 
Foreign Area and International Studies, Washington DC: Brassey’s.
Sato, Hideo and Timothy J. Curran (1982) ‘Agricultural trade: the case of beef and 
citrus’, in I.M. Destler and Hideo Sato (eds.) Coping with US-Japan Economic Conflicts, 
Lexington MA: Lexington Books.
Sato, Hideo and Michael W. Hodin (1982) The US-Japanese steel issue of 1977’, in 
I.M. Destler and Hideo Sato (eds.) Coping with US-Japan Economic Conflicts, 
Lexington MA: Lexington Books.
Saxonhouse, Gary R. (1972) The textile confrontation’, in Jerome B. Cohen (ed.) 
Pacific Partnership: United States-Japan Trade Prospects and Recommendations for the 
Seventies, Lexington MA: Lexington Books.
__________________(1982) ‘Evolving comparative advantage and Japan’s imports of
manufactures’, in Kozo Yamamura (ed.) Policy and Trade Issues o f the Japanese 
Economy: American and Japanese Perspectives, Seattle WA: University of Washington 
Press.
318
___________________  (1983a) ‘The micro- and macroeconomics of foreign sales to
Japan’, in William R. Cline (ed.) Trade Policy in the 1980s, Washington DC: Institute 
for International Economics.
__________________ (1983b) ‘What is all this about “Industry Targeting” in Japan?’,
The World Economy, 6(3), September, pp. 253-273.
___________________ (1989) ‘Product differentiation, economies of scale and access to
the Japanese market’, in Robert Feenstra (ed.) Trade Policies for International 
Competitiveness, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
___________________ (1993) ‘What does Japanese trade structure tell us about Japanese
trade policy?’, Journal o f Economic Perspectives, 7(3), Summer, pp. 21-43.
Saxonhouse, Gary R. and Stern, Robert M. (1989) ‘An analytical survey of formal and 
informal barriers to international trade and investment in the United States, Canada and 
Japan’, in Robert M. Stern (ed.) Trade and Investment Relations Among the United 
States, Canada and Japan, Chicago: University of Chicago Press
Sazanami, Yoko, Shujiro Urata and Hiroki Kawai (1995) Measuring the Costs o f  
Protection in Japan, Washington DC: Institute for International Economics.
Schattschneider, E.E. (1935) Politics, Pressures and the Tariff: A Study o f  Free Private 
Enterprise in Pressure Politics, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.
Schlesinger, Arthur M. Jr. (1973) The Imperial Presidency, Boston: Houghton Mifflin 
Company.
Schlossstein, Steven (1984) Trade War: Greed, Power and Industrial Policy on 
Opposite Sides o f the Pacific, Ontario: Cogdon & Weed.
Schoppa, Leonard J. (1997) Bargaining With Japan: What American Pressure Can and 
Cannot Do, New York: Columbia University Press.
Schott, Jeffrey J. (1983) ‘The GATT Ministerial: A postmortem’, Challenge, May-June, 
pp. 40-45.
Schultze, Charles L. (1983a) ‘Industrial policy: A solution in search of a problem’, 
California Management Review, 25(4), Summer, pp 5-15.
__________________ (1983b) ‘Industrial policy: A dissent’, The Brookings Review’,
2(1), Fall, pp. 3-12.
Schwab, Susan C. (1994) Trade-offs: Negotiating the Omnibus Trade and 
Competitiveness Act, Boston: Harvard Business School Press.
Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA) (1980) An Industry Response to the Foreign 
Industrial Challenge in High Technology Industries, Cupertino CA: SIA.
319
_  __________________________ (1983) The Effect o f Government Targeting on
World Semiconductor Competition: A Case History o f Japanese Industrial Strategy> and 
its Costs for America, Cupertino CA: SIA.
________________________________ (1985) The Impact of Japanese Market
Barriers in Microelectronics, prepared for the subcommittee on Economic Goals and 
Intergovernmental Policy of the Joint Economic Committee, San Jose CA: SIA.
________________________________ (1990) A Deal is a Deal: Four Years of
Experience under the US-Japan Semiconductor Agreement, San Jose CA: SIA.
Sheard, Paul (1991) ‘The economics of Japanese corporate organization and the 
“Structural Impediments’' debate: A critical review’, Japanese Economic Studies, 19(4), 
pp. 30-78.
___________ (1992) ‘Keiretsu and closedness of the Japanese market: An economic
appraisal’, Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Paper no. 271, Osaka 
University.
__________ (1994) ‘Keiretsu, competition and market access’, Faculty of Economics,
Osaka University, photocopy, November.
Simmons, Beth A. (1994) Who Adjusts? Domestic Sources o f Foreign Economic Policy 
During the Interwar Years, Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.
Singer, J. David (1961) ‘The level-of-analysis problem in international relations’, World 
Politics, 14(1), October, pp. 77-92.
Skocpol, Theda and Margaret Somers (1980) ‘The uses of comparative history in 
macrosocial inquiry’, Comparative Studies in Society and History, 22, pp. 174-197.
Skowronek, Stephen (1995) ‘Order and change, Policy Forum: Institutions and 
institutionalism’, Polity, XXVIII(l), Fall, pp. 91-97.
Smith, Rogers M. (1995) ‘Ideas, institutions and strategic choice’, Polity, XXXVIII(l), 
Fall, pp. 135-140.
Smitka, Michael (1991) Competitive Ties: Subcontracting in the Japanese Automotive 
Industry, New York: Columbia University Press.
_____________(1997) ‘Automotive companies’, in Bruce W. Jentleson and Thomas G.
Paterson (eds.) Encyclopedia o f US Foreign Relations, Volume I, New York: Oxford 
University Press.
Snidal, Duncan (1985) ‘The limits of hegemonic stability theory’, International 
Organization, 39(4), Autumn , pp. 579-614.
Solomon, Robert (1977) The International Monetary System, 1945-1976: An Insider’s 
View, New York: Harper & Row.
320
Song, Ligang (2000) ‘Trade liberalisation and development of China’s foreign trade’, 
in Peter Drysdale and Ligang Song (eds.) China's Entry to the WTO: Strategic Issues 
and Quantitative Assessments, London: Routledge.
Spencer, Barbara J. and James A. Brander (1983) ‘International R&D rivalry and 
industrial strategy’. Review of Economic Studies, 50, October, pp. 707-722.
Strange, Susan (1987) ‘The persistent myth of lost hegemony’, International 
Organization, 41(4), Autumn, pp. 551-574.
Summers, Lawrence H. (1988) ‘Tax policy and international competitiveness', in Jacob 
A. Frenkel (ed.) International Aspects o f Fiscal Policies, Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press.
Takeuchi, Kenji (1989) ‘Does Japan import less than it should?: A review of the 
econometric literature’, Asian Economic Journal, 3, September, pp. 138-169.
Tamada, Llisao (1993) ‘The auto parts and accessories for OEM market in Japan’, 
American Embassy, Tokyo: September.
Thelen, Kathleen and Sven Steinmo (1992) ‘Historical institutionalism in comparative 
politics’, in Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen and Frank Longstreth (eds.) Structuring 
Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis, Cambridge UK:
Cambridge University Press.
Thurow, Lester (1992) Head to Head: The Coming Economic Battle Among Japan, 
Europe and America, New York: William Morrow.
Tolchin, Martin and Susan Tolchin (1988) Buying Into America: How Foreign Money is 
Changing the Face of Our Nation, New York: Times Books.
Tomita, Tetsuro (1992) ‘Telecommunications policy in Japan', in Harvey M. Sapolsky 
et ah, The Telecommunications Revolution, New York: Routledge.
Trezise, Phillip H. (1983) ‘Industrial policy is not the major reason for Japan’s success’, 
The Brookings Review>, Spring.
_____________ (1989-90) ‘Japan the enemy?’, The Brookings Review, 8, Winter, pp.
3-13.
Truman, David (1951) The Governmental Process, New York: A.A. Knopf Inc.
Tyson, Laura D’Andrea (1992) Who’s Bashing Whom?: Trade Conflicts in High- 
Technology Industries, Washington DC: Institute for International Economics.
Tyson, Laura D'Andrea and John Zysman (1989) ‘Developmental strategy and 
production innovation in Japan’, in Chalmers Johnson, Laura D’Andrea Tyson and John 
Zysman (eds.) Politics and Productivity: How Japan ’s Development Strategy Works, 
New York: HarperBusiness.
321
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) (1998) World 
Investment Report 1998: Trends and Determinants, United Nations: New York.
US Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs (1982) United States-Japan 
Relations, hearings before the House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs 
and its subcommittees on International Economic Policy and Trade and on Asian and 
Pacific Affairs, 97th Congress, 2nd session. March-August.
US Congress, House Committee on Ways and Means (1979) Taskforce Report on 
United-States Japan Trade, Washington DC, January.
(1980a) Competitive Factors 
influencing World Trade in Semiconductors, hearings before the subcommittee on 
international trade, 96th Congress, Is' session, Washington DC, 30 November 1979.
Trade Report, September.
(1980b) United States-Japan
________________________________________________  (1983) United States-Japan
Trade Relations, hearings before the subcommittee on international trade, 98th Congress, 
1st session, March-April.
US Congress, Joint Economic Committee (1980) US-Japanese Trade Relations, 
hearings before Joint Economic Committee, 96th Congress, 1st session, 10 October 1979.
US Congress, Senate Committee on Finance (1981) Oversight o f  US Trade Policy, 
hearings before the subcommittee on international trade of the Committee on Finance 
and the subcommittee on International Finance and Monetary Policy of the Committee 
on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 97th Congress, 1st session, 8-9 July.
________________________________________(1990) Super 301: Effectiveness in
Opening Foreign Markets, hearings before the subcommittee on international trade, 
101st Congress, 2nd session, 27 April.
_________________________ ______________(1991) hearings before the subcommittee
on internatioanl trade, 102nd Congress, 1st session, testimony by Joseph Massey, 2 
August.
US Department of Commerce (1979) A Report on the US Semiconductor Industry, 
Washington DC: US Government Printing Office.
__________________________(1989) ‘The joint DOC/MITI price survey: Methodology
and results’, Washington DC, December.
__________________________(1991) 'Results of the 1991 DOC/MITI price survey’, US
Department o f  Commerce News, 91-32, 20 May.
US Department of State (1984) Realism, Strength, Negotiation: Key Foreign Policy 
Statements o f  the Reagan Administration, Washington DC, May.
322
US General Accounting Office (US GAO) (1979) United States-Japan Trade: Issues 
and Problems, report by the Comptroller General of the United States, Washington DC.
Approach, Washington DC.
(1982a) Industrial Policy: Japan’s Flexible
____________________________________ (1982b) Industrial Policy: Case Studies in
the Japanese Experience, Washington DC.
______________________________ ______ (1983) Assessment o f  the Bilateral
Telecommunications Agreement With Japan, Washington DC.
____________________________________ (1988) Foreign Investment: Growing
Japanese Presence in the US Auto Industry, Washington DC, 28 March.
US International Trade Commission (US ITC) (1983) Foreign Industrial Targeting and 
its Effects on US Industries, Phase 1: Japan, Publication 1437, Washington DC.
______________________________________ (1987) US Global Competitiveness: The
US Automotive Parts Industry, Publication 2037, Washington DC.
______________________________________ (1993) ‘Japan’s trade issues with the
United States’, International Economic Review, March.
______________________________________ (1994) Industry and Trade Summary:
Certain Motor Vehicle Parts and Accessories, Publication No. 2751, Washington DC.
US Trade Representative (USTR) (1981) Statement on US Trade Policy, July, 
processed.
_______________________________ (1982) Japanese Barriers to US Trade and Recent
Japanese Government Trade Initiatives, November, processed.
_______________________________ (1986) National Trade Estimate: 1986 Report on
Foreign Trade Barriers, Washington DC.
US-Japan Trade Study Group (1984) Progress Report: 1984, Tokyo: US-Japan Trade 
Study Group.
van Wolferen, Karel (1986-87) ‘The Japan problem', Foreign Affairs, 65(2), Winter, pp. 
288-303.
__________________ (1989) The Enigma o f Japanese Power: People and Politics in a
Stateless Nation, London: Macmillan.
__________________ (1990) ‘The Japan problem revisited’, Foreign Affairs, 69(4), Fall,
pp. 42-55.
323
Vogel, Steven K. (1996) Freer Markets, More Rules: Regulatory Reform in Advanced 
Industrial Countries, Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press.
Vogel, David (1996) Kindred Strangers: The Uneasy Relationship Between Politics and 
Business in America, Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.
Volcker, Paul A. (1992) ‘Introduction’ in Paul A. Volcker and Toyoo Gyohten, 
Changing Fortunes: The World’s Money and the Threat to American Leadership, New 
York: Times Books.
Wallis, W. Allen (1987) ‘Structural Adjustment Dialogue and US-Japan Economic 
Relations’, US Department o f  State Current Policy, no. 924, Washington DC.
Waltz, Kenneth N. (1959) Man, the State, and War, New York: Columbia University 
Press.
________________ (1979) Theory o f International Politics, Reading MA: Addison-
Wesley.
Watanabe, Paul and Laura E. Imperiale (1990) ‘The past as present: United States-Japan 
relations and the politics of the Toshiba scandal’, Business in the Contemporary World, 
2, Summer, pp. 84-94.
Watts, William (1984) The United States and Japan: A Troubled Partnership, 
Cambridge MA: Ballinger.
Weaver, R. Kent and Bert A. Rockman (1993) Do Institutions Matter? Government 
Capabilities in the United States and Abroad, Washington DC: The Brookings 
Institution.
Webb, Michael C. and Stephen D. Krasner (1989) ‘Hegemonic stability theory: an 
empirical assessment’, Review> o f International Studies, 15, pp. 183-198.
Weir, Margaret (1992) ‘Ideas and the politics of bounded innovation’, in Sven Steinmo, 
Kathleen Thelen and Frank Longstreth (eds.) Structuring Politics: Historical 
Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis, Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press.
Weir, Margaret and Theda Skocpol (1985) ‘State structures and the possibilities for 
“Keynesian” responses to the Great Depression in Sweden, Britain and the United 
States’, in Peter Evans et al. (eds.) Bringing the State Back In, New York: Cambridge 
University Press.
Wheeler, Jimmy W., Merit E. Janow and Thomas Pepper (1982) Japanese Industrial 
Development Policies in the 1980s: Implications fo r  US Trade and Investment, New 
York: Hudson Institute, October.
White House (1985) Administration Statement on International Trade Policy, 23 
September, processed.
324
___________ (1992) “Global Partnership Plan of Action (Part II), Economic and Trade
Relations, XIII, Auto and Auto Parts“, photocopy.
Williamson, John (1985) The Exchange Rate System, Policy Analyses in International 
Economics 5, 2nd edition, Washington DC: Institute for International Economics.
Williamson, John and Stephan Haggard (1994) ‘The political conditions for economic 
reform’, in John Williamson (ed.) The Political Economy o f  Policy Reform, Washington 
DC: Institute for International Economics.
Wilson, James Q. (1989) Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They 
Do It, New York: Basic Books.
Wilson, James Q. and John J. Dilulio Jr. (1995) American Government: The Essentials, 
6th edition, Lexington MA: D.C. Heath and Company.
Winham, Gilbert R. (1986) International Trade and the Tokyo Round Negotiation, 
Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.
_________________ (1992) The Evolution o f International Trade Agreements, Toronto:
University of Toronto Press.
Winham, Gilbert R. and Ikuo Kabashima (1982) "The politics of US-Japanese auto 
trade’, in I.M. Destler and Hideo Sato (eds.) Coping with US-Japan Economic Conflicts, 
Lexington MA: Lexington Books.
Wolfers, Arnold (1962) Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics, 
Baltimore MD: Johns Hopkins Press.
325
